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I. INTRODUCTION 
Is the right to jury trial in civil cases a historical relic for "pick-
ling," or is it a valuable right for preserving? What effect has the 
merger) of Law and Equity2 had on the jury right? These issues have 
been faced by lawyers and judges all over the country. In Maryland, 
the issues came into focus in 1984 with the adoption of new rules of 
procedure. 
In 1993, Professors Richard Bourne and John Lynch published 
a book on Maryland Civil Procedure.3 A chapter of that book deals 
with the right to jury trial in civil cases.4 Professors Lynch and 
Bourne also "taught this course" before in a law review article.s 
1. The phrase "merger of Law and Equity" is used to denote that certain, sepa-
rate procedural rules for trying Law cases on the one hand, and Equity cases 
on the other hand, have been united. The merger of Law and Equity oc-
curred in 1984 in Maryland. See MD. RULE 2-301. The merger of Law and Eq-
uity in federal courts occurred in 1938. See FED. R Crv. P. 2. 
As suggested by the framers of the revised MARYLAND RULES, the idea of 
a merger of Law with Equity is complex. MD. RULE 2-301 provides: "There 
shall be one form of action known as 'civil action.' " A committee note to 
the rule provides: "The effect of this Rule is to eliminate distinctions be-
tween law and equity for purposes of pleadings, parties, court sittings, and 
dockets. It does not affect the right to jury trial." 
Separate courts of Equity were abolished before the 1984 revision. As 
the committee note provided, the revision affected pleadings, parties, court 
sittings, and dockets, but not the right to jury trial. Commentators have 
noted that the revision did not affect distinctions between legal and equita-
ble causes of action and remedies. See PAUL V. NIEMEYER & LINDA M. 
SCHUETT, MARYLAND RULES COMMENTARY 153 (2d ed. 1992). The distinction 
between Law and Equity continues as to other matters, such as subject mat-
ter jurisdiction of the district court and application of statutes of limitations 
(or laches). See MD. CODE ANN., Crs. & JUD. PROC. §§ 4-402(a), 5-101 (1995). 
Of course, the "merger of Law and Equity" is also complicated because 
it refers to one element of procedural reform that often includes other ele-
ments, such as elimination of common-law forms of action, ready joinder of 
claims and parties, comprehensive discovery, liberal amendment of plead-
ings, and simplified appeal. See generally FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CML PRO. 
CEDURE 19-22 (4th ed. 1992). 
2. "Law" and "Equity" are capitalized in this Article to reflect traditional us-
ages, and to distinguish Law and Equity as separate systems of procedure 
from other meanings of the words. See MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS arts. 5, 
23. Quotations from outside sources, however, have not been capitalized. 
Rather, I will take their words as I find them. 
3. See JOHN A LYNCH, JR. & RICHARD W. BOURNE, MODERN MARYLAND CML PROCE-
DURE (1993). 
4. Chapter 5 is entitled "Trial by Jury." [d. at 305. 
5. See Richard W. Bourne & John A. Lynch, Jr., Merger of Law and Equity Under 
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Here, I review their book chapter and their earlier article and set 
forth my own ideas about the right to jury trial. 
Professors Lynch and Bourne and I are colleagues at the Uni-
versity of Baltimore School of Law, teachers of Civil Procedure, and 
friends. Yet, we are in fundamental disagreement about the nature 
of the Maryland Constitution, its guarantee of the right to trial by 
jury, and the relative merits of trial by judge and by jury. This is 
more than an intramural squabble over some fine procedural point. 
Our dispute goes to the heart of the legal system: whether that sys-
tem is one of law or expedience, and whether it is one of demo-
cratic government or rule by the elite. 
A. The Lynch and Bourne Book Chapter and Article 
In their book chapter and article, Professors Lynch and Bourne 
assess the Maryland Constitution's provisions for the right to trial by 
jury in civil cases from an historical perspective. They ask basic 
questions about the jury right contained in those provisions: What 
happens to the common-law right to jury trial now that the 1984 
Maryland Rules merged Law and Equity? How is the jury right to be 
adapted to other procedural innovations, such as the declaratory 
judgment? Should Maryland's jury right be interpreted indepen-
dently of the federal jury right contained in the Seventh Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution, which has been held inap-
plicable to state courts? Should the state jury right mirror the 
federal right because Maryland cases, rules, and the Maryland Con-
stitution have tended to follow the federal example? 
B. My Thesis 
I believe Lynch and Bourne try to pickle, not preserve,6 the 
constitutional right to trial by jury. They do recognize recent devel-
opments in Maryland and federal courts favoring the jury right. 
However, they seem less interested in preserving the jury right than 
in limiting its scope to what it was before the merger of Law and 
Equity. I believe this approach is unsatisfactory in three respects. 
First, it largely ignores the constitutional aspect of the jury right. 
Second, it restricts, or does not protect, the jury right in both the-
ory and practice. Third, it is apparently premised on the belief that 
trial by a jury is inferior to trial by a judge. 
the Revised Maryland Rules: Does It Threaten TriallTy Jury?, 14 U. BALT. L. REv. 1 
(1984). 
6. See generally infra note 59 and accompanying text. 
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C. The Lynch and Bourne Approach 
Lynch and Bourne largely ignore the constitutional aspect of 
the right to jury trial. They are like the college instructor who reads 
to students the school catalog description of the course on the first 
day of class, and then boldly departs from that description in his syl-
labus, proceeding to teach the course the way he always has, reluc-
tantly incorporating a few new developments. Lynch and Bourne's 
"principled discretionary" theory gives lip service to the Maryland 
Constitution's jury right. However, they then abandon this theory in 
favor of an "approximation of pre-merger" approach, relying on 
pre-1984 Maryland precedent to resolve current problems, except 
where they reluctantly accept recent Maryland cases or persuasive 
federal authority. 
Lynch and Bourne do quote Article 57 and Article 238 of the 
7. See LYNCH & BOURNE. supra note 3, at 305 n.2 (quoting MD. CaNST .. DECL. OF 
RIGHTS art. 5 (the "Reception Provision"»; see also Bourne & Lynch, supra 
note 5, at 30 n.192. The Reception Provision provides: 
a. That the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Com-
mon Law of England, and the trial by Jury, according to the course 
of that Law, and to the benefit of such of the English statutes as ex-
isted on the Fourth day of July, seventeen hundred and seventy-six; 
and which, by experience, have been found applicable to their local 
and other circumstances, and have been introduced, used and prac-
ticed by the Courts of Law or Equity; and also of all Acts of Assem-
bly in force on the first day of June, eighteen hundred and sixty-
seven; except such as may have since expired, or may be inconsis-
tent with the provisions of this Constitution; subject, nevertheless, 
to the revision of, and amendment or repeal by, the Legislature of 
this State. And the Inhabitants of Maryland are also entitled to all 
property derived to them from, or under the Charter granted by 
His Majesty Charles the First to Caecilius Calvert, Baron of 
Baltimore. 
b. The parties to any civil proceeding in which the right to a 
jury trial is preserved are entitled to a trial by jury of at least 6 
jurors. 
c. That notwithstanding the Common Law of England, nothing 
in this Constitution prohibits trial by jury of less than 12 jurors in 
any civil proceeding in which the right to a jury trial is preserved. 
MD. CaNST .. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5. 
8. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 305 n.l (quoting MD. CaNST .. DECL. OF 
RIGHTS art. 23); see also Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 3 n.2 (quoting pro-
vision before amendment increasing amount from $500 to $5,000). In perti-
nent part, Article 23 provides: 
The right of trial by Jury of all issues of fact in civil proceed-
ings in the several Courts of Law in this State, where the amount in 
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Maryland Declaration of Rights which guarantee the right to jury trial. 
They also quote a fragment of the convention debate on the fore-
runner to Article 23, intended by its framers to protect the jury 
right from legislative encroachment.9 
1. Principled Discretionary Theory 
Mter a description of the Maryland Constitution's provlSlons 
and a fragment of the convention debate, Lynch and Bourne set 
forth their own theory of how the right to jury trial is to be deter-
mined after the merger of Law and Equity. Theirs is what might be 
called a "principled discretionary" theory.l0 That is, the jury right 
controversy exceeds the sum of five thousand dollars, shall be invio-
lably preserved. 
MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art 23. 
9. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 32 n.21O. The forerunner was MD. 
CONST. of 1851 art. X, § 4. The convention debate, in a longer version than 
that quoted by Lynch and Bourne, includes the following dialogue: 
MR CONSTABLE said that there was no guaranty in the Con-
stitution of Maryland for the trial by jury in civil cases. In the Fed-
eral Government there was a provision, but it was only applicable to 
the Federal courts. 
MR CONSTABLE read the third article of the declaration of 
rights [the Reception Provision]. 
MR CONSTABLE added that the Legislature had the express 
right to repeal the whole of this article, and they had constantly ex-
ercised the power to modify it. He had little fear of any inroad 
upon the trial by jury; but he should prefer to have it in the Consti-
tution rather than have it left with the Legislature. 
MR CHAMBERS inquired if the gentleman meant to be un-
derstood that the expression in relation to repeal by the Legislature 
was applicable the trial by jury? 
MR CONSTABLE replied in the affirmative. It applied to the 
whole article; and the Legislature had exercised the power upon 
every point but this one. They had changed the common law in a 
hundred respects. If this were a doubtful point, it should be placed 
beyond all controversy; for it was the great safeguard and bulwark 
of security for property and persons .... 
2 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE MARYLAND REFORM CONVENTION 766-67 
(1851) [hereinafter 1851 DEBATES]. 
10. Lynch and Bourne's theory is best developed in their law review article. See 
generaUy Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5. 
Characterization of their theory as a unified "approach" may be prob-
lematic. That characterization rests on the following evidence. Lynch and 
Bourne recognize that approaches to the question of the right to jury trial 
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should be within the discretion of Maryland trial judges,l1 guided by 
certain standards. First, they contend that the judge's discretion 
should be guided by four traditional principles governing the sepa-
ration of Law and Equity: 
The first principle is that Maryland's Constitution preserves 
the right to trial by jury as it existed at the time of the 
adoption of the Constitution vis a vis the scope of equity. 
Second, the scope of equity has historically been measured 
with due respect to the importance of the right to trial by 
jury. Third, the scope of equity is necessarily limited by the 
principle that equity will not intervene where the remedy at 
law is full, expeditious and adequate. Finally, it has been 
recognized that the scope of equity in Maryland may be ex-
panded by statute or judicial decision. 12 
Second, Bourne and Lynch assert that the discretion of Maryland 
trial judges should be guided by the common-sense notion that ju-
dicial economy is better served by trial by judge than by trial by 
jury.13 Third, the discretion of trial judges should be guided by the 
implicit notion that Equity is superior to Law as a mode of trial. 
2. Approximation of Pre-Merger Approach 
When Lynch and Bourne actually determine the situations in 
which the jury trial right should apply, they largely ignore the Mary-
land Constitution and abandon their own "principled discretionary" 
theory. Instead, absent recent Maryland precedent or persuasive fed-
after merger of Law and Equity may be generalized. For example, after the 
merger of Law and Equity in the federal courts under the FEDERAL RULES OF 
CML PROCEDURE, several approaches developed. See Bourne & Lynch, supra 
note 5, at 16-17 (jury priority); id. at 17-19 (basic issue analysis); id. at 19-20 
(waiver of jury by joinder of legal and equitable claims); id. at 4, 46, 64, 67-
69, 78 (Beacon doctrine); see also LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 334-37 
(Beacon doctrine). Lynch and Bourne's theory, which criticizes unbridled ju-
dicial discretion as eroding the jury right, suggests that the trial judge's dis-
cretion and certain principles guiding that discretion can coexist. See LYNCH 
& BOURNE, supra note 3, at 328, 331; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 16, 
20, 23, 29, 44. 
11. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 59; see also id. at 34, 29, 4647, 77; 
LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 326, 328, 331. 
12. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 59-60 (footnotes omitted); see also LYNCH & 
BOURNE, supra note 3, at 305, 312 (first principle); id. at 306-07, 326 (second 
principle); id. at 307, 326 (third principle); id. at 316-17, 321 (fourth princi-
ple). 
13. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 2-3, 60. 
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eral authority, their actual approach is what might be called "ap-
proximation of pre-merger." In other words, they reflexively follow 
pre-1984 precedent regarding whether a matter was to be tried at 
Law or in Equity in determining whether a matter is now to be 
tried by jury or judgeY 
D. The Jury Trial as Constitutional Right 
In contrast, the usual way of interpreting a constitutional provi-
sion, such as the right to jury trial, is to consider the following: its 
text (the words of the constitution); its history (the intent of the 
framers); its structure (the framework of government and the rela-
tionships between citizens and government); prudential concerns 
(the practical wisdom of using courts in a particular way); doctrine 
(principles derived from precedent and commentary on that prece-
dent); ethical ~atters (the sort of people we are and the sort of in-
stitutions we have);15 and the nature of the constitution (its para-
doxical character as both "written" or unchangeable, and "living" 
or adaptable to new circumstances). 
This article next takes an in-depth look at the usual ways of in-
terpreting the Maryland Constitution's provisions for the right to 
jury trial, the Lynch and Bourne theory, and their actual approach 
14. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 312, 316, 318, 319, 335, 338; Bourne & 
Lynch, supra note 5, at 16, 28-29, 44, 46-47, 54, 62, 78. But see LYNCH & 
BOURNE, supra note 3, at 331; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 52. 
15. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 7-8, 
94-95 (1982); see also Reed v. McKeldin, 207 Md. 553, 560-61, 115 A.2d 281, 
285 (1955) (considering text, entire Md. Const., historical context, purpose, 
convention or legislative proceedings); Norris v. Mayor of Baltimore, 172 Md. 
667, 675-77, 192 A. 531, 535 (1937) (considering language, historical context, 
purpose, usage, and subsequent history); cf BOBBITT, supra, at 8. Philip Bob-
bitt stated: 
My typology of constitutional arguments is not a complete list, nor 
a list of wholly discrete items, nor the only plausible division of con-
stitutional arguments. The various arguments illustrated often work 
in combination. Some examples fit under one heading as well as 
another .... A different typology might surely be devised through 
some sort of recombination of these basic approaches, and there 
can be no ultimate list because new approaches will be developed 
through time. 
BOBBITT, supra, at 8. The question of how the constitutional arguments fit to-
gether or weigh against each 9ther is considered in Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A 
Constructivist Coherence Thevry of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARv. L. REv. 
1189 (1987). 
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to determining how the jury right should be interpreted after the 
merger of Law and Equity. 
II. USUAL WAYS OF INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 
As stated above, a constitution is ordinarily interpreted by con-
sidering its nature, text, history, structure, doctrine, prudential con-
cerns, and ethical matters. 
A. Nature 
Paradoxically, the Maryland Constitution is both "written" and 
"living." It is at the same time unchangeable other than by amend-
ment, and adaptable to new circumstances~ 
1. Written Constitution 
By its nature, a written constitution is specific, enacted, enforce-
able and supreme. 16 The early Maryland case of Whittington v. PolA, 17 
which established the power of judicial review, described these qual-
ities. A written constitution is specific-it has prescribed limitations 
and restrictions. IS "It is enacted-it is a compact of the people 
through an elected convention. 19 A written constitution is enforcea-
ble-it is law to be applied by courts.20 A written constitution is su-
preme-it prevails when in conflict with other law, such as acts of 
the legislature.21 
A good example of the concept of a written constitution comes 
16. See Thqmas C. Grey, Constitutionalism: An Analytic Framewark, in CONSTITUTION-
ALISM: NOMOS XX, at 189-209 (1. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 
1979); IRVING BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 15-16 (1965). 
17. 1 H. &J. 236 (Md. 1802). 
18. See id. at 242. 
19. See id. 
20. See id. at 244; Brawner v. Curran, 141 Md. 586, 602-04, 119 A. 250, 255 (1922); 
see also MD. CONST. art. I, § 9 (requiring oath of office to support the consti-
tution and laws of Maryland); MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 8 (separation 
of powers); id. art. XIV (providing amendment of MD. CaNST. only by the 
people); id., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5 (Reception Provision, declaring what law 
is in force and directing the judiciary as to what law is to apply, including 
the MD. CaNST.); id. art. IV, § 2 (providing judges selected from those admit-
ted to practice law in the state, and distinguished, among other things, for 
sound legal knowledge); Whittington, 1 H. & J. at 243 (noting powers of mak-
ing, judging, and executing law are separate and distinct)." 
21. See Whittington, 1 H. & J. at 242, 244; Perkins v. Eskridge, 278 Md. 619, 624-26, 
636-39, 366 A.2d 21, 26, 32-33 (1976), overruled in part by Parrott v. State, 301 
Md. 411, 425, 483 A.2d 68, 75 (1985) (per curiam); see also Marbury v. 
" Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). 
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from outside the jury trial arena. In Brawner v. Curran,22 the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland sustained 'a challenge to the Soldiers' Bonus 
Act of 1922. Because its validity was conditioned upon the approval 
of a majority of the qualified voters of the state,23 the court held 
that the Act violated the Maryland Constitution's provisions that en-
dowed the legislature with the power of making laws24 and the gov-
ernor with the veto power.25 Thus, the legislature may not itself 
amend the written Maryland Constitution by adding a referendum 
provision. 
2. Living Constitution 
The nature of a living constitution is probably best stated by 
the idea that the Maryland Constitution is to be interpreted by "the 
spirit ... , and not by the letter."26 Stated another way: 
While the principles of the Constitution are unchangeable, 
in interpreting the language by which they are expressed, it 
will be given a meaning which will permit the application of 
those principles to changes in the economic, social, and po-
litical life of the people, which the framers did not and 
could not foresee. 27 
Again, a good illustration of the nature of the living constitution 
comes from outside the jury trial arena. In Norris v. Mayor of Balti-
more,28 the court of appeals held that a clause in the Maryland Con-
stitution, which provides that "[a]ll elections shall be by ballot"29 
permits voting by voting machine. The court reasoned that this 
method of voting comported with the constitutional meaning of 
22. 141 Md. 586, 119 A. 250 (1992). 
23. See Brawner, 141 Md. at 593-604, 119 A. 250-51 (1922). The proposed referen-
dum was neither attached to a purely local bill, which has been permitted in 
Maryland, nor petitioned by a percentage of the voters pursuant to the refer-
endum amendment. See generally MD. CONST. art. XVI. The nature of the writ-
ten constitution was underscored by a later amendment to the Maryland 
Constitution, adopted in 1924, which permitted the legislature to pass a 
Soldiers' Bonus Act and make it subject to a statewide referendum of the 
people. See MD. CONST. art. III, § 34. See generally Carl N. Everstine, The Legis-
lative Process in Maryland, 10 MD. L. REv. 91, 138-54 (1949). 
24. See MD. CONST. art. III. 
25. See id. art. II, § 17. 
26. Norris v. Mayor of Baltimore, 172 Md. 667, 675-77, 192 A. 531, 535 (1937). 
27. [d. 
28. 172 Md. 667, 192 A. 531 (1937). 
29. MD. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
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elections by "ballot"-an accurate and secret means of voting.30 
Thus, courts may give the Maryland Constitution life by applying it 
to new circumstances. 
These principles are equally applicable to the right to jury trial. 
As part of the written constitution, the jury right must be recog-
nized by the legislature and by judges. However, the interpretation 
of a living constitution requires the adaptation of the jury right to 
new circumstances, such as the merger of Law and Equity. 
B. Text 
The right to jury trial in civil cases appears in a number of 
places in the Maryland Constitution-the Reception Provision, the 
Principal Provision, and other provisions. The text of the Maryland 
Constitution is also noteworthy for its omissions. 
1. The Original Provision: Article 5 (Reception Provision) 
The original provision is the Reception Provision, now Article 5 
of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.31 It dates back to 1776.32 That 
Reception Provision receives as the law of the new state of Mary-
land, the common law of England (including trial by jury), certain 
English statutes, and certain acts of the provincial legislative Assem-
bly. While its meaning is not absolutely clear, the text of the Recep-
tion Provision may establish whether jury trial is a right, what law 
supplies the jury right, as of when (if at any particular time) that 
law is adopted, and whether that law may be modified by the legis-
lative or judicial branches. 
The Reception Provision seemingly provides a right to trial by 
jury. First, because the provision makes express reference to the jury 
trial-a traditional common-law "right,"33 it cannot be argued that 
the provision merely recognizes the jury trial as one of the laws to 
be in force after independence, such as the common law, English 
statutes, and acts of the Assembly.34 Second, although the provision's 
text uses the. term "entitled" as opposed to "right," the provision it-
self is contained in the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Furthermore, 
elsewhere in the same document the two terms are used 
30. See Norris, 172 Md. at 673-81, 192 A.2d at 534-37. 
31. See MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5. 
32. See MD. CONST. of 1776, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. III. 
33. See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text. 
34. Cf. MD. CONST. of 1776, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. XLI (stating resolutions of colo-
nial conventions also in force as laws). 
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synonymously.35 
The law supplying the jury trial right is the common law of En-
gland.36 The Reception Provision provides that "the Inhabitants of 
Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of England, and the 
trial by Jury, according to the course of that Law .... "37 
It is not clear when, if at any particular time, Maryland adopted 
the English common-law jury right. Because of the order, punctua-
tion,38 and language of the Reception Provision,39 the date of refer-
ence, July 4, 1776, appears to apply only to the reception of English 
statutes, not to the reception of English common law and trial by 
jury. 
Regardless of the date of reference, the Reception Provision ar-
guably leaves the jury right subject to modification by the legisla-
ture.40 A proviso expressly makes certain laws "subject, nevertheless, 
35. See id. art. III (providing that inhabitants of Maryland are "entitled" to prop-
erty derived from grants under the original Maryland charter); see also id. 
art. XXXIII (providing that Christians are "entitled" to protection in their 
religious liberty and that clergy of the church of England are "entitled" to 
support for a time). 
Later, in the debates on the MD. CONST. of 1851, the Reception Provi-
sion trial by jury was characterized as a constitutional right "considered so 
conclusive and imperative that it had even been doubted whether even by 
consent of parties, a trial of facts could be submitted to the court." 2 1851 
DEBATES, supra note 9 at 767. 
36. But if. infra notes 609-10 and accompanying text (Maryland common law); in-
fra notes 612-613 (idealized common law). 
37. Mo. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5. 
38. See id. The date of reference follows immediately after "the English statutes" 
without commas in later Maryland Constitutions. See id.; MD. CONST. of 1864, 
DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 4; MD. CONST. of 1851, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 3. But if. 
MD. CONST. of 1776, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. III. 
39. The earliest MD. CONST. received English laws that "existed at the time of 
[the inhabitants of Maryland] first emigration" and "such others as have 
been since made in England." MD. CONST. of 1776, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. III 
(emphasis added). The making of law applies better to statutes than com-
. mon law or the trial by jury. Further, the Reception Provision refers to En-
glish laws that "have been introduced, used and practiced by the Courts of 
Law or Equity." [d. The use of "laws" in "Courts of Law or Equity" applies 
better to statutes than common law or the trial by jury, both traditionally ap-
plicable only to courts of Law. 
40. That was the understanding of the Reception Provision held by the propo-
nent of the principal provision for the jury right adopted in 1851. See supra 
note 9 and accompanying text. In contrast, other provisions of the MD. 
CONST. of 1776 expressly made rights subject to legislative revision. See, e.g., 
MD. CONST. of 1776, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. XX (privilege against self-incrimina-
tion); id. art. XXVIII (prohibition against quartering of soldiers in wartime); 
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to the revision of, and amendment or repeal by, the Legislature of 
this State."41 The proviso immediately follows the reception of acts 
of the Assembly. However, because of punctuation42 and logic,43 the 
proviso appears to relate both to English statutes and English com-
mon law, perhaps including the jury right as well. 
Arguably, the Reception Provision also leaves the jury right sub-
ject to modification by the judiciary. Maryland did not receive all 
existing laws, but only those "which, by experience, have been 
found applicable to their local and other circumstances."44 Further, 
the common law which supplied the jury trial right is by definition 
shaped by judges.45 Thus, while the Reception Provision did provide 
a jury right, it may have been one subject to modification by the 
legislature and the judiciary. 
2. The Principal Provision: Article 23 
The principal provision in the Maryland Constitution for the 
right to jury trial in civil cases is Article 23 of the Maryland Declara-
tion of Rights. 46 Article 23 dates back to the Maryland Constitution of 
1851,47 and its meaning is clearer than that of the Reception 
Provision. 
Article 23 expressly recognizes the "right" to trial by jUry48 and 
id. art. XXXVII (rights, privileges, and benefits of the City of Annapolis). 
41. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5 (Reception Provision). 
42. See id. The proviso includes punctuation setting it apart from the immedi-
ately preceding phrase, "Acts of Assembly," causing the proviso to modify 
the "Common Law of England" and "English statutes" as well. See id. (semi-
colon). But see MD. CONST. of 1864, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 4 (commas); MD. 
CONST. of 1851, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 3 (commas). 
43. If the whole of English common law may be changed by statute, so may the 
part of English common law governing trial by jury. But cf. MD. CONST. of 
1776, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. XLII (stating that provisions of the MD. CONST., 
DECL. OF RIGHTS ought not be changed by the legislature, except as the Con-
vention prescribes); MD. CONST. of 1776 art. LIX (permitting amendment of 
MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS by acts of two successive legislatures). 
44. But cf. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5. This phrase may only relate to 
"English statutes," not to the "Common Law of England" and "trial by Jury." 
45. But cf. infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text (noting jury right is based on 
the Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights, as well as common law molded by 
judges). See generally infra note 612 and accompanying text (noting that theo-
retically, common law is "found," not "made" by judges). 
46. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (quoting MD. CONST., DECL. OF 
RIGHTS art. 23). 
47. See MD. CONST. of 1851 art. X, § 4. 
48. Presumably, the right to trial by jury is a "civil right," conferred by positive 
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is contained in the Maryland Declaration of RightS.49 The Article also 
provides for the jury right in courts of Law, as distinguished from 
courts of Equity,50 also known as courts of chancery.51 Article 23 also 
demands recognition of the jury right; it uses the mandatory term 
"shall," instead of a directory term such as "should," 52 or a permis-
sive term such as "may." Moreover, unlike the Reception Provision, . 
Article 23 contains no terms tending to subject the jury right to leg-
islative or judicial modification.53 Indeed, according to the 1851 
convention debate, the purpose of the provision was to safeguard 
the jury right from legislative change or repeaI.54 
That Article 23 "preserves" the jury right raises two questions. 
First, why is the right not "granted" or "established"? The answer is 
that the jury trial was already a right in the colony under English 
law55 and in the state under the Reception Provision.56 Article 23 
simply continued, or "preserved" that right. 
Second, what does "preserve" mean? Does "preserve" mean dy-
namic-synonymous with terms like "guarantee,"57 "uphold," "safe-
guard,"58 "protect," "perpetuate," and "secure"? Does "preserve" 
law, rather than a "natural right," superior to positive law. Cf MD. CONST., 
DECL OF RIGHTS art. 1 (" [I]nalienable right to alter, reform or abolish [the 
People's] Form of Govemment."). 
49. An amendment transferred the right from the body of the MD. CONST. to the 
MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS. See 1977 Md. Laws ch. 681; cJ. MD. CONST. of 
1867 art. XV, § 6 ("MISCELLANEOUS" article); MD. CONST. of 1864 art. XII, § 5 
("SCHEDULE" article); MD. CONST. of 1851 art. X, § 4 ("MISCELLANEOUS" arti-
cle). 
50. See MD. CONST. of 1851 art. IV, § 11; see also id. art. IV, §§ 15, 28. 
51. See id. art. IV, §§ 8, 23. 
52. The distinction, useful in interpreting statutes, has been criticized in inter-
preting constitutions. See 1 THOMAS M. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 
159 (8th ed. 1927). 
53. Cf MD. CONST. of 1851, DECL. OF RIGHTS arts. 20 (providing privilege against 
self-incrimination exists except with regard to past court practice or future 
legislative direction); id. art. 28 (discussing wartime quartering of soldiers in 
houses, without the consent of the owners, only as the legislature directs);. id. 
art. 37 (discussing Annapolis's existing rights, privileges, and benefits subject 
to legislative alteration). 
54. see supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
55. See Maryland Act for the Liberties of the People (1639), reprinted in 1 
ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND 41 (1883). See generally COOLEY, supra note 52, at 865. 
56. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. 
57. Albert Constable, the proponent of the jury right provision in the 1851 con-
vention, implied that the provision would be a "guaranty" for trial by jury in 
civil cases. See 2 1851 DEBATES, supra note 9, at 766. 
58. Constable viewed trial by jury as "the great safeguard and bulwark of security 
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mean static-synonymous with terms like "conserve," "defend," 
"keep," "maintain," "save," and "retain"?59 While the same ambigu-
ous term exists in the free press provision60 of the Maryland Consti-
tution of 1851, the term takes on a dynamic meaning in other pro-
visions of that constitution.61 This ambiguity in the term "preserve" 
is apparent in dictionaries of that period62 and today.63 
Finally, Article 23 provides that the jury right shall be inviolably 
preserved.64 The early constitutions of other states suggest that the 
inviolable nature of the jury right might relate to its historically "sa-
for property and persons." [d. at 767. 
59. An even less dynamic, or degenerative meaning, synonymous with terms like 
"pickle," "freeze," "can," "cure," "embalm," and "mummify," seems pre-
cluded by the modifying adverb "inviolably." 
60. See Mn. CONST. of 1851, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 38 ("[T]he liberty of the press 
ought to be inviolably preserved."). 
61. See id. art. 10 ("[F]or the redress of grievances, and for amending, strength-
ening, and preserving the laws, the Legislature ought to be frequently con-
vened." (emphasis added». That is, active measures-the frequent conven-
ing of the legislature-are needed to preserve the laws. See id. art. II, § 23. 
Section 23 provides: 
[The secretary of state] shall carefully keep and preserve a record 
of all official acts and proceedings, (which may, at all times, be in-
spected by a committee of either branch of the legislature), and 
shall perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law, or as 
may properly belong to his office. 
[d. In other words, existing records of official acts and proceedings will be 
supplemented by subsequent official acts and proceedings. Furthermore, the 
aging of documents may require, and advances in technology may permit, 
additional steps for preservation. See MD. CONST. of 1851 art. VI, § 2 ("The 
comptroller shall ... 'adjust, settle, and preserve all public accounts."). That 
is, public funds are not really preserved by inaction because of the ability to 
earn interest on idle funds and the likelihood of inflation. See, e.g., Luke 
19: 12-27 (parable of the talents). 
62. See, e.g., 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
42 (1828). 
63. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LAN-
GUAGE 1794 (1993). 
64. See MD. CaNST. OF 1851 art. 23. Another right "inviolably preserved" by the 
1851 MD. CaNST. was the liberty of the press. See MD. CONST. of 1851, DECL. 
OF RIGHTS art. 38. However, that provision was subsequently amended to ex-
pressly qualify the right of free expression: "[T] he liberty of the press ought 
to be inviolably preserved; that every citizen of the State ought to be allowed 
to speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible 
for the abuse of that privilege." MD. CONST .. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 40 (empha-
sis added). 
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cred" character,65 its protection "forever,"66 or its exemption from 
legislative change.67 Therefore, by keeping the jury right provision 
free from legislative or judicial modification, Article 23 established 
the jury right on a surer basis than did the Reception Provision. 
3. Other Provisions 
Two other provisions in the Maryland Constitution protect the 
right to jury trial in civil cases,68 and specific provisions of the con-
stitution guarantee the jury right in eminent domain cases.69 
First, the Due Process Clause of the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights provides that no person shall be "deprived of his life, liberty 
or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the 
land. "70 The phrase ''judgment of his peers" has been understood 
to mean trial by jury.71 That phrase may even suggest a requirement 
that the jury be drawn from a cross-section of the community.72 
Second, Article 20 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides 
that "the trial of facts, where they arise, is one of the greatest secur-
ities of the lives, liberties and estate of the People. "73 This provision 
may rather indefinitely74 establish a right of local venue for jury and 
65. See N.C. CONST. of 1776, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. XVI; PA CONST. of 1776, DECL. 
OF RIGHTS art. XI; VA CONST. of 1776, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 11. 
66. See NJ. CONST. of 1776 art. XXII. 
67. See N.H. CONST., BILL .OF RIGHTS of 1784, art. XX. 
68. Cf. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 21 (right to speedy trial by an impartial 
jury in criminal cases); id. art. 23 (right to jury trial of law as well as fact in 
criminal cases). 
69, See MD. CONST. art. III, §§ 4040C. Traditionally, eminent domain was consid-
ered a special proceeding, not an ordinary common-law proceeding triable 
by a jury. See, e.g., Bouton v. Potomac Edison Co., 288 Md. 305, 309-11, 418 
A.2d 1168, 1170-71 (1980). 
70. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 24. 
71. See Tichnell v. State, 278 Md. 695, 713-15, 415 A.2d 830, 840 (1980). But cf. 
FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAmAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGliSH 
LAw BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 173 (2d ed. 1968) (contending that the 
original meaning of "judgment of his peers" was trial by men of equal or 
greater rank, not trial by jury). 
72. Cf. PENNSYLVANIA FRAME OF GoVERNMENT OF 1682, LAws AGREED UPON IN EN-
GlAND § VIII, reprinted in 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A Docu-
MENTARY HISTORY 141 (1971) ("[A]ll trials shall be by twelve men, and as 
near as may be, peers or equals, and of the neighborhood and men without 
just exception."). 
73. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 20. 
74. The Court of Appeals of Maryland has held that the common-law rule re-
quiring cases of a criminal nature to be tried in the county where the of-
fense was committed is not required by the MD. CONST. However, the com-
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other trials.?5 Indeed, one early commentator equated "trial of the 
fact in the neighborhood" with "jury trial of the vicinage" in origi-
nal state constitutions.?6 Thus, these two additional constitutional 
provisions support the jury right in Maryland: one provision requir-
ing a trial by peers, a second providing for local venue. 
4. Omissions 
Omissions from the Maryland Constitution are noteworthy. The 
text of the constitution includes neither a requirement of separate 
courts of Law and Equity, nor a square right to trial by judge. 
There is no explicit constitutional requirement of separate 
courts of Law and Equity. There are references to separate courts of 
Law and Equity in the Maryland Constitution in the Reception Pro-
vision?? and the principal jury trial guarantee.?8 However, those ref-
erences appear to assume, rather than mandate the separation. Sep-
arate courts of Equity (the court of chancery?9 and the Circuit 
Court of Baltimore City)80 have been abolished, and their jurisdic-
tions reassigned by the Maryland Constitution. The constitution 
grants the legislature certain power over the courts: the Reception 
Provision makes English common law and statutes subject to legisla-
tive revision,8l the "necessary and proper" clause provides for legis-
lative law-making for any department,82 and a third provision autho-
rizes the legislature to prescribe circuit court jurisdiction.83 The 
Maryland Constitution also grants power to the court of appeals to 
mon-Iaw rule continues to be the general rule, subject to legislative revision. 
See Kisner v. State, 209 Md. 524, 530-32, 122 A.2d 102, 105-06 (1956); see also 
William Wirt Blume, The Place of Trial in Criminal Cases: Constitutional Vicinagr3 
and Venue, 43 MICH. L. REv. 59, 69-70, 87 & n.127 (1944). 
75. Cf. DEL. CONST. of 1776, DECL. OF RIGHTS § 13 (" [T]rial by jury of facts where 
they arise is one of the greatest securities of the lives, liberties and estates of 
the people.") 
76. Letter IV of Letters from the "Federal Farmer" to "The Republican" (Oct. 
12, 1787), reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 279 (Bernard 
Bailyn ed., 1993). 
77. See MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5. 
78. See MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 23; see also MD. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (A) 
(permitting continuation of existing courts "at Law and in Equity"); id. at 
§ 8(c) (allowing removal of "suits or actions at law"). 
79. See MD. CONST. of 1851 art. IV, §§ 8, 23. 
80. See 1980 Md. Laws ch. 523 (amending MD. CONST. art. IV, § 20(a), and re-
pealing MD. CONST. art. IV, § 29). 
81. See MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5. 
82. See MD. CONST. art. III, § 56. 
83. See MD. CONST. art. IV, § 20. 
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make rules regarding practice and procedure for all the courts.84 
Legislative and judicial modifications of the respective jurisdictions 
of Law and Equity, when not infringing on the right to jury trial,85 
have apparently withstood constitutional scrutiny. 
There is no explicit constitutional right to trial by judge86 in 
the same way that other provisions recognize the right to trial by 
jury. Section 8(a) of Article IV of the Maryland Constitution does 
provide that "[ t] he parties to any cause may submit the cause to the 
court for determination without the aid of a jury. "87 However, that 
provision does not establish a right to trial by judge for five reasons. 
First, the provision does not contain the term "right."88 Second, 
section 8(a) provides that the parties "may" submit their case to the 
court, a term that suggests discretion, not right.89 Third, the submis-
sion of a case to a judge for determination requires the consent of 
"[t]he parties,"90 which is not typical of a "right."91 Fourth, it may 
84. See MD. CONST. art: IV, § 18; see also MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUDo PROC. § 1-
201(a) (1995) (providing that the rule-making power of the court of appeals 
is to be liberally construed to include "unification of practice and procedure 
in actions at law and suits in equity"). 
85. See C. Christopher Brown, The Law/Equity Dichotomy in Maryland, 39 MD. L. 
REv. 427, 44344 (1980); see also MD. RULES BF40, 43 (1977) (repealed 1984). 
86. Cf. Maryland Community Developers, Inc. v. State Roads Comm'n, 261 Md. 
205, 213-14, 274 A.2d 641, 646 (1971) (stating that there is no right to trial 
by judge in the MD. CONST.); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 
510 (1959) (holding that there is no constitutional right to trial by judge in 
federal courts). See generally Note, The Right to a Nonjury Tria~ 74 HARv. L. 
REv. 1176 (1961). But if. Luppino v. Gray, 336 Md. 194,209-10,647 A.2d 429, 
437 (1994) (holding that, under MD. CONST., there is a constitutional right to 
trial by judge for all consenting parties to a case, not anyone party). See also 
HYMAN GINSBERG, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE & PROCEDURE IN MARYLAND 290 
(1928) ("The right to have an equity suit dealt with by equitable methods is 
as sacred as the right to a trial by jury at law .... "). Ginsberg cited no au-
thority for his proposition. Ginsberg's precursor cites only a case from Michi-
gan. See CHARLES EDWARD PHELPS. JURIDICAL EQUITY 170 n.4 (1894). 
87. MD. CONST. art. IV, § 8(a). 
88. See MD. CONST. art. IV, § 8(a); if. MD. CONST. art. IV, § 8(b) (c) (providing for 
"right" of removal to have a fair trial). 
89. The convention debate on the provision which is now MD. CONST. art. IV, 
§ 8(a), includes reference to the "privilege" or "option" of the parties. See 2 
DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1395 (1864) [hereinafter 1864 
DEBATES]; see also Desche v. Gies, 56 Md. 135, 137 (1881) (referring to the 
provision for consent or agreement to trial by judge). 
90. See 2 1864 DEBATES, supra note 89, at 1395; Desche, 56 Md. at 137. A waiver of 
the right to trial by jury does not constitute consent to trial by judge. See 
Luppino, 336 Md. at 210, 647 A.2d at 437. 
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well be that a judge has discretion in deciding whether or not to 
determine a case once submitted by the parties because there is no 
language in Section 8(a) directing the judge do SO.92 The 1864 con-
vention debate on Section 8(a) notes that judges may want juries, 
not themselves, to hear serious criminal cases, or cases where the 
facts are complicated.93 Fifth, the discretionary power a court of Eq-
uity had before 196194 to refer disputed issues of fact to a court of 
Law for an advisory jury verdict95 apparently withstood constitutional 
challenge. Thus, the text of the Maryland Constitution provides 
comprehensive protection for the right to jury trial in civil cases. 
The Maryland Constitution's provisions protecting the jury 
right are interrelated.96 Each provision identifies the source of the 
right as the common law of England. Each describes the issues to 
be tried by jury-issues of fact, not law, and issues in courts of Law, 
not Equity. The provisions perhaps even describe the jury and place 
of trial-a cross section of the local community in a local venue. 
Each provision inviolably preserves the right by putting it beyond 
the reach of the legislature. Finally, the Maryland Constitution con-
tains no provisions, such as for separate courts of Law and Equity or 
for a right to trial by judge, which might detract from the jury 
right. 
C. History 
The history of the civil jury trial right in England and in Mary-
land, including the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the 
original and the principal jury trial provisions, shows a tradition 
protective of the right. A brief sketch follows. 
91. Thus, if one party claimed a right to trial by jury and another claimed a 
right to trial by judge, the jury right would prevail. See Lanahan v. Heaver, 77. 
Md. 605, 26 A. 866 (1893). 
92. Cf MD. CONST. art. IV, § 8(b)-(c) (stating that the court "shall" order the 
case transmitted to another court for trial if removal for a fair trial is prop-
erly demanded); MD. RULE 12-207 (stating that the court "shall" determine 
the matter so submitted without a jury in eminent domain cases after an 
election of all the parties for court determination without a jury). 
93. See 2 1864 DEBATES, supra note 89, at 1394-95. 
94. This ancient, seldom-used practice was abolished by court rule. See MD. RULE 
517 & committee note (1977) (repealed 1984). 
95. See Brown, supra note 85, at 458-66 (describing transfer practice). 
96. But cf. ALFRED S. NILES, MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 343 (1915) (arguing 
either the principal provision, on one hand, or the Reception Provision and 
the Due Process Clause, on the other hand, are surplusage). 
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1.' English History 
In England, the history of the jury trial right began in 1215 
with the Magna Carta. In Chapter 39, the Due Process Clause of the 
Magna Carta granted a "judgment of . . . peers. "97 The Petition of 
Right in 1628 restated that grant,98 and the Bill of Rights in 1689 
more plainly provided for jury triaI.99 Blackstone praised the jury 
trial as the "principal bulwark of our liberties," "the glory of the 
English law," and "the best criterion, for investigating the truth of 
facts, that was ever established in any country."IOO 
The English Parliament has subsequently restricted the right of 
civil jury trial to certain specified situations, such as fraud, defama-
tion, malicious prosecution, and false imprisonment. 101 However, 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland has noted that acts of Parliament 
are not limited by a written constitution, as are acts of the Maryland 
legislature. 102 
2. Colonial Maryland History 
In colonial Maryland, Article X of the Maryland Charter of 
1632 granted colonists all the rights of English citizens, including 
the right to jury trial.103 In 1639, the Maryland Act for the Liberties 
of the People restated and reinforced that general grant. 104 
3. History of the Original Jury Right Provision 
The circumstances surrounding the original jury right provision 
began with a protest and ended with a new Maryland Constitution. 
A convention of delegates from the counties of Maryland adopted 
the Declaration of July 6, 1776, charging that the legislative and ex-
ecutive powers of England, among other abuses, had deprived the 
97. 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 12. But if. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 71, 
at 173 (stating original meaning was trial by men of equal or greater rank, 
not trial by jury). 
98. See 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 20. 
99. See Uf. at 43. 
100. 3 WILLIAM BlACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ** 350, 379, 385. 
101. See Supreme Court Act, 1981, ch. 54, § 69(1) (Eng.) (providing that the 
court of general jurisdiction is the Queen's Bench Division of the High 
Court of Justice); County Courts Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, ch. 22, § 94(3) 
(Eng.) (providing that the courts of limited jurisdiction are the county 
courts). 
102. See McCoy v. Johnson, 70 Md. 490, 17 A. 387 (Md. 1889). 
103. See WILLIAM KILTY, THE LAws OF MARTIAND (1799). 
104. See 1 ARCHIVES OF MARYlAND 41 (1883). 
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colonists in many cases of their right to trial by jury.I05 Of course, 
the protest resembled that then being made in the colonies gener-
ally.loo A similar convention later adopted the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights and Maryland Constitution in November of 1776. The Mary-
land Declaration of Rights included a Reception Provision accepting 
the jury trial as part of the common law of England,107 and a Due 
Process Clause providing for a ''judgment of ... peers."I08 On May 
25, 1776, even before the declaration, the convention had estab-
lished a court of admiralty with a right to trial by jury. 109 This court 
was recognized in the Maryland Constitution of 1776,110 and heard 
prize cases during the Revolutionary War. 1I1 However, the Maryland 
Constitution also authorized a chancellor and a court of chancery 
(without a jury) for the administration of equity.1I2 
4. History of the Principal Jury Right Provision 
The circumstances of the principal jury right provision were re-
formatory in nature. The proponent of that right in the 1851 con-
vention, Albert Constable, specifically wanted to put the jury right 
105. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION OF THE PROVINCE OF MARYLAND IN 1774, 
1775, & 1776, at 201 (1836) [hereinafter 1774 PROCEEDINGS]. The cases were 
actions for penalties and forfeitures for violations of various trade and reve-
nue acts. In England, those actions were heard in common-law courts. How-
ever, in America the actions might be brought either in common-law courts 
or in admiralty courts. If brought in adiniralty courts, there was no jury trial, 
and perhaps no local venue. See JUUUS GoEBEL, JR, ANTECEDENTS AND BEGIN-
NINGS TO 1801, at 85-88 (lC The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of 
the Supreme Court of the United States, 1971). 
106. See Declaration of Rights and Grievances, 1765, in SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 
196, 197 (stating that extension of the jurisdiction of the Court of Admiralty 
deprived the colonists of their right to jury trial); see also The Rights of the Col-
onists and a List of Infringements and Violations of Rights, 1772, in SCHWARTZ, 
supra note 72, at 200, 209; THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 19 (U.S. 
1776). 
107. See MD. CONST. of 1776, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 3. 
108. MD. CONST. of 1776, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 21. See supra notes 70-72 and ac-
companying text for a discussion of the current provision. 
109. See 1774 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 105, at 155. 
110. See MD. CONST. of 1776 art. LVI. 
111. See generally DAVID ROWEN & MICHAEL C. TOlLEY, COURTS OF ADMIRALTY IN 
COLONIAL AMERICA: THE MARYLAND EXPERIENCE, 1634-1776 (1995). A sample of 
cases is referred to in GoEBEL, supra note 105, at 154-55 n.44. 
112. See MD. CONST. of 1776 arts. 40, 48, 56; if. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, 54647 (Al-
exander Hamilton) (Modern Library 1937) (providing that eight of the 
other 13 states had no courts of chancery after the American Revolution). 
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beyond the reach of the legislature and, generally, to extend demo-
cratic limitations on the power of government. 
Under the Maryland Constitution of 1776, the legislature had a 
double check on the jury trial right. Under the Reception Provi-
sion,1I3 the jury right, as part of the common law of England, was 
arguably subject to amendment or repeal by the legislature.ll4 Also, 
the legislature, by acts of two successive sessions, could amend the 
constitution.ll5 The Maryland Constitution of 1851 removed both of 
those checks. First, it included the new principal jury rightll6 which, 
according t6 the convention debate, was not subject to legislative 
change.1l7 Second, the new Maryland Constitution provided for con-
stitutional amendment only by the action of a convention of the 
people. liS 
_ . Other provisions of the Maryland Constitution of 1851 indicate 
concern with the legislature encroaching on the right to jury trial. 
Those other provisions guaranteed the right to jury trial in eminent 
domain casesll9 and on appeals to the circuit courts from the judg-
ments of justices of the peace. 120 
The intent of the framers of the principal jury right was gener-
ally to increase democratic121 limitations on the powers of govern-
113. See supra note 7 for the current provision. 
114. See supra notes 37, 3940, 43 and accompanying text. 
115. See MD. CONST. of 1776 art. LIX. 
116. See MD. CONST. of 1851 art. X, § 4. See supra note 8 for the current provision. 
117. See supra note 9 for the legislative history. See also supra notes 48, 52-54 and 
accompanying text. 
118. See MD. CONST. of 1851 art. Xl. 
119. See ill. art. III, § 46. 
120. See ill. art. IV, § 19. But see ill. art. III, § 25. (continuing the legislative power 
of contempt unchecked by jury trial); cf. Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitu-
tional History of the Seuenth Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REv. 639, 705-07 (1973) 
(noting civil jury trial was generally considered to be a check on legislative 
excesses in taxation). 
121. Here, the term "democratic" is used in the sense of limiting the power of 
government in favor of the rights of individuals. The jury may also be demo-
cratic in three other respects: (1) it permits popular participation in the ad-
ministration of justice; (2) it permits determination by a group representing 
the community, rather than determination by a single judge; and (3) it per-
mits nullification of law in order to do justice in a particular case. See HARRy 
KALVEN, JR & HANs ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 5, 7-9 (1966). 
In other ways, of course, the right to jury trial is not democratic. First, 
individual rights may limit the exercise of power by the legislature, the most 
democratic . branch of government and one that may best reflect the will of a 
majority of the people. Second, individual rights may require enforcement 
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ment. That was the general intent of Constable, his political party, 
and a majority of the convention. Constable was a member of the 
Democratic Party,122 the "reform" party at the convention.123 He 
proposed limits on the taxing, spending, and borrowing powers of 
the legislature. 124 The convention adopted other popular reforms: 
reapportionment of the legislature; limitations on legislative power 
to contract debts and create corporations by special act, popular 
election of judges and local officials; and the right of the people to 
amend the Constitution by convention.125 
5. Subsequent History of the Jury Right in Maryland 
The subsequent history of the jury right in Maryland has also 
been protective of the right. The original and principal jury rights 
were restated in the 1864126 and 1867 Maryland Constitutions.127 The 
principal jury right was restated in a 1970 amendment that in-
creased the amount in controversy requirement from $5 to $500,128 
in a 1973 amendment that transferred the guarantee from the body 
of the Maryland Constitution to Article 23 of the Maryland Declara-
tion of Rights,129 and in a 1992 amendment that increased the 
amount in controversy from $500 to $5,000.130 The original jury 
right was also restated in a 1992 amendment providing for juries of 
at least six persons and allowing for juries of fewer than twelve. 131 
by the judiciary, the least democratic branch of government, based on its 
professional tradition, its initial appointment by the executive, and its elec-
tion for long terms (ten or fIfteen years). See MD. CONST. art. N, §§ 3, 5, 
5A(b)-(d), 41D. 
122. See BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS, 1774-1971, S. Doc. 
No.8, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 842 (1971). 
123. See JAMES WARNER HARRY, THE MARYLAND CONSTITUTION of 1851 at 15, 24, 25, 
28 (1902). 
124. See 1 1851 DEBATES, supra note 9, at 395. 
125. See MD. CONST. of 1851 art. III, §§ 3, 22, 47; id. art. N, §§ 4, 8-9, 12-13, 17-20; 
id. art. V, § 1; id. art. XI; id., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 1. See generaUy HARRy, supra 
note 123; FLETCHER MELVIN GREEN, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
SOUTH ATLANTIC STATES, 1776-1860 at 272-87 (1930). 
126. See MD. CONST. of 1864, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 4; id. art. XII, § 5. 
127. See MD. CONST. of 1867, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5; id. art. XV, § 6. 
128. See 1969 Md. Laws ch. 789. 
129. See 1977 Md. Laws ch. 681. 
130. See 1992 Md. Laws, chs. 205, 206. 
131. See id. chs. 203, 204. Of course, the decrease in the number of jurors, from 
the traditional twelve to as few as six, and the increase in the amount in 
controversy requirement from $5 to $500 and then $5,000, can be seen not 
only as not protective of the jury right, but as reducing its importance. It 
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Two rejected constitutional proposals underscore a tradition 
protective of the jury trial right. After ratifying the United States 
Constitution, the Maryland Convention of 1788 appointed a com-
mittee to draft amendments to the proposed Maryland Constitution. 
The committee proposed certain amendments, including a right to 
jury trial in .civil cases. When a minority of the committee insisted 
on presenting to the convention other proposals rejected by a ma-
jority of the committee, the majority decided to report no amend-
ments to the convention. 132 
The Maryland Constitutional Convention of 1967-68 proposed a 
constitution that would have included a right to jury trial in civil 
cases. The right would have been similar to a provision drafted by 
the Constitutional Convention Commission, which commented that 
the right "is firmly rooted in the Maryland tradition."133 
Of course, the more recent reaffirmations of the right to civil 
jury trial came in the face of criticisms of the civil jury in general,l34 
and in Maryland in particular. 135 
Thus, the history of the civil jury right in England and in 
America, and the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the 
original and the principal jury trial provisions, evidence a tradition 
protective of the right. 
D. Structure 
"If men were angels, no government would be necessary."136 
Men are not angels, thus government is necessary. In order to pro-
mote liberty and avoid tyranny,137 the government must be struc-
tured in a way to make it subject to external and internal controls. 
The external controls are the powers retained by the people-a fur-
ther security being the multiplicity of interests the people have. 138 
The internal controls include federalism (the division of powers be-
also is outside the scope of the present inquiry, which is, in what situations 
does the jury right apply? Cf Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 157 (1973) 
(stating that the size of the jury is incidental, not essential to the right to 
jury trial under the Seventh Amendment). 
132. See 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 729, 732. 
133. REpORT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMISSION 105 (1967). 
134. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 4 n.2, 9 n.9, for a collection of au-
thorities. 
135. See GEORGE KENNETH REIBUCH, A STUDY OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION IN THE 
STATE OF MARYLAND 79-80, 84, 137-38 (1929). 
136. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 337 Games Madison) (Modern Library 1937). 
137. See ill. No. 47, at 312-13 Games Madison). 
138. See ill. No. 51, at 337, 33940 Games Madison). 
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tween state and national governments) and the separation of pow-
ers among the legislature (further divided into two different 
houses), the executive, and the judiciary139 (further divided into 
trial and appellate courts) .140 Regarding external controls, some 
powers are retained by the people. 141 Regarding internal controls, 
governmental powers are divided between the United States and the 
State of Maryland. 142 
The legislative, executive, and judicial powers of state govern-
ment are expressly separated,143 although each branch has checks 
on the others. For example, the executive may veto bills passed by 
the legislature l44 and fill vacant judicial offices. 145 The legislature 
may impeach executive or judicial officers. 146 The judiciary may 
hold the acts of the executive147 and legislative148 branches to be un-
constitutional and void. 
The jury trial is another check against the legislative,149 execu-
tive150 and judicial151 branches. 152 The jury trial illustrates many of 
the structures established by the Maryland Constitution to promote 
139. See id. at 337-39. 
140. See id. No. 81, at 522-33 (Alexander Hamilton). 
141. See MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS arts. 34; see also id. art. I (elective franchise); 
id. art. XIV (providing for amendments to the constitution); id. art. XVI (the 
referendum); cf id., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 45 (retained rights). 
142. See MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS arts. 2-3. 
143. See id. art. 8; see also id. art. II (executive); id. art. III (legislative); id. art. IV 
(judiciary) . 
144. See id. art. II, § 17. 
145. See id. § 10; id. art. IV, §§ 5, 5A. 
146. See id. art. III, § 26. 
147. See Watkins v. Watkins, 2 Md. 341 (1852). 
148. See Perkins v. Eskridge, 278 Md. 619, 366 A.2d 21 (1976). 
149. See THE FEDERALIST No. 29, at 177 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modem Library 
1937) (power of taxation). 
150. See id. No. 83, at 543 (Alexander Hamilton) (barrier to the tyranny of a pop-
ular magistrate). 
151. See id. No. 65, at 426 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting that the jury stands be-
tween the judge who pronounces sentence and the party who receives it); see 
also id. No. 83, at 545 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating that judge and jury of-
fer double security against corruption). But if. id. No. 65, at 427 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (noting that juries are frequently influenced by the opinions of 
judges and sometimes are asked to find special verdicts, which leave the 
main questions to the decision of judges). 
152. Of course, in addition to these "structures," there are other controls on the 
government, such as a written constitution, a federal government having 
only limited powers, and individual rights. See BRANT, supra note 16, at 16-22. 
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liberty and avoid tyranny. The right to jury trial l53 establishes a role 
for the people in our representative democratic form of govern-
ment,I54 with its separation of powers. 155 
Jury procedures that make exceptions to strict separation of 
powers between judge and jury provide checks and balances. 156 For 
example, the judge provides a check on the jury by ruling on the 
admissibility of evidence, by instructing the jury on the law, and by 
setting aside erroneous verdicts. 157 The appellate courtsl58 provide a 
further check on the jury by reviewing judgments on jury verdicts. 159 
The jury provides a check on the judgel60 by finding facts l61 and by 
softening the harshness of legal doctrine. 162 Where a judgment may 
be unpopular with the legislature, the executive, or the people, the 
jury, by supporting the judge, provides a check on the popular 
branches of government. 163 
Thus, the right to jury trial is worth preserving as one of the 
structures of government established to retain powers of the people, 
and to check the judiciary and other branches of government. 
153. See MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS arts. 5, 23; see also supra notes 31-76 and ac-
companying text. 
154. See A FARMER, Essay IV (1788), reprinted in THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 36, 
38 (Herbert]. Storing ed., 1981). 
155. One commentator noted that a government enactment must avoid the vetoes 
of five bodies-lower house, senate, executive, judge, and jury. See L\SANDER 
SPOONER, AN ESSAY ON THE TRIAL BY JURY 11 (1852); see also infra notes 37Cr88 
and accompanying text. 
156. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 417, 498. See generally LAWRENCE M. 
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 155-56 (2d ed. 1985). 
157. See MD. RULE 2-513 to 2-517, 2-520, 2-532 to 2-535; see also MD. RULE 2-520(d) 
(providing that the judge'S power to summarize or comment on the evi-
dence also provides a check on the jury). See generally CHARLES W. JOINER, 
CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY 19-20, 67-68 (1962). 
158. See MD. CaNST. art. IV, § 14 (Court of Appeals of Maryland); id. § 14A (inter-
mediate courts of appeal). 
159. However, reexamination of facts tried by a jury is implicitly limited by the 
MD. CaNST. See Board of Shellfish Comm'rs v. Mansfield, 125 Md. 630, 94 A. 
207 (1915). 
160. See MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 23. 
161. See infra notes 1043-1103 and accompanying text. 
162. See generally A FARMER, supra note 154, at 39. Judges may need checking be-
cause of their excessive power, arbitrariness, corruption, or class or political 
biases. See Stephan Landsman, The History and Objectives of the Civil Jury Sys-
tem, in VERDICT: AsSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 22, 23, 33, 3843 (Robert E. 
Litan ed., 1993). 
163. See generally Landsman, supra note 162, at 20; see also supra notes 149-50 and 
accompanying text. 
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E. Doctrine 
Traditionally, Maryland courts and commentators have been 
protective of the right to jury trial in civil cases. Before the merger 
of Law and Equity in Maryland in 1984, however, there were both 
favorable and unfavorable interpretations in particular situations. 
Since the merger, Maryland courts have clearly taken a protective 
approach, following the federal courts. However, Maryland's ap-
proach raises several questions. Exactly what is the protective ap-
proach? That is, how is that approach to be applied in particular 
cases? Is Maryland's protective approach tied to Seventh Amend-
ment precedent in the federal courts? Why is the protective ap-
proach better than alternatives that other courts adopted after the 
. merger of Law and Equity? 
1. Traditional Interpretations 
Maryland courts have generally endorsed the right to jury trial. 
In one case, the Court of Appeals of Maryland, citing a Supreme 
Court opinion, stated that" [t]he trial by jury is justly dear to the 
American people."I64 The court of appeals has also noted that the 
constitutional guarantee was a limitation on the legislature's power 
to fix the jurisdiction of Law and Equity courts. 165 
Commentators from Maryland have also generally endorsed the 
jury right. Professor Alfred S. Niles wrote that "the courts will be 
careful to preserve the (jury] right and declare any law in substan-
tial violation thereof unconstitutional." 166 Professor Christopher 
Brown, anticipating the merger of Law and Equity in Maryland, pre-
dicted that the right to jury trial, which had been undermined in 
164. Allender v. Ghingher, 170 Md. 156, 167, 183 A. 610, 616 (1936) (quoting Par-
sons v. Bedford, 288 U.S. 433, 455 (1830»; see LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 
3, at 306 n.5; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 31. 
165. See Fooks' Ex'rs v. Ghingher, 177 Md. 612, 625-26, 192 A. 782, 788 (1937), 
noted in Bourne & Lynch. supra note 5, at 32-33. Fooks' apparently eroded a 
contrary precedent. See Capron v.·Devries, 83 Md. 220, 34 A. 251 (1896), 
noted in LYNCH & BOURNE. supra note 3, at 321; Bourne & Lynch. supra note 
5, at 31-32; see also infra notes 792-837 and accompanying text. However, in 
Capron the court of appeals did note that the statute, which conferred power 
theretofore exercised by Law courts on courts of Equity, was enacted in 
1841, before adoption of Article 23. Article 23 is the principal guarantee of 
the civil jury trial right in Maryland, and puts the right beyond legislative 
reach. See generally supra note 8. 
166. NILES, supra note 96, at 344. However, Niles wrote that the jury right may be 
waived, and that the right was not infringed by reasonable conditions or by 
initial trial without a jury if a jury trial was held on appeal. See id. at 343. 
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several ways, would be revitalized in a merged system. 167 Lynch and 
Bourne, while adopting an ambiguous stance regarding the right to 
jury trial,168 noted that Maryland courts have traditionally been quite 
protective of the jury right. 169 
2. Pre-Merger Interpretations 
Before the merger of Law and Equity in 1984, Maryland prac-
tice was not uniformly protective of the right to jury trial. Legisla-
tive and judicial interpretations of the right in particular situations, 
relevant to the distinction between Law and Equity and their 
merger, varied. Favorable interpretations, many of which have been 
noted by Lynch and Bourne, include the following: (1) the occa-
sional conclusion that the legislature may not abridge the right to 
jury trial by conferring on courts of Equity the jurisdiction to deter-
mine legal rights;170 (2) the equitable prerequisite of no adequate 
remedy at Law;171 (3) the transfer from Equity to Law;172 (4) the 
transfer from district court to circuit court for jury trial;173 (5) the 
injunction as ancillary relief in an action at Law;174 (6) the conclu-
siveness of earlier jury factual findings on the judge as to such ancil-
lary injunctive relief;175 (7) the right to jury trial in certain situations 
10 Equity cases;176 (8)the right to jury trial in certain special pro-
167. See Brown, supra note 85, at 427. 
168. As we have seen, Lynch and Bourne adopt a principled discretionary theory. 
See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text. In practice, they use an ap-
proximation of pre-merger approach. See supra note 14 and accompanying 
text. 
169. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 306; see also Bourne & Lynch, supra 
note 5, at 29-34. 
170. See Fooks' Ex'rs v. Ghingher, 177 Md. 612, 192 A. 782 (1937); McCoy v. John-
son, 70 Md. 490, 17 A. 387 (1889). 
171. See Pratt v. Vanwyck's Ex'rs, 6 Gill & J. 495, 498 (1834). 
172. See 1896 Md. Laws ch. 229; MD. RULE 515 (1977) (repealed 1984). 
173. See MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 4402(e) (1995). 
174. See MD. RULES BF40-43 (1977) (repealed 1984), cited in LYNCH & BOURNE, 
supra note 3, at 319, n.126; accord Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 55-56. 
175. See Beane v. McMullen, 265 Md. 585, 613-14, 291 A.2d 37, 52 (1972). 
176. For example, interpleader, see MD. RULE BU73 (1977) (repealed 1984), at-
tachment on an Equity judgment, see MD. RULE F5 (1977) (repealed 1984), 
appointment without consent of a personal guardian for a disabled person, 
see MD. RULE R77(b)(I)(a) (repealed 1997), and challenge to commitment 
after a finding of not guilty to criminal charges by reason of insanity, see MD. 
CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 12-114(c)(l) to (3) (1982), repealed Uy 1984 Md. 
Laws ch. 501, § 1. 
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ceedings;177 and (9) the right to jury trial on appeal from certain 
special proceedings.178 
Unfavorable interpretations before the merger of Law and Eq-
uity, many of which have been noted by Lynch and Bourne, include 
the following: (1) the abolition of the practice of chancellors in Eq-
uity referring disputed issues of fact to Law courts for jury trial;179 
(2) the erosion of the equitable prerequisite of no adequate remedy 
at Law;180 (3) the growth of "clean-up" jurisdiction in Equity;181 (4) 
the denial of jury trial initially, although not on appeal, in adminis-
trative agency determinations, workers' compensation decisions, and 
medical malpractice arbitration awards;182 and (5) the denial of jury 
trial in certain special proceedings. 183 
3. Post-Merger Interpretations 
Since the merger of Law and Equity in 1984, Maryland courts 
have clearly taken a protective approach to the right to jury trial in 
civil cases. The seminal case is Higgins v. Barnes. l84 There, Barnes 
sued Higgins for an equitable remedy: specific performance of a 
contract. Higgins answered and demanded a jury trial, asserting a 
counterclaim for legal relief and damages for breach of the same 
contract. Barnes opposed the jury demand on the ground that the 
initial claim was equitable and, once equitable jurisdiction attached, 
the entire case had to be determined by a judge. 
The court of appeals upheld Higgins's demand for jury trial. 
The court held that, where Barnes's claim and Higgins's answer and 
177. For example, mandamus, see MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-02 
(1995), declaratory judgments, see id. § 3404, and paternity proceedings, see 
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw §§ 6-1026 to 6-1027 (1991). 
178. For example, administrative agency determinations, see MD. RULE B11 (1977) 
(rescinded 1993); see also infra note 1594, workers' compensation decisions, 
see MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-745(d) (1991), and awards of medical 
malpractice arbitration panels, see MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-
06(b) (1995). 
179. See infra notes 561-62 and accompanying text. 
180. See infra note 563 and accompanying text. 
181. See infra note 564 and accompanying text. 
182. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
183. For example, juvenile causes, see MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-812(f) 
(1995), habeas corpus cases, see Roscoe v. Warden, 23 Md. App. 516, 328 
A.2d 64 (1974), attorney disciplinary proceedings, see MD. RULE BV1O(d), and 
contempts, see Meyers v. State, 23 Md. App. 275, 326 A.2d 773 (1974). 
184. 310 Md. 532, 530 A.2d 724 (1987), noted in LThlCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 
315, 327-37. 
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counterclaim contained the common legal issue of breach of con-
tract, Higgins had a right to jury trial of that issue before the judge 
considered any equitable claims of Barnes for specific performance 
and reformation. 
Higgins stands for a number of propositions. First, the historical 
division between Law and Equity survives in that claims and reme-
dies are still characterized and sorted out for trial by judge or jury. 
Breach of contract is a legal claim and damages is a legal remedy, 
both triable by a jury.185 Specific performance and reformation are 
equitable remedies, both triable by a judge.186 
Second, Higgins adopts a protective approach to the jury right. 
''Jury decisions of disputed legal issues are clearly favored .... "187 
Indeed, jury trial of legal issues may be denied only under the 
"most imperative circumstances."188 
Third, because the Maryland Constitution protects the right to 
jury trial, not the right to a bench trial,189 factual issues common to 
both legal and equitable claims must be tried first by the jury.190 
Otherwise, an earlier judicial determination would bind and delay a 
later jury determination. 191 
Fourth, Higgins relied on federal precedent-the line of cases 
beginning with Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover 92-as persuasive au-
thority for interpreting the Maryland Constitution's right to jury 
trial. The Higgins court relied on the federal cases for the following 
reasons: (1) those cases give primacy to the constitutional jury 
right;193 (2) federal courts faced the same situation as Maryland 
courts of interpreting the jury right after the merger of Law and 
185. See Higgins, 310 Md. at 552, 530 A.2d at 733. 
186. See id. at 552, 530 A.2d at 734. 
187. [d. at 541, 530 A.2d at 728. 
188. [d. at 551, 530 A.2d at 733 (quoting Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 472-
73 (1962) (quoting Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510-11 
(1959»); see also id. at 545-47,530 A.2d at 730-31. 
189. See id. at 547, 551 n.12, 530 A.2d at 730, 733 n.12. 
190. See id. at 552, 530 A.2d at 733-34. But cf. id. at 545-47, 551 n.12, 530 A.2d at 
730-31, 733 n.12 (noting that "most imperative circumstances" may justify 
judge trial ahead of jury trial of common factual issues). 
191. See id. at 545, 530 A.2d at 730. 
192. 359 U.S. 500 (1959). But cf. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 16 (suggesting 
that because of the Beacon court's distortions of jury right and scope of Eq-
uity, Maryland might look to federal cases decided after merger and before 
Beacon for guidance). 
193. See Higgins, 310 Md. at 541-51, 530 A.2d at 728-33. 
332 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 26 
Equity by court rule;194 (3) federal interpretations of Federal Rules 
have traditionally been relied upon by Maryland courts interpreting 
analogous Maryland Rules195 and Maryland Rule 2-301196 merging 
Law and Equity was patterned after Federal Rule 2; and (4) other 
approaches to the right to jury trial after the merger of Law and 
Equity failed to safeguard the right. 197 
4. Current Questions 
Mter Higgins, exactly what is the protective approach? Philo-
sophically, the Higgins court endorsed the federal approach, permit-
ting denial of the constitutional right to jury trial of legal issues 
only under "the most imperative circumstances."198 Practically, the 
Higgins court also endorsed the federal application of the jury right 
in a number of situations. There is a right to jury trial of facts in a 
legal counterclaim for contract damages, or in an answer alleging 
breach of contract raised in an equitable proceeding for specific 
performance of the contract. Where facts are common to both the 
legal counterclaim or defense and the equitable claim, there is a 
right to· have the jury determine those facts first.199 The court in 
Higgins also cited with approval federal cases that "saw through" a 
party's attempt to characterize legal issues in equitable terms;200 fed-
eral cases that saved the right to jury trial of facts in a legal claim 
for damages, although the claim was joined with an equitable claim 
for injunctive relief;201 federal cases that found legal issues triable of 
right by a jury in an equitable procedural device, such as the share-
holders' derivative action;202 and federal cases that analogized newly-
created actions to those that existed at common law to determine if 
194. See id. at 543-44, 530 A.2d 729. 
195. See id. at 543, 530 A.2d at 729. 
196. See id. 
197. See id. at 548, 530 A.2d at 732. 
198. Id. at 54445 n.5, 54647, 551, 530 A.2d at 730 n.5, 731, 733. 
199. See id. at 54347, 551-52, 530 A.2d at 729-31, 733-34. The court of appeals 
noted the similarity of Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). 
200. See Higgins, 310 Md. at 54546, 551, 530 A.2d at 728, 730, 733 (citing Dairy 
Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962». In Dairy Queen, the Supreme 
Court held that a plaintiff's claim for an equitable accounting for breach of 
contract or for infringement of trademark could be remedied by legal dam-
ages. 
201. See Higgins, 310 Md. at 54546, 551, 530 A.2d at 728, 730, 733 (citing Dairy 
QJi,een, Inc., 369 U.S. at 469). 
202. See id. at 541, 54546, 530 A.2d at 728, 730-31 (citing Ross v. Bernhard, 396 
U.S. 531 (1970». 
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they were triable of right by a jury.203 In Higgins, the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland also speculated that neither procedural "com-
plexity"204 nor equitable protection of a plaintiff from irreparable 
harm205 was a likely ground for denying a jury trial. 
The protective approach, however, will not save the jury right 
in all Law cases.206 In Higgins, the court of appeals assumed that an 
earlier determination of fact properly tried by a judge would collat-
erally estop a later trial of the same issue by a jury.207 In a later case, 
the court of appeals assumed that reasonable regulations of the jury 
right, such as the requirement of a timely demand, do not violate 
the right.208 
Maryland cases show that parties themselves can protect their 
right to jury trial by the way they structure their claims. A plaintiff 
may assert a claim triable by a jury, such as breach of contract, 
rather than a claim not triable by a jury, such as breach of trust.209 
A plaintiff may seek a remedy triable by a jury, such as damages or 
declaratory judgment, rather than a remedy not triable by a jury, 
such as an injunction.210 A plaintiff may also join legal and equitable 
203. See id. at 546, 530 A.2d at 731 (citing Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 
(1987), which followed Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974), and Pernell v. 
Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974»; see also Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 
Md. 274, 296, 385 A.2d 57, 70 n.19 (1978) (dictum) (citing Pernell with ap-
proval); Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Smith, 79 Md. App. 591, 628, 558 A.2d 
768, 785-86 (1989) (citing Curtis for the proposition that the right to jury . 
trial applies to newly-created statutory causes of action). 
204. See Higgins, 310 Md. at 547 n.7, 530 A.2d at 731 n.7. 
205. See id.; see also supra note 191. 
206. See infra note 269 and accompanying text. 
207. See Higgins, 310 Md. at 545, 551-52, 530 A.2d at 730, 733-34. In Higgins, the 
fact issue in one case was common to both legal and equitable claims. Thus, 
it was reversible error for the judge to hear the trial of fact first. However, if 
the fact had been subject to separate judge and jury determinations in two 
different actions, a determination of fact first tried properly by a judge 
would likely have collaterally estopped a later trial of the same issue by a 
jury. Cf Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (holding that 
precluding a party from relitigating facts resolved in an equity proceeding by 
a judge did not violate Seventh Amendment right to jury trial). 
208. See State v. Attman/Glazer P.B. Co., 323 Md. 592, 606-07, 594 A.2d 138, 145 
(1991) . 
209. See Fink v. Pohlman, 85 Md. App. 106, 120-21, 582 A.2d 539, 546 (1990). 
210. See Attman/Glazer P.B. Co., 323 Md. at 606-07, 594 A.2d at 145 (dictum); see 
also Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 33-34, 61, 63-64 (punitive damages may 
be awarded only at Law, not at Equity). However, a plaintiff's ability to avoid 
a jury trial by choosing an equitable remedy may be limited because of the 
equitable prerequisite that there be no adequate remedy at Law, and be-
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claims having common issues of fact, which would be triable by a 
jury. 211 
Similarly, a defendant may raise issues triable by a jury by way 
of answer or counterclaim212 or, absent res judicata, by way of a sep-
arate action.213 Of course, in structuring the counterclaim or de-
fense, a defendant may also choose one triable by a jury.214 
Mter Higgins, a second question is whether Maryland's protec-
tive approach is tied to interpretations of the federal courts. As has 
been shown,215 Higgins relied on the Beacon line of cases. Some of 
the reasons for that reliance suggest similar Maryland and federal 
interpretations: Maryland and federal courts faced the same situa-
tion after the merger of Law and Equity; Maryland's merger rule 
was patterned after the federal merger rule, and Maryland tradition-
ally has relied upon federal interpretations of analogous rules. How-
ever, other reasons for the Higgins court's reliance on federal cases 
suggest that Maryland's primary allegiance is not to federal cases, 
but rather to the Maryland Constitution. Federal cases are persua-
sive insofar as they give primacy to the constitutional jury right, 
while other approaches inadequately safeguard the right. 
A recent commentator on the Maryland Constitution noted 
that our constitutional history includes evidence of all three typical 
approaches to state constitutional development in relation to fed-
cause of the right to jury trial of legal issues regardless of how they are char-
acterized. See Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962), cited in Higgins, 310 
Md. at 546, 530 A.2d at 731. 
211. See Hashem v. Taheri, 82 Md. App. 269, 273, 571 A.2d 837, 840 (1990). In 
Hashem, a shareholder joined a legal claim for his own damages with a tradi-
tionally equitable derivative suit for an injunction. The court of special ap-
peals held that the issue of whether plaintiff was a shareholder, which was 
common to both legal and equitable claims, was triable by a jury. But cf 
Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 6 (under Bourne & Lynch's approximation 
of pre-merger approach, plaintiff could protect the jury right on the legal 
claim by filing separate suits). 
212. See Higgins, 310 Md. at 535 & n.l, 552, 530 A.2d at 725 & n.l, 733-34. For this 
reason, "winning a race to court" is unlikely to be helpful for one in the 
natural position of a defendant. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 328, 
337 (discussing Higgins); see also Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 49 & n.309 
(discussing Beacon). 
213. See Kris Jen Ltd. Partnership v. Fairfax Sav., F.S.B., 100 Md. App. 25, 639 A.2d 
206 (1994), rev'd, 338 Md. 1, 655 A.2d 1265 (1995); Bourne & Lynch, supra 
note 5, at 6. 
214. See Kahle v. John McDonough Builders, Inc., 85 Md. App. 1441, 1147-53, 582 
A.2d 557, 560-63 (1990). 
215. See supra notes 192-207 and accompanying text. 
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eral constitutional development.216 In the first approach, the "lock-
step" model, state courts rely on federal analogues.217 In the second 
approach, the primacy model, state courts undertake an indepen-
dent analysis of the text, structure, and historical intent of the state 
constitution and use decisions of the United States Supreme Court 
and of other state courts for guidance.218 In the third approach, the 
supplemental model, state courts "fill in the gaps" in areas unpro-
tected, unsettled, or not addressed by federallaw.219 This commenta-
tor concluded that the Maryland courts followed "lockstep" with the 
developments in federal law regarding the right to trial by jury in 
criminal cases.220 Of course, the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial 
in criminal cases has become binding upon the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.221 The Seventh Amendment, providing for 
a right to jury trial in civil cases, has not become binding upon the 
states.222 
Several things suggest that Maryland's protective approach to 
the jury right in civil cases need not follow "lockstep" with federal 
court interpretations of the Seventh Amendment, but instead may 
be more protective.223 First, Higgins gave primacy to the Maryland 
Constitution, not federal precedents.224 Second, the Maryland Con-
stitution does not just provide that the right to jury trial shall be 
"preserved," as does the Seventh Amendment.225 Rather, the Mary-
land Constitution provides that the right shall be "inviolably pre-
served. "226 Third, the convention debate on the principal Maryland 
216. See MICHAEL CARLTON TOLLEY, STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN MARYLAND 13-16, 
153-59 (1992) (using the approaches described in MARy CORNELIA PORTER & 
G. ALAN TARR, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN STATE AND NATION (1988». 
217. See id. 
218. See id. 
219. See id. at 97-102. 
220. See id. 
221. See id. at 86. 
222. See infra notes 34648 and accompanying text. 
223. See generaUy ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, STATE CONSfITUTIONAL LAw 166-203 (2d ed. 
1993). Williams suggested a number of general considerations justifying state 
courts exercising independence in the interpretation of their constitutions: 
the primacy of state constitutions, historically and logically; the utility of state 
experimentation in our federal system; the diversity of state circumstances 
and interests; state courts' familiarity with their states' own circumstances 
and interests; and the United States Supreme Court's increasingly conserva-
tive interpretation of individual rights in the 1970s and 1980s. See id. 
224. See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
225. See U.S. CaNST. amend. VII. 
226. See MD. CONST., DECL. OF RiGHTS art. 23. See supra note 8 for text of Article 23. 
336 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 26 
jury right shows a specific intent to protect it from encroachment 
by the legislature.227 Finally, the right to jury trial is protected at a 
sub-constitutional leveF28 by Maryland statutes229 and rules.230 
Mter Higgins, a third question is why the protective approach is 
better than alternatives adopted or considered by other courts after 
the merger of Law and Equity. In adopting a protective approach to 
the jury right, the Higgins court considered and rejected a variety of 
other approaches. The court reasoned that an approach making the 
jury right dependent upon whether the issues in a case were 
predominantly legal or predominantly equitable231 is unpredict-
able232 and fails to safeguard the right to jury triaF33 of a legal issue 
which might be characterized as incidental to an equitable issue.234 
227. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
228. See WIWAMS, supra note 223, at 194-203. 
229. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §§ 318-19 (1996) (actions against telegraph or tele-
phone company for damages to land from construction of lines); id. art. 25, 
§ 80 (1996) (review of determination by county commissioners regarding in-
jury to land from ditch or drainage improvement); MD. CODE ANN., REAL 
PROP. § 8-332 (b) (1996) (review of action of distress for rent); MD. CODE 
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-06(b) (2) (1995) (action to nullify an award of 
health care malpractice claims arbitration panel); id. § 3-404 (action for de-
claratory judgment); id. § 3-8A-02 (action for mandamus); MD. CODE ANN., 
HEALTH-GEN. I § 7-507(e) (1994) (action for release of person with mental 
retardation from state residen tial center); id. § 10-805 (e) ( 1994) (action for 
release of person with mental disorder from residential facility or Veterans' 
Administration hospital); MD. CODE ANN., TAX-PROP. § 4-403(b) (1994) (state 
action against county collector of taxes or surety for failure to remit taxes); 
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-1026(a) (1991) (alleged father in an action for 
paternity); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-745(d) (1991) (review of deci-
sion of Workers' Compensation Commission); MD. CODE ANN., NAT. REs. II 
§ 9-305(b) (1990) (review of administrative determination of designation of 
land as wetlands); MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. § 13-526(a) (1988) (issue re-
ferred from Tax Court). 
230. See infra notes 1541-1621 and accompanying text. 
231. See Higgins, 310 Md. at 540, 542, 546, 530 A.2d at 728, 729, 731; see also 
Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 17-19, 57-59 ("essentially" or "basically" le-
gal or equitable). 
232. See Higgins, 310 Md. at 548, 530 A.2d at 732; see also Bourne & Lynch, supra 
note 5, at 18, 58, 68. Lynch and Bourne also suggest that the characteriza-
tion of what relief is primary is outmoded after the merger of Law and Eq-
uity, and may leave too much discretion in making the characterization to 
the trial judge, who may be biased against trial by jury. See Bourne & Lynch, 
supra note 5 at 52, 58-59. 
233. See Higgins, 310 Md. at 548, 530 A.2d at 730, 732; Bourne & Lynch, supra 
note 5, at 20, 54-55. 
234. See Higgins, 310 Md. at 544-45, 530 A.2d at 730. 
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An approach which would make the jury right depend upon the na-
ture of the first claim asserted235 might deprive defendants of a 
right to jury trial of legal issues later asserted by giving plaintiff a 
unilateral choice of trial by judge.236 An approach which deems a 
defendant to have waived a jury right by joining a legal counter-
claim to an equitable claim237 might, in light of res judicata, deprive 
the defendant of a right to jury trial of a legal counterclaim.238 An 
approach that, in deference to history239 or efficiency,240 would have 
a judge determine an entire case involving any equitable issue,241 
might deprive the parties of a right to jury trial of legal issues.242 
Interestingly, Higgins itself is an example of how the protective 
approach safeguards the jury right where each of these other ap-
proaches might not. First, the court of appeals compared the facts 
of the case, which combined an equitable claim and a legal coun-
terclaim, with similar federal appellate court cases. Those federal 
cases ultimately overturned trial court decisions denying the jury 
right on the ground that equitable issues predominated over legal 
issues.243 Second, the court held that the legal issue of breach of 
contract, raised by answer and counterclaim, was not precluded 
from trial by jury because the first claim asserted was equitable.244 
Third, the court held that jury trial of the legal issue in the coun-
terclaim was not waived by being joined to the plaintiff's equitable 
claim.245 Fourth, the court rejected Barnes's contention246 that, be-
235. See id. at 54849, 530 A.2d at 732. 
236. See id. 
237. See id. at 543, 548, 530 A.2d at 729, 732. Joinder of claims is encouraged by 
the revised Maryland Rules. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 3, 56. 
238. See Higgins, 310 Md. at 54344, 548, 55(}'51, 530 A.2d at 729, 732, 733; see also 
Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 6-10, 57, 67..Q8. 
239. See Higgins, 310 Md. at 536-37, 530 A.2d at 726; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 
5, at 44, 46; see also id. at 61..Q2, 64, 69, 76-77. But cf id. at 54-55 (stating 
merger eliminates the justification for equitable clean-up due to the cost, de-
lay, and inconvenience of separate actions at Law and Equity in a bifurcated 
system). 
240. See Higgins, 310 Md. at 540, 530 A.2d at 728; see also Bourne & Lynch, supra 
note 5, at 2-3, 63..Q4 & nA08, 69 & nA37, 78. But if. infra notes 889-96 and 
accompanying text (providing that modern procedures permit expedition 
while preserving the jury right). 
241. See Higgins, 310 Md. at 535-36, 530 A.2d at 725-26. 
242. See id. at 545, 54849, 530 A.2d at 730, 732. 
243. See id. at 54344, 530 A.2d at 729-30. 
244. See id. at 535 n.!, 552, 530 A.2d at 725 n.l, 734. 
245. See id. at 552, 530 A.2d at 733-34. 
246. See id. at 535-36, 530 A.2d. at 725-26. 
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cause specific performance was historically an equitable action, the 
entire case must be tried by a judge.247 
The protective approach of Higgins may also be compared with 
a variety of alternatives adopted by other jurisdictions or suggested 
by commentary. First, some courts have taken an approximation of 
pre-merger approach: cases which would have been tried at Law 
before merger are to be tried a jury; cases which would have been 
tried in Equity before merger are to be tried by a judge.248 However, 
the approximation of pre-merger approach is deficient because it 
erodes the right to trial by jury of legal issues.249 For example, in 
Higgins, that approach would have denied Higgins a right to jury 
trial of factual issues in the defense and counterclaim for dam-
ages250 for breach of contract due to equitable clean-up.251 Also, the 
approximation of pre-merger approach is difficult to apply because 
of definitional and timing problems. 
Even before merger, the distinction between Law and Equity 
was often difficult to make because of overlaps, such as remedies 
for violation of contract/52 due to Law's borrowing from Equity, or 
joinder of parties253 and discovery254 because of the development of 
new rights and remedies, such as the declaratory judgment.255 The 
merger of Law and Equity makes the distinction even more difficult 
because of the liberal joinder of legal and equitable claims and de-
fenses in an action.256 
As to timing problems, if an approximation of pre-merger ap-
proach is taken, it may not be clear what time before merger is to 
be approximated-immediately before merger,257 the time during 
adoption of the Maryland Constitution,258 or some other time.259 In 
247. See id. at 551-52, 530 A.2d at 733-34. 
248. See, e.g., JONATHAN M. LANDERS ET AL., CML PROCEDURE 701 (3d. ed. 1992); see 
also supra note 14 and accompanying text; infra notes 1128-1514 and accom-
panying text. 
249. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 331; see also Bourne & Lynch, supra 
note 5, at 52. 
250. See Higgins, 310 Md. at 551-52, 530 A.2d at 733-34. 
251. See id. at 540, 530 A.2d at 728; see also id. at 535-36, 530 A.2d at 725-26. 
252. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 61.{')2. 
253. See id. at 38, 73-76. 
254. See id. at 3940, 45 n.291, 71. 
255. See id. at 4546. 
256. See id. at 55-71. 
257. See id. at 4446. 
258. See id. at 59 ("Maryland's Constitution preserves the right to trial by jury as it 
existed at the time of the adoption of the Constitution vis Ii vis the scope of 
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any event, the approximation of pre-merger approach seems outmo-
ded after the merger of Law and Equity. 
Merger eliminates the justification for much of the traditional 
Equity jurisdiction. As the Beacon court stated, whether there is no 
adequate remedy at Law, the prerequisite for Equity jurisdiction 
"must be determined, not by precedents decided under discarded 
procedures, but in the light of the remedies now made available by 
the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Federal Rules."26o Merger 
also eliminates the justification for the equitable clean-up doctrine: 
the idea that once Equity jurisdiction attached, Equity would resolve 
all aspects of a controversy, even those aspects being litigated in a 
court of Law. 261 
Second, some courts have taken an approach which largely 
leaves the mode of trial, by judge or by jury, to the discretion of the 
trial judge.262 In this sense, "discretion" means judicial action largely 
unrestricted by standards.263 However, the discretionary approach is 
defective because it threatens the right to jury trial,264 at least where 
standards for exercising that discretion are undefined,265 and appel-
equity."). Compare supra notes 31-45 and accompanying text (discussing MD. 
CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5, and 1776 constitutional jury right), with supra 
notes 46-68 and accompanying text (discussing MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS 
art. 23, and 1851 constitutional jury right). 
259. The time prior to Maryland's adoption of its Uniform Declaratory Judgments 
Act may serve as an example. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 47-50. 
The Act was adopted in 1939. See 1939 Md. Laws 294. 
260. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 507 (1959). Interestingly, the 
Beacon Court cited Maryland Theatrical Corp. v. Brennan, 180 Md. 377, 24 A.2d 
911 (1942) (demonstrating the utility of the declaratory judgment). That 
case held that a court may issue a declaration of the unconstitutionality of 
legislation, notwithstanding that an injunction instead of a declaratory judg-
ment was sought, because the defendant was not charged with enforcing the 
legislation, and because the official charged with its enforcement would pre-
sumably abide by the judgment. See Maryland Theatrical Gorp., 180 Md. at 388, 
24 A.2d at 917. 
261. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 13-15. 
262. See id. at 19-20, 66; see also id. at 16, 57; LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 
326, 328, 330 n.191, 331. 
263. See infra note 459 and accompanying text; if. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, 
at 19, 58-59, 65 (providing "discretion" in characterizing a case as basically, 
essentially, or predominantly legal or equitable); supra notes 10-13 and ac-
companying text ("principled discretionary theory"). 
264. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 16, 20, 23, 29, 44; see also LYNCH & 
BOURNE, supra note 3, at 326, 328, 331. 
265. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 20; see also LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 
3, at 331; cf Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 2-3, 58-59 (discussing bias of 
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late review is limited to abuse of discretion.266 
The third and fourth approaches that are suggested by com-
mentary would characterize cases as legal or equitable not accord-
ing to what rights are asserted and what remedies are sought,267 but 
according to which courts try the case. Thus, the third approach 
considers all civil actions to be actions at Law triable by a jury,268 
subject only to constitutional limitations-fact, not law, and more 
than $5000 in controversy.269 That is, Equity courts have been abol-
ished and all courts are "Courts of Law" within the meaning of the 
Maryland Constitution's jury right.21° Those courts, in addition to 
their historical functions, may administer traditionally equitable dis-
covery procedures271 and joinder devices272 and may issue declara-
tory judgments273 and injunctive relief.274 There is some basis for 
~his all-Law approach in the Maryland Constitution. The principal 
jury trial provision does provide for the right in civil proceedings in 
the "Courts of Law,"275 not, as the Seventh Amendment does, in 
"suits at common law. "276 Even before merger, it was standard prac-
tice for Equity courts to refer disputed issues of fact to Law courts 
for jury trial.277 The term "Courts of Law" was adopted in 1851.278 At 
some trial judges against jury trial). 
266. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 59 & n.374. 
267. See Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 540, 551-52, 530 A.2d 724, 728, 733-34 
(1987) . 
268. See JAMES, supra note 1, at 448; Arthur F. Kingdon, The New Rules are Inade-
quate, 23 J. AM. JUD. SOC'y 133, 135 (1939). Kingdon, speaking of the merger 
of Law and Equity under the Federal Rules, saw bringing the jury in every 
case as a "step backward" because the jury has no special qualifications, it is 
too large, it is not under close enough control by the judge, and it delays 
the trial of cases. See id. 
A variation on this approach would be to treat all actions as legal be-
cause of the availability of "legal" declaratory relief. See supra note 260 and 
accompanying text; infra note 1176 and accompanying text. Supplementary 
injunctive relief would be available, if necessary, to secure compliance with 
the declaratory judgment. See MD. CaDE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PRaC. § 3412 
(1995). 
269. See MD. CaNST., DECL. OF RiGHTS art. 23. 
270. See id. 
271. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 36, 45 n.291, 76. 
272. See id. at 45 n.291, 72-76. 
273. See id. at 47-50. 
274. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
275. See MD. CaNST., DECL. OF RiGHTS art. 23. 
276. See U.S. CaNST. amend. VII. 
277. See infra notes 304-06 and accompanying text. The reference practice was 
later abolished. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
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the same time, the office of chancellor and the court of chancery 
were marked for abolition,279 and that court's jurisdiction was as-
signed to the circuit courts,280 denoted as "courts of law. "281 How-
ever, that interpretation seems contrary to an existing practice 
which was continued after 1851. The existing practice was for the 
trial courts (the county courts) to have separate sittings as courts of 
Law or courts of Equity.282 The jurisdiction of the county courts was 
assigned to the circuit courts in 1851.283 The circuit courts' separate 
sittings284 and dockets continued until their abolition in 1984 by the 
revised Maryland Rules.285 The 1984 reforms, according to their 
framers, were not intended to affect the right to jury trial either.286 
The fourth approach is the opposite-to consider no civil ac-
tions to be actions at Law triable by a jury.287 That is, the courts ex-
isting after the merger of Law and Equity are a hybrid, they are not 
"Courts of Law" or courts of Equity. If they must be categorized as 
one or the other, they are more like Equity courts.288 They may ad-
minister traditionally equitable discovery procedures289 and joinder 
devices. 29o They may issue essentially equitable declaratory judg-
ments,291 and, like traditional Equity courts,292 may order other ap-
278. See MD. CONS[. of 1851 art. X, § 4. 
279. See id. art. IV, § 23. 
280. See id. art. IV, § 8. 
281. See id. art. IV, § 10 (Court of Common Pleas of Baltimore City); id. § 11 (Su-
perior Court of Baltimore City); id. § 24 (filling judicial vacancies); id. § 28 
(transfers of venue); id. § 31 (pro se appearances); see also id. art. I, § 2; id. 
art. IV, §§ 4, 9, 14; id. art. V, § 1 (criminal convictions disqualifying govern-
ment officials). But see id. art. IV, § 11 (Superior Court of Baltimore City 
with jurisdiction also as a "court of equity"). 
282. See EDGAR G. MIllER, EQUITY PROCEDURE 2-3 & n.8 (1897); see also MD. CONS[. 
of 1851 art. IV, § 15. 
283. See MD. CONST. of 1851 art. IV, § 8. 
284. See id. art. IV, § 28. 
285. See MD. RULE 2-301 & com. 
286. See id. 
287. See MILTON D. GREEN. BASIC CNIL PROCEDURE 179-80 (2d ed. 1979). 
288. See generaUy Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal 
Ruks of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 909, 922-26 
(1987); Louise Weinberg, The New Meaning of Equity, 28 J. LEGAL EDUC. 532, 
534 & n.18 (1977). 
289. See supra note 254 and accompanying text. 
290. See supra note 253 and accompanying text. 
291. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 47 n.297. But cJ. id. ("[TJhe courts have 
steadfastly refused to so hold."); id. at 47-50 (declaratory judgments are cate-
gorized as legal or equitable depending upon the relief for which they are 
substituted) . 
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propriate relief even if not requested. 293 However, this all-Equity ap-
proach has little basis in the Maryland Constitution or practice. 
Maryland's Constitution contains various provisions protecting the 
right to trial by jury,294 but no right to trial by judge.295 The merger 
of Law and Equity in 1984, according to the framers of the revised 
rules, was not intended to affect the right to jury trial.296 Further, if 
other approaches permitting choice between trial by a judge or by a 
jury unduly restrict the right to jury trial,297 then considering no ac-
tions to be actions at Law triable by jury is improper. 
Fifth, commentary suggests that where legal and equitable is-
sues are joined, the case should be tried by a jury. The verdict is 
then binding as to legal issues and advisory as to equitable issues.298 
However, the advisory verdict has been abolished in Maryland.299 
Therefore, Maryland doctrine is protective of the jury right. Al-
though Maryland's protective approach is somewhat difficult to de-
fine, it has followed federal interpretations of the jury right. There 
is some basis, however, for Maryland being even more protective of 
the jury right than the federal courts have been. In any event, Mary-
land's protective approach is better than other alternatives that have 
been suggested. 
292. See MD. RULE 370(a} (3) (1977) (repealed 1984) (permitting the general equi-
table plea for "such other and further relief as is just"). 
293. Cf FED. R CN. P. 54(c} ("Except as a party against whom a judgment is en-
tered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief which the party 
in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded 
such relief in the party's pleadings."). 
294. See supra notes 31-76 and accompanying text. 
295. See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text. 
296. See supra note 286 and accompanying text. 
297. See supra notes 233, 236, 238, 242, 249-51, 264-66 and accompanying text. 
298. See Fraser v. Geist, 1 F.RD. 267, 269 (E.D. Pa. 1940) (dictum); see al50 JAMES, 
supra note 1, at 441-42; if. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 28 & n.181 (stat-
ing jury verdict in a tort claim against the United States and others was 
merely advisory against the United States). 
299. See MD. RULE 2-511 (d), discussed in Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 35 & 
n.221; see also id. at 44 n.284. But if. Fitzgerald v. United States Lines, 374 
U.S. 16 (1963) (a seaman's related claims under the Jones Act, triable of 
right by a jury, and under admiralty doctrines of unseaworthiness and main-
tenance and cure, not triable of right by a jury, should both be tried by the 
jury). Of course the advisory verdict could be reinstated either by legislative 
act or court rule. See infra notes 1531-66 and accompanying text. 
') 
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F. Prudential Concerns 
Courts may sometimes avoid deciding issues of constitutional 
law, and other times decide issues in subtle, indirect ways rather 
than on principle. Courts often invoke doctrines such as case-or-
controversy or justiciability, abstention, vagueness, and overbreadth 
to avoid deciding a case on the merits. In order to keep from creat-
ing new principles of law, courts may decide the merits but invoke 
case-by-case adjudication techniques of balancing the benefits of an 
action against its costs or considering all the facts and circumstances 
of a situation. Courts use these techniques to safeguard their own 
positions, saving their authority for other cases that should be de-
cided on the basis of new legal principles. They also do so to acti-
vate the political processes, permitting resolution of problems by 
legislators.300 
The right to jury trial presents three prudential concerns. First, 
which is superior, trial by judge or by jury? This general issue is 
treated in some detail in two other contexts below.301 Second, in 
view of our system of separated powers and checks and balances, 
are not both judge and jury desirable? This other general issue is 
discussed above as the structural mode of constitutional interpreta-
tion.302 Third, and I believe the most pressing prudential concern, 
what are the benefits that flow to judges and our justice system gen-
erally when juries, instead of judges, decide cases? 
Traditionally, the benefits of trying issues of fact by jury have 
been taken for granted in Maryland. Cases on the Law side were 
historically tried by jury. It was not until 1864 that the Maryland 
Constitution expressly permitted submission of a case for determina-
tion by the court without a jury.303 Historically, issues of fact in suits 
300. See BOBBfIT, supra note 15, at 62-71. 
301. See infra notes 867-955 and accompanying text (discussing judicial economy); 
infra notes 956-1124 (discussing the argument that Equity is superior to Law 
as a mode of trial). Bourne and Lynch appear to treat these matters as pure 
policy concerns, unrelated to constitutional interpretation. See infra notes 
870, 959-1124 and accompanying text. In any event, these prudential con-
cerns were specifically overridden when the jury right was adopted as part of 
the MD. CONST. See infra notes 933-35, 1114-15 and accompanying text. 
302. See supra notes 136-63 and accompanying text. 
303. See MD. CONST. of 1864 art. IV, § 8 (providing in part that "the parties to any 
cause may submit the same to the Court for determination without the aid 
of a jury"). In the convention debate, an opponent argued that the provi-
sion was "imposing upon the judge a duty which has not hither been de-
volved upon him." 2 1864 DEBATES, supra note 89, at 1394. 
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in Equity were regularly referred to Law courts for jury triaP04 Pro-
fessor Brown summarized the reasons for the referral procedure. 
Jury resolution of factual disputes on the basis of live testimony was 
viewed as superior to the chancellor's fact-finding on the basis of 
sworn pleadings and written depositions.305 Jury trial was considered 
to be required in several situations-where facts were strongly dis-
puted, causing reasonable doubt in the chancellor's mind, where 
documentary evidence would not clearly resolve the conflict, or 
where the credibility of witnesses was important.306 However, the 
chancellor would resolve factual issues where proof was clear, leav-
ing no reasonable doubt, or where the referral to Law for a jury 
trial was impractical considering the small amount in controversy.307 
Generally, commentators have noted a number of benefits to 
judges and our justice system of having juries. First, by providing for 
public participation in trials, the jury helps legitimize outcomes.308 
That legitimacy comes from opening the jury to all citizens,309 thus 
bringing the authority of the people-the sovereign in a democratic 
society-to the execution of the laws.310 That legitimacy is particu-
larly needed where the decision is difficult.311 
Second, the jury may be a "lightning rod for animosity" that 
might otherwise center on the judge.3!2 Because the jury is repre-
304. See Brown, supra note 85, at 458-65. 
305. See id. at 463-64. Oral testimony did not become part of Equity proceedings 
until 1890. See id. at 464 n.237. 
306. See id. at 462·M & n.238. 
307. See id. at 462-64. Amendments to the principal jury trial provision, increasing 
the amount in controversy from $5 to $500 in 1970 and from $500 to $5,000 
in 1992, may alleviate this concern. See supra notes 128, 130 and accompany-
ing text. 
308. See AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION/BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, CHARTING A FUTURE 
FOR THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 10 (1992) [hereinafter ABA/BROOKINGS]; 
Jonathan D. Casper, Restructuring the Traditional Civil Jury: The Effects of 
Changes in Composition and Procedures in VERDICT: AssESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYS-
TEM 414, 420 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993). 
309. See 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 378 (Phillips Bradley 
ed., Vintage Books 1954). 
310. See id. at 294, 297. 
311. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 7. 
312. See id.; see also Landsman, supra note 162, at 49 ("safety valve"); if. 2 1864 DE-
BATES, supra note 89, at 1395 (discussing a provision, adopted as MD. CONST. 
of 1864 art. IV, § 8, expressly permitting submission of a case for determina-
tion by the court without a jury, and a proponent's argument that judges 
would likely not want to try onerous cases, such as serious criminal matters, 
without a jury); THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 426 (Alexander Hamilton) (Mod-
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sentative, largely anonymous, and discontinuous, it can deflect criti-
cism that might otherwise be concentrated on a single, visible, and 
continuously sitting judge.313 
Third, the jury provides a "black box" decision314 in some situa-
tions where the giving of a reasoned decision might not be appro-
priate.315 The jury's "judgment call" might be best where all the 
facts and circumstances require an individualized decision,316 where 
the facts are difficult to resolve,317 where the jury's decision is more 
"equitable" than a strict application of the law,318 or where a con-
flict between fundamental values leaves only a "tragic choice. "319 
Moreover, this "black box" decision is subject to only limited appel-
late review. 320 
,ern Library ed. 1937) (stating a court for the trial of impeachments was 
. needed because "[ tJ here will be no jury to stand between the judges who 
are to pronounce the sentence of the law, and the party who is receive or 
suffer it"). 
313. See George L. Priest, Justifying the Civil Jury, in VERDICT: AsSESSING THE CIVIL 
JURY SYSTEM 103, 107, 124-25 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993). But if. id. at 124-25, 
129, 132 (stating most civil jury cases are routine, rather than notorious). Of 
course, to most parties, as well as the jury, no case is "routine." See Lands-
man, supra note 162, at 49; Marc Galanter, The Regulatory Function of the Civil 
Jury in VERDICT: AssESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM, 61, 88, 101 n.102 (Robert E. 
Litan ed., 1993). 
314. See Abram Chayes, The &le of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. 
REv. 1281, 1287 (1976). 
315. Cf Galanter, supra note 313, at 61-62 (stating jury decisions in the aggregate, 
along with other predictors, provide a kind of precedent, signaling what 
other juries might do). 
316. See GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 55, 206·{)7 n.5 (1978). 
317. See supra note 306 and accompanying text. In the convention debate on a 
provision, adopted as MD. CONST. of 1864 art. IV, § 8, expressly permitting 
submission of a case for determination by the court without a jury, an oppo-
nent objected that in such cases the judge would have to try the facts as well 
as construe the law and that the facts might be complicated. See 2 1864 DE-
BATES, supra note 89, at 1394. See generally Richard Lempert, Civil Juries and 
Complex Cases: Taking Stock After Twelve Years, in VERDICT, AssESSING THE CIVIL 
JURY SYSTEM 181 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993) (concluding that juries may do 
as well as judges in deciding complex cases). 
318. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 107-08 & n.7. lnterestingly, the au-
thors did call this "jury equity." 
319. See CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 316, at 57, 110. But if. Priest, supra note 
313, at 107-09, 125-26 (stating civil jury does not make decisions involving life 
and death, but does determine liability and damages). 
320. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
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G. Ethical Matters 
As noted above, "ethical matters" reflect "the sort of people we 
are" and the sort of institutions we have.321 However, in order for 
ethical argument to be a mode of constitutional interpretation, it 
must be tied to the constitution, unlike ethical and moral argument 
generally.322 Professor Philip Bobbitt described three varieties of eth-
ical interpretation of the United States Constitution. One is a gen-
eral principle in the constitutional text itself, a principle that may 
need interpretation in specific cases. The Ninth Amendment rights 
retained by the people323 and the Fourteenth Amendment "liberty" 
protected by due process are good examples.324 A second variety of 
ethical interpretation is a "textual cousin," or an analogy to the 
constitutional text.325 The best example is the incorporation of pro-
visions of the Bill of Rights against the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment.326 A third variety of ethical interpretation is the 
use of the constitutional text, not for its own force, but as evidence 
of a more general, non-textual principle.327 The best example is the 
general right of privacy described in Griswold v. Connecticut,328 which 
was suggested by the specific provisions of the First (right of associa-
tion) , Third (prohibition of quartering of soldiers), Fourth (right 
against unreasonable searches and seizures), Fifth (right against self-
incrimination), and Ninth Amendments (other retained rights).329 
Ethical argument may help answer two questions. First, how 
protective of the jury right should Maryland courts be? Second, 
should Maryland courts be at least as protective of the jury right as 
the federal courts have been in interpreting the Seventh Amend-
ment? Next, this article examines the three modes of ethical argu-
ment-explicit principles, textual cousins, and non-textual princi-
ples-to try to answer these two questions. 
321. BOBBITf, supra note 15, at 95. 
322. See BOBBITT, supra note 15, at 94-95, 138-41. 
323. See id. at 101, 144, 152, 172-73. 
324. See id. at 98-99, 172-73. 
325. See id. at 142-43. 
326. See id. at 100, 143, 147-53, 168. 
327. See id. at 142. 
328. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
329. Cf BOBBITT, supra note 15, at 169-75 (classifying various types of constitu-
tional arguments in Griswold). 
1997] The Right to Trial by Jury 347 
1. Explicit Principles 
Several explicit principles330 in the Maryland Constitution bear 
on the interpretation of the jury right. Two provisions in the Mary-
land Constitution appear not to protect the jury right. The first pro-
vision refers to separate courts of Law and Equity. However, as has 
been shown, those provisions assume, as opposed to mandate, sepa-
rate courts of Law and Equity.33) The second provision allows a party 
to submit a case to the court for determination without a jury. How-
ever, as previously demonstrated, that provision establishes no right 
to trial by judge.332 
Another provision in the Maryland Constitution arguably re-
quires application of the federal, jury-protective Seventh Amend-
ment to Maryland courts. Article 2 of the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights makes the federal Constitution and laws supreme over the 
Maryland Constitution and laws. That provision states: 
The Constitution of the United States, and the Laws made, 
or which shall be made, in pursuance thereof, and all Trea-
ties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of 
the United States, are, and shall be the Supreme Law of the 
State; and the Judges of this State, and all the People of 
this State, are, and shall be bound thereby; anything in the 
Constitution or Law of this State to the contrary 
notwithstanding.333 
However, the convention debates regarding Article 2 make clear 
that this supremacy clause was a recognition that the United States 
was a union of states, not a compact of sovereign states that re-
mained free to claim "states' rights," to nullify federal law, or se-
cede from the Union.334 Specifically, Article 2 was held not to affect 
330. The principles discussed here are general principles. Specific principles bear-
ing on the jury right are discussed above as part of the constitutional "text." 
See supra notes 31-76 and accompanying text. 
331. See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text. 
332. See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text. 
333. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 2. 
334. See DEBATES OF THE MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1867, at 99-107 
(1867) [hereinafter 1867 DEBATES]. The predecessor to Article 2 provided: 
The Constitution of the United States and the laws made in pursu-
ance thereof being the supreme law of the land, every citizen of 
this State owes paramount allegiance to the Constitution and Gov-
ernment of the United States, and is not bound by any law or ordi-
nance of this State in contravention or subversion thereof. 
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Supreme Court holdings concerning incorporation of the Bill of 
Rights.335 Thus, Article 2 does not require application of the unin-
corporated Seventh Amendment to state court proceedings. 
Yet another provision in the Maryland Constitution might limit 
the jury right in certain cases. As Lynch and Bourne suggest, Mary-
land's Due Process Clause may limit the jury right in "complex 
cases" for two reasons.336 First, the jury could not comprehend the 
issues and evidence in a case.337 Second, the length of time to try 
the case would make business and professional people unable to 
participate, depriving the parties of a fair cross section of the com-
MD. CONST. OF 1864, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5. However, the convention de-
bates on Article 5 and the one case interpreting Article 5 are silent on any 
intent to make the Bill of Rights generally, or the Seventh Amendment par-
ticularly, applicable to the State of Maryland. 
The convention debates on the supremacy clause of Article 5 have sug-
gestive references to the Bill of Rights and to its specific provisions. How-
ever, there is little support for the idea that the supremacy clause requires 
application of the Seventh Amendment or any other provisions of the Bill of 
Rights. The many references to the "bill of rights" are not to the first ten 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, but to the MD. CaNST., DECL. OF 
RIGHTS, the MAss. CaNST., BILL OF RIGHTS, or bills of rights generally. See 1 
1864 DEBATES, supra note 89, at 296, 306, 326, 327, 328, 329, 469, 494, 497, 
502, 504, 510, 515, 525, 526 (referring to the MD. CaNST.); id. at 502 (refer-
ring to the Massachusetts Bill of Rights); id. at 305, 329 (referring'to bills of 
rights generally). No references to the Seventh Amendment could be found 
in the convention debates. 
There are references to other provisions of the Bill of Rights. However, 
those references are not to rights to be applied against the state. See id. at 
445-46 (rights which limit the federal government); id. at 520 (rights improp-
erly suspended during the Civil War by the federal government); cf. id. at 
295-97, 510 (comparing Maryland free speech in parliamentary debate with 
federally protected speech). 
Similarly, the one case interpreting the 1864 version of Article 5 viewed 
it as a supremacy clause requiring allegiance to federal law, not as a provi-
sion requiring incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the state. See Ander-
son v. Baker, 23 Md. 531, 617 (1865). 
335. Two Maryland cases rely on the old rule from Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 
Pet.) 243 (1833), that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states. See Robb 
v. State, 190 Md. 641, 60 A.2d 211 (1948) (holding Fifth Amendment double 
jeopardy does not apply in Maryland state proceedings), overruled by Benton 
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Slansky v. State, 192 Md. 94, 63 A.2d 599 
(1949) (holding Sixth Amendment jury trial does not apply in Maryland 
state criminal cases), overruled by Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
336. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 334; see also infra note 969 and accom-
panying text. 
337. See In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 419, 427 (9th Cir. 1979). 
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munity.338 Nevertheless, a complexity exception has been rejected in 
Maryland.339 Therefore, these explicit principles neither add nor de-
tract from the protection of the right to jury trial. 
2. Textual Cousins 
Three federal constitutional and two state constitutional textual 
cousins may protect the right to jury trial in civil proceedings in 
Maryland courts. The first federal textual cousin is the Sixth 
Amendment. Of course the Sixth Amendment, via the Fourteenth 
Amendment, requires a jury trial in state criminal prosecutions.340 
By analogy, the Sixth Amendment may protect the right to jury trial 
in some civil cases, such as administrative proceedings341 and civil 
contempt proceedings,342 that substitute for criminal proceedings.343 
In such cases, a civil jury operates like the criminal jury to protect 
citizens from arbitrary or unlawful state prosecution.344 The Sixth 
Amendment makes no distinction between Law and Equity, but ex-
cepts "petty offenses"345 and may be more protective of the jury 
right than Maryland constitutional provisions. 
The second federal textual cousin is the Seventh Amendment. 
The Supreme Court has held that the Seventh Amendment is not 
applicable to the states directly346 or through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.347 Those holdings have recently been reaffirmed.348 
338. See id. at 427 n.54. 
339. See infra notes 959-73 and accompanying text. 
340. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
341. Cf Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 
387 U.S. 541 (1967) (stating that the Fourth Amendment limits administra-
tive, not just criminal, searches for health violations and fire hazards, respec-· 
tively). 
342. Cf Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335-36 (1977) (stating that the state's inter-
ests in punishing contempt, whether labeled civil, criminal, or quasi-criminal' 
are important enough to cause a federal court to abstain under Younger v. 
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971». 
343. Cf. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 515 (1959) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting); Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 
284 (1988) (stating that declaratory judgments are neither legal nor equita-
ble, but may be considered as substitutes for either legal or equitable relief 
for purposes of jury trial and appeal). 
344. See generaUy Priest, supra note 313, at 109. 
345. See, e.g., Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968). 
346. See Lessee of Livingston v. Moore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 469, 551-52 (1833). 
347. See Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 90 (1875). 
348. See, e.g., Melancon v. McKeithen, 345 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. La. 1972), afl'd sub 
nom., Mayes v. Ellis, 409 U.S. 943 (1972); Bringe v. Collins, 274 Md. 338, 335 
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However, the reaffirmations have come without consideration of the 
change in the test for determining whether a right housed in the 
Bill of Rights is applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Previously, the formulation was whether a right was "of the 
very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty, "349 'a formulation rely-
ing on a more conceptual than historical basis. Currently, the for-
mulation is whether a right is "fundamental to the American 
scheme of justice,"350 a formulation relying on American tradition 
and practice. 
Regarding American tradition, the right to jury trial in civil 
cases was continued by state constitution, statute, or common-law 
practice in each of the thirteen original states after indepen-
dence. 351 The lack of a guarantee of the civil jury right in the 
United States Constitution was a leading cause for the anti-federalist 
attack before its adoption, and a catalyst for the adoption of the Bill 
of Rights soon after ratification.352 
Nearly every state constitution guarantees the right to jury trial 
in civil cases.353 Upon reconsideration, therefore, the Supreme 
Court might conclude that the Seventh Amendment right to jury 
trial is "fundamental to the American scheme of justice" and, 
hence, should be applied to the states. Likewise, the Supreme Court 
might abandon the process of deciding which provisions of the Bill 
of Rights should be applied against the states and conclude that all 
provisions should be incorporated.354 
The third federal textual cousin is the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Professor Don Sampen argued that 
the right to jury trial should apply in all cases.355 He concluded that 
the distinction between Law and Equity is grounded solely on his-
torical circumstances and has no rational basis. Thus, the distinction 
A.2d 670 (1975). 
349. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled Uy Benton v. Mary-
land, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). 
350. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149, 150 n.14 (1968). 
351. See Wolfram, supra note 120, at 655. 
352. See id. at 656-Q6. 
353. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 473 (1993); if. id. at 473 n.2 
("Colorado, Louisiana, and Wyoming have no constitutional guarantee to 
jury trial in civil cases."). 
354. Virtually the entire Bill of Rights has been applied against the states. See 2 
RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NowAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 423 
(2d ed. 1992). 
355. See Don R. Sampen, Law and Equity, the Right to a Jury Trial, and Equal Protec-
tion, 70 ILL. BJ. 376 (1982). 
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does not even satisfy deferential scrutiny.356 He opined that the dis-
tinction is not justified by the parties' expectations, by considera-
tions of efficiency, nor by suitability of issues for jury consideration. 
Therefore, the distinction violates the equal protection rights of 
persons denied jury trial of fact in equity cases.357 However, that ar-
gument is unlikely to prevail. Deferential scrutiny rarely results in a 
holding of unconstitutionality.358 Further, the distinction between 
Law and Equity is reflected in another provision of the Constitution 
itself - Article 111.359 
Two state textual cousins also offer some support for a protec-
tive interpretation of the right to jury trial in Maryland. The first 
state textual cousin is the right to jury trial in criminal cases under 
Articles 5, 21, and 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. As ex-
plored above, the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United 
States Constitution may by analogy protect the right to jury trial in 
some civil cases.360 Similarly, the Maryland Constitution's right to 
jury trial in criminal cases, which has been interpreted to mirror 
the Sixth Amendment,361 may protect the right to jury trial in some 
nominally civil cases because of the blurring of lines between civil 
and criminal cases.362 Interestingly, the application of the criminal 
right to jury would put jury nullification of the law363 on a firmer 
basis because of Article 23's provision making the jury "the Judges 
356. See id. The right to jury trial in state courts is not a fundamental right pro-
tected by the Seventh and Fourteenth Amendments. See supra notes 34648 
and accompanying text. Therefore, discrimination against the exercise of the 
right to jury trial would not be subject to strict scrutiny, requiring a compel-
ling state interest and narrowly tailored means. C/, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 
434 U.S. 374 (1978) (applying strict scrutiny to a classification interfering 
with the exercise of the right to marry, part of the fundamental right to pri-
vacy). But see Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 
351 U.S. 12 (1956) (access to appellate courts); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 
533 (1964) (right to vote in state elections). 
357. See Sampen, supra note 355. 
358. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (overruling Morey v. 
Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957». But see, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
359. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all 
Cases, in Law and Equity .... n). 
360. See supra notes 337-42 and accompanying text. 
361. See generally TOLLEY, supra note 216, at 97-102. 
362. See State v. Roll, 267 Md. 714, 298 A.2d 867 (1973) (analyzing civil and crimi-
nal contempt). 
363. See infra notes 956-1103 and accompanying text. 
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of Law, as well as of fact."364 
The second state textual cousin is the implied guarantee of 
equal protection in the Due Process Clause of Article 24 of the Ma-
ryland Declaration of RightS.365 Generally, the state and federal guaran-
tees of equal protection have been similarly interpreted.366 The right 
to jury trial is a fundamental right under the Maryland Constitu-
tion.367 Classifications significantly interfering with fundamental 
rights are subject to strict scrutiny.368 Therefore, classifications such 
as the one between Law issues (triable by a jury) and Equity issues 
(not triable by a jury) might be subject to strict scrutiny. The dis-
tinction between Law and Equity has been described as "outmo-
ded"369 and a "historical fortuity,"370 "historically accidental,"371 and 
"accidental and anomalous."372 These descriptions suggest the dis-
tinction no longer has any rational basis. If the distinction between 
Law and Equity does not satisfy deferential, rational basis scrutiny,373 
then the distinction does not satisfy strict scrutiny, requiring a com-
pelling governmental interest and narrowly tailored means. On the 
other hand, this argument may not prevail. It may well be that the 
distinction between Law and Equity does not significantly interfere 
with the right to jury trial,374 which exists only at Law.375 
364. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 23. This provision has been narrowly inter-
preted to include the law of the crime and not procedural and evidentiary 
law within the province of the judge. See, e.g., Stevenson v. State, 289 Md. 
167, 177-80,423 A.2d 558, 564 (1980). 
365. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 426 A.2d 929 (1981). 
366. See id. at 705, 426 A.2d at 941. But see id. at 717-22, 426 A.2d at 948-50 (stating 
that occupation, although not mentioned in the MD. CaNST., is an "impor-
tant private right"· requiring "heightened scrutiny"); Hornbeck v. Somerset 
County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 650-51, 458 A.2d 758, 786-87 (1983) (pro-
viding that education, although an express right in the MD. CaNST., is not a 
"fundamental right" requiring strict scrutiny). 
367. See Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 309, 385 A.2d 57, 77 (1978). 
368. See id. 
369. Brown, supra note 85, at 444. 
370. [d. at 455. 
371. WILLIAM CALVIN CHESNUT, SIXTY YEARs IN THE COURTS 21 (1958). 
372. PHELPS, supra note 86, at 184 (citing other commentators). 
373. See Sam pen, supra note 355 and accompanying text; see also Kirsch v. Prince 
George's County, 381 Md. 89, 626 A.2d 372 (1993). 
374. Cf Murphy v. Edmonds, 385 Md. 482, 601 A.2d 102 (1992) (holding that a 
legislative "cap" on noneconomic damages violates neither the right to jury 
trial nor equal protection); Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 
57 (1978) (holding that medical malpractice arbitration violates neither the 
right to jury trial nor equal protection), overruled on other grounds by Newell v. 
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3. Non-textual Principles 
The text of the Maryland Constitution provides evidence of a 
number of general, non-textual principles bearing on the interpre-
tation of the jury right. Although some of these principles are pro-
tective of the jury right, others are ambiguous. 
The first general, non-textual principle is that of limited gov-
ernment.376 Express limits on government in the Maryland Constitu-
tion include the following: the reservation of powers and rights in 
the people-a general reservation of powers;377 the right to alter, re-
form, or abolish the form of government;378 the right to vote;379 the 
right of referendum;380 and the rights and liberties typical of bills of 
rights.381 Express limits on government also include the following: a 
constitution;382 the supremacy of federal law;383 the separation of 
government powers among legislative, executive, and judicial 
branches;384 a bicameral legislature;385 checks and balances among 
the branches;386 the grant of "home rule" powers to local govern-
Richards, 323 Md. 717, 594 A.2d 1152 (1991). 
375. See MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5 (granting right of "trial by Jury, ac-
cording to the course of that [Common] Law"); id. art. 23 (granting "right 
of trial by Jury ... in the several Courts of Law"). 
376. Even the inherent plenary authority of the states, as opposed to the suppos-
edly limited enumerated powers of the federal government, is limited. See 
BOBBITT, supra note 15, at 147-53; see also Whittington v. Polk, 1 H. & J. 236, 
242-43 (Md. 1802). 
377. See MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art 3. 
378. See id. arts. 1, 6. 
379. See id. art. 7; id. art. I, § 1. 
380. See id. art. XVI, § 1. 
381. See, e.g., id. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 13 (right to petition); id. art. 19 (right to 
remedy); id. arts. 16, 21, 23, 25-27 (rights of accused); id. art. 24 (due pro-
cess); id. art. 31 (quartering of soldiers); id. arts. 36-37 (freedom of religion); 
id. art. 40 (free press and speech); id. art. 45 (other retained rights); id. art. 
23 (right to trial by jury); see also MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 46 (equal 
rights); id. art. 47 (rights of victims of crime); supra notes 32-69 and accom-
panying text. 
382. See MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 44 (stating that the MD. CONST. is appli-
cable in time of war, as well as peace, notwithstanding any plea of necessity). 
383. See id. art. 2; U.S. CONST. art. VI, d. 2. 
384. See MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 8. 
385. See id. art. III, § 1. 
386. See, e.g., id. art. II, § 10 (senate advice and consent of executive appoint-
ments); id. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 17 (executive veto of legislation); id. art. 20 
(executive pardon); See also id. art. III, § 24 (house of delegates as grand in-
quest of the state); id. § 26 (impeachment by legislature). 
354 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 26 
ments;387 and many others.388 
The principle of limited government requires that the jury 
right be protected. The jury, through its functions of finding fact 
and applying law to fact, may limit the executive branch, which en-
forces public law and represents the government in criminal and 
civil cases.389 Through the power of nullification, juries may limit 
the legislature, which enacts the laws that courts apply. The jury 
may also limit the judiciary, which, without the jury, would have 
sole discretion to find facts and apply laws.390 
The second general, non-textual principle is that of govern-
ment by the people, or popular participation in government.391 Ex-
press provisions in the Maryland Constitution which illustrate this 
principle include the following: the making of the constitution by 
the people;392 the origination of government from the people;393 the 
right of the people to alter, reform, or abolish the government;394 
the right of the people to regulate the internal government and po-
lice of the state;395 the right of citizens to vote for government of-
ficers;396 the right of the people to petition the legislature;397 free-
dom of speech and of the press;398 the right of victims to be heard 
in criminal proceedings;399 the ability of citizens to hold public of-
fice;400 citizen participation on government commissions;401 the right 
387. See id. art. XI (Baltimore City); id. art. XI-A (charter counties); id. art. XI-E 
(municipal corporations); id. art. XI-F (code counties). 
388. See, e.g., id. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 6 (accountability of government officers); id. 
art. 30 (subordination of the military to the civil power); id. art. 35 (prohibi-
tion 6f multiple office-holding); id. art. 41 (prohibition of monopolies); id. 
art. II, § 1 (limiting the governor's tenn in office); id. art. III, § 21 (open 
legislative proceedings); id. §§ 27-35, 52, 55 (other procedural and substan-
tive limitations on legislation). 
389. See, e.g., id. art. II, § 1 (executive power). 
390. See Landsman, supra note 162, at 38-39 (Seventh Amendment purposes); see 
also supra notes 149-63 and accompanying text (jury role in checks and bal-
ances). 
391. See BOBBITT, supra note 15, at 129 (government of the people or republican 
fonn of government). 
392. See MD. CONST. preamble ("We, the People ... declare .... "). 
393. See id. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 1. 
394. See id. arts. 1, 6. 
395. See id. art. 4. 
396. See id. art. 7; id. art. I, § 1. 
397. See id. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 13. 
398. See id. art. 40. 
399. See id. art. 47. 
400. See, e.g., id. art. III, § 9 (right of state citizens to hold office of senator or 
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of citizens to nominate persons for office;402 and the right of 
referendum.403 
The principle of government by the people requires that the 
jury right is preserved. As de Tocqueville put it, the jury is above all 
a "political institution," a consequence of "the sovereignty of the 
people," and a "means of making the people rule."404 
The third general, non-textual principle is government for the 
people. The purpose of government is to secure the liberty of the 
people.405 The Maryland Constitution expressly states that it was es-
tablished to secure "our civil and religious liberty.''406 The principle 
of government for the people also requires that the jury right be 
protected. Like the jury in criminal cases, in civil cases, when the 
government is a party, the jury provides a safeguard from the arbi-
trary or unlawful exercise of governmental authority.407 That safe-
guard is needed where the government brings suit against a citi-
zen,408 where a citizen sues the government,409 and in other cases 
where the government, its agent, or employee is a party.410 Of 
delegate). 
401. See, e.g., id. art. IV, § 4A (Commission on Judicial Disabilities). 
402. See, e.g., id. art. XI-A, § 1 (members of charter county board). 
403. See id. art. XVI, § 1. 
404. 1 DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 309, at 291-97. 
405. See BOBBITT, supra note 15, at 98-100, 172-73; see also THE DEClARATION OF IN-
DEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (stating that governments are instituted to 
secure certain inalienable rights, including life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness). 
406. MD. CONST. preamble; see id. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 6 (stating that the people 
may reform the old government or establish a new government when public 
liberty is manifestly endangered); id. art. 7 (providing that the best security 
of liberty is the right of suffrage); id. art. 33 (stating that the independence 
and uprightness of judges are a great security to the rights and liberties of 
the people). 
407. See Priest, supra note 313, at 109-10. 
408. For example, for condemnation of property. See id. at 110. The need for a 
safeguard may explain why there may be a jury right in proceedings by the 
government to collect taxes. See Allnutt v. Comptroller of Treasury, 61 Md. 
App. 517, 527 & n.3, 487 A.2d 670, 675 & n.3 (1985) (dictum); see also infra 
notes 1597-1621 and accompanying text (discussing jury right by court rule 
in certain proceedings for guardianship of the person). But if. Allnutt, 61 
Md. App. at 524-27, 487 A.2d at 674-76 (finding no jury right in Maryland 
Tax Court), noted in LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 322 n.148. See generally 
Wolfram, supra note 120. 
409. Perhaps for damages for false arrest, false imprisonment, assault, or mali-
cious prosecution by a police officer. See Priest, supra note 313, at 110, 118. 
410. See id. at 117-18. Priest found that these cases were infrequently heard by ju-
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course, if the possibility of arbitrary or unlawful governmental au-
thority includes the actions of the judge in a case,411 the jury may 
be needed as a safeguard in all civil cases as well. 
The fourth general, non-textual principle is the rule of law. 
That is "ours is a government of laws, and not of men. "412 Express 
provisions of the Maryland Constitution which support the principle 
of the rule of law include the following: the making of a constitu-
tion;413 the reception of English common law and statutes and acts 
of the provincial assembly as law in the new state;414 the accountabil-
ity of government officials for their official actions;415 the reforma-
tion or replacement of arbitrary and oppressive government;416 the 
principle that the laws and their execution ought not be sus-
pended;417 the principle that the law should provide remedies and 
justice for injuries;418 the principle that martial law should not pre-
vail, except for persons in the armed services;419 that the constitu-
tion applies both in time of war and in time of peace and should 
not be departed from under the plea of necessity;420 the require-
ment that officers take an oath to support the constitution and 
laws;421 the duty of the governor to take care that the laws are faith-
fully executed;422 the principle that judges are to be selected from 
those who have been admitted to practice law and who are most 
distinguished for sound legal knowledge;423 and the principle that 
judges are to be disqualified for interest in their cases or for rela-
tion to the parties involved.424 
ries. See id. at 118. However, these cases may be increasing in number be-
cause of the erosion of governmental immunities and expansion of reme-
dies. See id. at 110. 
411. See supra note 162. 
412. BOBBITf, supra note 15, at 217; see also Comptroller of Treasury v. M.E. Rock-
hill, Inc., 205 Md. 226, 234, 107 A.2d 93, 98 (1954) (quoting United States v. 
Dickson, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 141, 162 (1841». 
413. See MD. CONST. preamble. 
414. See id. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5. 
415. See id. art. 6. 
416. See id. 
417. See id. art. 9. 
418. See id. art. 19. 
419. See id. art. 32. 
420. See id. art. 44. 
421. See id. art. I, § 9. 
422. See id. art. II, § 9. 
423. See id. art. IV" § 2. Judges are also to be distinguished for their integrity and 
wisdom. See id. 
424. See id. art. IV, § 7. 
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The principle of the rule of law is ambiguous in relation to the 
jury right. On the one hand, the jury seems to be the rule of men, 
not the rule of law,425 because the jury is "aresponsible"-it need give 
no reason for its decision,426 which is generally unreviewable.427 The 
jury has also been characterized as capricious428-as "a twelve-man 
ephemeral legislature not elected by voters"-and as a "law-
breaker. "429 On the other hand, the right to jury trial is expressly 
provided for in the highest law, the United States Constitution.430 
Indeed, the Due Process Clause prohibits the deprivation of life, lib-
erty, or property except by the judgment of one's peers431 or by the 
law of the land.432 The jury may ensure that the spirit of the law 
governs, rather than insisting on strict applications, to ensure justice 
in particular cases.433 In view of these ambiguities, the principle of 
the rule of law offers little help in determining whether the jury 
right should be protected. 
The fIfth general, non-textual principle is equal justice under 
the law.434 Express provisions in the Maryland Constitution which 
support this principle are the guarantees of due process and an im-
partial trier of fact. The Maryland Due Process Clause435 has been 
held to guarantee, by implication, the equal protection of the 
laws.436 The guarantee of an impartial trier of fact includes the fol-
lowing: the oath taken by all officeholders to act without partiality 
425. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 8. This conclusion is a complaint of 
critics of the jury. 
426. See CAiABRESI & BOBBTIT, supra note 316, at 57. 
427. See Priest, supra note 313, at 105; see also supra notes 159, 315, 320 and accom-
panying text. But cf. MD. RULE 2-532 (motion for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict); MD. RULE 2-533 (motion for new trial); MD. RULE 2-535 (revisory 
power). 
428. SeeJEROME FRANK, LAw AND THE MODERN MIND 192 (1930). 
429. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 129-30 (1949). 
430. See supra notes 31-76 and accompanying text. 
431. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
432. See MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 24. 
433. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 8-9. 
434. See BOBBTIT, supra note 15, at 217; cf. State v. Hutchinson, 287 Md. 198, 222, 
411 A.2d 1035, 1048 (1980) (Smith, J., dissenting) (providing that the State 
and the defendant stand in a position of equality in criminal case). 
435. See MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 24. 
436. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 426 A.2d 929 (1981). The 
Constitution includes more specific guarantees of equal protection of the 
laws. See, e.g., MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 46 (equality of rights based 
on sex). 
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or prejudice,437 the requirement of an impartial jury,438 the require-
ment of an impartial judge,439 and the right of removal upon a 
showing that a fair and impartial trial could not be had in the court 
where the case is pending.44o However, the principle of equal justice 
under the law is ambiguous as it relates to the jury right. On the 
one hand, the jury may be an equalizer between the poor and op-
pressed and the rich and powerful.441 On the other hand, it may be 
argued that justice requires that all litigants be treated alike.442 In 
view of this ambiguity, the principle of equal justice under the law 
offers little help in determining whether the jury right should be 
protected. 
The sixth general, non-textual principle is that of free political 
exchange,443 or, more specifically, the free flow of information from 
government to the people.444 Express provisions in the Maryland 
Constitution supporting that principle are as follows: freedom of 
speech and of the press;445 the diffusion of knowledge and virtue, 
and a system of general education;446 open legislative proceedings;447 . 
437. See MD. CONST. art. I, § 9. 
438. See id., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 21 (right to impartial jury in criminal prosecu-
tions); see also MD. CODE ANN .. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-21O(b)(2) (1995) (ex-
cuse from a particular jury for inability to render impartial jury service). 
439. See MD. CONST. art. IV, § 7 (disqualification of judge for interest, relation, or 
representation); see also id. art. IV, § 15 (disqualification of judge who partici-
pated in the same case in a lower court). 
440. See id. art. IV, § 8(c). 
441. See ABA/BROOKINGS, supra note 308, at 9. In the 18th century, a leveling 
force may have been needed against creditors. See Landsman, supra note 162, 
at 37-38. In the 19th century, a leveling force may have been needed against 
merchants, bankers, and industrialists. See id. at 43. In the 20th century, a 
leveling force may be needed against manufacturers of toxic substances and 
defective products. See id. at 53. However, the research on whether the jury 
actually functions as a leveler is ambiguous. See Galanter, supra note 313, at 
71-72. 
442. The ambiguity as to whether equal justice requires a leveling on the one 
hand, or a strict neutrality on the other hand, is similarly present in argu-
ments over affirmative action-whether equal protection requires a race-
conscious or a color-blind Constitution. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. 
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
443. See BOBBITT, supra note 15, at 101. 
444. Free political exchange, more broadly, might also involve people informing 
the government through popular participation. See supra notes 391403 and 
accompanying text. It might also include people-to-people exchanges, intra-
governmental exchanges, and inter-governmental exchanges. 
445. See MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 40. 
446. See id. art. 43; id. art. VIII, § 1 (free public education). 
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membership on government commissions open to the public;448 
publication of reports of appellate judicial decisions;449 publication 
of an abstract of the accounts of the treasurer;450 and publication of 
proposed amendments to the constitution.451 The principle of free 
political exchange requires that the jury right be protected. The 
jury is one way to assure public access to information about our sys-
tem of justice.452 
Thus, four of the six general, non-textual principles suggest a 
protective interpretation of the jury right. The other two principles 
are ambiguous. 
This detailed study of the usual ways of interpreting the consti-
tutional provision for the right to jury trial reveals a solid basis for a 
protective approach to the jury right in Maryland. Lynch and 
Bourne take a different approach with their principled discretionary 
447. See id. art. III, §§ 21, 22, 30 (referring to open meetings, published journals 
of proceedings and published laws, respectively). 
448. See, e.g., id. art. IV, § 4A (Commission on Judicial Disabilities). 
449. See id. arl. IV, § 16. 
450. See id. art. VI, § 4. 
451. See id. arl. XIV, § 1. 
452. Cf Buzbee v. Journal Newspapers, Inc., 297 Md. 68, 465 A.2d 426 (1983) (ad-
dressing public and press access to pre-trial proceedings in criminal cases). 
Early praise of the civil jury as the people's "school in public affairs" has 
come under criticism. An example of such praise can be found in A FARMER, 
supra note 154, at 36, 39. For a commentary thereon, see 5 THE COMPLETE 
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 154, at 7. See also FEDERAL FARMER, LETTER IV 
(Oct. 12, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, 245, 249-50 
(Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). de Tocqueville praised the jury as a "public 
school" in which jurors learn their rights, habits of reason, the spirit of the 
laws, equity in judging others, and their duties to society and its government. 
See supra note 309, at 294-97. More recently, the jury has been praised for fa-
cilitating public understanding of, support for, and confidence in, our legal 
system, and for spreading knowledge of law and legal process throughout 
the nation. See ABA/BROOKINGS, supra note 308, at 10-11. 
There have been several criticisms of the jury as a public school. Jury 
service does not come often enough for most citizens to provide them with 
much education. See Priest, supra note 313, at 121-23. Even when jury service 
comes, the case may be routine, rather than one providing educational op-
portunities in civic virtues such as a case involving government power or 
complex societal values. See id. at 123-24, 126. When jury service does influ-
ence citizens, it may disenchant them and cause them to lose confidence in 
the administration of justice. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 8. Other 
mechanisms for educating citizens in civic responsibility, such as public 
schools and the media, have developed since de Tocqueville's time. See 
Priest, supra note 313, at 120-21, 126-27. 
360 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 26 
and actual approximation of pre-merger theory, to which we now 
tum. 
III. THE LYNCH AND BOURNE PRINCIPLED DISCRETIONARY 
THEORY 
In their book chapter453 and in an earlier law review article,454 
Lynch and Bourne largely ignore the constitutional aspect of the 
right to jury trial. The authors do quote the original· and the princi-
pal jury trial provisions in the Maryland Constitution and a frag-
ment of the relevant convention debate.455 They then set forth their 
own "principled discretionary" theory, which maintains that the 
right to jury trial after the merger of Law and Equity is to be left to 
the discretion of Maryland's trial judges, who in turn must be 
guided first by standards which reflect four traditional principles 
governing the separation of Law and Equity: 
The first principle is that Maryland's Constitution preserves 
the right to trial by jury as it existed at the time of the 
adoption of the Constitution vis a vis the scope of equity. 
Second, the scope of equity has historically been measured 
with due respect to the importance of the right to trial by 
jury. Third, the scope of equity is necessarily limited by the 
principle that equity will not intervene where the remedy at 
law is full, expeditious and adequate. Finally, it has been 
recognized that the scope of equity in Maryland may be ex-
panded by statute or judicial decision.456 
Second, the principled discretionary theory directs that the discre-
tion of Maryland's trial judges should be guided by the common 
sense notion that judicial economy is better served by trial by a 
judge than trial by a jury. Third, their theory directs that the discre-
tion of trial judges should be guided by the notion that Equity is su-. 
perior to Law as a mode of trial.457 . 
The principled discretionary theory may be criticized on four 
grounds-two in passing and two in detail. In passing, Lynch and 
Bourne do not actually apply that theory when deciding the proper 
situations in which the jury right is to apply-their approximation 
453. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3. 
454. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5. 
455. See generally supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text; supra note 9 and accom-
panying text. 
456. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 59-60 (footnotes omitted). 
457. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text. 
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of pre-merger approach.458 Also, Lynch and Bourne's principled dis-
cretionary theory is a hodgepodge of inconsistent policies. It is like 
a faculty meeting without an agenda-interesting, but lackingstruc-
ture. That structure should be provided by the constitutional right 
to jury trial. 
Of course, the idea of principled discretion is an apparent con-
tradiction in terms. To the extent that judges have discretion, they 
are not limited by standards. To the extent that judges are limited 
by standards, they have no discretion.459 However, as developed be-
low, discretion and standards often go together.460 
The standards themselves are also inconsistent with each other 
and come from different sources. Regarding sources, the six stan-
dards include two pure policy matters, three policies describing eq-
uitable jurisdiction, and one matter of constitutional law. The pure 
policy matters concern the common sense notion that judicial econ-
omy is served by trial by a judge, rather than a jury,461 and Equity'S 
superiority to Law as a mode of trial.462 The three policies under-
girding equitable jurisdiction include Equity'S respect for the impor-
tance of the jury right,463 Equity's prerequisite that there be no ade-
quate remedy at Law,464 and Equity'S expansion and contraction of 
the jury right by statute or judicial decision.465 The matter of consti-
tutional law is the preservation of the jury right as it existed at the 
time of the Maryland Constitution's adoption.466 
On their faces, these standards reflect different attitudes to-
wards the constitutional right to jury trial. Three of the standards-
expansion of Equity (and contraction of the jury right) by statute or 
judicial decision,467 the common sense notion that judicial economy 
is better served by trial by a judge than by a jury,468 and Equity'S su-
458. See supra note 14 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 1128-1514 and 
accompanying text. 
459. See Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 
101 HARv. L. REv. 10, 13, 26, 71-72 (1987). 
460. See infra notes 974-1003 and accompanying text. 
461. See infra notes 867-70 and accompanying text. 
462. See infra notes 956-68 and accompanying text. 
463. See infra notes 636-38 and accompanying text. 
464. See infra notes 704-07 and accompanying text. 
465. See infra note 788 and accompanying text. 
466. See infra note 600 and accompanying text. But see infra notes 591-632 and ac-
companying text. 
467. See infra notes 838-39 and accompanying text. 
468. See infra notes 918-19 and accompanying text. 
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periority to Law as a mode of trial,469 obviously restrict the jury 
right. Three of the standards-preservation of the jury right as it 
existed at the time of the constitution's adoption,47o Equity's respect 
for the jury right,471 and Equity's prerequisite that there be no ade-
quate remedy at Law472-are nominally protective of the jury right. 
Thus, instead of having a unifying theme of the right to jury trial 
under the Maryland Constitution, Lynch and Bourne patch to-
gether a theory based on a variety of inconsistent standards from 
different sources. 
The principled discretionary theory suffers from two additional 
defects. Each aspect of Lynch and Bourne's theory restricts, rather 
than protects, the right to jury trial. Each aspect of their theory is 
also contrary to many of the usual ways of interpreting the Mary-
land Constitution. Those criticisms will now be considered in detail. 
A. Trial Judges' Discretion 
The first aspect of the principled discretionary theory advanced 
by Lynch and Bourne is the notion that the right to a jury trial is 
within the discretion of Maryland trial judges473 who are to be 
guided by specified standards. This idea is not protective of the 
right to trial by jury and is contrary to accepted methods of inter-
preting the Constitution. 
1. Not Protective of the Jury Right 
The idea of allowing trial judges the discretion, subject to cer-
tain standards, to determine whether a trial should be by judge or 
by jury may not fully protect the constitutional right to a jury trial. 
Lynch and Bourne recognize that judicial discretion may erode the 
jury right, at least where standards for exercising that discretion are 
undefined and where appellate review is limited to abuse of discre-
tion.474 That erosion is particularly likely because of the bias held by 
469. See infra notes 1104-06 and accompanying text. 
470. See infra notes 531-90 and accompanying text. 
471. See infra note 633 and accompanying text. But see infra notes 685-93 and ac-
companying text. 
472. But see infra notes 719-86 and accompanying text. 
473. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 326; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 
44; LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 328, 330 n.191, 331; see also Bourne & 
Lynch, supra note 5, at 34, 29, 4647, 59, 77. But cJ. LYNCH & BOURNE, supra 
note 3, at 331 (stating that the discretion of trial judges must be restricted in 
some circumstances to protect the right to trial by jury); see also Bourne & 
Lynch, supra note 5, at 29, 44, 47. 
474. See supra notes 262-66 and accompanying text. 
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many trial judges against trial by jury.475 
As developed below, Lynch and Bourne try to define the stan-
dards which should guide judicial discretion in determining 
whether trial should be by judge or jury. However, their definition 
does not protect the jury right. Moreover, their position is contrary 
to discernible trends in state and federal law to curtail judicial dis-
cretion regarding the jury right. In Higgins v. Bames,476 the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland described judicial discretion and quoted the 
Supreme Court in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westovef77 for the proposi-
tion that "such discretion is very narrowly limited and must, when-
ever possible, be exercised to preserve jury trial. "478 Maryland trial 
judges have traditionally had substantial discretion concerning the 
conduct of a trial,479 including determinations as to whether a case 
is equitable and triable by a judge, or legal and, thus, more prop-
erly tried by a jury.480 
475. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 58-59; see also id. at 2-3. But if. infra note 
681 and accompanying text (noting that judges generally favor retention, not 
abolition, of the jury trial). 
476. 310 Md. 532, 551 n.12, 530 A.2d 724, 733 n.12 (1987). 
477. 359 U.S. 500, 510 (1959). 
478. Higgins, 310 Md. at 544, 530 A.2d at 730; see also LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 
3, at 331. 
479. See generally Pitts v. Pitts, 181 Md. 182, 190-91, 29 A.2d 300, 304 (1942) (dic-
tum) (consolidation of cases); Mead v. Tydings, 133 Md. 608, 612, 105 A. 863, 
864 (1919) (dictum) (continuance of proceedings); Connor v. Celanese Fi-
bers Co., 40 Md. App. 452, 459, 392 A.2d 116, 120 (1978), overruled on other 
grounds by Eastern Stainless Steel v. Nicholson, 60 Md. App. 659, 670, 484 
A.2d 296, 301 (1984), a/I'd, 306 Md. 492, 510 A.2d 248 (1986) (dictum) (sep-
arate trial order). 
480. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 44 & n.280; Brown, supra note 85, at 
477-48, 465 (1980). See generally LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 328, 330 
n.191; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 16, 57, 66. 
Thus, the determination of whether a case is an equitable one or a legal 
one might be of the same variety as the application of a procedural rule to a 
particular factual situation. See Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Samuel R. Ros- _ 
off, Ltd., 195 Md. 421, 73 A.2d 461 (1950). However, it is not clear to what 
extent the determination of whether a case was equitable or legal was a mat-
ter for the -discretion of the trial judge. In part, this uncertainty is a result of 
the different contexts in which the determination was made. For instance, a 
judge's discretion may be limited because the scope of Equity may be over-
shadowed by a defendant's right to a jury trial. See Bourne & Lynch, supra 
note 5, at 31-32, for a review of cases holding that Equity should not have 
exercised jurisdiction when it deprived the defendant of the jury trial to 
which he otherwise would have been entitled. Adding to the confusion is the 
fact that the line between Law and Equity is slowly evaporating. For instance, 
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even where there is an adequate remedy at Law, Equity may still exercise ju-
risdiction. For a discussion of cases allowing Equity courts to support the ju-
risdiction of a court of Law, see id. at 37-44. 
Even the characterization of issues as either legal or equitable guides 
the judge's decision. See id. at 47-50 (noting that Law and Equity have con-
current jurisdiction in declaratory judgment situations); id. at 51-53 (typi-
cally, claims of title to land are treated as legal); id. at 53-55 (recission and 
restitution based upon fraud is handled by a court of Law because merger 
overcomes the shortcomings of an Equity court alone hearing the case). Fur-
ther confusion arises when Equity "cleans up" legal claims. See id. at 55-71. 
The compatibility of the defenses and replications available between the two 
courts also may direct a judge's decision toward one court as opposed to an-
other. See id. at 29, 34, 64 n.412. The judge may also have less discretion 
when determining the appropriateness of dismissing or transferring a case to 
a court that lacked jurisdiction originally. See id. at 72-73 (noting a judge has 
less discretion because transfer from Equity to Law is mandated for various 
questions of fact). A judge'S decision to refer an equitable suit to a Law 
court is disfavored. See id. at 35-35, 44 n.284 (noting abolition of advisory ju-
ries in Equity). Some issues, however, are individually triable by jury. See id. 
at 72. Also, the judge's decision may be facilitated by the fact that Maryland 
courts maintain, as much as possible, the separation of legal and equitable 
claims. See id. at 34. 
The classification of a claim as either legal or equitable is also made 
more difficult by the traditional complexities involved in distinguishing 
among matters of discretion, law, and fact, and in deciding among applica-
ble standards of appellate review. Of course, deciding whether the nature of 
a case is a matter of discretion or is instead a question of law or a mixed 
question of law and fact is itself a question of law, fully reviewable upon ap-
peal. See Emory v. Faith, 113 Md. 253, 256-57, 77 A. 386, 387 (1910) (noting 
that no appeal lies from an order determining a matter committed to the 
discretion of the lower court; the appellate court decides whether the 
judge'S decision was within that discretion and whether that discretion was 
so exercised as not to impair the established rights of a party). 
There are cases suggesting that the scope of Equity jurisdiction or the 
requirements of the constitutional right to jury trial are questions of law for 
determination by the trial judge. Cf Capron v. Devries, 83 Md. 220, 223-24, 
34 A. 251, 251-52 (1986) (holding statutory Equity jurisdiction existed, not-
withstanding the jury right); Spangler v. Dan A. Sprosty Bag Co., 183 Md. 
166,174,36 A.2d 685, 689 (1944) (holding jurisdiction lies in Equity because 
of its more flexible and adaptive remedies). But if. McCoy v. Johnson, 70 
Md. 490, 490-92, 17 A.2d 387, 387 (1989) (holding Equity had no jurisdiction 
because of the jury right); Clorius v. Watkins, 203 Md. 546, 548-52, 102 A.2d 
274, 275-77 (1954) (holding Equity had no jurisdiction because there was an 
adequate remedy at Law). Thus, the determination might be of the same va-
riety as the construction of a statute in a case that required the court to de-
termine whether a sled was a vehicle. See generally Moon v. Weeks, 25 Md. 
App. 322, 333-36, 333 A.2d 635, 64143 (1975) (holding a sled is a vehicle as 
opposed to a motor vehicle, which made it subject to the state's vehicle 
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Presumably, a trial judge's determination that a case should not 
be tried by jury was reviewable by an appellate court under an 
abuse of discretion standard.481 That appellate review was not pro-
laws). If the determination is a question of law, it would be fully reviewable 
on appeal. See Rohrbaugh v. Estate of Stem, 305 Md. 443, 447 n.2, 505 A.2d 
113, 115 n.2 (1986) (holding lower courts' interpretations of law are af-
forded no presumption of correctness). 
Other cases suggest that the determination is a mixed question of law 
and fact for the trial judge. See, e.g., Moore v. McAllister, 216 Md. 497, 505-
11, 141 A.2d 176, 181-83 (1958) (reasoning that whether Equity has jurisdic-
tion is in essence a determination of whether the party seeking equitable re-
lief is entitled to it on the merits under the historic principles of Equity). 
Thus, the determination might be of the same variety as the application of 
the constitution to a case determining whether or not a motion picture was 
obscene. See gencraUy Wagonheim v. Maryland State Bd. of Censors, 255 Md. 
297, 305-06, 258 A.2d 240, 244-45 (1969), a/I'd sub nom. Grove Press, Inc. v. 
Maryland State Bd. of Censors, 401 U.S. 480 (1971). If the determination is a 
mixed question of law and fact, the standard of appellate review the court 
would probably apply would be the full independent review normally af-
forded determinations of constitutional fact, rather than the deferential 
clearly erroneous standard afforded to review of facts tried by a trial judge. 
See Wagonheim, 255 Md. 297 at 306, 258 A.2d at 244. 
Even if the determination of whether a case was an equitable one or a 
legal one is for the discretion of the trial judge, that discretion varies. Only 
in some cases is it absolute and not open to review. See Newcomer v. Miller, 
166 Md. 675, 680-81, 172 A. 242, 244 (1934). The trial judge's discretion is 
not absolute where its exercise invades established rights. See id.; if. Bourne 
& Lynch, SUPRA note 5, at 23 (stating that in the federal courts, Beacon re-
quires that judicial discretion be limited by the constitutional jury right); id. 
at 46 n.295 (stating that a few states have adopted a rule similar to Beacon). 
In any event, an appellate court reviewing the exercise of a trial judge's 
discretion in determining whether a case is an equitable one or a legal one 
may, as a practical matter, require a statement of reasons supporting the de-
termination. If no reasons are stated, the appellate court may find it difficult 
to affirm that exercise of discretion. If reasons supporting the determination 
are stated, the appellate court may review those reasons to see that the trial 
judge's discretion was not abused. Cf Canterbury Riding Condominium v. 
Chesapeake Investors, Inc., 66 Md. App. 635, 648-53, 505 A.2d 858, 865-67 
(1986) (discussing discretion in certifying as final a judgment as part of a 
multiple claim and multiple party action). But see Allnutt v. State, 59 Md. 
App. 694, 478 A.2d 321 (1984) (stating that in a tax court proceeding, where 
no right to jury trial exists, but where a statute provides that the court in its 
discretion may submit issues of fact to a court of Law for trial by jury on a 
party's request, the tax court did not abuse its discretion by not submitting 
issues without stating reasons). 
481. See Brown, supra note 85, at 447-48, 464, 465; see also Moore v. McAllister, 216 
Md. 497, 512, 141 A.2d 176, 184 (1958) (stating in dicta that a court might 
abuse its discretion by raising lack of equity jurisdiction and dismissing a 
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tective of the jury right, however. First, the abuse of discretion stan-
dard is a very lenient one, requiring substantial deference to the de-
cision of the trial judge.482 The trial judge's choice regarding the 
mode of trial may have reflected hostility toward the jUry483 and was 
often, according to Lynch and Bourne, based upon principles which 
provided little guidance.484 Second, the trial judge's determination 
of the mode of trial was not immediately appealable and may have 
eluded review altogether. The decision to conduct a trial by judge 
or jury was interlocutory, not a final decision from which an imme-
diate appeal might be taken before conclusion of the case in 
chief.485 That the determination of the mode of trial may have 
eluded review is most apparent where the party desiring jury trial 
prevailed in a trial by judge.486 Even where the party seeking a jury 
trial lost in a trial by judge, the error would be harmless if the ap-
pellate court concluded that a jury would have reached the same 
decision.487 The error might also elude review if the jury right was 
waived by the parties. In that event, the mode of trial would have 
been reviewed on appeal only if the trial court raised the issue sua-
case after a defendant has waived the question of jurisdiction). See generally 
Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 59 & n.374. 
482. See Narthwestern Nat'[ Ins., 195 Md. at 436, 73 A.2d at 467; cf. supra note 480 
(stating that discretion varies). Only in some cases is discretion absolute and 
closed from review. But cf. Narthwestern Nat'[ Ins., 195 Md. at 436, 73 A.2d at 
467 (noting that the equitable/legal determination may be outside the trial 
judge'S discretion; it may be a question of law fully reviewable upon appeal, 
or a mixed question of law and fact, or constitutional fact, subject to inde-
pendent appellate review). 
483. See supra note 475 and accompanying text. 
484. See supra note 265 and accompanying text. 
485. See Ex parte Johnson, 215 Md. 391, 138 A.2d 347 (1958). Some doubt about 
this proposition developed because of the general principle that a decision 
settling a constitutional right is an immediately appealable final judgment. 
See Condon v. Gore, 89 Md. 230, 234, 42 A. 900, 902 (1899). However, the 
Condon principle was eroded and then, sub silentio, overruled. See Old Cedar 
Dev. Corp. v. Jack Parker Constr. Corp., 320 Md. 626, 579 A.2d 275 (1990) 
(holding that an order striking a demand for a jury trial was not immedi-
ately appealable as a "final judgment" under the "collateral order doc-
trine"). Old Cedar did leave open the possibility that denial of the jury right 
might be reviewable by mandamus under extraordinary circumstances. See id. 
at 633 n.2, 579 A.2d at 279 n.2 (citing Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Maya-
camas Corp., 485 U.S. 271 (1988». 
486. Cf. Master Royalties Corp. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 235 Md. 74, 96, 200 A.2d 
652, 664 (1964) (holding that grant of jury trial was not prejudicial error). 
487. But see Brown, supra note 85, at 44748 (denial of jury trial may be prejudicial 
error). 
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sponte.488 Thus, that aspect of Lynch and Bourne's principled discre-
tionary theory which states that the jury right should be left to the 
trial judge's guided discretion is not protective of the right to jury 
trial. 
2. Contrary to the Usual Ways of Interpreting the Constitution 
The idea of leaving the determination of the right to jury trial 
to the discretion of trial judges is also contrary to accepted notions 
of constitutional construction.489 This judicial discretion is contrary 
to the nature of a written constitution-specific, enforceable, and 
supreme.490 The constitutional jury right aims to restrain govern-
mental power. Leaving the jury right to the discretion of trial judges 
frustrates this larger purpose. The constitutional right to trial by 
jury is clearly not a matter properly left to judicial discretion. 
Moreover, such judicial discretion is also contrary to the text of 
the constitution. The principal jury right provision provides for a 
"right" of trial by jury that is "inviolably preserved. "491 While the 
text of the original jury right provision may have left the right sulr 
ject to modification by the judiciary,492 that original provision has 
been supplemented by the principal jury right provision.493 
The breadth of judicial discretion urged by Lynch and Bourne 
is also contrary to the history of the Maryland Constitution. In En-
gland, the jury right was intended in part to function as a check on 
royal power.494 In Maryland, the purpose of the right to a jury trial 
was to put the right beyond the reach of the legislature and, pre-
sumably, the judiciary.495 
Such judicial discretion may be contrary to the structure of gov-
ernment. This discretion may be used to eliminate trial by a jury, 
which may otherwise soften the harshness of legal doctrines and 
serve as a check on the trial judge.496 The standard of appellate re-
view of a trial judge'S discretion also limits the scope of appellate re-
488. See Moore v. McAllister, 261 Md. 497, 511, 141 A.2d 176, 184 (1958). 
489. See generally supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
490. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text. 
491. See supra note 8; see also supra notes 48, 52-69 and accompanying text. 
492. See supra notes 4045 and accompanying text. 
493. See supra note 491 and accompanying text. 
494. See 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 4-7, 17-19, 4041; see also supra notes 97-100 
and accompanying text. 
495. See supra notes 9, 21, 117 and accompanying text. 
496. See supra notes 160.62, and accompanying text. 
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view, another check on the trial judge.497 
Such judicial discretion is contrary to current doctrine in Mary-
land. As we have seen, by following the Supreme Court's opinion in 
Beacon, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has curtailed judicial dis-
cretion to protect the jury right.498 That doctrine has clarified an 
ambiguity as to whether a trial judge has discretion to determine 
whether a case was equitable or legal and, thus, triable by a jury.499 
Such judicial discretion may be contrary to prudential con-
cerns. Absent clear proof, the jury benefits judges and our justice 
system by legitimizing outcomes by being a "lightning rod" for ani-
mosity, and by providing a "black. box" decision.5°O Those benefits 
are lost if a trial judge's discretion is exercised to deny trial by jury. 
Judicial discretion is contrary to some ethical matters. Subject-
ing the determination of the right to jury trial to the trial judges' 
discretion may violate equal protection. Where the determination is 
not made on a rational basis, the judge'S decision a fortiori fails to 
meet the strict scrutiny standard required for an infringement of a 
fundamental right.50l Additionally, a trial judge . exercising the jury's 
functions of fact-finding and applying law to fact violates the princi-
ple of limited government by eroding an express limitation on gov-
ernmental power.502 Similarly, the trial judge eliminates popular par-
ticipation in government by exercising jury functions, thereby 
violating the principle of government by the people.503 When exer-
cising jury functions, a judge essentially eliminates the jury, a safe-
guard for the liberty of the people. In doing so, a judge might be 
violating the principle of government for the people.504 The trial 
judge, exercising jury functions, may also violate the principle of 
free political exchange.505 
497. Cf supra note 320 and accompanying text (discussing appellate court review 
of jury verdicts). 
498. See supra notes 476-78 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 184, 187-88, 
189-97 and accompanying text. 
499. See supra note 480 and accompanying text. 
500. See supra notes 312-15, 320 and accompanying text. 
501. See supra notes 365-73 and accompanying text. 
502. See supra notes 376-82, 390 and accompanying text. 
503. See supra notes 391, 404 and accompanying text. 
504. See supra notes 405-11 and accompanying text. 
505. See supra notes 443-52 and accompanying text. 
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B. Strict Historical Test 
The second aspect of Lynch and Bourne's principled discre-
tionary theory is that "Maryland's Constitution preserves the right 
to trial by jury as it existed at the time of the adoption of the Con-
stitution vis a vis the scope of equity."506 Thus, Lynch and Bourne 
suggest that federapo7 and Maryland508 courts have used, or should 
use, a static historical test in determining the right to a jury trial. 
That is, if a matter would have been heard at Law by a jury at the 
time the Maryland Constitution was adopted, it should so be heard 
now; if a matter would have been heard in Equity by a judge, it 
should so be heard now. 
Lynch and Bourne's strict historical test may be criticized on 
three grounds. First, the test is unworkable. Problems arise from the 
use of history generally, and the history of Law and Equity in 
particular. 
General problems of arguing from history include the nature 
of history and the motivations of those invoking an historical argu-
ment. Regarding the nature of history, a strict historical test would, 
presumably, be based on patterns,509 not on isolated occurrences. 
However, gleaning patterns from practices, which may be patter-
nless,510 may be based on fiat,511 not on history. Of course, history 
506. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 59; see also LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, 
at 305, 312. 
507. See Bourne &: Lynch, supra note 5, at 11, 15, 29. Elsewhere, of course, Bourne 
& Lynch recognize that the effect of Beacon and its progeny has been to 
soften the strictness of the historical test in favor of the jury right. See id. at 
20-29; LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 313, 330, 337. 
508. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 305, 312; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 
5, at 36 & n.232, 59. Elsewhere, of course, Bourne & Lynch recognize that 
the effect of Higgins, relying on Beacon and other federal precedents, may be 
to soften the strictness of the historical test in favor of the jury right. See 
LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 334-35, 337. 
509. The use of history is not easy even when only a single item, not a pattern of 
occurrences, is considered. See, e.g., Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REv. 
l325, l327 (1984). The inquiry includes the following questions: What is his-
tory? Is this item history? If this item is history, what is the item's meaning? 
510. Cf Edith Guild Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARv. 
L. REv. 289, 336 (1966) (noting that judge-jury relations in the l3 original 
states at the time of the adoption of the Seventh Amendment were nearly 
patternless). Another commentator has noted a dispute about the early prac-
tice of the chancellor's referral of issues of fact to a Law court for jury trial. 
See Brown, supra note 85, at 458-60. 
511. Cj., e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 544 (1985) 
(noting that reliance on history to determine what state governmental func-
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may be perceived as a process, not a set of occurrences.512 
Regarding motivation, history may be perceived as establishing 
a particular set of results, for example, the duplication of traditional 
judge or jury trial practices, or as establishing a principle such as 
the preservation or denial of the right to a jury trial.513 Even if his-
tory is used to establish a particular set of results-a strict historical 
test- that test may be used, depending upon the motivation of the 
user, to preserve the jury right or deny it. As will be demonstrated, 
as often as not, the test is not used.514 Moreover, when it is used, 
the historical test generally causes denial of the right.515 
Problems arise from the history of Law and Equity, particularly 
in construing a strict historical test as of 1776. These problems in-
clude the evolutionary' nature of our civil justice system, the uncer-
tainty of the boundary between Law and Equity, and the encroach-
ment on Law by Equity since 1776, notwithstanding the test. 
Coordinate systems of Law and Equity were just one stage in 
the evolution of our Anglo-American civil justice system. Earlier 
stages included a system of justice that was basically administra-
tive,516 followed by the development of the common law,517 and then 
by the development of a supplementary system of Equity.518 The co-
ordinate systems of Law and Equity as they existed in 1776519 have 
been largely replaced by a system which has merged Law and Equity 
in most instances.52o In view of that evolution, a strict historical test 
of the right to jury trial is arbitrary in several respects. First, that 
test freezes the right at a particular time, without regard to earlier 
tions were "governmental" and therefore immune from federal governmen-
tal regulation, and which functions were "proprietary" and therefore not im-
mune, furnishes an arbitrary standard because of the historical continuum of 
practices from before the American Revolution the present). 
512. See CHARLES A MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 27-28 
(1969); if. Henderson, supra, note 510,' at 336 (the common law is a system, 
not just a set of rules). 
513. See John C. McCoid, II, Procedural Reform and the Right to Jury Trial: A Study of 
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 116 U. PA. L. REv, 1, 10-15 (1967); see also 
Wolfram, supra note 120, at 735. 
514. See infra notes 532-90 and accompanying text. 
515. See infra notes 539-42, 546 and accompanying text. 
516. See THEODORE PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw 15-16, 81, 
355 (5th ed. 1956). 
517. See id. at 20-21,27. 
518. See id. at 673, 675, 681, 684. 
519. See id. at 681-82, 684, 692. 
520. See MD. RULE 2-301; see also FED. R CIY. P. 2. 
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and later developments in the relationship between Law and Equity. 
Second, the choice by litigants between Law and Equity might have 
been based not only on whether a judge or a jury was the trier of 
fact, but upon a number of other considerations, such as avoidance 
of multiplicity of suits, varying rules of evidence, and the availability 
of particular remedies.521 However, the merged procedure has abol-
ished many of the considerations for choosing between Law and Eq-
uity.522 Third, the selection of the year 1776 as a benchmark is 
pro blematic. 523 
The boundary between Law and Equity in 1776, as at other 
times, was uncertain.524 The distinction between Law and Equity, has 
often been difficult to discern because of overlaps between the two 
systems, because of Law and Equity's borrowings from each other, 
and because of the development of new rights and remedies.525 
Notwithstanding the strict historical test, Equity has encroached 
on Law since 1776. The traditional reference by the chancellor to a 
Law court for a jury trial of disputed issues of fact has been abol-
ished,526 the equitable prerequisite that there be no adequate rem-
edy at law has been eroded,527 and the dean-up doctrine has been 
extended.528 Apparently, these encroachments have come without 
challenge to the right to jury triaP29 . 
Thus, Lynch and Bourne's strict historical test is unworkable.· 
As developed below, the federal and Maryland courts are now tak-
521. See JAMES ET AL., supra note 1, at 418-20. Other considerations which might 
have influenced a litigant'S choice between Law and Equity procedures in-
clude different officials (judge or chancellor), different procedures for com-
mencement of actions (summons or subpoena), pleadill:gs, joinder of claims 
and parties, discovery, presentation of evidence (orally or in writing), final 
order (judgment or decree), execution (levy or contempt), scope of appel-
late review, different grounds for relief (of right or by discretion), and dif-
ferent principles of adjudication (precedent or "reason and conscience"). See 
generally GINSBERG, supra note 86; MILLER, supra note 282; PHELPS, supra note 
86. 
522. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 319-20, 329-30; Bourne & Lynch, supra 
note 5, at 45 n.292, 52, 54-55, 76. 
523. See infra notes 602-08 and accompanying text. 
524. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 326; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 
33, 44-46; see also id. at 29, 34. 
525. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 45-46. 
526. See infra note 562 and accompanying text. 
527. See infra note 563 and accompanying text. 
528. See infra note 564 and accompanying text. 
529. See Brown, supra note 85, at 451, 469. 
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ing a more dynamic historical approach.530 More importantly, for 
the purposes of this Article, Lynch and Bourne's strict historical test 
may be criticized because it is not protective of the jury right and 
because it is contrary to accepted constitutional principles. 
1. Not Protective of the Jury Right 
A strict historical test is nominally protective of the jury right. 
That is, if a matter would have been heard at Law by a jury at the 
time the Maryland Constitution was adopted, it should be heard by 
a jury now. However, Lynch and Bourne use the strict historical test 
for determining whether trial should be by judge or jury because 
this test tends to restrict rather than protect the right to jury trial. 53! 
The test is like a college quota system originally used to assure the 
admission of a minimum number of minority students, but later 
used to cap the number of minority admissions. 
Lynch and Bourne cite a number of Maryland532 and federal533 
cases as authorities for a strict historical test. The Maryland cases in-
clude Higgins v. Barnes,534 Impala Platinum Ltd. v. Impala Sales 
(US.A.), Inc.,535 Pennsylvania ex rel. Warren v. Warren,536 and Fooks' Ex-
ecutors v. Ghingher.537 A strict historical test in Maryland courts, ac-
cording to Lynch and Bourne, would freeze the right to jury trial in 
Law actions as of 1776, the date of the first constitutional jury 
right.538 
There is language in Higgins, citing Knee v. Baltimore City Passen-
ger Railway,539 supporting a strict historical test.540 However, Higgins 
is not a good example of the use of a strict historical test. There, 
530. See infra notes 628-29 and accompanying text. 
531. But cf. Brown, supra note 85, at 457-69 (discussing the strict historical test 
used to protect the jury right). 
532. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 312 n.48; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 
5, at 33, 36 & n.232. 
533. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 11 n.46, 15. 
534. 310 Md. 532, 530 A.2d 724 (1987). 
535. 283 Md. 296, 389 A.2d 887 (1978). 
536. 204 Md. 467, 105 A.2d 488 (1954). 
537. 172 Md. 612, 192 A. 782 (1937). 
538. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 305, 312; see also Bourne & Lynch, supra 
note 5, at 33, 36, 59. See generally Fleming James, Jr., Right to a Jury Trial in 
Civil Actions, 72 YALE LJ. 655, 655 & n.4 (1963) (providing that a state consti-
tution generally preserves the right to jury trial as it existed in English his-
tory at the date of that state's first constitution). 
539. 87 Md. 623, 40 A. 890 (1898). 
540. See Higgins, 310 Md. at 542-43, 530 A.2d at 729. 
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Barnes sued Higgins for specific performance of a contract. Higgins 
answered and counterclaimed for damages for breach of the same 
contract, and demanded a jury trial. The court of appeals assumed 
that because specific performance was historically an action in Eq-
uity, once equitable jurisdiction attached, the entire case would 
have been determined by the judge and not a jury. Thus, Equity's 
"clean-up" jurisdiction would have included Higgins's answer and 
counterclaim for damages for breach of contract, legal issues histor-
ically triable by jury. However, the court of appeals held that, after 
merger of Law and Equity, the constitutional right to jury trial re-
quired that the legal issues in Higgins's answer and counterclaim 
must be heard by a jury, before the judge decided upon the equita-
ble specific performance claim. Because a jury trial was granted as 
to certain legal issues in a context which would have been heard 
historically by the judge exercising equitable clean-up jurisdiction, 
Higgins did not use a strict historical test, although the case was pro-
tective of the jury right. 
There is language in Knee supporting a strict historical test.54 ! 
Knee is also a good example of the use of a strict historical test, but 
in a different context. Knee claimed that a statute, requiring that 
costs of his earlier trial be paid before a new trial began, deprived 
him of the right to jury trial in the new action. The court of ap-
peals upheld the statute because a similar common-law practice an-
tedated the Maryland Constitution.542 Thus, Knee used a strict histor-
ical test, not to distinguish between actions at Law triable by a jury 
and suits in Equity not triable by a jury, but to determine what reg-
ulations of the jury right were permitted. Knee's use of a strict his-
torical test in that context was used to restrict the jury right. 
There is language in Impala supporting a strict historical test.543 
Nevertheless, Impala is not a good example of the use of a strict his-
torical test. In Impala, the plaintiff sued at Law for contract dam-
ages. One of two defendants counterclaimed, asserting a number of 
legal and equitable claims and remedies. Presumably, a case com-
bining legal and equitable issues could only have been heard in Eq-
uity; once equitable jurisdiction attached, the entire case would 
have been determined by the judge. When the plaintiff objected to 
trial by jury, the defendant was allowed to strike from the counter-
541. See Knee, 87 Md. at 625, 40 A at 891. 
542. See id. at 632-33, 40 Aat 892. 
543. See Impala Platinum Ltd. v. Impala Sales (U.S.A.), Inc., 283 Md. 296, 320-21, 
389 A2d 887, 901 (1978). 
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claim all relief other than the legal remedy of damages. The verdict 
for defendant on the counterclaim was upheld on appeal as prop-
erly tried by a jury. Plaintiff's objection, that defendant was allowed 
to recover damages on an equitable claim for breach of fiduciary re-
lationship, was rejected because that issue was held to be one which 
might be tried at Law as equitable estoppeP44 or fraud.545 Because a 
jury trial was granted as to issues in a context which would have 
been heard historically by the judge, Impala did not use a strict his-
torical test. Yet, Impala was protective of the jury right. 
There is language in Warren supporting a strict historical test,546 
and that case is also a good example of the use of such a test. War-
ren was an action for support of wife and children brought at Law, 
with a demand for jury trial. The court of appeals held that the ac-
tion should have been brought in Equity, where such actions had 
been tried in Maryland as early as 1727. Warren used a strict histori-
cal test, but used it to restrict the jury right. 
There is language in Fooks' supporting a historical test, but not 
a strict historical test.547 The receiver of an insolvent bank sought to 
liquidate the bank's assets by enforcing its stockholders' liability 
under an assessment statute enacted in 1910. In a related case, Al-
lender v. Ghingher,548 the court of appeals held that two of the re-
ceiver's suits against the stockholders in Equity were improper, 
among other reasons, because joinder rules at Law provided an ade-
quate remedy precluding Equity jurisdiction based on multiplicity, 
and because of the constitutional right to jury trial. Other stock-
holders in Fooks' then claimed that a decree entered against them 
several years before in a third suit was also void as outside the juris-
diction of Equity. The court of appeals concluded that because of 
the "vague and shadowy" distinctions between Law and Equity, the 
decree was not void, but only voidable. Being several years after the 
time for seeking appellate review had run, the stockholders' chal-
lenge to the decree was untimely. 
544. Apparently, equitable estoppel could not be heard on the Law side until 
long after 1776. See 1888 Md. Laws ch. 547. 
545. Apparently, fraud historically could be heard either in Law or in Equity, de-
pending upon the relief sought. See Impala, 283 Md. at 321 n.ll, 389 A.2d at 
902 n.ll; see also Richardson v. Stillinger, 12 G. &J. 477 (Md. 1842). 
546. See Pennsylvania ex reL Warren v. Warren, 204 Md. 467, 474, 105 A.2d 488, 491 
(1954). 
547. See Fooks' Ex'rs v. Ghinger, 172 Md. 612, 625, 192 A. 782, 788 (1937). 
548. 170 Md. 156, 183 A. 610 (1936). 
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Apparently, no claim to the jury right was made in Fooks', as it 
had been in Allender, although the issue was similar-the respective 
jurisdictions of Law and Equity. However, a strict historical test 
would not have helped the stockholders in Fooks' and Allender. The 
assessment statute under which the receiver sued the stockholders 
was not enacted until 1910. Accordingly, no right to jury trial ex-
isted in 1776. Fooks', therefore, could not have used a strict histori-
cal test. Although the related case, Allender, was protective of the 
jury right, no claim to that right was made in Fooks'. Had such a 
claim been made as part of the stockholders' belated claim in 
Fooks: that case would not have been protective of the right. 
Thus, four out of five of these Maryland authorities-Higgins, 
Knee, Impala, and Warren-have language supporting a strict histori-
cal test. The fifth, Fooks', has language supporting a historical test, 
but not a strict historical test. However, three out of the five author-
itie&-Higgins, Impala, and Fooks '-do not actually use a strict histori-
cal test. Of the two authorities that do use a strict historical test, 
Knee and Warren, both restrict the jury right. Knee uses the test not 
to distinguish between Law and Equity, but to determine what regu-
lation of the jury right is permitted. Thus, while Lynch and 
Bourne's Maryland authorities have language supporting a strict his-
torical test, more often than not, the test is not applied. Further-
more, when the strict historical test is applied, it is used to restrict 
the jury right. 
Many other Maryland authorities not cited by Lynch and 
Bourne do not use a strict historical approach. Some of those au-
thorities ignore a strict historical test, while protecting the jury 
right. By statute in the nineteenth century and by court rule in the 
twentieth century, ancillary injunctive relief was provided in actions 
at Law; thus, jury trial of legal issues could be had in cases which 
earlier could only have been heard in Equity.549 Similarly, by court 
rule in the twentieth century a number of other equitable proce-
dures, including discovery, class actions, and intervention, were pro-
vided in actions at Law.550 By court rule in the twentieth century 
certain issues in interpleader actions were specifically permitted to 
be transferred to Law courts for trial by jury.55) By statute in the 
twentieth century the jury right was preserved in certain new pro-
549. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
550. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 72-73. 
551. See id. at 73-74. 
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ceedings, for example, declaratory judgment actions.552 
Other cases and authorities refuse to apply a strict historical 
test, while restricting the jury right. Among the cases are Attorney 
Grievance Commission v. Kerpelman553 and Houston v. Lloyd's Consumer 
Acceptance Corp.554 Kerpelman denied an attorney a right to jury trial 
in disciplinary proceedings because the Maryland Rules provided 
that such proceedings should be governed by rules which applied in 
Equity. However, the Court of Appeals of Maryland cited no histori-
cal authority that attorney disciplinary proceedings were equitable 
in 1776, although the court did cite later precedents from federal 
and state courts. The court also noted that a statutory procedure 
for referring factual issues from Equity Law courts for jury determi-
nation had been abolished.555 Houston upheld a court rule requiring 
a written election for jury trial, although no such requirement ex-
isted at the time the Maryland Constitution was adopted. Analogiz-
ing the requirement to the rule of costs in Knee v. Baltimore City Pas-
senger Railwaf56 and the federal jury demand requirement,557 the 
court of appeals upheld the rule as a re1asonable regulation of the 
right to jury trial. 
There are still other authorities that refuse to apply a strict his-
torical test, while restricting the jury right. Bringe v. Collins558 upheld 
the practice of providing a jury trial only on appeal to a circuit 
court from a landlord's action in a district court to recover prop-
erty. The court of appeals upheld the practice, although the action 
was historically one at Law which the right to jury trial attached, al-
though a 1793 statute provided for jury trial in the initial proceed-
ings, and although the jury in the initial proceedings was not abol-
ished by statute until 1886. Summary judgment559 and directed 
verdict560 also have been approved, although they did not exist in 
1776. 
552. See id. at 47-50; if. MD. CODE ANN .. FAM. LAw §§ 5-1026(a), 5-1027(b) (1991) 
(paternity proceedings). 
553. 288 Md. 341, 420 A.2d 940 (1980). 
554. 241 Md. 10,215 A.2d 192 (1965). 
555. See infra note 586 and accompanying text. 
556. 87 Md. 623,40 A. 890 (1898). See generally supra notes 54142 and accompany-
ing text. 
557. See FED. R Cw. P. 38. 
558. 274 Md. 338, 347 n.3, 335 A.2d 670, 676 n.3 678-79 (1975). 
559. See Fletcher v. Flournoy, 198 Md. 54, 81 A.2d 232 (1951). 
560. See Frush v. Brooks, 204 Md. 315, 323-24, 104 A.2d 624, 627-28 (1954). 
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One commentator noted three other developments. First, the 
eighteenth century practice of a chancellor in Equity referring dis-
puted issues of fact to a Law court for jury triaJ561 became discre-
tionary in the nineteenth century, and was abolished by court rule 
in the twentieth century.562 Second, the equitable prerequisite of no 
adequate remedy at Law was eroded by a nineteenth century statute 
and by a twentieth century court rule that damages at Law were in-
adequate unless the party against whom damages were sought 
posted a bond or otherwise showed property ownership from which 
the damages could be satisfied.563 Third, equitable clean-up jurisdic-
tion grew after 1776.564 
The federal cases Lynch and Bourne cite, including Baltimore & 
Carolina Line Inc. v. Redman,565 Dimick v. Schiedt,566 and Liberty Oil Co. 
v. Condon National Bank,567 illustrate the strict historical test. Accord-
ing to Lynch and Bourne, a strict historical test in federal court 
would freeze jury trial practice as of 1791, the date of the Seventh 
Amendment.568 
There is language in Redman supporting a strict historical 
test.569 However, given that Redman arose in a different context, that 
case is not a good example of the use of a strict historical test.570 
In Redman, the Supreme Court held that the court of appeals 
had the power to give judgment notwithstanding a jury verdict for a 
plaintiff, and that a judgment notwithstanding the verdict did not 
violate the jury right. The Supreme Court referred to a common-
law practice of a trial judge submitting a case to the jury while re-
561. See infra note 586 and accompanying text. 
562. See Brown, supra note 85, at 458-66; see also Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 
34-35, 44 n.284, 72. 
563. See Brown, supra note 85, at 450, 466-69; see also LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 
3, at 318 n.113. 
564. See Brown, supra note 85, at 470-73; see also JAMES ET AL., supra note 1, at 416-
17 (noting that in 1786, English and then American Equity courts began 
granting legal relief rather than dismissing a case when the basis for equita-
ble jurisdiction failed). 
565. 295 U.S. 654 (1935). 
566. 293 U.S. 474 (1935). 
567. 260 U.S. 235 (1922). 
568. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 312; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 
11, 15, 29. 
569. See Redman, 295 U.S. at 657. 
570. Redman qualified Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co., 228 U.S. 364 (1913), 
which did use a strict historical approach, and used it to protect the jury 
right. See id. at 656. 
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serving a point of law for later decision.571 A commentary on 
Redman has noted that the later decision was made by the court en 
banc at Westminster.572 However, the old common-law practice dif-
fers in at least two respects from the practice approved in Redman. 
First, the trial judge at common law reserved the point for the 
judges en banc; he did not decide it himself.573 In Redman, the trial 
judge reserved the point only until after verdict. He then decided 
the point himself, rejecting the defendant's motion to dismiss and 
motion for directed verdict.574 Second, the judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict at common law came from a court sitting en banc.575 
In Redman, the judgment notwithstanding the verdict came from an 
appellate court, the Supreme Court.576 Thus, Redman dealt not with 
a distinction between Law and Equity, but with the judgment not-
withstanding the verdict, a device with which the judge in a case at 
Law may control the jury. Redman, therefore, arose in a specific con-
text, did not use a strict historical test, and restricted the jury right .. 
There is language in Dimick supporting a strict historical test.577 
Interestingly, Dimick s holding, but not its dictum, is a good example 
of the use of a strict historical test. Like Redman, Dimick arose in a 
specific context. In Dimick, the Supreme Court rejected the additur 
device of granting a new trial if the defendant did not consent to 
an increase in damages. The Court held that additur violated the 
Seventh Amendment because no such practice existed in 1791. 
However, the Court in dictum endorsed the remittitur device of 
granting a new trial if the plaintiff did not consent to a decrease in 
damages. The Court rested its endorsement of remittitur on federal 
practice dating back only to 1822, and on "the practice of some of 
the English judges-a practice which has been condemned .. , by 
every reasoned English decision, both before and after the adoption 
of the federal Constitution," as contrary to common-law princi-
ples.578 Thus, Dimick dealt not with a distinction between Law and 
Equity, but with the conditional new trial, a device by which the 
judge may control the jury in a Law case. Therefore, Dimicks hold-
ing, which rejected additur, used a strict historical test and pro-
571. See id. at 659-60. 
572. See RICHARD H. FIELD ET AL .• CIVIL PROCEDURE 651 (6th ed. 1990). 
573. See Redman, 295 U.S. at 659-60. 
574. See id. at 659. 
575. See supra note 572 and accompanying text. 
576. See Redman, 295 U.S. at 659, 661. 
577. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935). 
578. [d. at 484. 
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tected the jury right. By endorsing remittitur in dictum, however, 
Dimick did not apply a strict historical test, and restricted the jury 
right. 
Liberty Oil contains language supporting a strict historical test,579 
and is a good example of the use of that test. In Liberty Oil, a con-
tract purchaser of oil lands deposited money with a bank pending 
the vendors' proof of titles. Alleging a defect in title, the purchaser 
sued the bank for damages. The bank, claiming that it was a disin-
terested stakeholder and that the vendors had also claimed the de-
posited money, interpleaded the vendors and asked to be 
discharged. 
The Supreme Court upheld the Law and Equity Act of 1915, 
which permitted the bank's use of equitable interpleader defensively 
in an action at Law. The Court held that the defensive interpleader 
under the Act was like historical practice. Under the Act, the judge 
not only had authority to decide the equitable interpleader, but had 
discretion to try any legal issues. Historically, a defendant with an 
equitable defense to a Law action could file a bill in Equity to en-
join the action, determine the equitable defense, and, in the judge's 
discretion, clean up the legal issues. While a jury had been waived 
in writing, the issue was similar, characterizing the case as one at 
Law or one in Equity. Moreover, the Supreme Court in dictum con-
sidered the implications of the Seventh Amendment right. The 
Court held that the case was one in Equity which could be more 
fully reviewed by appeal, rather than one at Law subject to more 
limited review by writ of error. Liberty Oil, therefore, used a strict 
historical test. No claim of jury right was made. Had such a claim 
been made, the case would not have been protective of the right 
because of the judge's discretionary clean-up jurisdiction. 
Thus, all three of these Supreme Court authorities-Redman, 
Dimick, Liberty Oit-have language supporting a strict historical test. 
Redman and Dimick use the test in determining which of the judge's 
devices to control the jury are permitted, but not in distinguishing 
between Law and Equity. The Redman and Dimick dicta do not actu-
ally use a strict historical test. The Dimick and Liberty Oil holdings do 
use a strict historical test. In Dimick, the Court uses the test to pro-
tect the jury right, while in Liberty Oil, the Court uses the test to re-
strict the jury right. Thus, although Lynch and Bourne's Supreme 
Court authorities have language supporting a strict historical test, as 
579. See Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Nat'l Bank, 260 U.S. 235, 243 (1922). 
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often as not, those cases do not apply the test. When the test is ap-
plied, it is used to restrict the jury right. 
In other ways, Lynch and Bourne depart from a strict historical 
test in order to restrict the jury right. They assume that with Equity 
having broad discretion to try all the issues without a jury, in 1776 
virtually any combination of legal and equitable claims could be 
joined.580 In this context, however, Lynch and Bourne's assumption 
is inconsistent with the state of affairs in 1776-the separation of 
Law and Equity;581 the limitations on joinder of legal and equitable 
claims;582 Equity's respect for the jury right;583 Equity's prerequisite 
of no adequate remedy at Law;584 the possibility that Equity's discre-
tion to hear legal issues was very narrowly limited;585 and the power 
of Equity to refer issues of fact to Law courts for trial by jury.586 
Moreover, elements of Lynch and Bourne's restrictive princi-
pled discretionary theory seem inconsistent with a strict historical 
approach given the expansion of Equity by statute or judicial deci-
sion since 1776,587 and the modern notions that judicial economy is 
better served by trial by a judge than trial by a jury588 and that Eq-
uity is superior to Law as a mode of triaP89 This departure from a 
strict historical test may reflect a more dynamic historical ap-
proach-the approximation of pre-merger approach (reflecting de-
velopments up to 1984) Lynch and Bourne take when they actually 
decide the situations in which the jury right applies.590 
580. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 46; see also id. at 54-55, 60, 62,75-77; cf. 
id. at 12-15 (federal practice in 1791); see generally LYNCH & BOURNE, supra 
note 3, at 307. 
581. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 306, 326; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 
5, at 11, 29, 34, 44-45, 55, 64. 
582. See BOURNE & LYNCH, supra note 5, at 34-35, 55, 64. 
583. See infra notes 633-703 and accompanying text. 
584. See infra notes 704-87 and accompanying text. 
585. See James, supra note 538, at 693. 
586. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 307 n.12; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 
5, at 34-35, 72. One commentator described this practice as virtually creating 
a right to have factual issues in Equity resolved by a jury at Law. See Brown, 
supra note 85, at 458-66. 
587. See infra notes 788-89 and accompanying text. 
588. See infra notes 867-955 and accompanying text. 
589. See infra notes 956-1124 and accompanying text. 
590. See infra notes 1128-1514 and accompanying text. 
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2. Contrary to the Usual Ways of Interpreting the Constitution 
A strict historical test is also contrary to many of the usual ways 
of interpreting the constitution. A strict historical test is contrary to 
the nature of a "living Constitution," one to be interpreted by its 
"spirit," not by its "letter. "591 Generally, the constitutional right to 
jury trial should be protected, not restricted, in new circumstances 
such as the development of substantial rights and remedies,592 the 
"borrowing" by Law of procedural devices from Equity such as join-
der and discovery,593 and the merger of Law and Equity.594 
Analogously, changes in jury qualifications and selection since 
the framing of the Maryland Constitution indicate the unworkability 
of a strict historical test in interpreting another aspect of the right 
to jury trial. Shortly after the Maryland Constitution was adopted, 
persons qualifying for jury service were freemen, residents of the 
county having the most wisdom and experience, possessing a free-
hold of fifty acres in the county or possessing property in the state 
worth three hundred pounds or more.595 Selection of jury panels 
. 591. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text; see also McCoid, supra note 513, 
at 11. The inconsistency of constitutionalism with a strict historical test for 
interpreting the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution has 
been noted even by a proponent of that test: 
[B]lind adherence to history would seem to place modem judicial 
administration in an historical strait jacket, controlled by the poli-
cies of a society of 200 years ago. Traditional constitutional analysis 
has never been so limited. Ever since Chief Justice Marshall admon-
ished that it "is a Constitution we are expounding," courts generally 
have been willing to read the broad language of the Constitution to 
account for changing social conditions. A rigid historical approach 
in the interpretation of the seventh amendment would seem to be 
out of step with the more flexible interpretive approaches generally 
employed in delimiting the scope of other constitutional provisions. 
Martin H. Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irration-
ality of Rational Decision Making, 70 Nw. U. L. REv. 486, 487 (1975) (footnote 
omitted). But cf. id. at 517, 531 (stating that the rigid historical approach 
provides flexibility by allowing the legislature to authorize a jury trial). 
592. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 313-15, 337-38; Bourne & Lynch, supra 
note 5, at 45-46. 
593. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 319-20; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, 
at 31, 36, 55-76. 
594. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
595. See Feb. 1777 Md. Laws ch. 15, § 10; Oct. 1777 Md. Laws ch. 16. Apparently, 
the person was required to be 21 years of age or older. See 1797 Md. Laws 
ch. 87, § 5 (age set at 25); cf. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 29 (providing 
that federal courts apply standards of the state in which they sit). 
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was apparently left to the discretion of the county sheriffs.596 Today, 
persons qualifying for jury service are citizens of Maryland, residents 
of the county in which the court sits, registered voters, at least eigh-
teen years old, and proficient in English.597 In addition, selection of 
jury panels is random598 and discrimination on the basis of race, 
color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status is 
prohibited.599 
A strict historical test is also contrary to the text of the Consti-
tution, namely Article 23, the original Reception Provision, and the 
principal jury trial provision. The test is also contrary to the legal 
implications that stem from constitutional omissions. The Reception 
Provision appears to adopt a strict historical test. That provision 
states that "the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Com-
mon Law of England, and the trial by Jury, according to the course 
of that Law, and to the benefit of such of the English statutes as ex-
isted on the Fourth day of July, seventeen hundred and seventy-
Six."600 
However, further investigation of that provision does not sup-
port a strict historical test. First, because of the order, punctuation, 
and language of the Reception Provision, the July 4, 1776 reference 
date may apply only to the reception of English statutes, not the re-
ception of English common law and the trial by jury.601 Thus, the 
jury right would not be tied to any historical date. 
Second, there are other ambiguities in the Reception Provision 
about time and place, casting doubt upon a strict historical test. 
With respect to time, it is not clear whether a historical test would 
use 1634, 1776, 1851, 1867, or some other year as the time of refer-
ence. As developed above, the Reception Provision now establishes 
the date for the reception of English law as July 4, 1776.602 However, 
596. See Feb. 1777 Md. Laws ch. 15, § 10 (incorporating provincial law); see also 
1715 Md. Laws ch. 37, § 1; if. 1797 Md. Laws ch. 87, §§ 1-2 (sheriff'S oath, 
assuring integrity, experience, and intelligence of jurors). 
597. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUDo PROC. §§ 8-102, 8-207 (1995); if. 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1863(b) (2), 1865(b) (1994) (federal qualifications). 
598. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUDo PROC. §§ 8-102, 8-205, 8-208 (1995); if. 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1861, 1863(b) (1994) (provisions for random selection). 
599. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUDo PROC. § 8-103 (1995); see also U.S. CONST. 
amends. 13-15, 19, 24, 26; if. 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (1994) (non-discrimination 
provision) . 
600. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5. 
601. See supra notes 3647 and accompanying text. 
602. See supra note 600 and accompanying text. That date was set in 1851. See MD. 
CONST. OF 1851, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 3. 
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the original version of the Reception Provision603 established a 
much earlier time for the reception of English law: that of the first 
immigration to Maryland in 1634.604 Of course, the principal provi-
sion, Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, may have 
changed the time of reference. The predecessor of Article 23, which 
was initially adopted in 1851, "inviolably preserved" the right.6oS It 
was re-adopted as part of a new Maryland Constitution in 1864,606 
was again adopted as part of the current Maryland Constitution in 
1867,607 and was subsequently amended in 1970, 1978, and 1992.608 
Regarding place, it is not clear whether the English common-
law jury right was an idealized right, or the right as practiced in En-
gland or in Maryland. Maryland jury trial practice is suggested by 
the Reception Provision's reference to the use of presumably local, 
provincial Maryland "[c]ourts of Law or Equity."609 However, a com-
plaint of Maryland residents was that English authorities had de-
prived them in many cases of trial by jury.610 English jury trial prac-
tice is suggested by the provision of Article 5 that trial by jury is to 
be "according to the course of that [English Common] Law. "611 
. However, a truer idea of the common-law jury right was one of an 
idealized eternal system of principles, of which judicial practice was 
only evidence.612 Thus, the common-law jury right was not amenable 
603. See MD. CONST. OF 1776, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. III. 
604. The first English settlement in Maryland was in 1634 under a charter granted 
in 1632. See MARYLAND MANUAL 1994-1995, at 17. 
605. MD. CONST. of 1851 art. X, § 4. 
606. See MD. CONST. of 1864 art. XII, § 5. 
607. See MD. CONST. of 1867 art. XV, § 6. 
608. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text. 
609. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5. See supra note 7 for full text of the Re-
ception Provision. 
610. See 1774 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 105, at 201. The residents of all 13 colonies 
made the same complaint. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 
(U.S. 1776). 
611. MD. CaNST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5; cf. Markman v. Westview Instruments, 
Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1389 & n.3 (1996) (stating that the historical test for 
determining the meaning of the Seventh Amendment does not deal with 
"the possibility of conflict between actual English common-law practice and 
American assumptions about what that practice was, or between English and 
American practices at the relevant time"). 
612. See State v. Buchanan, 5 H. &J. 317, 356-59 (Md. 1821). Put another way, the 
common law was not just a body' of rules, but a system of jurisprudence com-
bining stability (adherence to precedent) and change (adaptation to new cir-
cumstances). See generally ARTHUR R HOGUE, ORIGINS OF THE COMMON LAw 5, 
244-45,247 (1966). 
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to a strict historical test.613 Third, the Reception Provision expressly 
makes the received English law, perhaps including the jury right, 
subject to modification by the legislature,614 and impliedly makes 
that law subject to modification by the judiciary.615 
A strict historical test is also contrary to the principal jury trial 
provision, Article 23. That provision has language suggesting a his-
torical test, stating that the right of trial by jury in "Courts of Law," 
distinguished from courts of Equity (or Chancery),616 shall be "invio-
lably preserved. "617 However, there is no hint in Article 23 of a strict 
historical test, freezing the jury trial practice as of a certain date. 
Even if such a test were adopted, Article 23 offers no guidance as to 
what the date should be.618 
A strict historical test as used by Lynch and Bourne, which 
more often restricts the jury right,619 is contrary to implications 
which stem from omissions from the Maryland Constitution. As de-
veloped above, the Maryland Constitution preserves the right to 
trial by jury, not trial by judge or even separate courts of Law and 
Equity.620 The strict historical test should be used to preserve, not 
just restrict, the jury right.621 
613. See Wolfram, supra note 120, at 736-39, 744-45 (1973); if. supra notes 567-75 
and accompanying text (a strict historical test is contrary to the nature of a 
"living" constitution). A strict historical test may not work even in long-
standing statutory schemes such as those embodied in federal statutes en-
acted before the FEDERAL RULES OF CML PROCEDURE which conform federal 
procedure to state procedure as of certain dates. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, 
FEDERAL COURTS 424-26 (5th ed. 1994). 
614. See supra notes 4043 and accompanying text. 
615. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. 
616. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text. 
617. See supra notes 52-69 and accompanying text'. Interestingly, Bourne and 
Lynch often use the term "preserve" and its variants, not in a historical 
sense, but as a synonym for "protect." See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 
328, 331; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 15 n.77, 16, 44, 47, 49, 57, 65, 66 
n.417, 70-73. 
618. See supra notes 602-08 and accompanying text. Such dates could include, 
among others, 1634, 1776, 1851, 1864, 1867, 1970, 1978, and 1992. 
619. See supra notes 531-90 and accompanying text. 
620. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
621. See Wolfram, supra note 120, at 735-36 (1973) (providing that the historical 
test under the Seventh Amendment should "preserve" the right to jury trial, 
not jury practice in 1791); McCoid, supra note 513, at 14 (providing that the 
Seventh Amendment's pro-jury bias, reflected in Beacon's flexible historical 
test, operates only to expand, not curtail, the jury trial). 
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A strict historical test is contrary to the history of the jury right. 
That history spans a period from the Magna Carta in 1215 to the 
most recent amendment in Maryland in 1992.622 Selection of the 
date of July 4, 1776 to freeze the jury right seems particularly arbi-
trary given that colonists were then complaining that they were be-
ing deprived of their jury right.623 Selection of that date also seems 
contrary to the purpose of Article 23, which put the jury right be-
yond the power of amendment or repeal by the legislature, a power 
held by these branches in 1776.624 
A strict historical test may be contrary to the structure of gov-
ernment. Juries, which find facts and soften the harshness of legal 
doctrine, provide a check on the trial judge.625 When the strict his-
torical test is used to restrict rather than protect the jury right, this 
check on the trial judge is eliminated. 
The strict historical test is also contrary to doctrine. There is 
some past support in Maryland626 and federal627 doctrine for a strict 
historical test. However, Lynch and Bourne recognize that the fed-
eral courts now take a dynamic, rather than a strict historical ap-
proach,628 which Maryland follows.629 
A strict historical test may also be contrary to prudential con-
cerns. Having the jury decide cases benefits judges and our justice 
system. The jury helps legitimize the outcome, acts as a "lightning 
rod," and provides a "black box" decision.630 These benefits are lost 
when the strict historical test is used to restrict, rather than protect 
the right to jury trial. 
A strict historical test may also be contrary to some ethical mat-
ters. A strict historical test as of 1776, and one used more often to 
restrict than protect the jury right, seems likely to fail deferential 
equal protection scrutiny under either the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution, or Article 24 of the Maryland Dec-
622. See supra notes 97-131 and accompanying text. 
623. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text. 
624. See supra notes 113, 115-17 and accompanying text. 
625. See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text. 
626. See supra notes 53148 and accompanying text. 
627. See supra notes 565-72 and accompanying text. 
628. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 330, 337; see also Bourne & Lynch, supra 
note 5, at 4; if. JAMES ET AL., supra note 1, at 422 ("elastic" historical test); 
McCoid, supra note 513, at 14, 23-24 ("flexible" or "principled" historical 
test); Redish, supra note 591, at 487-502, 530-31 ("rational" historical test). 
629. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 337. 
630. See supra notes 308-20 and accompanying text. 
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laration of RightS.631 Used in this way, a strict historical test may also 
violate the principles of limited government, government by the 
people, government for the people, and free political exchange.632 
Thus, the aspect of Lynch and Bourne's principled discretion-
ary theory that the Maryland Constitution requires use of a strict 
historical approach in determining the jury right, is not protec·tive 
of the jury right and is contrary to many of the usual ways of inter-
preting the constitution. 
C. Equity Respects the Jury Right 
The third aspect of Lynch and Bourne's principled discretion-
ary theory is that "the scope of equity has historically been mea-
sured with due respect to the importance of the right to trial by 
jury. "633 That principle applies in both federal634 and Maryland635 
courts. Apparently, this principle of Equity's respect for the jury 
right is more a policy of Equity than a matter of constitutional 
right636 in both federal637 and Maryland638 courts. Lynch and Bourne 
seem to make the right to jury trial discretionary with trial judges.639 
This reduction of a constitutional right to a discretionary policy 
is somewhat like the disclaimer in many college catalogs. Mter set-
ting forth admission, tuition, curriculum, degree, and other require-
ments, the catalog notes that those requirements are subject to 
change at any time, and that the catalog is not to be considered a 
contract. 
A number of examples illustrate the principle that Equity re-
spects the jury right. Some examples of limitations on equitable ju-
risdiction based on respect for the right to jury trial mentioned by 
Lynch and Bourne include the following: the equitable prerequisite 
that there be no adequate remedy at Law,640 the ability of Equity to 
631. See supra notes 365-74 and accompanying text. 
632. See supra notes 376441, 443-52 and accompanying text. 
633. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 59-60; see also LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 
3, at 306·07, 326. 
634. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 17; see also id. at 23. 
635. See id. at 17, 34, 59-61; see also id. at 29-33, 50, 78. 
636. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 335. 
637. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 16. But if. id. at 23, 49 (emphasizing 
jury trial being a constitutional right in Beacon). 
638. See id. at 29, 31-33, 34. But if. id. at 50; LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 328 
(emphasizing jury trial being a constitutional right). 
639. Cf supra notes 473-505 and accompanying text (stating that the first aspect of 
principled discretionary theory was the trial judge'S discretion). 
640. See infra notes 704-09 and accompanying text. 
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transfer cases with legal issues to Law courts,641 the unwillingness of 
Equity courts to identify declaratory judgment actions as inherently 
equitable,642 and the ability of Law courts to issue injunctions as an-
cillary relief.643 
Examples of limitations on equitable jurisdiction based on respect 
for the right to jury trial which Lynch and Bourne fail to mention 
include the following: the right to jury trial of the issue of paternity 
in equitable paternity proceedings,644 the right to jury trial regard-
ing the appointment by Equity of a guardian for an allegedly dis-
abled person who has not consented to the appointment,645 and the 
reluctance of Equity courts to issue injunctions in certain cases.646 
Still other limitations on Equity might indicate respect for the 
right to jury trial, but seem to be motivated by other concerns. 
Those limitations include both the gradual evolution of Maryland 
courts from separate courts of Law and Equity to a merged court 
system647 and the statutory limitations on equitable power. 
In early colonial Maryland, common-law courts adjudicated le-
gal matters and a chancellor administered Equity.648 The grants of 
641. See supra note 586 and accompanying text. 
642. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 19 & n.109; LYNCH & BOURNE, supra 
note 3, at 337-38; see also Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 47-50. 
643. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. In cases where an injunction was 
issued as ancillary relief in an action at Law, the order of trial reflects the 
principle that Equity respects the jury right. The claim for legal relief was re-
quired to be tried first, and the judge, in fashioning injunctive relief, was re-
quired to follow the factual findings of the jury. See Bourne & Lynch, supra 
note 5, at 55-56. 
644. See supra note 552. 
645. See MD. RULE 10-205 (b). 
646. See, e.g., Prucha v. Weiss, 233 Md. 479, 480, 197 A.2d 253, 256 (1964) (antici-
pated libel). 
647. See infra notes 648-56 and accompanying text (describing the principal steps 
in that evolution). For a discussion of other steps in the evolution, see supra 
note 586 and accompanying text (discussing the ability of Equity to transfer 
cases with legal issues to Law courts), LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 319 
& n.124, 336 (discussing the borrowing by Law courts of certain equitable 
procedures such as discovery), Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 39-40, 42-43, 
75-76 (discussing same), id. at 14-15, 29, 34 (discussing the borrowing by Law 
courts of certain equitable defenses such as fraud), and supra note 174 and 
accompanying text (discussing the ability of Law courts to issue injunctions 
as ancillary relief). 
648. See MILLER, supra note 282, at 2-3. The history of the chancellor and courts of 
chancery from the beginning of the Province of Maryland is summarized in 
CARROLL T. BOND, THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND 4-5 (1928). 
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some Equity powers to the common-law courts in 1763,649 and full 
Equity powers to the common-law courts in 1815,650 together with 
the abolition of the office of chancellor in 1851,651 seem to have 
been based on efficiency rather than on respect for the right to jury 
trial. 
The grant of Equity powers to the common-law courts which 
existed in each county, rather than the retention of all Equity pow-
ers in one chancellor for all of Maryland, was apparently designed 
to make Equity accessible to all residents of Maryland, especially 
those in counties remote from the chancellor.652 The abolition of 
the office of chancellor seemed to have been an economy mea-
sure.653 The chancellor's work could be accomplished by the com-
mon-law courts which had Equity powers.654 The 1984 merger of 
Law and Equity procedures655 also was designed for simplicity and 
efficiency.656 
Statutory limits on equitable power do not indicate respect for 
the right to jury trial. An old lower federal court case, Baker v. Bid-
dle,657 established a framework for analyzing the issue. English courts 
were of general jurisdiction. Resulting overlaps in jurisdictions be~ 
tween the courts of Law and Equity were left to be defined by those 
courts by their own usages.658 In the United States, the limited juris-
diction of the federal courts was defined by constitutional provisions 
and by statute, and the powers of both Law and Equity were vested 
in the same courts.659 Thus, the Equity powers of the federal courts 
were limited by the interlocking provisions of the Seventh Amend-
ment right to jury trial, and the Judiciary Act of 1789's denial of Eq-
uity jurisdiction where there was an adequate remedy at Law.660 The 
649. See 1763 Md. Laws ch. 23, § 5. 
650. See 1815 Md. Laws ch. 163, § 1. 
651. See MD. CONST. of 1851 art. IV, § 23. 
652. CJ. ELBERT M. BYRD, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN MARYLAND 9 (1961) (stating that 
accessibility was the motivation for an earlier constitutional amendment es-
tablishing judicial districts). 
653. See 2 1851 DEBATES, supra note 9, at 502, 562, 568-69, 592. 
654. See id. at 562, 632. 
655. See MD. RULE 2-301 committee note. 
656. See Preface to TENTATIVE DRAFr OF REvISED MARYLAND RULES OF PROCEDURE, 9 
Md. Reg. 2384-85 (Nov. 26, 1982). 
657. 2 F. Cas. 439 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1831) (No. 764). 
658. See id. at 445-46. 
659. See id. at 446. 
660. See id. at 443-45. The Seventh Amendment was proposed by the First Con-
gress, which also enacted the adequate remedy at Law provision of the Judi-
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state courts, having general jurisdiction, followed the English tradi-
tion of judicially defined jurisdictional limits.661 Of course, the juris-
diction of the state courts was also limited by supreme federal law662 
and by whatever constitutional and statutory provisions the states 
themselves chose to adopt. 
While Maryland has constitutional limits, including the right to 
jury trial, on the equitable powers of its trial courts, there are no 
specific statutory limits on those powers. That is, there is no statute 
denying Equity jurisdiction where there is an adequate remedy at 
Law.663 On the other hand, there is no statute preferring the rules 
of Equity to those of Law where the two differ:664 The only signifi-
cant statutory limitations on Equity powers are general in nature, 
and reserve jurisdiction to other tribunals. The jurisdiction and 
powers of the circuit courts, which are the trial courts of general ju-
risdiction, are defined as follows: 
The circuit courts are the highest common-law and equity 
courts of record exercising original jurisdiction within the 
State. Each has full common-law and equity powers and ju-
risdiction in all civil and criminal cases within its county, 
and all the additional powers and jurisdiction conferred by 
the Constitution and by law, except where by law jurisdic-
tion has been limited or conferred exclusively :upon an-
other tribunal.665 
Thus, the circuit courts have full Equity powers,666 except where ju-
ciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 16, 1 Stat. 82 (repealed 1948). Congress's intent 
was to connect the two provisions. See Baker, 2 F. Cas. at 444. Technically, the 
right to jury trial between 1789 and 1791, when the Seventh Amendment was 
adopted, was based on other provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1789. See Judi-
ciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9 (District Court) (repealed 1948); id. § 12 (Cir-
cuit Court) (repealed 1911), id. § 13 (Supreme Court) (codified as amended 
28 U.S.C. § 1872 (1997»; I Stat. at 77,80,81. 
661. See Baker, 2 F. Cas. at 445. 
662. In some cases, acts of Congress have made the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts exclusive of the state courts. See WRIGHT, supra note 613, at 43-44. 
Such acts are supreme over state law under the provisions of the Supremacy 
Clause. See U.S. CaNsT. art. VI. 
663. Cf LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 307, 326; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 
5, at 60 (equitable principle). See generaUy infra notes 704-09 and accompany-
ing text. 
664. Cf Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 58 n.373 (citing a Connecticut statute). 
665. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 1-501 (1995). 
666. See MILLER, supra note 282, at 1-2; PHELPS, supra note 86, at 27. 
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risdiction has been limited, for example, by the constitutional right 
to jury trial, or where jurisdiction is exclusively granted to other 
tribunals, such as the federal courts,667 health care malpractice arbi-
tration panels,668 district courts,669 and workers' compensation com-
missions.67o There are express limits on the Equity jurisdiction of 
the other state trial courts, the district courts,671 but the effect of 
those limits is merely to reserve the remaining Equity jurisdiction to 
the circuit courts.672 
Lynch and Bourne's principle, that Equity respects the jury 
right, . may be criticized on several grounds. One is that the princi-
ple is unworkable for a number of reasons. First, as we have seen, 
the boundary line between Law and Equity is uncertain.673 Indeed, a 
. primary rationale for distinguishing between the two is the circular 
proposition that Law uses the jury trial and Equity does not.674 
Thus, Equity'S respect for the jury trial is likely to be of little help 
in defining the scope of Equity. . 
Second, the best protection for the right to jury trial has histor-
ically been the separation of Law and Equity.675 Of course, the 
667. See supra note 662. 
668. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-D2(a) (1995). 
669. See id. §§ 4401, 4405. 
670. See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-509(a) (1991). 
671. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 4402(a) (1995). 
672. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 69-70. 
673. See supra note 545 and accompanying text. 
674. See Phelps, supra note 86, at 33, 185. 
675. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 306, 326; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 
5, at 11, 29, 34, 4445. The separation of Law and Equity in modem times in 
Maryland may not have offered the same limits on Equity jurisdiction that 
the separation of the two systems had in England at the time of American 
independence. One commentator noted the existence in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries of three checks on the English chancellor's en-
croachment on common-law jurisdiction: opposition from Law courts, oppo-
sition from Parliament, and appellate review by the House of Lords, which 
was, as a practical matter, controlled by common lawyers. See PHELPS, supra 
note 86, at 14-18. In Maryland, similar checks do not now exist. Law and Eq-
uity are administered by the same courts. See supra notes 648-56 and accom-
panying text. There is no "war between the courts." PHELPS, supra note 86, at 
14-17. The state legislature has not limited Equity'S encroachment on Law. 
See supra notes 663, 665-72 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 788-866 
and accompanying text. There is appellate review of Equity'S exercise of ju-
risdiction. See generally MD. CaNST. art. IV; MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. 
§§ 12-101 to -702(1995). However, there is no practical control of state ap-
pellate courts by attorneys from the common-law bar in Maryland, see 1831 
Md. Laws ch. 268, §§ 1, 3, as in England, see Supreme Court of Judicature 
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merger of Law and Equity removes that protection.676 
Third, Equity may be expanded by statute or judicial decision. 677 
Yet, that expansion might come at the expense of Law and the jury 
right.678 Often, the courts do not even recognize the threat to jury 
trial from the expansion of equitable jurisdiction.679 
Fourth, trial judges may be biased against jury trial.68o That bias 
appears paradoxical in light of the principle that Equity has 
respected the right to jury trial and in light of surveys showing that 
trial judges generally favor retention, not abolition, of the jury trial 
in civil cases.681 However, the bias may be explained by the follow-
ing distinctions: (1) the bias may be that of trial judges,682 not the 
appellate judges whose opinions are reported as respecting the 
right to jury trial;683 (2) the bias may be one occasionally reflected 
in denying jury trial in particular situations, such as "complex" 
cases,684 not in the generality of situations; (3) the bias may not re-
flect institutional bias, but rather the personal self-regard of trial 
Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., ch. 66, § 87 (repealed). The common-law and Eq-
uity bars have been integrated. However, a check on Equity jurisdiction that 
exists now in Maryland, but did not then exist in England, is a democratic 
influence on the selection of judges. Now in Maryland," the judge in a court 
exercising Equity jurisdiction is popularly elected or is appointed by a popu-
larly elected official. See MD. CaNST. art. lV, §§ 3, 5, 5A, 41D. In England, the 
chancellor has historically been an official appointed by a hereditary mon-
arch. See GoEBEL, supra note 105, at 493. 
676. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 307, 326; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 
5, at 4, 15, 20, 4647, 78. 
677. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 60. See generally infra notes 788-866 
and accompanyIng text; LYNCH & BOURNE,. supra note 3, at 321. 
678. See infra note 789 and accompanying text. 
679. See Bourne & Lynch, SUPRA note 5, at 77; see also supra note 529 and accompa-
nying text. In many cases there may have been no question of the right to 
jury trial because no jury was demanded or no question of fact was in dis-
pute. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 52-53,77. 
680. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 2-3, 59. 
681. See, e.g., May/June 1977 ATLA BAR NEWS 5. In that survey of 6,049 state and 
495 federal trial judges in which nearly 53% responded, 92.5% of state 
judges and 89.3% of federal judges favored retention of the jury trial. See id. 
682. See supra note 680 and accompanying text. 
683. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 23, 49 (Supreme Court of the United 
States); id. at 17, 29-31, 33, 50, 59-60 (Court of Appeals of Maryland). 
684. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 333-35; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, 
at 27 & n.162. Compare Morris S. Arnold, A Historical Inquiry in the Right to 
Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 829 (1980), with. 
James S. Campbell & Nicholas LePoidevin, Complex Cases and Jury Trials: A 
Reply to Professor Arnold, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 965 (1980). 
392 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 26 
judges who may believe that they themselves can judge a case better 
than a jury could, despite believing that the jury is generally a good 
thing. 
Perhaps more significantly for the purposes of this Article, 
Lynch and Bourne's principle that Equity respects the jury right 
may also be criticized because it fails to protect the jury right, and 
because it is contrary to accepted methods of constitutional 
in terpretation. 
1. Not Protective of the Jury Right 
Of course, the principle that Equity respects the jury right is 
nominally protective of the right to jury trial. However, as described 
by Lynch and Bourne, the principle fails to protect the right to jury 
trial in three ways-two in theory and one in practice. First, the 
principle seems to be one of policy, not of constitutional right.685 
Thus, like other policy, the principle is subject to change by the leg-
islature or judiciary; the principle is not fundamental, like a consti-
tutional right. 686 Second, the principle is just one of six aspects of 
Lynch and Bourne's principled discretionary theory. Thus, it is not 
afforded the supremacy ordinarily conferred upon constitutional 
rights as against other conflicting policies.687 Third, the principle 
that Equity respects the jury right has not proven effective in 
practice. 
Lynch and Bourne identify the following past equitable en-
croachments by Equity on Law: the growth of the equitable clean-
up doctrine,688 the abolition of the traditional reference by the 
chancellor to a Law court for jury trial of disputed issues of fact,689 
the erosion of the equitable prerequisite that there .be no adequate 
remedy at Law,690 and the intervention of Equity in certain areas in-
volving legal rights because of the presence of fraud,691 the need for 
an accounting,692 or the danger of multiplicity of actions.693 Thus, 
685. See supra notes 636-38 and accompanying text. 
686. See infra note 694 and accompanying text. 
687. See infra note 695 and accompanying text. 
688. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 307; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 
13, 54, 57, 60, 62, 75, 78. Other commentators have noted the expansion of 
the clean-up doctrine. See supra note 564 and accompanying text. 
689. See supra note 562 and accompanying text. 
690. See supra note 563 and accompanying text. 
691. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 38-42; see also LYNCH & BOURNE,' supra 
note 3, at 316, 335 n.219. 
692. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 318-19, 335 n.219, 336-37; Bourne & 
Lynch, supra note 5, at 42-43. But if. LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 332-
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the aspect of Lynch and Bourne's principled discretionary theory 
that Equity respects the right to jury trial is not protective of the 
right to jury trial. 
2. Contrary to the Usual Ways of Interpreting the Constitution 
The principle that Equity respects the right to jury trial is also 
contrary to accepted principles of constitutional interpretation. 
Thus, the aspect of Lynch and Bourne's principled discretionary 
theory that Equity respects the jury right fails to protect or "pre-
serve" the jury right and is contrary to many of the usual ways of in-
terpreting the Maryland Constitution. An equitable policy of respect 
for the jury right is contrary to the nature of a written constitution. 
The jury right is fundamental law-it is part of a constitution, which 
is a compact of the people through an elected convention. The jury 
right is not just policy subject to change by the legislature or judici-
ary.694 The constitutional jury right is also supreme-it prevails over 
other conflicting laws and policies.695 
An equitable policy of respect for the jury right is also contrary 
to the text of the constitution. The principal jury right provision ex-
pressly provides for a "right" of trial by jury, mandates recognition 
of that right, and provides that it be "inviolably preserved. "696 
An equitable policy of respect for the jury right is contrary to 
the history of the Maryland Constitution. The purpose of the princi-
pal jury right provision was to put the right beyond the reach of 
policy-making by. the legislature and, presumably, the judiciary.697 
An equitable policy of respect for the jury right is contrary to 
doctrine. While support for the jury right before merger of Law 
and Equity was somewhat ambiguous,698 since Higgins followed the 
Supreme Court's lead in Beacon, Maryland courts have clearly taken 
a protective approach to the jury trial as a constitutional right.699 
That protective approach is consistent with commentators on Mary-
33, 336 (stating that Dairy Queen limits the need for accounting in federal 
courts). 
693. See Bourne & ILynch, supra note 5, at 43-44. But if. LYNCH & BOURNE, supra 
note 3, at 320 (stating that merger, joinder, and long-arm jurisdiction may 
render multiplicity obsolete); Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 44. 
694. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text. 
695. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
696. See supra notes 49-69 and accompanying text. 
697. See supra notes 9, 20, 116-18 and accompanying text. 
698. See supra notes 170-83 and accompanying text. 
699. See supra notes 184-97 and accompanying text. 
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land's jury right,7<JO other than Lynch and Bourne.701 
The equitable policy of respect for the jury right is contrary to 
one of the ethical matters. Ours is a limite.d government, expressly 
restricted by a constitution,702 which includes a right to jury trial703 
as a limit on the policy-making branches of government. 
D. Equity Will Not Act Where the Remedy at Law is Adequate 
The fourth aspect of Lynch and Bourne's principled discretion-
ary theory is that "the scope of equity is necessarily limited by the 
principle that equity will not intervene where the remedy at law is 
full, expeditious and adequate. "704 This principle that there be no 
adequate remedy at law705 applies in both federaF06 and Maryland707 
courts. According to Lynch and Bourne, this principle is a bulwark, 
protecting the right to jury trial in both federal708 and Maryland709 
courts. 
Although Professor Douglas Laycock wrote that the adequate 
700. See Brown, supra note 85, at 455-74; NILES, supra note 96, at 34344. 
701. But if. supra notes 636-38 and accompanying text (discussing the conflict be-
tween respect for the jury right as policy and as constitutional right). 
702. See supra note 382 and accompanying text. 
703. See supra note 381 and accompanying text. 
704. Lynch & Bourne, supra note 5, at 60; see infra notes 70fJ:.(J7. 
705. This adequate remedy at Law prerequisite is the "longstanding principle of 
equity" to which Lynch and Bourne referred in their article. See Bourne & 
Lynch, supra note 5,' at 22. In the article, they concluded that the Supreme 
Court misread its precedents, and that Beacon misread Scott. See Bourne & 
Lynch, supra note 5, at 22-23. Bourne & Lynch wrote that Beacon derived 
from Scott the "longstanding principle of equity" that the right to jury trial 
cannot be impaired by any blending of legal and equitable claims. The au-
thors misread Beacon. The "longstanding principle of equity" to which Beacon 
referred is that "equity has always acted only when legal remedies were inad-
equate." Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 509 (1959); see id. 
at 505, 506-07,516-17 (Stewart, j., dissenting). 
706. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 329-33, 337; Bourne & Lynch, supra 
note 5, at 4, 12-25. 
707. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 307, 316; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 
5, at 29-77. 
708. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 330-33; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, 
at 12, 21-22; see also Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 539 (1970) (citing 
Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co., 287 U.S. 92, 94 (1932), and Hipp v. Babin, 60 
U.S. (19 How.) 271,278 (1856». 
709. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 307, 326; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 
5, at 29-30, 51, 61, 70; see also Shorl'!ham Developers, Inc. v. Randolph Hills, 
Inc., 269 Md. 291, 303-05, 305 A.2d 465,473-74 (1973). 
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remedy at Law principle710 is dead,711 Lynch and Bourne's conclu-
sion that the principle protects the right to jury trial has some truth 
to it.7l2 Laycock's thesis was that those cases stating the principle ac-
tually reached their conclusions on other grounds.713 However, his 
focus was on the adequate remedy at Law principle as a basis for 
courts choosing between legal remedies, such as damages, and equi-
table remedies, such as injunctive and other forms of specific re-
lief.714 Layc;:ock conceded that the adequate remedy at Law principle 
was used occasionally to protect the right to jury trial.715 However, 
Laycock concluded that the rule is not a factor in most jury trial 
disputes and may even be a basis for denying the jury right.716 Thus, 
in this context, Laycock's report of the death of the adequate rem-
edy at Law principle is an exaggeration.717 Nonetheless, the report 
of the death of the principle was not much of an exaggeration until 
710. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATII OF TIlE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 8 (1991). 
Laycock equates two rules: (1) Equity will act only to prevent irreparable in-
jury, and (2) Equity will act only if there is no· adequate legal remedy be-
cause "what makes an injury irreparable is that no other remedy can repair 
it." [d. (endnote omitted); see also id. at 239. 
711. See id. at vii, 5, 7, 24; if. JAMES ET AL., supra note 1, at 448 (stating the princi-
ple "had been in a state of substantial atrophy for two hundred years" 
before Beacon ); Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 45 n.290 (citing Black-
stone, discussing the extent and variety of cases in Equity courts that suggest 
that the law was a "dead letter"). But if. LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 
329 (stating that Beacon "reincarnated the concept of the adequacy of the le-
gal remedy" in the context of the right to jury trial). 
712. See supra notes 708'{)9 and accompanying text. 
713. Those other grounds include courts' fear of ordering preliminary relief prior 
to full trial and deliberation, deference to other tribunals such as courts, ad-
ministrative agencies, or the executive branch, fear of interference with 
countervailing rights such as free speech and the right to work, fear of im-
posing hardship on a defendant or others, deference to more particular law, 
hostility to the merits of plaintiff's case, avoidance of cases that are moot or 
not ripe, and avoidance of decrees that would be difficult to supervise. See 
LAYCOCK, supra note 710, at 5, 110-236. 
714. See id. at 12-16. Laycock was not interested at all in the adequate remedy at 
Law principle as a basis for courts choosing between Law and Equity, gener-
ally. He found the distinction purely historical and dysfunctional in court sys-
tems with merged procedure. See id. at viii, ix, 11-16. 
715. See id. at 213-17. 
716. See infra notes 767-69 and accompanying text. 
717. Cf THE OXFORD DlcrIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 550 (2d ed. 1955) (citing Samuel 
Langhorne Clemens (Mark Twain) in a cable from Europe to the Associated 
Press: "The report of my death was an exaggeration."). 
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fairly recently.718 
Lynch and Bourne's principle that Equity acts only where there 
is no adequate remedy at Law may be criticized because it fails to 
protect the jury right and because it is contrary to accepted princi-
ples of constitutional interpretation. 
1. Not Protective of the Jury Right 
The principle that Equity acts only where there is no adequate 
remedy at Law is nominally protective of the right to jury trial. That 
is, if there is an adequate remedy at Law triable by jury, Equity will 
not take jurisdiction. However, as described by Lynch and Bourne, 
the principle is not protective of the right to jury trial. This is true 
for several reasons. First, as a matter of function, the principle is 
usually restrictive of the jury right. Historically, the prerequisite of 
Equity that there be no adequate remedy at Law was not just a pol-
icy of deference or comity with respect to courts of Law. It was also 
separate grounds for Equity jurisdiction. That is, the principle was 
not a limit on, but an extension of, Equity'S power.719 This was true 
both in federal720 and in Maryland721 courts. This tendency of the 
adequate remedy at Law principle to increase the jurisdiction of Eq-
uity at the expense of jurisdiction of Law and the right to jury 
triaP22 was magnified by the structural,723 source,724 definitional725 dy-
namics,726 and procedural and tactical727 matters discussed below. 
718. See infra notes 741-49 and accompanying text. 
719. One commentator suggested the ultimate extension of Equity's power. See 
Doug Rendleman, The Inadequate Remedy at Law Prerequisite for an Injunction, 
33 U. FrA. L. REv. 346, 355 (1981). He found the remedy at Law might be in-
adequate because the jury determination might frustrate the underlying sub-
stantive law, or because three features of the jury system-new jurors for 
each trial, lack of expertise, and unanimous secret deliberations-make the 
jury inadequate in Equity actions which might continue for years. See id. 
However, another commentator concluded that the jury cannot be consid-
ered as inadequate because the Constitution considers it a virtue. See OWEN 
M. FISS. THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 39 (1978). 
720. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 332-33 n.204; Bourne & Lynch supra 
note 5, at 12 & n.55, 13. 
721. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 316-17; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, 
at 35, 4041, 42-43, 69-70. 
722. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 319, 330-31; Bourne & Lynch, supra 
note 5, at 20, 21-23, 29-30, 31, 44. 
723. See infra note 728 and accompanying text. 
724. See infra notes 729-32 and accompanying text. 
725. See infra notes 733-40 and accompanying text. 
726. See infra notes 741-49 and accompanying text. 
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Thus, the adequate remedy at Law principle is comparable to a col-
lege's practice regarding prerequisites for an elective course. When 
an insufficient number of students register for the course, the col-
lege waters-down or abolishes the prerequisites so that more stu-
dents will sign up. 
Second, as a matter of structure, the principle that Equity acts 
only where there is no adequate remedy at Law is not protective of 
the jury right. Mter the abolition of separate courts of Law and Eq-
uity and the merger of Law and Equity procedures, most of the po-
litical and institutional checks to enforce Equity'S deference to Law 
no longer exist.728 
Third, as a matter of the source of the principle, that Equity 
acts only where there is no adequate remedy at Law, the principle is 
not protective of the jury right. In Maryland, the· application of the 
principle is discretionary with judges; it has not been enacted by the 
legislature as a limitation on judicial jurisdiction. This point is de-
veloped in the old lower federal court case of Baker v. Biddle.729 That 
case distinguished between the federal courts on the one hand, and 
English and state courts on the other hand. The federal courts were 
limited by a statute, enacted by the first Congress, which provided 
that "suits in equity shall not be sustained in either of the courts of 
the United States in any case where plain, adequate and complete 
remedy may be had at law. "730 While that statute introduced no new 
rule and was merely declaratory of the common law, it added the 
authority of the legislature, such that the principle was not left en-
727. See infra no.tes 767-70 and accompanying text. 
728. See supra no.te 675. The adequate remedy at Law principle was entrusted to 
the Equity co.urts themselves. See LAyCOCK, supra note 710, at 20-21. 
729. 2 F. Cas. 439 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1831) (No.. 764). 
730. Judiciary Act o.f 1789, ch. 20, § 16, 1 Stat. 82, repealed fly Act of June 25, 1948, 
ch. 646, 62 Stat. 996. The legislative histo.ry to. the repealer provided: "Sec-
tion [16] is o.bso.lete in view o.f Rules 1 and 2 o.f the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE abo.lishing distinctio.ns between actio.ns at law and suits in eq-
uity." HR REp. No. 308, 80th Co.ng., 1st Sess. A236 (1947). Ho.wever, the 
principle that Equity will no.t intervene where there is an adequate remedy 
at Law' survived the merger o.f Law and Equity in 1938. See Beaco.n Theatres, 
Inc. v. Westo.ver, 359 U.S. 500, 506-07 (1959). The principle go.verns the sub-
stantive aspects of Equity, although separate equitable procedures have been 
abo.lished by merger. See Grauman v. City Co.. o.f N.Y, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 172, 
174 (S.D.N.Y 1939) .. One co.mmentato.r has written that the principle persists 
after merger because o.f the jury right. See OWEN M. FISS, INJUNCTIONS 12 
(1972). 
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tirely to the discretion of the judiciary.131 On the other hand, the 
English and state courts have generally not been limited by statu-
tory enactment of the equitable prerequisite of no adequate remedy 
at Law, so the principle has been left to the discretion of the 
courts.132 
Fourth, as a matter of the definition of the principle that Eq-
uity acts only where there is no adequate remedy at Law, the princi-
ple is not protective of the jury right. It is not just an "adequate" 
remedy at Law133 that precludes equitable jurisdiction, it is a "full, 
expeditious and adequate" remedy,134 an adequate, complete, and 
certain remedy,135 an "adequate, complete, and sufficient" rem-
edy,136 a "plain, adequate and complete" remedy,131 or a "complete, 
practical, and efficient" remedy.138 Any of these formulations would 
seem to increase equitable jurisdiction at the expense of common-
law jurisdiction and the jury right, when compared with a formula-
tion that Equity will not intervene where there is an "adequate" 
remedy at Law.139 Historically, the legal remedy infrequently met 
one of these fuller formulations.140 
731. See Baker, 2 F. Cas. at 444. The adoption of the Seventh Amendment added 
the authority of the Constitution, so the principle was not left to the discre-
tion of the legislature. See id. 
732. See id. at 445. But if. supra notes 706-D7 and accompanying text (providing 
the principle in Maryland is similar to that in the federal courts). 
733. Fiss has pointed out that there are inherent ambiguities in the doctrine that 
Equity will act only where there is no adequate remedy at Law. First, how in-
adequate must the legal remedies be? Second, which type of inadequacies-
the retrospective nature of the damage action, the use of a jury, or the fu-
ture financial unresponsiveness of the defendant-count for purposes of ap-
plying the doctrine? Third, which alternative remedies-damages action, 
criminal prosecution or defense, habeas corpus, removal, transfer, adminis-
trative proceeding, or appeal-must be shown to be inadequate? See FIss, 
supra note 719, at 38-39; see also LAYCOCK, supra note 710, at 22. 
734. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 60. 
735. See LYNCH &: BOURNE, supra note 3, at 317 (citing Brown, supra note 85, at 
428). 
736. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 40 (citing Johnson v. Bugle Coat, Apron & 
Linen Serv., 191 Md. 268, 277, 60 A.2d 686,690 (1948)). 
737. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 12 (citing Insurance Co. v. Bailey, 80 U.S. 
(13 Wall.) 616 (1871)). 
738. LAYCOCK, supra note 710, at 22. 
739. See Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 
37 HARv. L. REv. 49, 96 (1923). . 
740. See LAYCOCK, supra note 710, at 4, 23, 237. 
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Fifth, as a matter of dynamics, the principle that Equity acts 
only where there is no adequate remedy at Law is not protective of 
the jury right. In applying the adequate remedy at Law principle, 
the courts have confronted two questions. First, may equitable juris-
diction grow in ways that by comparison make traditional legal rem-
edies inadequate? Second, does the improvement in the adequacy 
of legal remedies erode existing equitable jurisdiction? The horn-
book law answers to both of these questions worked to erode any 
protection the principle had for the right to jury trial. Equitable ju-
risdiction could grow in ways that, in comparison, made the remedy 
at Law inadequate.741 For example, equitable clean-up jurisdiction 
grew,742 and a later statute and court rule provided that damages at 
Law were inadequate unless the defendant showed security for a 
judgment.743 
The improvement in the adequacy of legal remedies also did 
not generally oust existing equitable jurisdiction.744 For example, ju-
risdiction over injunctions was not supplanted by the rule permit-
ting injunctions as ancillary relief in an action at Law,745 and equita-
ble jurisdiction of accounting was not ousted entirely by the 
availability of discovery in actions at Law.746 
Lynch and Bourne, with some exceptions, seem to endorse the 
hornbook answers, which tend to erode the protection of the ade-
quate remedy at Law principle for the jury right.747 Thus, Lynch and 
Bourne generally agree that equitable jurisdiction could grow in 
ways that in comparison make the remedy at Law inadequate.748 
741. See WIlliAM F. WALSH, A TREATISE ON EQUITY 134 (1930); PHELPS, supra note 
86, at 198; see also 1 POMEROy'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 155-56 (Spencer W. Sy-
mons ed., 5th ed. 1941); if. HENRY L. MCCUNTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCI-
PLES OF EQUITY 77 (2d ed. 1948) (stating that Equity may give relief even 
where there is no precedent). 
742. See supra note 564 and accompanying text. 
743. See supra note 563 and accompanying text. 
744. See MCCUNTOCK, supra note 741, at 115-17; PHELPS, supra note 86, at 198,259-
60. 
745. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 318-19; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, 
at 39, 55-56. 
746. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 319 & n.124, 336; Bourne & Lynch, 
supra note 5, at 4243. 
747. The exceptions are where Maryland cases already require a more jury-
protective approach. 
748. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 28-29. This growth could be by statute 
or court decision. See id. at 32, 60 & n.381; see also LYNCH & BOURNE, supra 
note 3, at 321; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 33 n.21O, 63 & nA03. But if. 
id. at 32 n.206, 35 n.225, 50 & n.322, 51 (providing that constitutional right 
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They also generally agree with the hornbook idea that the improve-
ment in the adequacy of legal remedies does not oust existing equi-
table jurisdiction.749 • 
Of course, Beacon in the federal courts750 and Higgins in the Ma-
ryland courts751 established a dynamic adequate remedy at Law prin-
ciple, one that protects the jury right. However, Lynch and Bourne 
are critical of this dynamism at every step. . 
As we have noted above, the adequate remedy at Law principle 
may be seen either as a policy of deference or comity with respect 
to courts of Law-protecting the right to jury trial by limiting Eq-
uity's jurisdiction-or as a separate basis for Equity jurisdiction-ex-
tending Equity'S power.752 Before Higgins, Lynch an~ Bourne, choos-
ing between Beacon's protection of the jury right and a more 
traditional expansion of the scope of Equity, wrote that Maryland 
courts should pick the expansion of Equity.753 Thus, they believed 
that the protection of the jury right might be left to the discretion 
of the trial judge.754 Several factors underscored their choice of an 
expansive Equity, rather than a protective jury right. These factors 
include their preference' for pre-Beacon precedentS rather than for 
to jury trial is some limit on the legislative power to classify actions as equita-
ble). 
749. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 36 n.229, 77; see a40 supra notes 74546. 
But if. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 44 (providing that Equity's consider-
able discretion in adjudicating legal claims is unlikely to be decreased by 
procedural reforms, but the exercise of Equity'S discretion should consider 
the right to trial by jury). 
750. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). Lynch and 
Bourne wrote that after Beacon the legal remedy will almost never be found 
inadequate because such inadequacy must be assessed in light of modem 
procedural reforms. The merger of Law and Equity and the permissive join-
der of legal and equitable claims now allows a court to grant preliminary in-
junctive relief before a jury trial of legal issues, see LYNCH & BOURNE, supra 
note 3, at 330-31, and final injunctive relief afterward, see Bourne & Lynch, 
supra note 5, at 60-61. Discovery is available in all cases, see LYNCH & BOURNE, 
supra note 3, at 319; party joinder may avoid the threat of multiple litigation, 
see id. at 320; the Declaratory Judgment Act provides a new remedy for viola-
tion of legal rights, see id. at 330, 338; and the availability of masters under 
the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE gives juries assistance in complex fi-
nancial matters, see id. at 333, 337. 
751~ See Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 530 A.2d 724 (1987). 
752. See supra notes 704-27 and accompanying text. 
753. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 28-29. 
754. See id. at 16, 17, 19,29,44,60. But if. id. at 20,29,34,44 (threat to the right 
to jury trial). 
/ 
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Beacon itself,755 their understanding that the majority OpInIOn mis-
read precedent,756 that the opinion's reasoning was "radical,"757 and 
by their sympathy for the Beacon dissent.758 
Even before Higgins, Lynch and Bourne conceded that the Ma-
ryland courts had used a dynamic adequate remedy at Law princi-
ple in certain areas, such as joinder of parties,759 joinder of claims 
and remedies,76o and discovery.761 Even after Higgins preliminarily 
endorsed the Beacon line of cases,762 Lynch and Bourne criticized 
those cases,763 tried to limit them to their facts,764 and distinguished 
them where possible,765 even while conceding that the Beacon line of 
cases will likely be fully accepted in Maryland.766 
Sixth, as a matter of procedure and tactics, the principle that 
Equity . acts only where there is no adequate remedy at Law is not 
protective of the jury right. Professor Christopher Brown wrote that 
the impact of the choice between Law and Equity on the right to 
jury trial has largely escaped notice.767 .Douglas Laycock says this is 
so because in most cases it is the plaintiffs who benefit from jury 
755. See id. at 17; see also id. at 29, 78. But if. infra note 1159 and accompanying 
text (discussing reliance on post-Beacon lower federal court cases, including 
some not protective of the jury right); 
756. See supra note 705. 
757. Bourne and Lynch criticized two points made by Beacon: (1) that the Declar-
atory Judgment Act limited Equity by providing a legal remedy, and (2) the 
constitutional jury trial right limits judicial discretion. See Bourne & Lynch, 
supra note 5, at 49. Neither of these points seems radical. See infra notes 
1168-84 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 473-504 and accompany-
ing text. 
758. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 329-30 nn.188 & 191; see also Bourne & 
Lynch, supra note 5, at 21 n.121, 22 n.129; if. LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 
3, at 333 n.209, 334 n.212 (expressing sympathy with the dissent in Ross v. 
Bernhard, 396 U.s. 531 (1970». 
759. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 31, 38. 
760. See id. at 37 (discussing injunction as an ancillary remedy at Law). 
761. See id. at 36, 38, 72. 
762. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 315, 327-35. 
763. See id. at 329 n.188, 330 n.191, 333 n.209, 334 n.212 (quoting Justice Stewart's 
dissents); see also id. at 329-31. 
764. See id. at 331, 334. 
765. See id. at 318-19, 336-37 (stating that equitable accounting in Maryland is 
based not only on the need for discovery, but the existence of confidential 
relationships and complicated accounts); id. at 335 & n.216, 337 (providing 
no masters in Maryland to assist juries). 
766. See id. at 335, 337. 
767. See Brown, supra note 85, at 458, 473. 
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sympathy or the possibility of a larger award of damages.768 Presuma-
bly, those plaintiffs desiring a jury trial will structure their cases to 
clearly be actions at Law. 769 
In some cases, however, either plaintiffs or defendantS may ma-
nipulate the Law-Equity distinction to avoid jury trial.770 In those sit-
uations, the jury rights of other parties may have escaped notice be-
cause of waiver for lack of timely demand, because the harmless 
error rule precluded an interlocutory review of the denial of jury 
trial, or because of the deferential scope of appellate review of the 
trial judge's abuse of discretion.771 
2. Contrary to the Usual Ways of Interpreting the Constitution 
The principle that Equity will not act where the remedy at Law 
is adequate was traditionally used to expand Equity at the expense 
of the right to jury trial. 772 Lynch and Bourne's approval of the 
principle as traditionally applied,773 and their limited acceptance of 
a dynamic interpretation of that principle to protect the right to 
jury trial,774 are contrary to many accepted principles of constitu-
tional interpretation. 
The adequate remedy at Law principle, as traditionally used, is 
contrary to the nature of a written constitution. The constitutional 
right to jury trial is supreme; it prevails over other conflicting laws 
and policies,775 such as a principle which permits Equity to grow at 
the expense of Law and the jury right. The adequate remedy at Law 
principle, as traditionally used, is also contrary to the nature of a 
"living" constitution;776 the right to jury trial, not the jurisdiction of 
Equity at the jury right's expense, should be dynamic. 
The adequate remedy at Law principle, as traditionally used to 
permit Equity to grow at the expense of the jury right, is contrary 
to the text of the Maryland Constitution. The principal jury right 
provision, Article 23, expressly mandates recognition of the jury 
768. See LAYCOCK, supra note 710, at 214. 
769. For example, before the merger of Law and Equity, plaintiffs could sue for 
damages for violation of a legal right in a Law court. See supra notes 209-11 
and accompanying text 
770. See LAYCOCK, supra note 710, at 214-15. 
771. See supra notes 474-88 and accompanying text. 
772. See supra notes 719-27, 733-46 and accompanying text. 
773. See supra notes 748-49 and accompanying text. 
774. See supra notes 753-66 and accompanying text. 
775. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
776. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
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right and provides that it be "inviolably preserved. "777 In addition, it 
is the jury right that is protected, not separate courts of Law and 
Equity nor the right to trial by a judge.778 
The adequate remedy at Law principle, as traditionally used, is 
contrary to the history of the Maryland Constitution. The purpose 
of Article 23 was to put the right beyond the reach of Equity's in-
cursions pursuant to legislative and, presumably, judicial 
decisions.779 
The adequate remedy at Law principle, as traditionally used, 
may also be contrary to the structure of government. A dynamic, 
not an over-looked,780 jury right is needed now that most of the po-
litical and institutional checks to· enforce Equity's deference to Law 
no longer exist.781 If the adequate remedy at Law principle is used 
to expand Equity at the expense of Law, the jury's checks on the 
judge782 may be lost. 
The adequate remedy at Law principle, as traditionally used, is 
contrary to doctrine. The Court of Appeals of Maryland's decision 
in Higgins, following the Supreme Court's lead in Beacon,783 requires 
a dynamic adequate remedy at Law principle protecting the jury 
right.784 That approach is consistent with the commentary of Profes-
sor Christopher Brown on the jury right in Maryland.785 
Moreover, the adequate remedy at Law principle, as tradition-
ally used, may be contrary to some prudential concerns. If the ade-
quate remedy at Law principle is used to expand Equity at the ex-
pense of Law, the benefits of the jury to the judge and our legal 
system, such as helping to legitimize outcomes, acting as a "light-
ning rod," and providing a "black box" decision,786 are lost. 
The adequate remedy at Law principle, as traditionally used, is 
contrary to ethical matters. The adequate remedy at Law principle 
used to restrict the jury right may violate the principles of limited 
government, government by the people, government for the people, 
777. See supra notes 48-69 and accompanying text. 
778. See supra notes 77-95 and accompanying text. 
779. See supra notes 10, 21, 113, 117 and accompanying text. 
780. See supra notes 767-71 and accompanying text. 
781. See supra note 675 and accompanying text. 
782. See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text. 
783. See supra notes 18.4-97 and accompanying text. 
784. See supra notes 750.51 and accompanying text. 
785. See Brown, supra note 85, at 448-51. 
786. See supra notes 308-20 and accompanying text. 
404 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 26 
and free political exchange.787 
E. Equity May Expand by Statute or Judicial Decision 
The fifth aspect of Lynch and Bourne's principled discretionary 
theory is that "the scope of equity in Maryland may be expanded by 
statute or judicial decision. "788 This expansion may be at the ex-
pense of the right to jury trial.789 Lynch and Bourne apparently base 
that conclusion on one authority: the "seldom cited"790 or "old and 
little noted"791 case of Capron v. Devries.792 It is appropriate, however, 
that Capron is' "seldom cited" and "little noted." 
In Capron, Devries was a trustee who obtained an order from a 
court of Equity that certain real property be sold.793 The purchaser 
was Mrs. Capron, a married woman.794 Alleging a defect in title, she 
refused to accept and pay for the property.795 Therefore, the court 
ordered that the property be resold at her risk. When the property 
787. See supra notes 376411, 443 and accompanying text. 
788. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 60; see id. at 32; cf. id. at 33 n.2ID, 63; 
LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 321 (expansion by the legislature). 
789. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 321; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 
32. 
790. LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 321. 
791. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 31. 
792. 83 Md. 220, 34 A. 251 (1896). Other authorities suggested by Bourne and 
Lynch for their conclusion that the scope of Equity may be expanded by 
statute or judicial decision at the expense of the right to jury trial do not ap-
pear to be substantial. 
The first such authority states that the original 1776 constitutional right 
to jury trial was subject to restriction by the legislature. See Bourne & Lynch, 
supra note 5, at 30 & n.192. However, Bourne and Lynch go on to note that 
the principle 1851 constitutional right to jury trial was adopted to "protect 
the jury trial right from encroachment by the legislature." Bourne & Lynch, 
supra note 5, at 32 n.2ID. Then, they conclude that Capron "obviously indi-
cates that the 1851 provision has not been construed to preclude contraction 
of the right to Uury] trial by the Legislature." [d. at 33 n.210. 
The second set of authorities suggested by Lynch and Bourne for their 
conclusion that the scope of Equity may be expanded by statute or judicial 
decision at the expense of the right to jury trial, states that the legislature 
and the court of appeals have classified certain actions as equitable by stat-
ute or court rule. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 316-18; Bourne & 
Lynch, supra note 5, at 35. However, Bourne and Lynch state that such 
power may be limited by the right to jury trial. See Bourne and Lynch, supra 
note 5, at 35 & n.225; see also LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 321. 
793. See Capron, 83 Md. at 223, 34 A. at 251. 
794. See id. 
795. See id. 
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was resold for a price lower than the earlier sale, the Equity court 
ordered Mrs. Capron to pay the deficiency to the trustee.796 
On appeal, Mrs. Capron argued that the statute as applied vio-
lated her constitutional right to a jury trial in common-law cases.797 
Second, Mrs. Capron argued that as a married woman acting alone 
and without her husband, she was not personally liable on an un-
written contract. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland rejected plaintiffs argu-
ment. First, it held that the legislature properly enlarged the juris-
diction of Equity to permit deficiency decrees in trustee sales.798 Be-
cause the suit was properly within equitable jurisdiction, the right to 
trial by jury in common-law cases was not applicable.799 Second, the 
court of appeals held that, according to settled authority, a married 
woman was personally liable on the contract.8OO 
Capron does not support Lynch and Bourne's principle that the 
scope of Equity may be expanded by statute or judicial decision at 
the expense of the jury right. Capron, as Lynch and Bourne's article 
recognized, has been "seldom cited" and "little noted." Further-
more, Capron apparently did not recognize that the expansion of 
Equity might contract the jury right. In any event, there are other 
alternative explanations for the holding in Capron. 
As noted above, Lynch and Bourne themselves characterize 
Capron as being "seldom cited" and "little noted."801 Capron has sub-
sequently been cited in only two published Maryland opinions ad-
dressing situations where the legislative or judicial power has come 
into possible conflict with the right to jury triapo2 In the first situa-
796. See id. 
797. See id. at 224, 34 A. at 251-52. 
798. See id. at 224, 34 A. at 252. 
799. See id. 
800. See id. 
801. See supra notes 790-91 and accompanying text. 
802. In two other published Maryland opinions citing Capron, there was no con-
flict between legislative or judicial power and the jury right. In the first case, 
Mercantile Bank v. Maryland Title Guarantor Co., 153 Md. 320, 138 A. 251, 254 
(1927), the issue was not the jury right, but the power of an Equity court to 
enter a deficiency judgment, without an order of payment of the balance 
due, against a defaulting purchaser at a foreclosure sale. See id. In the sec-
ond case, In re Anderson, 272 Md. 85, 93-94, 321 A.2d 516, 521 (1974), the is-
sue was the power of the legislature to establish juvenile courts in Equity 
with different principles, regarding the right to appeal by the State and the 
protections of the double jeopardy clause, than the principles applicable in 
criminal proceedings. See id. 
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tion, Allender v. Ghingher,803 the Court of Appeals of Maryland ap-
proved, but distinguished, Capron from the case at hand involving a 
statutory proceeding to enforce a banking corporation's legal right 
to assess its stockholders. Unlike Capron, which involved a valid leg-
islative grant of equitable jurisdiction, Ghingher involved no valid 
statutory or judicial grant of equitable jurisdiction. 
In the second situation, the Attorney General of Maryland ap-
proved the legislature's creation of a housing court in Baltimore 
City. As part of the existing courts in Baltimore City, the housing 
court was to exercise both Law and Equity jurisdiction.804 However, 
the opinion noted that the jurisdiction of the court would have to 
be exercised in a manner consistent with the constitutional right to 
jury tria1.805 
Capron apparently failed to recognize that the expansion of Eq-
uity jurisdiction might contract the jury right. That failure may have 
been based on ignorance of the purpose of the 1851 constitutional 
jury trial provision, on an alternative belief that the 1776 constitu-
tional jury trial provision applied to the case, or on a belief that Eq-
uity'S expansion was not at the expense of the jury right. 
If Capron is authority for the principle that Equity may be ex-
panded by statute or judicial decision, thus diminishing the scope 
of the jury right, the case is squarely contrary to the intent of the 
framers of the 1851 constitutional jury trial provision. The propo-
nents of the 1851 provision noted the legislature's power to repeal 
or modify the original 1776 constitutional jury trial provision and 
stated their intention of putting the right beyond reach of the legis-
lature.806 The Capron court's ignorance of the added vitality of the 
right to jury trial after 1851 is perhaps understandable. While the 
record of the debates on the Maryland Constitution of 1851 is read-
ily available,807 the record is not indexed. The portion of that re-
803. 170 Md. 156, 183 A. 610 (1936), discussed in LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 
321 n.137 (describing Allender as acknowledging the continuing validity of 
Capron); Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 31-32 (describing Allender as citing 
Capron with approval); see also id. at 32-33 (discussing Fooks' Ex'rs v. 
Ghingher, 172 Md. 612, 192 A. 782 (1937) (emphasizing that the power of 
the legislature to fix the jurisdiction of Law and Equity was limited by the 
constitutional right of trial by jury, and that the boundary line between Law 
and Equity was "vague and shadowy"». 
804. See 61 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 291,295-96 (1976). 
805. See id. at 299. 
806. See supra note 9. 
807. See generally 2 1851 DEBATES, supra note 9. 
1997] The Right to Trial by Jury 407 
cord dealing with the jury trial provision808 has no heading in the 
text and has been cited in no published Maryland opinions.809 Fur-
thermore, the principal commentator on the Maryland Constitution 
later called the 1851 provision possibly "surplusage" in light of the 
1776 provision.8IO 
However, Capron may have applied to the original 1776 consti-
tutional jury trial provision, not the 1851 constitutional jury trial 
provision. As Capron noted in another connection, the statute con-
ferring jurisdiction on EquityBll was enacted by the legislature in 
1841.812 Thus, the statute was enacted when the only applicable con-
stitutional right to jury trial was the original 1776 provision, which 
arguably was subject to legislative813 and judicial power.814 Capron 
quoted the 1851 constitutional jury trial provision,815 but dismissed it 
as not being a limitation on the power of the legislature to enlarge 
the jurisdiction of Equity.816 Capron failed to note the likely irrele-
vance of the 1851 jury right to the earlier 1841 legislation.817 
Capron may not support the proposition that "either the legisla-
ture or an appellate court may contract the scope of the right to 
trial by jury by expanding the scope of equity. "818 Instead, Capron 
808. See id. at 766-67. 
809. However, the portion of the debates dealing with the right to jury trial in 
criminal cases and making the jury the judges of law as well as fact has been 
cited in at least one Maryland case. See Slansky v. State, 192 Md. 94, 105, 63 
A.2d 599, 603 (1949). 
810. See NILES, supra note 96, at 343. 
811. Mrs. Capron also argued on appeal that the statute, by enlarging the powers 
of Equity, violated the constitutional grant of common-law jurisdiction of cer-
tain specified courts in Baltimore City. See Capron v. Devries, 83 Md. 220, 
222, 34 A. 251, 252 (1896). The court of appeals rejected that argument. See 
id. 
812. See id. at 221, 34 A. at 252 (citing 1841 Md. Laws ch. 216). 
813. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text. 
814. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. 
815. See Capron, 83 Md. at 224, 34 A. at 252. 
816. See id. Capron may have been based on a belief that Equity'S expansion was 
not at the expense of the jury right. See supra notes 811-15 and accompany-
ing text; see infra notes 818-27 and accompanying text. 
817. The court of appeals assumed in another connection that a constitutional 
provision regarding the common-law courts in Baltimore City was irrelevant 
as a limitation on the earlier 1841 legislation. See Capron, 83 Md. -at 224, 34 
A. at 252. See generally New Cent. Coal Co. v. George's Creek Coal & Iron 
Co., 37 Md. 537 (1873) (stating the rule that constitutional amendments are 
to apply prospectively, not retroactively, unless a retroactive intent is clear). 
818. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 32. 
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may be based on a belief that Equity's expansion was not at the ex-
pense of the jury right. To be sure, the 1841 statute,819 as inter-
preted previously,820 expanded the scope of Equity by permitting 
new remedies such as resale of the property purchased by the wo-
man, and a deficiency judgment against her separate property. 
Those remedies might be considered equitable because they were 
available in suits within the exclusive jurisdiction of Equity-a trus-
tee's sale of property ordered by a court of EquityB21 or a married 
woman's separate property.822 In either event, the statute permitting 
the remedies would not expand Equity jurisdiction at the expense 
of the right to jury trial because common-law courts never had juris-
diction in such cases. Even if those statutory remedies might be 
considered legal, they would be available in an existing equitable 
proceeding and would, therefore, be within Equity'S clean-up juris-
diction.823 The statute permitting those remedies would expand Eq-
uity jurisdiction at the expense of the jurisdiction of the common-
law courts. Traditionally, however, Equity'S clean-up jurisdiction was 
not perceived as violating the right to jury trial.824 
The language of the Capron case indicates that it failed to rec-
ognize that the expansion of Equity jurisdiction might contract the 
jury right: 
It is now argued that the statute under which the Court 
passed this order is unconstitutional. . . . It is maintained 
that it is in violation of articles five and twenty~three of the 
Maryland Declaration oj Rights, and of the sixth section of Ar-
ticle fifteen of the Constitution. These citations were in-
tended to show the inviolable character oj the right oj trial by 
jury and of [the] Magna Carta. This will not be questioned. 
The section from the fifteenth Article is in these words: Sec. 
6. "The right of trial by jury of all issues of fact in civil pro-
ceedings in the several Courts of Law in this State, where 
the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of five dollars, 
819.· See supra notes 811-12 and accompanying text. 
820. See Capron, 83 Md. at 223, 34 A. at 251 (citing Fowler v. jacobs, 62 Md. 326 
(1884»; Galloway v. Shipley, 71 Md. 243, 17 A. 1023 (1889). 
821. See 1 POMEROy'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 741, § 151; see also Brown, 
supra note 85, at 429. 
822. See 1 POMEROy'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 741, § 159; 4 id. § 1099; see 
also Brown, supra note 85, at 429. 
823. See generally supra notes 250-51 and accompanying text (discussing Higgins v. 
Bames, 310 Md. 532, 530 A.2d 724 (1987». 
824. See supra notes 564, 741-42 and accompanying text. 
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shall be inviolably preserved." It must be evident that there is 
no reference to a trial of an issue of fact in another jurisdiction: a 
Court of Equity, for instance. It can hardly be established that 
the Legislature has not the power to enlarge the jurisdic-
tion of equity. The system of equity jurisprudence has been 
of steady growth ever since its origin; sometimes by the ef-
fect of judicial decisions; and sometimes by statute law. It is 
difficult to see a reason why the Legislature could not give 
it the jurisdiction to pass a decree for the payment of a sum 
of money which the Court finds to be due from one suitor 
to another in a proceeding pending before it . . . .825 
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Thus, Capron emphasized the inviolability of the right to jury trial 
and noted that the matter was pending in Equity, where there was 
no such right. The case did not recognize the conflict between the 
expanding powers of Equity and the right to jury trial, much less 
recognize the legislature's power to contract that right. 
Other evidence that Capron did not recognize the conflict be-
tween the expanding powers of Equity and the jury right is sug-
gested by its treatment of precedent. McCoy v. Johnson826 was an ear-
lier case squarely holding that the power of the legislature to 
expand Equity jurisdiction was limited by the constitutional jury 
right. Although counsel for Mrs. Capron raised McCoy in argu-
ment,827 the Capron opinion did not mention McCoy. By implication, 
Capron did not recognize that there was a conflict between legisla-
tive expansion of Equity and the jury right. 
Rather than being decided on the ground that Equity may be 
expanded by statute or judicial decision, thus contracting the jury 
right, Capron may have been decided on one or more alternative 
grounds. As previously noted, one such ground was that the applica-
ble constitutional jury trial right was the original 1776 provision ex-
pressly subject to legislative power and implicitly subject to judicial 
power,828 not the 1851 provision intended to put the jury right be-
yond the reach of the legislature.829 
A second alternative ground for Capron is that it may merely re-
825. Capron, 83 Md. at 224, 34 A. at 251-52 (emphasis added). 
826. 70. Md. 490, 17 A. 387 (1889), cited in Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 32 
n.206, 35 nn.225-26, 50 n.322, 51 & n.324, 70 n.442. 
827. See Capron, 83 Md. at 222, 34 A. at 251. 
828. See supra notes 40-45, 813-17 and accompanying text. 
829. See supra notes 9, 806 and accompanying text. 
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flect the limited nature of appellate review. 830 An alleged denial of 
the right to jury trial, like other objections, must be timely raised or 
it is waived. There is no indication in Capron that the objection was 
raised in the trial court, for example, by way of motions for dismis-
sal or for reference of an issue, or transfer ·of the case to a com-
mon-law court. Review was had by appeal of a final deficiency de-
cree,831 not by appeal of an order denying the right to jury trial or 
by a mode of interlocutory review, such as mandamus.832 Also, only 
prejudicial errors are reviewable on appeal.833 The court of appeals's 
finding, that the merits of the case were decided in accordance with 
precedent,834 suggests that any error in denying a jury trial may have 
been considered harmless, not prejudicial. 
A third alternative ground for Capron is that it may merely re-
flect hostility to the merits of the jury claimant's case and support 
for earlier precedent establishing her liability. Regarding the mer-
its,835 the jury claimant had purchased real property at a sale de-
creed by a court of Equity. When she alleged a defect in title and 
refused to pay for the property, the court ordered its resale at her 
risk. On resale, the property brought less than at the prior sale, 
therefore, the court ordered her to pay the deficiency. She did not 
convince the trial court of the alleged defect of title and did not 
state on appeal the grounds for the defect. In addition to alleging 
that the trial court lacked power and that the statute providing for 
equitable jurisdiction was unconstitutional, she relied upon the lim-
ited capacity of married women to make contracts, which would be 
a legal defense, but might be considered "inequitable" on the other 
side of the court.836 The court of appeals, relying on earlier prece-
dents, summarily rejected the argument.837 
Thus, Capron does not support Lynch and Bourne's principle 
that the scope of Equity may be expanded by statute or judicial de-
cision at the expense of the jury right. More importantly for the 
purposes of this Article, that principle may be criticized because it 
830. See supra note 487 and accompanying text. 
831. See Capron, 83 Md. at 223, 34 A. at 251. 
832. See supra note 485. 
833. See supra note 487 and accompanying text. 
834. See infra note 837 and accompanying text. 
835. See generally Capron, 83 Md. at 221-23, 34 A. at 249-50 (argument of counsel). 
836. Cf GINSBERG, supra note 86, at 10-11, 14, 18 (maxims of Equity favoring 
"clean hands," fulfilling obligations, and equitable results). 
837. See Capron, 83 Md. at 223, 34 A. at 251 (citing Fowler v. Jacobs, 62 Md. 326 
(1884»; Galloway v. Shipley, 71 Md. 243, 17 A. 1023 (1889). 
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fails to protect the jury right and it contradicts the usual ways of in-
terpreting the. Maryland Constitution. 
1. Not Protective of the Jury Right 
Lynch and Bourne's principle that the scope of Equity may be 
expanded by statute or judicial decision at the expense of the jury 
right is obviously restrictive of the right to jury trial. The principle 
is not only that Equity may be expanded by statute or judicial deci-
sion,838 but that the expansion may be at the expense of the jury 
right.839 
2. Contrary to the Usual Ways of Interpreting the Constitution 
The aspect of Lynch and Bourne's principled discretionary the-
ory that the scope of Equity may be expanded by statute or judicial 
decision at the expense of the jury right is not protective of the jury 
right and is contrary to many of the usual ways of interpreting the 
Constitution. 
The principle of legislative or judicial expansion of Equity at 
the expense of the jury right is contrary to the nature of a written 
constitution. The constitutional jury right is supreme as it prevails 
over other conflicting laws and judicial decisions,840 such as those 
expanding the scope of Equity at the expense of the jury right. The 
principle of an expanding Equity is also contrary to the nature of a 
"living" constitution.841 The right to jury trial, not the jurisdiction of 
Equity at the jury right's expense, should be expansive. 
The principle of legislative or judicial expansion of Equity at 
the expense of the jury right is also contrary to the text of the Ma-
ryland Constitution. The principal jury right provision, Article 23, 
expressly mandates recognition of the jury right and provides that it 
shall be "inviolably preserved. "842 Moreover, it is the jury right that 
is protected, not separate courts of Law and Equity or the right to 
trial by a judge.843 
The principle of legislative or judicial expansion of Equity at 
the expense of the jury right is also contrary to the history of the 
Maryland Constitution. The purpose of Article 23 was to put the 
right beyond the reach of Equity'S incursions pursuant to legislative 
838. See supra note 788 and accompanying text. 
839. See supra note 789 and accompanying text. 
840. See supra note 21·and accomp.mying text. 
841. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text. 
842. See supra notes 48-71 and accompanying text. 
843. See supra notes 77-95 and accompanying text. 
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and, presumably, judicial decisions.844 
The principle of legislative or judicial expansion of Equity at 
the expense of the jury right is also contrary to the structure of gov-
ernment. An expansive jury right, not an expanded Equity at the 
expense of the jury right, is needed now that most of the political 
and institutional checks to enforce Equity'S deference to Law no 
longer exist.845 If Equity is expanded at the expense of Law, the 
jury's checks on the judge of finding fact and softening the harsh-
ness of legal doctrine may be 10st.846 
The principle of legislative or judicial expansion of Equity at 
the expense of the jury right is also contrary to doctrine. We have 
already seen that the Capron case, apparently Lynch and Bourne's 
only authority for the principle,847 may not support it.848 Further-
more, Lynch and Bourne admit that the power of the legislature 
and the courts to expand Equity at the expense of the jury right is 
limited in some way by the jury right, and that there are authorities 
conflicting with their interpretation of Capron. 
The primary authority that Lynch and Bourne cite for jury lim-
its on Equity's expansion is McCoy v. Johnson. 849 That case includes 
the following passage affirming the constitutional right to jury trial: 
[I] t is clear the Legislature has no power to confer on 
Courts of equity the jurisdiction to determine legal rights, 
in regard to which Courts of law exercise exclusive jurisdic-
tion. In such cases the Constitution guarantees suitors the 
right of trial by jury, and this right the Legislature cannot 
abridge or take away. The Act of 1888 [purporting to give 
the court, in its discretion, power to declare legal title to 
property] was borrowed, we find, word for word from the 
Code of the Indian Empire, but the British Parliament is 
not controlled, nor is its power limited, as is the power of 
the Legislature in this State, by a written Constitution. The 
jurisdiction then conferred by the Act of 1888, can only be 
exercised in regard to such matters as are properly cogniza-
ble by a Court of equity; and its exercise in regard to ,these, 
844. See supra notes 9, 52.(j7 and accompanying text. 
845. See supra note 675 and accompanying text. 
846. See supra notes 156-62 and accompanying text. 
847. See supra notes 789-92 and accompanying text. 
848. See supra notes 793-837 and accompanying text. 
849. 70 Md. 490, 17 A. 387 (1889), cited in Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 32 
n.206, 35 & n.225, 50 n.322, 51 & nn.324-25, 70 n.442. 
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the Act merely provides, shall rest in the discretion of the 
Court.850 
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The authorities Lynch and Bourne cite as conflicting with their 
interpretation of Capron are State v. Rutherforrfl51 and other cases per-
mitting agency determinations without a jury where a right to jury 
trial was preserved on appeal de novo.852 
Of course, Lynch and Bourne discuss Higgins v. Barnes,853 the 
Maryland case following Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover. 854 However, 
Lynch and Bourne do not mention that Higgins noted a concern 
that expansion of Equity jurisdiction had eroded the jury right. 855 
Nor do Lynch and Bourne mention that Higgins concluded that the 
constitutional jury right remains as "absolute" after merger of Law 
and Equity as before, and that court rules are something short of 
the Maryland Constitution.856 
850. McCoy, 70 Md. at 492-93, 17 A. at 387. 
851. 145 Md. 363, 125 A. 725 (1924), overruled by In Petition for Writ of Prohibi-
tion, 312 Md. 280, 539 A.2d 664 (1988), discussed in LYNCH & BOURNE, supra 
note 3, at 321-22. Rutherford does have a statement strongly supporting the 
constitutional right to jury trial. See Rutherford, 145 Md. at 370, 125 A. at 728. 
The case treats the jury trial as something that could be denied by specific 
design of the legislature. See id. at 371, 125 A. at 728. There is also language 
in Allender v. Chingher, 170 Md. 156, 167"()8, 183 A. 610, 616 (1936), strongly 
supporting the constitutional right to jury trial, while suggesting that a legis-
lative enactment or judicial decision could abridge the right. The language 
in both Rutherford and Allender suggesting that the jury trial could be denied 
by legislation or by judicial decision, however, is dictum and conflicts with 
the idea in McCoy that the constitutional jury right is a limit on legislative 
authority. In addition, the language in Rutherford and Allender is squarely con-
trary to the intent of the framers of the 1851 constitutional jury trial provi-
sion. See supra note 374 and accompanying text. 
852. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 322 & n. 147 (workers' compensation 
appeals); see also id. at 322 & n.148 (health care malpractice claims arbitra-
tion appeals). 
853. 310 Md. 532, 530 A.2d 724 (1987), discussed in LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, 
at 327-37. 
854. 359 U.S. 500 (1959). 
855. See Higgins, 310 Md. at 532, 530 A.2d at 728. 
'856. See id. at 54243,530 A.2d at 729. Higgins reached that conclusion in the con-
text of an allegation that raising a counterclaim, permissive or compulsory 
under court rules, would constitute a waiver of the right to jury trial. See id. 
Other commentators on the Maryland Constitution would protect the jury 
right at the expense of equity. See NILES, supra note 96. Professor Niles wrote 
that "the courts will be careful to preserve the right [of trial by jury] and de-
clare any law in substantial violation thereof unconstitutional." Id. at 344; see 
also Brown, supra note 85. Professor Brown noted the trend toward Equity'S 
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Lynch and Bourne also conclude that, in reconciling the jury 
right with expanding Equity jurisdiction after Higgins, Maryland 
cases are likely to follow federal doctrine.857 They recognize that fed-
eral cases are generally protective of the jury in that context, with a 
few narrow exceptions, such as where the legislature delegates the 
determination of "public rights" to administrative agencies,858 under 
"most imperative circumstances,"859 and other situations.860 
The principle of legislative or judicial expansion of Equity at 
the expense of the jury right is also contrary to some prudential 
concerns. The benefits a jury provides include legitimizing out-
comes, being a "lightning rod," and providing a "black box" 
decision.861 
The principle of legislative or judicial expansion of Equity at 
the expense of the jury right is also contrary to some ethical mat-
ters. While it may be reasonable to maintain a traditional distinction 
between Law and Equity, particularly a distinction mentioned in the 
federal and state constitutions,862 allowing ad hoc changes to Equity 
may not be reasonable under the equal protection guarantees of 
the Fourteenth Arnendment863 or the Maryland Constitution.864 A 
fortiori, those changes would not satisfy equal protection strict scru-
tiny where the fundamental right to jury trial under the Maryland 
Constitution is implicated. 865 In addition, the principle of legislative 
or judicial expansion of Equity at the expense of the jury right may 
violate the principles of limited government, government by the 
expansion came at the expense of the jury right, see id. at 427, 448, 451, 473-
74, and noted that the expansion of Equity at the expense of the jury right 
came about largely through oversight, see id. at 451, 473, but concluded that 
the jury right should, see id. at 451, and predicated that it soon would, see id. 
at 474, be protected. The Higgins court, noting that the expansion of Equity 
eroded the constitutional jury right, cited Brown. See id. at 541, 530 A.2d at 
728. 
857. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 323, 327. 
858. See id. at 323 & nn.149-54. But cf. id. at 323-24 & nn.155-56 ("private rights"). 
859. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 22, 25; see also LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 
3, at 329-30. 
860. Compare LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 335, with Bourne & Lynch, supra 
note 5, at 26-27 (complexity). 
86l. See supra notes 308-20 and accompanying text. 
862. Cf New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (finding "grandfather clause" 
is reasonable). 
863. See supra notes 365-73 and accompanying text. 
864. See supra notes 365-73 and accompanying text. 
865. See supra notes 330-75 and accompanying text. 
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people, government for the people, and free political exchange.866 
F. Judicial Economy 
The sixth aspect of Lynch and Bourne's principled discretion-
ary theory is the common-sense notion that judicial economy is bet-
ter served by trial by a judge than by trial by a jury.867 Judicial econ-
omy868 is a widely shared value.869 Lynch and Bourne conclude that 
as a matter of common sense, judicial economy is better served by 
trial by a judge than by trial by a jury.870 The concept that jury trials 
take more time and, therefore, more effort and expense than judge 
trials, is commonly accepted.871 
A jury trial may take more time from beginning to end than 
trial by a judge. Even before trial, the judge may be called upon to 
hear argument and rule on whether a jury trial may be had.872 A 
panel of potential jurors must be selected from the public,873 and a 
jury must be selected from that panel through questioning874 and by 
allowing challenges for cause and peremptory challenges.875 Law-
yers' arguments and presentation of evidence may take more time 
in a case tried by a jury than in a case tried by a judge.876 The judge 
866. See supra notes 376452 and accompanying text. 
867. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 60. 
868. The term "judicial economy" is broadly considered to include economy of all 
resources, such as time, effort, and money, and economy of all interested 
groups, including courts, parties, other trial participants, and the public. 
869. See, e.g., MD. RULE 1-201(a). MD. RULE 1-201 (a) provides: "These rules shall be 
construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, and elim-
ination of unjustifiable expense and delay." [d. (emphasis added). FED. R Cw. P. 
1 provides: "These rules ... shall be construed ... to secure the just, speedy, 
and inexpensive determination of every action." [d. (emphasis added). 
870. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 60; see also id. at 2-3, 63, 64 & n.408, 69 
& n.437. The value of judicial economy is recognized under several names, 
including efficiency, economy, judicial administration, expedition, and avoid-
ance of delay. See id. 
871. One estimate was that a personal injury case may be tried by a judge in 40% 
less time than a jury. See HANs ZEISEL ET AL., DElAY IN THE COURT 81 (1959). 
But if. Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., Book Review, 48 CAL. L. REv. 360, 370 n.22 
(1960) (contending jury trials are 300% longer than bench trials); 1 DE TOG-
QUEVILLE, supra note 309, at 292 n.4 (providing that introduction of juries al-
lows for diminishing the number of judges). See generally infra notes 910-16 
and accompanying text. 
872. See MD. RULE 2-325. 
873. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 8-102, -212 (1995 & Supp. 1996). 
874. See MD. RULE 2-512(c), (d). 
875. See MD. RULE2-512(e), (h); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 8-301 (1995). 
876. See Casper, supra note 308, at 417. 
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must instruct the jury,877 and the jury must deliberate and reach a 
verdict, which ordinarily must be unanimous.878 Moreover, jury ver-
dicts may result in more appeals than judge trialS.879 
This common-sense notion of judicial economy, however, mer-
its close examination. It is like faculty governance. Anyone who has 
sat through a faculty meeting would agree that faculty democracy 
does not appear be the most efficient way to get things done. Nev-
ertheless, faculty democracy serves values other than efficiency, is 
required by accrediting agencies, and has some efficiencies of its 
own as compared with unilateral action by a dean. Also, there are 
ways of improving faculty democracy. 
Like faculty democracy, the jury serves values other than effi-
ciency. Lynch and Bourne cite an early Maryland case for the pro-
position that a Law trial is superior to an Equity trial.880 They also 
identify other important values of the jury trial such as common-
sense justice881 reached by a democratic process.882 As developed be-
low, the jury promotes structural,883 prudential,884 and ethical885 
values. 
Many of the inefficiencies of jury trial have been reduced by 
modem procedural developments, such as merger of Law and Eq-
uity, expedited procedures, summary determination, and improve-
ments to the jury. Moreover, the merger of Law and Equity has 
made the process more efficient.886 Lynch and Bourne note that 
877. See MD. RULE 2-520. 
878. See MD. RULE 2-251, -522. 
879. See Peter H. Schuck, Mapping the Debate on Jury Reform, in VERDICT: AssESSING 
THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 306, 317 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993). 
880. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 30 & n.187 (citing Richardson v. Stil-
linger, 12 G. & J. 477 (1842». That proposition was based on the rule that 
Equity has no jurisdiction where there is an adequate remedy at Law. See 
Richardson, 12 G. & J. at 479-84. The rule, in tum, was apparently based on 
three advantages of the Law courts as follows: (1) the jury trial, (2) the tak-
ing of testimony in open court (rather than by deposition), (3) and the ad-
missibility of testimony of persons with an interest in the case. See id. at 480. 
Modem procedural developments have eliminated those distinctions, except 
for the jury trial. See MD. RULE 2-301 & committee note. Nevertheless, the 
jury provides a mode of trial that is superior in many respects to a judge 
trial. See infra notes 956-1124 and accompanying text. 
881. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 3. 
882. See id. at 49 n.311. 
883. See infra notes 936-38. 
884. See infra note 952. 
885. See infra notes 947-53, 964. 
886. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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having to litigate a claim in the separate systems of Law and Equity 
resulted in additional cost, delay, and inconvenience.887 However, 
merger of the separate systems eliminated those inefficiencies.888 
Modern procedures permit litigation to be expedited, while 
protecting the jury right. Lynch and Bourne note that preliminary 
injunctive relief may be granted before jury trial889 and final injunc-
tive relief afterward.890 Of course, judges have authority to shorten 
time requirements891 and assign cases for trial so as to dispose of 
them expeditiously.892 Lynch and Bourne also note that the legisla-
ture may expedite trial of certain cases.893 They cite a Supreme 
Court case, Pernell v. Southall Realty,894 which concluded that there 
was no necessary inconsistency between the desire for speedy justice 
and the right to jury trial.895 To support that proposition, the Court 
cited as examples the laws of thirteen states guaranteeing jury trial 
in summary eviction proceedings.896 
Even in cases where the jury right exists, many determinations, 
. such as summary judgment,897 motion for judgment,898 and issues of 
887. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 45 n.292, 54-55, 76 and accompanying 
text. Equity'S clean-up doctrine could eliminate those inefficiencies in some 
situations, but only at the expense of the jury right. See ill. at 45 n.292, 54, 
55, 57, 60, 76. 
888. See id. at 45 n.292, 54-55; see also id. at 78. See generally LYNCH & BOURNE,. 
supra note 3, at 326-37. 
889. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 330-31, 336 & n.221; Bourne & Lynch, 
supra note 5, at 25 nn.151, 161. 
890. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 61. 
891. See MD. RULE 1-204(a). 
892. See MD. RULE 1-211. 
893. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 64 n.408, 69 n.437 (federal bankruptcy 
proceedings); id. at 69 n.435 (mechanics' lien adjudications); see also, e.g., 
MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 3409(e) (1995) (declaratory judgment); 
ill. § 3-704(a) (habeas corpus); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-332(b) (1996) 
(distress); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GoV'T § 10-623(c) (1993) (access to public 
records); MD. RULE 2-221 (b) (interpleader). 
894. 416 U.S. 363 (1974), cited in Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 35 nn.225-26. 
895. See Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 384 (1974). The Court noted that 
in many cases where liability was conceded, no jury would be requested, and 
that in other cases where there was no dispute of fact, summary judgment 
would be granted. See ill. The Court also noted that delay might be required 
by fairness and due process. See ill. at 385. 
896. See id. at 384 & n.34. 
897. See Fletcher v. Flournoy, 198 Md. 53, 81 A.2d 2~2 (1951); MD. RULE 2-501. 
898. See MD. RULE 2-519; see also Frush v. Brooks, 204 Md. 315, 324, 104 A.2d 624, 
628 (1954) (dictum). 
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law, generally899 will be made by the judge, not the jury. To that ex-
tent, any efficiencies of trial by the judge will be retained. 
Additionally, efforts are being made to make jury trials even 
more efficient.900 For example, judges can be better trained in trial 
management, modern technology, and communications skills.901 
Lawyers can be better trained in trial advocacy and communications 
skills,902 while jury selection can be improved by the use of written 
questionnaires903 and lawyers' opening statements made to the en-
tire venire.904 Rules of evidence can be simplified and trials short-
ened,905 and trial exhibits can be improved by the use of modern 
technology.906 There have been suggestions, generally rejected, to 
modifY jury verdicts by abandoning the unanimity requirement,907 
reducing jury discretion by providing statutory schedules for non-
economic damages,908 and bifurcating trials in liability and then 
damages phases.909 
Maintenance of a justice system using two arbiters, judge and 
jury, appears in obvious ways to be less efficient in time, effort, and 
expense than using only a judge.9lO However, commentators in re-
899. See MD. RULE 2-502; cf. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 23 (preserving the 
right of trial by jury of issues of fact). 
900. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS RElATING JUROR USE AND MANAGEMENT (1983); see 
also VERDICT, supra note 162; ABA/BROOKINGS, supra note 308. 
901. See ABA/BROOKINGS, supra note 308, at 4, 12, 25. 
902. See id. at 4, 21. 
903. See id. at 32. 
904. See id. at 4, 21, 32. 
905. See id. at 15-17,22,24-25. 
906. See id. at 3,16-17,19,22. 
907. See id. at 26-27. 
908. See id. at 4, 13, 27. 
909. See id. at 27-28. 
910. See supra note 871 and accompanying text. The distinction seems to be be-
tween the efficiencies of trial by the jury and trials by the judge, not between 
trials at Law and in Equity. Equity is not inherently more expeditious than 
Law. For example, in 19th century England it was said that "delay and ex-
pense reign supreme" in the Court of Chancery. See Charles Synge Christo-
pher Bowen, Progress in the Administration of Justice During the Victorian Period, 
in 1 SELECT ESSAW IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 516,516 (1907); see also 
CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 7-8 (Modem Library ed., 1985) (1853) (foot-
notes omitted). 
Jamdyce and Jamdyce drones on. This scarecrow of a suit has, in 
course of time, become so complicated, that no man alive knows 
what it means .... Innumerable children have been born in the 
cause; innumerable young people have married in it; innumerable 
old people have died out of it. Scores of persons have deliriously 
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cent years have noted a number of ways in which a jury trial may be 
more efficient than a judge trial. First, because of the possible dis-
cussion of allegations that may be inadmissible as evidence and, 
therefore, require disqualification of the trier of fact, a judge may 
be more likely to participate in negotiations leading to settlement in 
a case to be tried by a jury than in a case to be tried to that 
judge.911 Second, jury trials are much more likely than judge trials 
to be concentrated and continuous, bringing a closure of case de-
velopment and allowing few interruptions.912 Third, in a complex 
case, more clarity is required from the lawyers and the judge in a 
jury trial than in a judge trial.913 Fourth, evidence is more likely to 
be excluded in a jury trial than in a judge trial, resulting in a 
shorter triaP14 Fifth, the jury reaches its verdict summarily, in a 
matter of hours or days, while the judge, who must make findings 
of fact and conclusions of law, may deliberate and labor over an 
found themselves made parties in Jarndyce and Jarndyce, without 
knowing how or why; whole families have inherited legendary ha-
treds with the suit. The little plaintiff or defendant, who was prom-
ised a new rocking-horse when Jarndyce and Jarndyce should be set-
tled, has grown up, possessed himself of a real horse, and trotted 
away into the other world. Fair wards of court have faded into 
mothers and grandmothers; a long procession of Chancellors has 
come in and gone out; the legion of bills in the suit have been 
transformed into mere bills of mortality; there are not three 
Jarndyces left upon the earth perhaps, since old Tom Jarndyce in 
despair blew his brains out at a coffeehouse in Chancery Lane; but 
Jarndyce and Jarndyce still drags its dreary length before the Court, 
perennially hopeless. 
DICKENS, supra, at 7-8. Indeed, one cause of the merger of Law and Equity in 
England in the 19th century was the public's arousal "by the intolerable ex-
pense and delay in equitable procedure." MCCUNTOCK, supra note 741, at 17. 
911. See MORRIS]. BLOOMSTEIN, VERDICT 120-21 (1968). 
912. See Galanter, supra note 313, at 88. 
913. See Patrick E. Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue: Civil Juries and the Alloca-
tion of Judicial Power, 56 TEX. L. REv. 47, 54 (1977). One commentator has 
concluded that the jury trial requires clarity of lawyers and judges in present-
ing the law to the jury in every case. See Edson L. Haines, Preface to JOINER, 
supra note 157, at vii-viii. 
914. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Improving the Qyality of Jury Decision-making, in VER-
DICT: AssESSING THE CML JURY SWTEM 341, 343 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993); 
Stanley E. Sacks, Preservation of the Civil Jury System, 22 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 
76, 83-84 (1965); At least this is true if the time which would have been 
taken for the presentation of evidence exceeds the time taken for arguments 
over its admissibility. 
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opinion for months.915 Sixth, appellate review of jury-tried facts is 
more strictly limited than appellate review of judge-tried facts.916 
There are even some doubts about the data that supposedly 
demonstrate that trial by a judge is more efficient than trial by a 
jury. Some commentators have suggested that generalizations are 
difficult, because of a skewed sample of cases. That is, the small per-
centage of cases that do reach the jury may be the closest, hardest, 
and most insoluble ones.917 Thus, at least some of the extra time, ef-
fort, and cost in jury trials is a result of the nature of the case, not 
a result of the trier being a jury as opposed to a judge. 
More importantly for purposes of this Article, Lynch and 
Bourne's common-sense notion that judicial economy is better 
served by trial by a judge than by trial by a jury may be criticized 
because it is restrictive of the jury right and because it is contrary to 
the usual ways of interpreting the Maryland Constitution. Just as 
faculty democracy is required by accrediting agencies, the jury trial 
may be required by the Maryland Constitution. 
1. Not Protective of the Jury Right 
Lynch and Bourne's common-sense notion that judicial econ-
omy is better served by trial by a judge than by trial by a jury is ob-
viously restrictive of the right to jury trial. Lynch and Bourne make 
it clear that this notion. of judicial economy may motivate either the 
legislature918 or the judiciary919 to restrict the jury right. 
915. See Higginbotham, supra note 913, at 55; JOINER, supra note 157, at 72-73. 
Compare FED. R Cw. P. Form 31 (jury findings as to liability and damages), 
with FED. R Cw. P. 52(a) (judge findings of fact and conclusions of law), and 
MD. RULE 2-522(a) (judge statement of reasons and basis for determining 
damages). 
916. See Higginbotham, supra note 913, at 58; JOINER, supra note 157, at 74; cf. 
Board of Shellfish Comm'rs v. Mansfield, 125 Md. 630, 94 A. 207 (1915) (stat-
ing that constitutional jury trial guarantee implicitly prohibits appellate re-
view of jury-found facts); Charlton Bros. Transp. Co. v. Garrettson, 188 Md. 
85, 51 A.2d 642 (1947) (holding appellate review only of legal sufficiency, 
not of weight of the evidence, in jury verdict). But cf. MD. RULE 8-131(c) (ap-
plying clearly erroneous standard to appellate review of judge's evidentiary 
findings). Compare U.S. CONST. AMEND. VII "[N]o fact tried by a jury, shall be 
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to 
the rules of the common law.", and Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645 (1946) 
(allowing appellate reexamination only if the verdict was not based on sub-
stantial evidence or was unreasonable), with FED. R Cw. P. 52(a) (allowing 
appellate review of judge's findings of fact by a clearly erroneous standard). 
917. See, e.g., Schuck, supra note 893, at 307-08. 
918. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 3 n.3, 64 n.408, 69 n.437. 
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2. Contrary to the Usual Ways of Interpreting the Constitution 
Lynch and Bourne's common-sense notion that judicial econ-
omy is better served by trial by a judge than by trial by a jury is not 
protective of the jury right. Moreover, it is contrary to many of the 
usual ways of interpreting the Maryland Constitution. 
That common-sense notion is contrary to the nature of a writ-
ten constitution. The jury right is specific, enacted, and enforcea-
ble, and it is supreme as it prevails over other conflicting laws and 
policies,920 such as judicial economy. The jury right is consistent 
with a "living" constitution. It has survived the merger of Law and 
Equity,921 and it may be protected at the same time that litigation is 
expedited.922 
The common-sense notion that judicial economy is better 
served by trial by a judge than by trial by a jury is also contrary to 
the text of the Maryland Constitution. The principle jury right pro-
vision, Article 23, expressly mandates that the jury right shall be in-
violably preserved.923 
Article 23 does invoke judicial economy in one respect. Article 
23 includes a $5,000 amount in controversy requirement,924 preclud-
ing jury trial of small claims. There is no other language in Article 
23, however, which suggests that policies, such as judicial economy, 
may be invoked to erode the jury right.925 Indeed, Article 44 of the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights generally rules out pleas to "necessity" 
to excuse departures from the Maryland Constitution.926 While Arti-
cle 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides that legal reme-
919. See id. at 2-3, 60, 63, 69. 
920. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text. 
921. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
922. See supra notes 889-909 and accompanying text. 
923. See supra notes 47-67 and accompanying text. 
924. See supra note 8. 
925. Cf U.S. CaNST. AMEND. N (right to be free of "unreasonable" searches and 
seizures); MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5 (providing that inhabitants of 
Maryland are entitled the benefit of English statutes in existence on July 4, 
1776, "which, by experience, have been found applicable to their local and 
other circumstances"); id. art. 25 (right to be free of "excessive" bail and 
"excessive" fines). 
926. See MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 44 ("That the provisions of the Constitu-
tion of the United States, and of this State, apply, as well in time of war, as 
in time of peace; and any departure therefrom, or violation thereof, under 
the plea of necessity, or any other plea, is subversive of good Government, 
and tends to anarchy and despotism."). 
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dies should be available "speedily without delay, "92: we have seen 
that modern procedural developments permit expeditious jury tri-
alS.928 Furthermore, the Maryland Constitution preserves the right to 
trial by jury, not to trial by judge.929 
The common-sense notion that judicial economy is better 
served by trial by a judge than by trial by a jury is contrary to the 
history of the Maryland Constitution. That history shows hundreds 
of years of reverence for the jury. right.930 English deprivation of 
that right, under the plea of efficiency,931 was one of the abuses 
leading to the American Revolution.932 
The framers of Article 23 recognized that jury trials may take 
more time than trials by judges,933 but they adopted the jury right 
anyway.934 The framers of Article 23 wanted to put the jury right be-
yond the reach of the legislature and, presumably, the judiciary.935 
The common-sense notion that judicial economy is better 
served by trial by a judge than by trial by a jury is contrary to the 
structure of government. Eliminating the jury eliminates a check by 
the people on the government, generally.936 Eliminating the jury 
also eliminates the jury's check on the trial judge by finding facts 
927. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 19 provides: 
Id. 
That every man, for any injury done to him in his p~rson or prop-
erty, ought to have remedy by the course of the Law of the land, 
and ought to have justice and right, freely without sale, fully with-
out any denial, and speedily without delay, according to the Law of 
the land. 
928. See supra notes 889-899 and ,!-ccompanying text. 
929. See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text. 
930. See supra notes 100-04, 107-D8 and accompanying text. 
931. See GoEBEL, supra note 105, at &5-87 (enforcement of trade laws and collec-
tion of revenues). 
932. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text. 
933. On April 30, 1851, the constitutional convention debates regarding the num-
ber of judges to be provided for Baltimore City included the following dis-
cussion: "OJ ury trials ... imposed the heaviest burdens upon the courts .... 
[I] t was jury trials, where the cal!es were argued before the court, and excep-
tions were taken, and the court instructs the jury, that consumes time .... " 
2 1851 DEBATES, supra note 9, at 644. However, the convention record also 
noted the existence of a backlog of 2,500 cases in the court of chancery be-
cause of dilatory course of proceedings. 
934. The jury trial guarantee was adopted by the convention on May 7, 1851, one 
week after the discussion. See supra note 933; see also 2 1851 DEBATES, supra 
note 9, at 766-67. 
935. See generally supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
936. See supra notes 153-63 and accompanying text. 
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and by softening the harshness of legal doctrine.937 Eliminating the 
jury also eliminates the jury's check, by supporting the judge, on 
the popular branches of govemment.938 
The common-sense notion that judicial economy is better 
served by trial by a judge than by trial by a jury is contrary to doc-
trine. As has been shown, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has rec-
ognized that the constitutional jury right is a limitation on the legis-
lature's power to fix the jurisdictions of Law and Equity.939 
Traditionally, Maryland courts have not been very alert to the ero-
sion of the jury right.940 However, Higgins v. Bames941 suggests a new 
regime. Higgins expressly rejected an approach preferring the "effi-
ciency" of a judge trial in favor of "a jealous protection of the right 
of jury trial. "942 Higgins narrowly limited the discretion of trial 
judges to restrict the jury right943 to situations where the jury itself 
would obstruct a satisfactory disposition of the issue944 or where 
"most imperative circumstances" exist.945 
Another commentator suggested that the right to jury trial 
should be limited because it is as impractical as it is instructive. The 
commentator was Professor Redish in Seventh Amendment Right to 
Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of Rational Decision Making. 946 
Redish himself noted three criticisms of the idea of limiting the 
right to jury trial on the ground that it is impractical. First, that 
idea may lead to determinations based on judicial whim.947 Second, 
937. See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text. 
938. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
939. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. But if. Houston v. Lloyd's Con-
sumer Acceptance Corp., 241 Md. 10,215 A.2d 192 (1965) (holding that the 
exercise of the jury right is subject to a requirement that the election of a 
jury trial be in writing); NILES, supra note 96, at 18, 343 (citing Knee v. Balti-
more City Pass. Ry., 87 Md. 623, 40 A. 890 (1898) (providing that reasonable 
regulations of the exercise of the jury right are permitted». 
940. See Brown, supra note 85, at 451, 473-74. 
941. 310 Md. 532, 530 A.2d 724 (1987). 
942. [d. 
943. See id. at 543-44 & n.12, 550-51, 530 A.2d at 730, 733 & n.12. 
944. See id. at 550-51, 530 A.2d at 733. But if. id. at 546 n.7, 530 A.2d at 731 n.7 
(providing no such case was found to exist). 
945. [d. at 543-44, 546, 550-51, 530 A.2d at 730, 731, 733. Complexity of the issues 
is unlikely to constitute "most imperative circumstances." [d. at 546 n.7, 530 
A.2d at 731 n.7. 
946. See Redish, supra note 591. 
947. See id. at 512. Redish recognized this problem in all situations where legal re-
alism or sociological jurisprudence (rather than law as narrowly defined) is 
the basis for decision. 
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other social values competing with efficiency exist and must be bal-
anced against it.948 Third, that idea may not be durable.949 Others 
have criticized Redish's idea of limiting the right to jury trial be-
cause it is impractical. Moreover, a criticism directed specifically at 
Redish was that his approach was elitist-to the extent judges per-
ceive that the jury is not just like them, judges may use their power 
to try to curb jurors.950 A general criticism of the judicial economy 
approach to interpreting the jury trial right is that the approach 
would be rejected out of hand if it was applied to other provisions 
of the Bill of Rights. Thus, the approach suggests a lack of sympathy 
for the objectives of the constitutional right of jury trial.951 
The common-sense notion that judicial economy is better 
served by trial by a judge than by trial by a jury is contrary to a pru-
dential concern. The jury is a benefit to judges and our justice sys-
tem by helping legitimize outcomes, by being a "lightning rod" for 
animosity, and by providing a "black box" decision.952 
The common-sense notion that judicial economy is better 
served by trial by a judge than by trial by a jury is contrary to cer-
tain ethical concerns. For purposes of equal protection, the jury 
right is a fundamental constitutional right. Thus, any classification 
significantly interfering with the exercise of the right would be 
948. See id; see also supra notes 880-85 and accompanying text; cf. supra notes 911-
16 and accompanying text (showing conflicting views of the relative effi-
ciency of trial judge and trial jury). 
949. See Redish, supra note 591, at 513-14. Thus, the future might bring different 
evaluations of efficiency or of how efficiency and other values should be 
weighed. 
950. See Lewis H. Larue, A Jury of One's Peers, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 841, 865 & 
n.86 (1976). 
The judges would believe that deciding cases "on the law and the 
evidence" requires a disciplined mind, the sort of mind the judge 
believes himself to have. A temptation that seduces the judge is for 
him to say that the best juror is a person who is just like himself. 
Insofar as the jurors are not just like the judges, and insofar as the 
difference is perceived by the judges as a lack of discipline, then to 
that extent the judges will use their power to try to curb the jurors. 
Id. (footnote omitted) 
951. See Wolfram, supra note 120, at 649 n.33; see also Wilkens v. State, 293 Md. 
335,444 A.2d 445, 448 (1982) (a criminal contempt case quoting Bloom v. Il-
linois, 391 U.S. 194, 208-09 (1968) ("Perhaps to some extent we sacrifice effi-
ciency, expedition, and economy, but the choice in favor of jury trial has 
been made, and retained, in the Constitution."». 
952. See supra notes 308-20 and accompanying text. 
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strictly scrutinized.953 However, judicial economy, like other effi-
ciency measures, is likely to satisfy only deferential rational basis re-
view, not strict scrutiny.954 Therefore, any significant limitation on 
the jury right imposed for the purpose of judicial economy would 
violate equal protection. 
The common-sense notion that judicial economy is better 
served by trial by a judge than by trial by a jury also violates the 
principles of limited government, government by the people, gov-
ernment for the people, and free political exchange.955 
C. Equity is Superior to Law as a Mode oj Trial 
The seventh aspect of Lynch and Bourne's principled discre-
tionary theory is their suggestion that Equity is superior to Law as a 
mode of trial.956 Mter the merger of Law and Equity,957 that superi-
ority is generally of trial by judge over trial by jury.958 
Arguments over which is 'the better decision-maker, judge or 
jury, is a litde like asking who should make decisions for a school-
the dean or the faculty? Both unitary decision-makers like a dean, 
and collegial decision-makers, like a law faculty, have strengths and 
weaknesses. Both decision-makers typically consider mercy and ad 
hoc matters, on the one hand, as well as justice and reason, on the 
other hand. Of course, faculty decisions are usually made in a con-
text of power-sharing with the dean, who may initially refer matters 
to the faculty and who often later exercises some reviewing author-
ity over faculty decisions. Thus, faculty decision-making provides the 
checks and balances of participation by both the faculty and the 
953. See supra notes 365-68 and accompanying text. 
954. But cf. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S, 71 (1971) (providing that while judicial econ-
omy was a legitimate objective, a preference of males over females to admin-
ister decedents' estates was arbitrary discrimination violating equal protec-
tion) . 
955. See supra notes 376411, 443-52 and accompanying text. 
956. See infra notes 959-1044 and accompanying text; cf. supra note 305 and ac-
companying text (stating that Equity proceedings did not include oral testi-
mony until 1890). But cf. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 30 (citing Rich-
ardson v. Stillinger, 12 G. & J. 477 (1842) (holding that a court of Law is the 
superior method of trial for most civil cases». 
957. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
958. The distinction between substantive equitable rights and remedies and sub-
stantive legal rights and remedies, a distinction which survives merger, is con-
sidered below. See infra notes 1125-1514 and accompanying text (discussing 
Lynch and Bourne's approximation of pre-merger approach for actually de-
ciding in what situations the jury right is to apply). ' 
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dean. In any event, the school's decisions typically are s~bject to re-
view by higher authority-the provost, the president, and the board, 
Lynch and Bourne's suggestion, that Equity is superior to Law 
as a mode of trial, appears to be based on five elements expressly 
or impliedly stated in their work: expertise, decision-making pro-
cess, expedition, judicial economy, and result. 
First, Lynch and Bourne, by references to the "chancellor,"959 
suggest that a judge has expertise that a jury does not have. Gener-
ally, a judge does not have expertise in the usual sense. An official 
in an administrative agency960 or on a specialized tribunal96I devel-
ops expertise, a special claim to competency based on knowledge of 
and experience with certain substantive rules and special proce-
dures.962 While an experienced trial judge may have expertise in the 
trial of fact, at least compared with appellate judges,963 that exper-
tise is different, but not necessarily greater, than the expertise of a 
jury.964 
The relative competence of judge and jury were summarized in 
KaIven and Zeisel's classic study of the American jury: 
On the one hand, it is urged that the judge, as a result of 
training, discipline, recurrent experience, and superior in-
telligence, will be better able to understand the law and an-
alyze the facts than laymen, selected from a wide range of 
intelligence levels, who have no particular experience with 
matters of this sort, and who have no durable official re-
959. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 329, 331; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 
5, at 29, 44, 47, 56, 62-64, 69, 75, 77. The office of chancellor no longer ex-
ists in Maryland. See supra notes 648-51 and accompanying text. Moreover, 
separate courts of Equity have been abolished. See id. The last hold-out was 
Baltimore City, where separate courts of Law and Equity with rotating judges 
existed until 1980. See MD. CONST. art. IV, §§ 27-33 (1867) (repealed 1980). 
Thus, by referring to "chancellor," Bourne and Lynch must be referring to a 
judge. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 329 ("In a merged system ... 
the powers of the chancellor are present in every action."). . 
960. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term- Foreword: The Forms of 
Justice, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1, 34-35 (1979). 
961. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazeli, The Ordinary and the Ex-
traordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARv. L. REv. 465, 481-86 (1980) (pro-
bate and bankruptcy courts). 
962. See id. at 481; Fiss, supra note 960, at 1, 34-35. 
963. See Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1985). 
964. Cf. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REv. 1055, 1058 
(1964) (stating that a jury, having common sense and the feel of the com-
munity, is an expert at deciding negligence and at pricing damages). 
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sponsibility. On the other hand, it is argued that twelve 
heads are inevitably better than one; that the jury as a 
group has wisdom and strength which need not character-
ize any of its individual members; that it makes up in com-
mon sense and common experience what it may lack in 
professional training, and that its very inexperience is an as-
set because it secures a fresh perception of each trial, avoid-
ing the stereotypes said to infect the judicial eye.965 
427 
The debate over the respective competence of judge and jury is 
fierce, long-standing, and filled with value judgments.966 However, it 
should not be surprising that judges and juries have different char-
acteristics, for they complement each other in function. 967 In any 
event, the debate is largely theoretical as long as there is a constitu-
tional right to jury trial.968 
. Where complex cases are involved, however, the judge is likely 
to have an expertise that the jury does not have. Thus, Lynch and 
Bourne suggest that complex cases may be more suitable for trial by 
judge than trial by jury.969 Lynch and Bourne recognize, however, 
that this idea of a complexity exception to the right to jury trial has 
not been accepted in either Maryland970 or federal97I courts for sev-
eral reasons. First, after procedural reforms, complex issues may be 
adjudicated in an action at law.972 Second, the complexity idea may 
965. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 8. Kalven and Zeisel concede that all 
judges are not alike and that all juries are not alike. For example, some ju-
ries will be more rule-minded than the average judge, while some judges will 
have more of an open sentiment than the average jury. See id. at 99-100. 
In Maryland, it is a jury of six, not twelve, whose heads may be better 
than one. See supra note 7. It is not six heads or one head, but both in ajury 
trial, which is conducted under supervision of a judge. See supra notes 157-63 
and accompanying text. 
966. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 3-9; see also Galanter, supra note 313, 
at 69-91. 
967. See supra notes 157-62 and accompanying text. 
968. See supra notes 7-15 and accompanying text. 
969. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 334; Bourne & Lynch,~supra note 5, at 
27, 42; see also id. at 24, 30-31, 60. See generally Deirdre W. Bastian Lee & Eu-
genia Cooper Wootton, Comment, Complex Federal Civil Litigation - Can Jury 
Trials be Constitutionally Avoidea? 11 U. BALT. L. REv. 110 (1981). 
970. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 335 & n.218; Bourne & Lynch, supra 
note 5, at 42 n.267; see also supra notes 336-39 and accompanying text. 
971. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 332-33, 334, 335; Bourne & Lynch, 
supra note 5, at 24-25, 42 n.267. But see id. at 27 n.162. 
972. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 332-33; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, 
at 42. 
428 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 26 
run afoul of the constitutional right to trial by jury.973 Thus, Equity 
is not superior to Law as a mode of trial because of any expertise. 
Second, Lynch and Bourne suggest that Equity is superior to 
Law as a mode of trial because the decision-making process of Eq-
uity (the judge), is better than the decision-making process of Law 
(the jury). Lynch and Bourne mention only one aspect of Equity's 
supposed superiority of the decision-making process-the existence 
of discretion. In that respect, however, the decision-making 
processes of Equity and Law are similar. In certain other respects 
not mentioned by Lynch and Bourne, the decision-making 
processes of the judge and the jury are different, but neither one is 
clearly superior to the other. In one other respect, however, the 
jury trial is clearly superior to a judge trial-the jury trial includes a 
system of checks and balances. 
Lynch and Bourne note that a significant characteristic of Eq-
uity is its discretion.974 While they do not systematically describe Eq-
uity'S discretion,975 Lynch and Bourne do mention several of its as-
pects. That discretion permits weighing or balancing the interests of 
the parties,976 as well as that of the public,977 in determining whether 
973. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 332-33, 335; Bourne & Lynch, supra 
note 5, at 27 n.162. One commentator has concluded that a jury is required 
where the issues are difficult in order to permit public scrutiny and thereby 
assure that justice is not lost in the maze. See Wolfram, supra note 120, at 
74647. Cf supra note 913 and accompanying text Uury trial may be prefera-
ble to a judge trial in complex cases because of the greater clarity required 
of the lawyers and the judge in a jury trial). 
974. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 44, 47 n.297, 63; if. LYNCH & BOURNE, 
supra note 3, at 318 ("equity and good conscience"). 
Other commentators have noted that this discretion is judicial, not per-
sonal, which is informed by principles of equity, law, and public policy and 
which considers all of the circumstances of a case. See, e.g., PHELPS, supra 
note 86, at 212-15. 
975. Fiss has more systematically identified several different aspects of Equity'S dis-
cretion. First, unlike most legal relief, equitable relief is discretionary in the 
sense that it is extraordinary or not of right. See FISS, supra note 719, at 1. 
Second, equitable relief is discretionary because it is not controlled by pre-
cise rules. See FISS, supra note 730, at 91. Third, equitable relief is discretion-
ary in that appellate review is limited. See id. Fourth, discretion may be exer-
cised at many different stages of a case in Equity, including the 
determinations of whether or not the equitable prerequisites have been satis-
fied, whether or not a substantive right has been violated, whether or not an 
equitable remedy is be granted, and, if so, what the nature of that remedy is 
to be. See id. at 91-93. 
976. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 62 n.393; if. LYNCH & BOURNE, supra 
note 3, at 326 ("equitable inquiry" in civil coercive contempt). 
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relief should be granted. Equity's discretion also permits consider-
ing all of the circumstances in determining what relief should be 
gran ted. 978 
The idea that Equity is superior to Law because of Equity's dis-
cretion is a philosophical and historical oversimplification that does 
not accurately reflect modern practice. Philosophically, Dean Pound 
saw rules of law and the exercise of discretion as two antagonistic 
ideas in the administration of justice.979 Although rules of law are 
characteristic of the common law980 and the exercise of discretion is 
characteristic of Equity,981 Law and Equity react with one another982 
and any boundaries between the two are accidentap83 
Historically, to associate discretion with Equity and not with 
Law is an oversimplification. Prior to the development of Equity, 
common-law courts exercised significant powers of discretion984 and 
heard appeals to conscience.985 Traditionally, Law courts have also 
issued certain extraordinary, or discretionary remedies, such as 
mandamus.986 
Indeed, Henry McClintock has hinted that Law courts could be 
just as flexible as Equity in deciding cases to meet changing needs. 
The common-law theory was that precedents were based on "imme-
morial custom." Law courts interpreted and applied precedents to 
decide cases. Thus, Law courts might exercise flexibility in two dif-
ferent ways. First, a Law court had to determine the content of the 
immemorial custom on which the precedents were based. Second, a 
Law court had to interpret precedents and apply them to a particu-
lar case. 987 
977. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 43-44. 
978. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 314 n.65, 315; see also Bourne & Lynch, 
supra note 5, at 62. 
979. See Roscoe Pound, The Decadence of Equity, 5 COLUM. L. REv. 20 (1905); see also 
KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 9; cf. DAN B. DOBBS, LAw OF REMEDIES 67 
(2d ed. 1993) ("Discretion of equity courts ... makes possible decisions that 
are flexible, intuitive, and tailored to the particular case. It also makes possi-
ble decisions that are unanalyzed, unexplained, and unthoughtful."). 
980. See generally Pound, supra note 979, at 20-35. 
981. See id. at 22. 
982. See id. at 24. 
983. See id. at 23. 
984. See PLUCKNEIT, supra note 516, at 158, 675. 
985. See id. at 680. 
986. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-Ol (1995). 
987. See MCCUNTOCK, supra note 741, at 10; cf. Calvin Woodard, Is the United States 
a Common Law Country? (changes in common-law theory in England and 
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. Even before merger of Law and Equity, Law courts exercised 
substantial discretion regarding procedural aspects of a law case, 
such as ordering separate trials,988 transferring cases to another 
county,989 requiring production of evidence,99o submitting a case for 
a special verdict,991 ruling on a new trial motion,992 revising a judg-
ment within thirty days of its entry,993 and directing entry of final 
judgment on part of a multiple claim or multiple party action.994 
Historically, the scope of discretion in Equity courts became re-
stricted as Equity was systematized under the influence of chancel-
lors who were lawyers995 and as the principle of stare decisis or pre-
cedent became accepted.996 In modern practice, because Law and 
Equity are administered by the same judges, there is a tendency to 
overlook historical distinctions between Law and Equity.997 
Ironically, the discretionary element of the decision-making 
process of Equity is also available in the jury trial of Law cases. In 
that respect, the two processes have been characterized as func-
America), in ESSAYS ON ENGUSH LAw AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 120, 120-
35 (Elisabeth A. Cawthorn & David E. Narrett eds., 1994). 
988. MD. RULE 501 (a) (1977) (repealed 1984), applicable at Law and in Equity, 
was interpreted as giving the court wide discretion. See Connor v. Celanese 
Fibers Co., 40 Md. App. 452, 459, 392 A.2d 116, 120 (1978), overruled on other 
grounds by Eastern Stainless Steel v. Nicholson, 60 Md. App. 659, 484 A.2d 
296 (1984). 
989. MD. RULE 317 (1977) (repealed 1984), applicable generally, provided that 
the circuit court, where venue was improper, might dismiss or transfer the 
action. 
990. MD. RULE 521 (1977) (repealed 1984), applicable generally, was interpreted 
as within the court's discretion. See Evans v. Howard, 256 Md. 155, 161, 259 
A.2d 528, 531 (1969). 
991. MD. RULE 560(a) (1977) (repealed 1984),applicable at Law, expressly made 
the method of submission of the issues to the jury within the court's discre-
tion. 
992. MD. RULE 567(c) (1977) (repealed 1984), applicable at Law, was interpreted 
as within the discretion of the court. See Brinand v. Denzik, 226 Md. 287, 
293, 173 A.2d 203, 206 (1961). 
993. MD. RULE 625(a) (1977) (repealed 1984), applicable at Law, was interpreted 
as within the discretion of the court. Hardy v. Metts, 282 Md. 1, 6, 381 A.2d 
683, 686 (1978). 
994. MD. RULE 605 (1977) (repealed 1984), applicable generally, was interpreted 
as giving the court discretion. See Diener Enters., Inc. v. Miller, 266 Md. 551, 
555,295 A.2d 470, 473 (1972). 
995. See PLUCKNETT, supra note 516, at 688. 
996. See id. at 690, 692. 
997. See MCCUNTOCK, supra note 741, at 51. 
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tional equivalents.998 Indeed, Kalven and Zeisel have identified a 
function of' the jury as applying "common-sense equities" to a case, 
a role ordinarily not permitted the judge.999 Lynch and Bourne note 
the "common sense justice of civil juries." 1000 
Of course, in any society with rules, discretion must have lim-
its. lool Where the standards for the exercise of discretion are unde-
fined, the only limit may be the conscience of the one who exer-
cises that discretion,1002 which is like making the standard for 
measuring length vary with the "chancellor's fOOt."1003 
The jury trial, by providing checks and balances between judge 
and jury, does limit discretion. The judge provides a check on jury 
discretion by ruling on the admissibility of evidence, instructing the 
jury on the law, and setting aside erroneous verdicts. lOO4 The jury 
provides a check on the judge's discretion by finding facts and soft-
ening the harshness of legal doctrine. l005 In this respect, jury trial is 
clearly superior to judge trial. 
Generally, Lynch and Bourne do not compare other aspects of 
998. See FIss, supra note 719, at 27. Fiss stated elsewhere that one aspect of equita-
ble discretion is the use of open-ended concepts, such as "reasonable," 
which are also applied (by the jury) in common-law actions. See FIss, supra-
note 730, at 92. 
999. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 8-9, 87, 107, 115, 285, 291, 299, 304, 
346, 375, 395, 399, 443 n.18, 477 n.4, 489-95, 498-99. Kalven and Zeisel also 
appeared to equate jury "equity" with jury "discretion." See id. at 498; see also 
ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 66 (rev. ed. 
1954) (reporting that "the jurors are chancellors"); Chayes, supra note 313, 
at 1287 (" [O]ne of the virtues of the jury was thought to be its exercise of a 
rough-hewn equity, deviating from the dictates of the law where justice or 
changing. community mores required." (emphasis added» ; VALERIE P. HANs 
& NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 116 (1986) (" Uluries frequently apply a 
measure of fairness and equity to a case that a judge, preoccupied with the 
fine points of the law, will ignore." (emphasis added»; SPOONER, supra note 
155, at 64, 81, 110-12, 191 (stating old common-law courts were courts of 
conscience in which jurors decided cases according to their own notions of 
natural equity). 
1000. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 3; see also ABA/BROOKINGS, supra note 308, 
at 9 (stating that the jury expresses "the community's sense of fairness, of 
justice, of right and wrong" and balances competing values). 
1001. See generally KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1971). 
1002. Cf supra notes 262-66 and accompanying text (discussing discretion of the 
trial judge as an approach to determining the right to jury trial after 
merger). 
1003. JOHN SELDEN, TABLE TALK 52 (1821). 
1004. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
1005. See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text. 
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the decision-making processes of the judge and the jury.lOO6 Those 
aspects may be divided into four general categories for purposes of 
comparison: the composition of the decision-maker, its inputs, its 
deliberation, and its outputs. As developed below, neither the judge 
nor the jury has a clear overall superiority as to prominent aspects 
of decision-making in those categories. 
With respect to the composition of the decision-maker, we have 
already seen mixed results. Kalven and Zeisel concluded that in cer-
tain respects a judge is superior to the jury: the judge is better able 
than a layperson to understand the law and the facts because of the 
judge'S superior intelligence-contrasted with the jury's wide range 
of intelligence-and because of the judge's training, discipline, and 
experience-contrasted with the jury's lack of professional training 
and its inexperience. 1007 However, Kalven and Zeisel concluded that 
in other respects the jury is superior to the judge: the wisdom and 
strength of twelve is greater than that of one,1008 the jury's common 
sense and broad experience may offset the judge's professional 
training, and the jury's fresh perception of a trial is better than the 
judge's stereotypes. 1009 
Other debate on the composition of the decision-maker, cen-
tered on fairness and responsibility, has reached differing conclu-
SiOllS. Regarding fairness, some have seen the jury as more biased 
and emotional than the judge, tOtO while others have seen the jury as 
less elitist and more representative of the community, lOll less cor-
ruptible,1012 and more subject to scrutiny and challenge for bias 
than the judge.1013 Regarding responsibility, some have seen the 
1006. C! supra notes 969-73 and accompanying text (complex cases). 
1007. See supra note 965 and accompanying text. 
1008. C! supra note 7 Uury of six in Maryland). 
1009. See supra note 965 and accompanying text. 
1010. See John W. Wigmore, A Program far the Trial of Jury Tria~ 12 J. AM. JUD. SOC'y 
166, 168 (1929). But cf. supra note 1009 and accompanying text Uudicial ste-
reotypes); JOINER, supra note 157, at 26, 34, 66 (background biases resulting 
from accumulated experiences); SEYMOUR WISHMAN, ANATOMY OF A JURY 146-
47 (1986) (prior lawyer roles influence judicial behavior). 
1011. See HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 999, at 49-50; JOINER, supra note 157, at 65. 
1012. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 7-8 (stating that 12 are more difficult 
corrupt than one); SPOONER, supra note 155, at 124 (providing that jurors, 
until they come to the jury box, are unknown to the parties). 
1013. See HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 999, at 63-78 (stating that jurors are subject to 
voir dire and challenges for cause). See generally Schuck, supra note 879, at 
309-10 (providing that judges' systematic biases of social status, wealth, politi-
cal activity, peer group, professional training, and socialization are more ob-
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temporary nature of the jury's role as a weakness,1014 while others 
have seen it as a strength. 1015 
With respect to the inputs of the decision-making process, the 
judge has a clear superiority over the jury in understanding applica-
ble law, and the judge has some superiority in gathering facts. With 
regard to understanding the law, we have already seen that the 
judge, who has professional training, is superior to the jury, which 
lacks that training. 1016 With regard to gathering facts, the judge, un-
like the jury, may question witnesses1017 and take notes during 
trial.I018 However, the collective memory of the jury may be superior 
to the memory of the judge.1019 
With respect to the deliberation of the decision-maker, the jury 
has a clear superiority over the judge. We have already seen that 
twelve (or six) heads are usually better than one. I020 The representa-
tive nature of the juryl021 also permits the inclusion of a variety of 
groups, classes, and viewpoints. 1022 The deliberation of the jury per-
mits group interaction, such as discussion, exchange of ideas, argu-
ment, and criticism-qualities not characteristic of the deliberation 
jectionable than juries' random biases). 
1014. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 8. But cf. id. at 498 (stating the undo-
mesticated status of the jury may be an advantage). 
1015. See Galanter, supra note 313, at 88-90 (stating that the jury's transience per-
mits a fresh response, resonant to the emerging moral sense of the commu-
nity, compared with the judge's response, jaded by routines and stereotypes 
and constrained by institutional priorities, professional networks, and career 
concerns); SPOONER, supra note 155, at 124 (providing judges regularly, but 
jurors rarely, are exposed to the temptations of money, fame, and power). 
1016. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 8. 
1017. See HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 999, at 123-24. But cf. WISHMAN, supra note 
1010, at 166 (stating the questioning of witnesses may detract from the evalu-
ator's detachment). The judge'S superiority over the jury in this respect, 
however, could be eliminated by reforming trial procedure to permit jurors 
to question witnesses. See HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 999, at 246. 
1018. See HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 999, at 123. But cf. WISHMAN, supra note 1010, 
at 137 (stating that the taking of notes may distract the evaluator from ob-
serving a witness's demeanor at a critical moment). The judge'S superiority 
over the jury in this respect, however, could be eliminated by reforming trial 
procedure to permit jurors to take notes. See HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 999, 
at 246. 
1019. See Robert MacCoun, Inside the Black Box: What Empirical Research Tells Us about 
Decisionmaking by Civil Juries, in VERDICT, supra note 162, at 137, 167. 
1020. See supra note 965 and accompanying text. 
1021. See supra note 1011 and accompanying text. 
1022. See REID HAsTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 7-8 (1983). 
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of a single person. 1023 Of course, different juries and different 
judges vary regarding whether they truly deliberate. One commen-
tary noted that some juries are "verdict-driven," emphasizing voting 
rather than deliberation, while others were "evidence driven," em-
phasizing deliberation rather than voting. 1024 Whether judges begin 
with premises, rather than with conclusions, has also been ques-
tioned by legal realists. 1025 
With respect to the outputs of the decision-maker, the judge's 
reasoned judgment1026 appears clearly superior to the jury's "black 
box" verdict. 1027 However, as developed below, that apparent superi-
ority is not necessarily a real superiority.1028 Thus, Equity is not supe-
rior to Law as a mode of trial because of decision-making processes. 
Third, Lynch and Bourne say that Equity is superior to Law as 
a mode of trial because Equity is expeditious. 1029 However, as de-
tailed above, modern procedures permit litigation to be expedited, 
while protecting the jury right. 1030 
Fourth, Lynch and Bourne imply that Equity is superior to Law 
as a mode of trial because Equity better serves judicial economy.1031 
1023. See JOINER, supra note 157, at 25-35; see also Wigmore, supra note 1010, at 171. 
Wigmore concluded that the best means for reaching a judgment is to recc 
oncile the conclusions of a number of persons selected at random. By anal-
ogy, Wigmore noted that the final standing of a student at a university is de-
termined not by any single professor, but by the net result of 20 or more 
professors' judgments. 
The jury may also be better than the judge at generating solutions to 
problems and correcting factual errors. See MacCoun, supra note 1019, at 
167. 
1024. See HAsTIE ET AL., SUPRA note 1022, at 163-65 (study of mock juries); if. 
KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 488-89, 496 (providing the real decision 
is usually made before deliberation begins; deliberation is the means by 
which unanimity is reached). 
1025. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAw AND THE MODERN MIND 108-26 (1963 ed.). Kalven 
and Zeisel noted that the issue of whether the evidence or the conclusion 
comes first rises in the study of both jury and judge decision-making. See 
KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 490. 
1026. See MD. RULE 2-522(a) (statement of reasons required in bench trial). 
1027. See Chayes, supra note 314, at 1287. 
1028. See infra notes 1068-89 and accompanying text (jury sentiments about the 
law); see also supra notes 314-20 and accompanying text (prudential con-
cerns). 
1029. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 52, 53 n.349, 61, 63, 64 & n.408, 69 & 
n.437. 
1030. See supra notes 889-906 and accompanying text. 
1031. See supra notes 867-79 and accompanying text. 
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That notion has already been set forth and criticized in detai1. 1032 
Fifth, Lynch and Bourne suggest that Equity is superior to Law 
as a mode of trial, because the resultlO33 of trial by a judge is supe-
rior to that of trial by a jury.1034 As examples, Lynch and Bourne 
make reference to two areas of law: medical malpractice1035 and con-
tracts. 1036 Their suggestion is subject to a number of criticisms, some 
of a general nature and some directed to the two examples. Gener-
ally, the extent of the difference in result between a judge and jury 
trial is difficult to assess. There seems to be a large measure of 
agreement, however, between the results of the two types of tri-
als.1037 Kalven and Zeisel's study of the jury in four thousand civil 
cases found that judge and jury agreed on liability in about 78% of 
the cases.1038 Contrary to the expectation that the jury favors the 
plaintiff, the disagreement in the remaining 22% of the cases was 
distributed fairly evenly- the jury was more favorable to the plain-
tiff in 12% of ' the cases, and the judge was more favorable to the 
plaintiff in 10% of the cases.1039 The jury's award of damages was on 
1032. See supra notes 880-958 and accompanying text. 
1033. The element of result may be related to most of the other elements relating 
to the superiority of Equity as a method of trial--expertise, decision-making 
process, and expedition. See supra notes 959-1030 and accompanying text. 
1034. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 2-3. Bourne and Lynch recognize that 
those who favor juries believe that juries give better results than judges. See 
id. at 3 (quoting Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 34344 (1979) 
(Rehnquist, j., dissenting». 
1035. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 3 n.3 (stating that the legislature found 
"the 'societal costs of jury adjudication too high in the area of health care 
malpractice"). But see NEIL VIDMAR. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN 
JURY: CONFRONTING THE MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE. DEEP POCKETS. AND 
OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGES AWARDS (1995): 
The statutory scheme provides for decision by an arbitration panel, not 
by a judge. ,See MD. CODE ANN .. CTS. & JUD. PROC., §§ 3-2A~I(b), 3-2A~3(c), 
3-2A~(d), 3-2A~5(a) (1995). The panel's award is subject to judicial review 
with trial by a jury if properly elected. See id. § 3-2A~6(b). However, Bourne 
and Lynch ~ite medical malpractice as an example of the civil jury "as a bur-
densome constitutional luxury, the costs of which must be lessened by re-
striction." Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 2-3 (footnotes omitted). Presum-
ably, Bourne and Lynch believe that trial by a judge would generally provide 
a more satisfactory result than trial by a jury. 
1036. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 54 n.354. 
1037. See generally Par/dane, 439 U.S. at 332 & n.19; Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. 
Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 539-40 (1958) (stating judge and jury are unlikely to 
reach different results). 
1038. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 64, 521-23 (prior studies). 
1039. See id. at 64. 
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the average about 20% higher than that of the judge. 104O 
The value of these statistics, however, is problematic. While the 
verdicts of the jury were, presumably, a matter of record, the deci-
sions of the judge were hypothetical because they were rendered in 
cases actually decided by the jury, and because they were as re-
ported by the judge. 1041 The reasons for judgejury disagreement 
covered a variety of items,1042 including evaluation of evidence, ap-
plication of the burden of proof, facts available to the judge but not 
the jury, disparity of counsel, sentiments about the parties, and sen-
timents about the law. 1043 Of course, any jury study is limited by its 
methodology-the identification and selection of judges trying jury 
cases and the selection and number of cases reported. 1044 
Lynch and Bourne, using examples from the substantive legal 
domains of medical malpractice and contracts to illustrate the jury's 
inferiority, suggest that judgejury disagreements may be 
based on sentiments about the law. 1045 Kalven and Zeisel have con-
1040. See id. at 64 n.13. 
1041. See id. at 48. The judge and jury may have agreed because the judge subtly 
conveyed to the jury the judge's feelings about the case, and because the 
jury was influenced by those cues. See WISHMAN, supra note 1010, at 145-46. 
On the other hand, the judge's decision may have agreed with the jury ver-
dict, in part, because of the judge's respect for the jury system. See MacCoun, 
supra note 1019, at 165. 
1042. The reasons for the disagreement were those reported by the judge as cate-
gorized by the authors of the study. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 125, at 
48, lQ4.05. 
1043. See id. at 106-09. 
1044. See id. at 33-54. 
1045. Judgejury disagreements in the two areas of medical malpractice and con-
tracts may also be affected by sentiments about the parties, as the following 
discussion suggests. 
Kalven and Zeisel have concluded that sentiments about the defendant 
account for 11 % of judgejury disagreements. See id. at 115. Although they 
were considering only party defendants in criminal trials, their conclusions 
may be relevant in the civil context because they noted that juries tend to 
equate criminal cases and civil cases, treating the victims in criminal cases as 
plaintiffs. See id. at 493. Sentiments about the parties relate to individual 
characteristics that affect jury sympathy. See id. at 194. Individual characteris-
tics that affect credibility are considered as relating to the evidence. See id. 
By hypothesis, the likely candidates for jury sympathy would be the "lit-
tle guys" such as the medical malpractice plaintiff in a suit against the health 
care provider (a medical professional or institution). See James Kevin MacAl-
ister & Alfred L. Scanlan, Jr., Health Claims Arbitration in Maryland: The Experi-
ment Has Failed, 14 U. BALT. L. REv. 481, 501 (1985). It could also be the 
debtor defendant sued by a creditor (a merchant or a-financial institution). 
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eluded that such sentiments account for 29% of judgejury disagree-
ments. 1046 Those sentiments have been characterized more plainly as 
the jury's quarrel with the law,1047 revolt from the law,1048 war with 
the law,1049 the jury's ability to disregard substantive rules of law, 1050 
the jury's power to nullify the law, 105 1 and as jury equity.1052 
In the case of judgejury disagreements, Kalven and Zeisel con-
eluded that not only do the jury's reasons withstand public scrutiny, 
but they usually are the law in other jurisdictions.1053 In this sense, 
the jury may be viewed as a "little parliament."1054 Generally, com-
mentators have identified a number of areas where the jury may dis-
agree with the law: the jury might ignore a slight amount of con-
tributory negligence where that would bar plaintiff's recovery;1055 the 
See Wolfram, supra note 120, at 672-705. In both situations, jury sympathy for 
the little guys might be a legitimate factor in a society that prizes equal jus-
tice under law. But see supra notes 434-42 and accompanying text. In medical 
malpractice cases, jury sympathy for the patient would help counterbalance 
jury sympathy for the defendant, a member of a respected occupation 
(medicine). See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 207. In contract cases, 
jury sympathy for the debtor would help offset the comparatively superior 
economic status of the creditor and its consequent likely superior legal 
counsel. Cf id. at 115, 351-72 (stating disparity of counsel accounts for 4% of 
judgejury disagreements). A contingent fee arrangement is unlikely to be 
available to a debtor defendant, although it would likely be available to a 
medical malpractice plaintiff. See generally F.B. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES 
FOR LEGAL SERVICES 25-28 (1964). Thus, jury sentiment may tend to make the 
jury verdict superior to the decision of a judge. But if. KALVEN & ZEISEL, 
supra note 121, at 99-100 (stating neither all judges nor all juries are alike-
some judges may be more open to sentiment than the average jury). 
1046. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 115. Note that the 29% of the cases 
in which jury sentiments about the law cause judge and jury to disagree is a 
percentage of the 22% of the cases in which judge and jury disagree. See 
supra notes 1053-54 and accompanying text. Thus, jury sentiments about the 
law caused judge and jury to disagree in only about 6% of the cases studied. 
1047. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 499. 
1048. See id. at 165, 427, 433. 
1049. See id. at 495. 
1050. See Wolfram, supra note 120, at 671. 
1051. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 311-12, 433. That phrase seems be 
used in connection with juries in criminal cases. Compare HANs & VIDMAR, 
supra note 999, at 149-60 (criminal cases), with id. at 160-63 (civil cases). 
1052. See Kalven, supra note 964, at 1071-72; see also supra note 998 and accompany-
ing text. 
1053. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 497. 
1054. PATRICK DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 164 (1956). 
1055. See infra note 1076 and accompanying text (noting that under Arizona law, 
judges determine questions of contributory negligence); if. KALVEN & ZEISEL, 
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jury might award damages for pain and suffering in an amount 
which compensates plaintiff for attorney's fees where those fees are 
not legally an element of damages;1056 or the jury might ignore the 
law on collateral benefits, imputed negligence, and the violation of 
criminal statutes to establish negligence. 1057 
By hypothesis, there are a number of sentiments about the law 
that may explain judgejury disagreements in the two specific areas 
mentioned by Lynch and Bourne. For example, contrary to current 
Maryland law,1058 a jury in a medical malpractice case might apply a 
rule of strict liabilitylO59 in light of the existence of liability insur-
ancel060 and the opportunity for spreading the risk. 1061 Similarly, 
contrary to current Maryland Law,1062 a jury might apply the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur. 1063 
In a contracts case for breach of an implied warranty of 
merchantability of goods, a jury, contrary to current Maryland 
law,I064 might find that the warranty was negated and that the 
merchant was excused for the poor quality of goods because the 
buyer was "looking for a bargain and got beat at it."1065 In an unli-
censed home improvement contractor's suit for payment for work 
supra note 121, at 108, 242-57 (discussing "contributory negligence" of the 
victim as a defense to criminal rape). But see Kalven, supra note 964, at 1072 
(opining that, contrary to the popular view, the jury does not ignore the 
contributory negligence rule and apply comparative negligence). 
1056. See HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 999, at 161; MAcKINNON, supra note 1045, at 
14546; see also Kalven, supra note 964, at 1069-71. 
1057. See Kalven, supra note 964, at 1072. 
1058. Liability for medical malpractice is based on negligence. See Shilkret v. An-
napolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 190, 349 A.2d 245, 247 (1975). 
1059. A rule of strict liability exists in other tort areas. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., 
PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 538-59 (5th ed. 1984) (animals, fire, abnormally 
dangerous things and activities). But cf. Kalven, supra note 964, at 1072 
(opining that, contrary to the popular view, the jury has not created a strict 
liability system in personal injury cases). 
1060. See, e.g., MacAlister & Scanlan, supra note 1045, at 486. 
1061. See, e.g., id. at 517. 
1062. Res ipsa loquitur does not ordinarily apply in medical malpractice cases in Ma-
ryland. See Meda v. Brown, 318 Md. 418, 428, 569 A.2d 202, 207 (1990). 
1063. Res ipsa loquitur does apply in many other jurisdictions. See KEETON ET AL., 
supra note 1059, at 252-53, 256-57. 
1064. A warranty that goods are merchantable is ordinarily implied in a contract of 
sale between merchant and buyer. See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 2-314 
(1992); cf. id. § 2-316 (exclusion or modification of warranties). 
1065. Cf KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 246 (reason for acquittal in a criminal 
case of fraud). 
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completed, a jury, contrary to current Maryland law,1066 might find 
that the contractor was entitled to payment because the homeowner 
"had originally selected this contractor because in operating without 
a license he was cheaper than a more respectable contractor would 
have been. "1067 
The jury should be permitted its own sentiments about the law. 
The jury is a "black bOX"1068 which is expected to give its verdict 
without a statement of reasons.1069 The spirit of the law, 1070 justice, 1071 
or the equities lO72 may require a different result than the letter of 
the law. Although the same sentiments may have an effect on the 
judge, the judge is less likely than the jury to be influenced by 
them. I073 The dividing line between law and fact is uncertain 1074 and 
it is where the evidence is in doubt that the jury is most likely to 
yield its sentiments about the law.1075 Some state constitutions ex-
pressly recognize this aspect of the jury process. For example, an 
Arizona provision makes the jury the judge of questions of contribu-
tory negligence or assumption of the risklO76 and a Maryland provi-
sion makes the jury in criminal cases the judge of law as well as of 
fact. 1077 
1066. A contract made by an unlicensed home improvement contractor is illegal as 
against public policy and will not be enforced. See Harry Berenter, Inc. v. 
Berman, 258 Md. 290, 293-96, 265 A.2d 759, 761-62 (1970). 
1067. Cf. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 24647 (discussing reason for acquittal 
in a criminal case of acting as a home improvement contractor without a li-
cense). 
1068. See supra note 314 and accompanying text. 
1069. Cf. supra note 1026 and accompanying text (judge's reasoned judgment). 
1070. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 8, 346. 
1071. See id. at 8-9. 
1072. See supra note 999. 
1073. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 108-09 & n.8. But if. id. at 99-100 (stat-
ing that all judges are not alike and all juries are not alike; "some juries will 
be more rule-minded than the average judge," and some judges will be 
more open to sentiment than the average jury). 
1074. See Indiana ex reL Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938); Dobson v. Masonite 
Corp., 359 F.2d 921, 923-24 (5th Cir. 1966). 
1075. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 164-65, 432-33. 
1076. See ARIz. CONST. art. 18, § 5. That provision is discussed in Byrd v. Blue Ridge 
Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 538-39 (1958), and Herron v. Southern Pac. 
Co., 283 U.S. 91, 92-94 (1931). 
1077. See MD. CONST .. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 23, which provides: "In the trial of all 
criminal cases, the Jury shall be the Judges of Law, as well as of fact, except 
that the Court may pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a 
conviction." [d. 
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There is other support for the proposition that the jury should 
be permitted its own sentiments about the law. The Maryland Con-
stitution's Due Process Clause provides that no man ought be "de-
prived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his 
peers, or by the Law of the land."1078 Arguably, that clause autho-
rizes members of the jury to give judgment according to their con-
sciences without regard to law. 1079 Furthermore, the oath prescribed 
for state officers,1080 presumably including jurors,1081 is a general 
oath, not an oath requiring jurors to apply the law in the instruc-
tions given them by the judge.1082 And generally, as developed 
above, a function of the jury is to apply common sense, rather than 
1078. [d. art. 24. 
1079. Cf SPOONER, supra note 155, at 111 (interpretation of a similar phrase in the 
Magna Carta). 
1080. See MD. CONST. art. I, § 9. Section 9 provides: 
Every person elected, or appointed, to any office of profit or trust, 
under this Constitution, or under the Laws, made pursuant thereto, 
shall, before he enters upon the duties of such office, take and sub-
scribe the following oath, or affirmation: I, ... do swear, (or affirm, 
as the case may be,) that I will support the Constitution of the 
United States; and that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to 
the State of Maryland, and support the Constitution and Laws 
thereof; and that I will, to the best of my skill and judgment, dili-
gently and faithfully, witllOut partiality or prejudice, execute the of-
fice of ... , according the Constitution and Laws of this State. 
[d.; see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 70, § 10 (1995). Section 10 provides: 
The oath to be administered to a person who has an appointment 
which requires him to take an oath, but who is not embraced in 
the provisions of [art. I, § 9] of the Constitution, shall be that he 
will faithfully discharge his duty, unless a different form of oath is 
prescribed by law or ordinance. 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 70, § 10 (1995). 
1081. A juror serves in an office of trust. See Schowgurow v. State, 240 Md. 121, 
125, 213 A.2d 475, 478 (1965). See generally Board of Supervisors v. Attorney 
Gen., 246 Md. 417, 427-28, 229 A.2d 388, 394 (1967). 
1082. See Safeway Trails, Inc. v. Smith, 222 Md. 206, 218, 159 A.2d 823, 830 (1960) 
(jurors' oath to "weIland truly try the issues'between the parties and a true 
verdict given according to the evidence .... "). 
In the context of presidential powers under Article II of the United 
States Constitution, there has been a debate about whether the contents of 
an official oath add anything to the powers of the officer. Compare CONGRES-
SIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETA-
TION 436 (1996), and EDWIN S. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT 
MEANS TODAY 120 (1974), with RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 309 
(1974). 
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the law narrowly conceived. 1083 
Jury sentiments about the law are likely to influence a verdict 
only occasionally. As developed above, the judge and jury disagree 
on liability in only 22% of the cases.1084 Sentiments about the law ac-
count for only 29% of the disagreements. lo85 Kalven and Zeisel sug-
gest that so few cases are influenced by the jury's sentiments on the 
law for the following reasons: the law has adjusted well to the equi-
ties-the gap between official values and popular values is a small 
one;1086 the group nature of the jury decision moderates eccentric 
views;1087 and the jury is invested with a public task brought under 
the influence of a judge, put to work in solemn surroundings, and 
not told it has the power to disagree with the law. 1088 It is only 
where the evidence is in doubt that the jury is likely to yield to its 
sentiments about the law. 1089 
Functionally, the judge has many techniques to assure that the 
result of a case, triable of right by a jury, is the same as the result of 
a case not so triable. 1090 The judge may preliminarily decide a case 
before trial, where the position of one party clearly lacks merit. 1091 
The judge supervises the process of selecting the jury.1092 The judge 
1083. See supra note 1000 and accompanying text. 
1084. See supra note 1038 and accompanying text. 
1085. See supra note 1046 and accompanying text. 
1086. Kalven and Zeisel conclude that the jury's quarrel with the criminal law has 
been, historically, over seditious libel laws and Prohibition and, generally, 
over game; liquor, gambling, drunk driving, blue, regulatory, and tax laws. 
See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 286-97. 
1087. See id. at 498. 
1088. See id; see also MARYLAND CIVIL PATIERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS 3, 5, 20 (3d ed. 
1993) (stating that the jury is instructed to base its verdict upon the evi-
dence and upon the law as the judge gives it). 
1089. See KALVEN& ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 164-65, 432-33. 
1090. It is the judge who decides whether a case is triable of right to a jury, i.e., 
whether the case is a "civil proceeding" in one of the "Courts of Law" and 
whether the $5,000 amount in controversy is satisfied. See MD. CONST., DECL. 
OF RIGHTS art. 23. It is also the judge who decides whether a particular issue 
is one of "fact" to be decided by the jury. See id. It is also the judge who de-
cides whether jury trial has been properly and timely demanded. See MD. 
RULE 2-325. 
1091. See, e.g., MD. RULE 2-322 (preliminary motions to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted and strike an insufficient defense); 
MD. RULE 2-501 (summary judgment); MD. RULE 2-506 (voluntary dismissal); 
MD. RULE 2-613 (default judgment). 
1092. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-201 (1995) (plan for random 
selection of jurors); id. § 8-207 (determination of prospective juror's qualifi-
cations); id. § 8-210 (excuse from jury service); id. § 8-211 (ruling on chal-
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determines the structure,1093 location,1094 and timingl095 of trial. The 
judge determines what evidence may be presented at trial. 1096 The 
judge instructs the jury on the law and may summarize the evi-
dence. I097 The judge chooses whether the jury will return a general 
verdict or a special verdict. I098 In the event that a party's evidence is 
insufficient, the judge may grant judgment before the case goes to 
the juryl099 or, after the jury's verdict, may grant a judgment not-
withstanding the verdict. lloo In the event of error or the verdict be-
ing against the weight of the evidence, the judge may grant a com-
plete, partial, or conditional new trial. llol In certain situations, the 
judge may exercise revisory power over the judgment. 1102 In the 
event of error or a judgment being based on insufficient evidence, 
appellate judges may reverse or modify a judgment. ll03 Thus, Equity 
is no.t superior to Law as a mode of trial because of the result. 
1. Not Protective of the Jury Right 
Lynch and Bourne's suggestion that Equity is superior to Law 
as a mode of trial seems obviously restrictive of the right to jury 
trial. l104 Indeed, Lynch and Bourne call for checking the expansion 
of the jury, 1 \05 if not restricting it. l106 
lenges to compliance with selection procedures); MD. RULE 2-512(d) (con-
duct of voir dire); MD. RULE 2-512(i) (designation of a foreperson). 
1093. See, e.g., MD. RULE 2-502 (separation of legal questions), Mo RULE 2-503 (con-
solidation of actions and separate trials). 
1094. See, e.g., MD. CONST. art. IV, § 8; MD. RULE 2-505 (removal). 
1095. See, e.g., MD. RULE 1-204(a) (shorten or extend time requirements), MD. RULE 
1-508 (continuance). 
1096. See, e.g., MD. RULE 2-517 (ruling on objections to evidence); MD. RULE 2-514 
(requiring production of evidence). 
1097. See MD. RULE 2-520. 
1098. See MD. RULE 2-522. 
1099. See MD. RULE 2-519. 
1100. See MD. RULE 2-532. 
1101. See MD. RULE 2-533. 
1102. See MD. RULE 2-535. 
1103. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUo. PROC. §§ 12-301 to 304, -308 (1995) (re-
view of circuit court judgments on appeal by the court of special appeals); 
id. §§ 12-201 to 203, -307 (further review on writ of certiorari by the court of 
appeals). 
1104. See supra note 973. 
1105. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 60 ("There is no reason why Maryland 
must expand the right to trial by jury in the wake of merger at a time when 
its suitability for the pressures of modern litigation has been called into 
question.") . 
1106. See id. at 2-3 ("When romantic notions about the contribution of juries are 
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2. Contrary to the Usual Ways of Interpreting the Constitution 
Lynch and Bourne's suggestion that Equity is superior to Law 
as a mode of trial is also contrary to many of the usual ways of in-
terpreting the constitution. 
That suggestion is contrary to the nature of a written constitu-
tion. The jury right is specific, enacted, enforceable, and supreme 
lawl107 by which the people- themselves have chosen the jury as the 
superior mode of trial. The jury right is consistent with a "living" 
constitution-it has survived the merger of Law and Equity,1108 and 
other procedural reforms permit the jury continued superiority.lI09 
The suggestion that Equity is superior to Law as a mode of trial 
is contrary to the text of the Maryland Constitution. The principal 
jury right provision, Article 23, expressly mandates that the jury 
right shall be inviolably preserved. IIIO On the other hand, the text 
of the Maryland Constitution includes neither a requirement of 
courts of Equity nor a square right to trial by judge. II II 
The suggestion that Equity is superior to Law as a mode of trial 
is also contrary to the history of the Maryland Constitution. Black-
stone praised the jury trial as "the best criterion, for investigating 
the truth of facts .... "1112 Protests in Maryland, and in the colonies 
generally, charged that England had deprived the colonists in many 
cases of trial by jury.11I3 The proponents of the principal constitu-
tional jury right in 1851 strengthened the right as part of a general 
program to extend democratic limitations on the power of govern-
ment. 1I14 Subsequent constitutional reaffirmations of the jury right 
came in the face of criticisms of the jury trial. II 15 
The suggestion that Equity is superior to Law as a mode of trial 
is contrary to the structure of government. As developed above, the 
jury trial, which includes both judge and jury, permits the two to 
tempered by experience in judicial administration, the civil jury may be legit-
imately regarded as a burdensome constitutional luxury, the costs of which 
must be lessened by restriction.") (footnotes omitted). 
1107. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text. 
1108. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
1109. See generally supra note 960 and accompanying text. 
1110. See supra notes 46-67 and accompanying text. 
1111. See supra notes 77-95 and accompanying text. 
1112. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra, note 100, at *385. 
1113. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text. 
1114. See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text. 
1115. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
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check each other.lll6 
The suggestion that Equity is superior to Law as a mode of trial 
is contrary to doctrine. The Court of Appeals of Maryland, citing 
United States Supreme Court opinions, has stated that "[t]he trial 
by jury is justly dear to the American people,"Ill7 and that "Ulury 
decisions of disputed legal issues are clearly favored."lll8 Moreover, 
the court of appeals has rejected the "efficiency" of the judge trial 
for "a jealous protection of the right to jury trial,"lll9 except in the 
"most imperative circumstances." 1120 
The suggestion that Equity is superior to Law as a mode of trial 
is contrary to some prudential concerns. The jury trial is superior to 
the judge trial because the jury helps legitimize outcomes, acts as a 
"lightning rod" for animosity, and provides a "black box" 
decision. 1121 
The suggestion that Equity is superior to Law as a mode of trial 
is contrary to some ethical matters. For purposes of equal protec-
tion, the jury right is a fundamental constitutional right; any classifi-
cation significantly interfering with the exercise of the right would 
be strictly scrutinized. ll22 However, a general favoritism of judge trial 
as superior to jury trial would not satisfY even deferential review. ll23 
The suggestion that Equity is superior to Law as a mode of trial 
runs counter to the principles of limited government, government 
by the people, government for the people, and free political 
exchange.1l24 . 
Thus, the aspect of Lynch and Bourne's principled discretion-
ary theory that Equity is superior to Law as a mode of trial, is not 
protective of the jury right, and is contrary to many of the usual 
ways of interpreting the Maryland Constitution. In addition, Lynch 
and Bourne do not actually apply their theory when deciding the 
1116. See supra notes 1004-05 and accompanying text. See generally supra notes 149-
63 and accompanying text. 
1117. Allender v. Ghingher, 170 Md. 156, 183 A. 610 (1936) and supra text accom-
panying note 164. 
1118. Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 541, 530 A.2d 724, 728 (1987). 
1119. [d. 
1120. [d. at 545, 530 A.2d at 730. 
1121. See supra notes 312-20 and accompanying text. 
1122. See supra note 365-75 and accompanying text. 
1123. Cf supra notes 356, 359 and accompanying text (distinction between Law and 
Equity, generally). 
1124. See supra notes 443-52 and accompanying text. 
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situations in which the jury right is to apply. Let us now turn to 
those practical situations. 
IV. LYNCH AND BOURNE'S APPROXIMATION OF PRE-
MERGER APPROACH 
The thesis of this Article is that Lynch and Bourne try to 
"pickle," not preserve, the right to jury trialY25 The Introduction to 
this Article mentions that Lynch and Bourne give lip service to the 
Maryland Constitution, but then boldly propose a principled discre-
tionary theory which they abandon in favor of an approximation of 
pre-merger approach to resolve current problems. As developed be-
low, Lynch and Bourne reluctantly accept recent Maryland cases 
and some analogous federal authority. 
As already developed above, Lynch and Bourne's principled dis-
cretionary theory,1126 is not the approach they actually use. It is a 
hodgepodge of inconsistent policies and is restrictive (or not pro-
tective) of the right. Moreover, it is contrary to many of the usual 
ways of interpreting the Maryland Constitution. 1127 Next, this article 
looks at the defects in Lynch and Bourne's actual approximation of 
pre-merger approach to deciding whether the jury right applies in 
particular problem situations. 
Lynch and Bourne's approximation of pre-merger approach 
generally states that the jury right should exist as it did before the 
merger of Law and Equity in 1984. That is, matters which would 
have been tried at Law before merger are now to be tried by jury; 
matters which would have been tried in Equity before merger are 
now to be tried by judge.1128 If Lynch and Bourne accept recent, 
1125. See supra notes 6, 59 and accompanying text. 
1126. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text. 
1127. See supra notes 453-1124 and accompanying text. 
1128. See generaUy supra note 14 and accompanying text. This approximation of pre-
merger approach is apparent not only in Bourne and Lynch's discussion of 
the problem situations considered below, but in the other parts of their 
works. See, e.g., LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 306 ("Maryland courts ... 
tradition ... "); id. at 316 ("Maryland jurisprudence"); id. at 318 ("pre-
merger practice," "actions ... historically ... regarded"); id. at 321-22 ("Ma-
ryland courts ... conflicting authorities"); id. at 324 ("practice," "tradi-
tion"); Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 4 ("prior Maryland practice"); id. 
at 11 ("Maryland jurisprudence"); id. at 16 ("Maryland jurisprudence"); id. 
at 17 ("decisions of the Court of Appeals of Maryland"); id. at 29 ("tendency 
throughout Maryland legal history," "Maryland authority," "tradition," "Ma-
ryland decisions"); id. at 29-34 (generally, Maryland cases regarding the right 
to trial by jury); id. at 3444 (generally, Maryland decisions regarding equita-
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post-merger Maryland precedents and analogous federal authority, 
they do so only reluctantly.1129 Lynch and Bourne's approximation 
ble encroachments upon jurisdiction of courts of Law); id. at 46 ("tradi-
tion"); id. at 47 ("Maryland precedents"); id. at 78 ("Maryland's established 
limitations"). But see, e.g., LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 307 ("the federal 
experience and the evolving adaptation of this experience in Maryland"); id. 
at 323 ("resort to the experience of the federal courts"); id. at 324 ("federal 
courts ... may provide useful guidance"); Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 
4 ("consider approaches ... in light of federal and state experience," as well 
as "prior Maryland practice"); id. at 16 ("guidance ... in the federal cases 
decided after merger and before Beacon"); id. at 60 ("re-examine ... in light 
of the post-merger remedial powers"). 
The approximation of pre-merger approach, generally, has been criti-
cized as eroding the jury right, as inconsistent with Higgins, and as difficult 
to apply. See supra notes 249-61 and accompanying text. 
1129. This reluctance to accept analogous federal precedent is most marked in 
Bourne and Lynch's article. It is apparent not only in their discussion of the 
problem situations considered below, but in the other parts of their article. 
See, e.g., Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 4 (stating much in Maryland juris-
prudence supports the approach of many other states, contracting the jury 
right); id. at 11 (" [T] here is limited support in Maryland jurisprudence for 
the vigorous jury trial policy ultimately adopted by the federal courts."); id. 
at 16 ("Beacon ... would find little sanction in Maryland jurisprudence."); 
id. at 28-29 (explaining that the tendency in Maryland legal history is to ex-
pand the scope of Equity, not to expand the scope of the right to jury trial 
as in the federal courts); id. at 29 ("[T]here appears to be little Maryland 
authority compelling the courts to adopt doctrines comparable to those 
adopted by the Supreme Court in Beacon."); id. at 68 ("Adoption of the rule 
in Beacon Theatres might inappropriately restrict the scope of equitable adju-
dication and expand the availability of trial by jury."); id. at 78 ("Fidelity to 
the historic right to trial by jury after merger demands not blind subservi-
ence to Beacon Theatres, but a common sense attentiveness to Maryland's es-
tablished limitations on the appropriate exercise of equitable jurisdiction."); 
cf. id. at 35 & n.225 (discussing the power of the legislature to classify actions 
as equitable and its limitations); id. at 38 ("Bachman and the discovery cases 
suggest that the 'inadequate remedy at law' requirement for equitable juris-
diction retains dynamism in Maryland similar to that accorded the parallel 
federal notion in Beacon Theatres." (footnote omitted»; id. at 42 n.267 (dis-
cussing both a 1922 Maryland case and Dairy Queen which held that ade-
quate remedies at Law may limit the use of equitable accounting); id. at 56 
(discussing MD. RULE BF40 (repealed 1984), which in a manner very similar 
to Beacon, provided for trial of a jury claim before trial of an equitable 
claim). By the time of Bourne and Lynch's book, Higgins had generally 
adopted the protective federal approach. But see id. at 11 ("The experience 
of the federal courts ... provides substantial guidance to the Maryland judi-
ciary .... "). See generally, e.g., LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 307 (" [T] he 
Maryland courts have relied heavily on the federal experience."); id. at 323 
("[R]esort to the experience of the federal courts ... may provide useful 
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of pre-merger approach largely ignores the constitutional aspect of 
the jury right1l30 and their own principled discretionary theory.1l3J 
guidance."); id. at 324 ("[T]he federal courts ... may be useful."). However, 
the authors show some reluctance in accepting analogous federal authority. 
1130. Bourne & Lynch, in dealing with various problem situations, frequently refer 
to the right -to trial by jury. See LYNCH & BOURNE. SUPRA note 3, at 312-38; 
Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 47-77. However, those references are al-
most entirely in the context of questioning whether or not there is a jury 
right and of concluding either that there is or that there is not a jury right. 
With a few exceptions, the authors' approximation of pre-merger ap-
proach is unrelated to the usual ways of interpreting the MD. CONST. Their 
approach is essentially based on doctrine- principles derived from prece-
dents-which is one of those usual ways. See supra note 15 and accompanying 
text. Bourne and Lynch cite hundreds of cases from the courts of Maryland, 
the federal system, and other states. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, 312-
38 nn. 48-234; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, 47-77 nn.298490. However, the 
authors' approximation of pre-merger approach is inconsistent with recent 
Maryland precedents and the Higgins line of cases. Compare supra notes 187-
97 and accompanying text, with supra notes 248"{)1 and accompanying text. 
There are some noteworthy exceptions, some respects in which the au-
thors do properly consider a variety of the usual ways (other than doctrinal) 
of interpreting the Maryland Constitution. First, on several occasions, 
Bourne and Lynch cite McCoy v. Johnson, 70 Md. 490, 17 A. 387 (1889), for 
the proposition that the constitutional jury right should govern where it con-
flicts with contrary legislation. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 50 & 
n.322, 51 & nn.324-25; see also id. at 32 n.206, 70 n.442. But see LYNCH & 
BOURNE, supra note 3, at 321 (citing Capron v. Devries, 83 Md. 224, 34 A. 251 
(1896». See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 60 & n.381, 63 n.403, for the 
proposition that the legislature may expand Equity at the expense of the 
jury right. By citing McCoy for the supremacy of the Maryland Constitution 
over ordinary legislation, the authors suggest that the Maryland Constitution 
should be interpreted by considering its nature as written. See generally supra 
notes 16-25 and accompanying text. 
Second, Bourne and Lynch recognize that the jury right will have to be 
reinterpreted in light of new circumstances such as the merger of Law and 
Equity. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 306-07, 312, 326-37; Bourne & 
Lynch, supra note 5, at 34, 29-78. See generally infra note 1132. Bourne and 
Lynch generally take an approximation of pre-merger approach: the creation 
of new causes of action. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 313, 315. But 
see id. at 312 (stating that the jury right is preserved as it existed in 1776); id. 
at 337-38 (referring to new remedies); Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 47-
50. By recognizing the need for reinterpreting the jury right in light of these 
new circumstances, the authors suggest that the Maryland Constitution 
should be interpreted by considering its nature as "living." See generally supra 
notes 26-29 and accompanying text. 
Third, Bourne and Lynch state that the Maryland Constitution preserves 
the jury right as it existed in 1776. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 312. 
But see supra notes 506..Q32 and accompanying text (criticism of Bourne and 
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Also, their approximation of pre-merger approach is more designed 
to limit, or "pickle" the jury right than preserve or protect it. 
Lynch and Bourne deal with a variety of problem situations in 
both their article and their book chapter. In each of these situa-
tions, this Article will consider in detail three characteristics of their 
approach. First, they usually try to approximate the way the jury 
right was applied before the merger of Law and Equity. Second, the 
authors only reluctantly accept, if at all, post-merger Maryland pre-
cedent and analogous federal authority. Third, they often overlook 
ways to preserve the constitutional jury right in light of modem 
procedural developments. 1132 Thus, their approximation of pre-
merger approach generally restricts the jury right. 
In considering these problem situations, keep in mind that the 
constitutional right to jury trial can be violated in a number of 
Lynch's strict historical test). By relying on that language in the first Mary-
land Constitution, Bourne and Lynch suggest that the MD. CONST. should be 
interpreted by considering its text. See generally supra notes 31-95 and accom-
panying text. 
1131. Lynch and Bourne, in dealing with the various problem situations, frequently 
refer to the elements of their principled discretionary theory. See LYNCH & 
BOURNE, supra note 3, at 312-38; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 47-77. 
That theory is a hodgepodge of inconsistent policies. Thus, the elements of 
that theory have little effect on the authors' approximation of pre-merger 
approach, unless those elements are selectively invoked as in the cases of di-
vorce and mechanics lien. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 62-64, 68-69 
(stating that a jury trial might interfere with equitable discretion, the legisla-
ture has power to expand equitable jurisdiction by statute, and judicial econ-
omy is better served by judge trial than by jury trial). 
1132. Those developments include the merger of Law and Equity. See LYNCH & 
BOURNE, supra note 3, at 306; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 3, 29. The 
developments also include the availability, in the trial of Law actions, of cer-
tain Equity procedures, such as discovery. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, 
at 319 & n.124, 336; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 36, 45 n.291, 71-72. 
Joinder devices, such as class action, intervention, and interpleader are in-
cluded. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 335-36; Bourne & Lynch, supra 
note 5, at 73-74. Developments have been made regarding equitable reme-
dies such as preliminary and final injunctions. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra 
note 3, at 319 n.126, 331 n.194; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 4 n.9, 37, 
51-52, 55-56 & n.360, 61. Those modem procedural developments also in-
clude the liberal joinder of claims, remedies, defenses, and parties. See 
Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 5, 70; see also LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 
3, at 307, 320, 326, 328; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 3, 34, 38, 45 n.291, 
64, 72. Modem procedural developments also include the declaratory judg-
ment remedy, see LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 330 n.193, 337-38; 
Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 46 n.293, 47-50; and the long-arm statute, 
see LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 320; see also supra note 750. 
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ways. Such problem situations can be illustrated by the facts of the 
Beacon case. In Beacon, Fox brought suit asking for a declaratory 
judgment that it had not violated antitrust laws by exclusively con-
tracting with movie distributors to show new movies at its thea-
ters. 1I33 Fox also asked for an injunction against Beacon, a competi-
tor who was interfering with those contracts by threatening Fox and 
its distributors with treble damages suits under the antitrust laws. lI34 
Beacon responded, filed a counterclaim for antitrust treble dam-
ages, and demanded a jury trial. 1135 
The first way the jury right may be violated is by the trial court 
holding that there was no right to jury trial at all. That is, because 
Fox's claim for declaratory and injunctive relief was "essentially eq-
uitable, "1136 the rest of the case was within Equity's clean-up jurisdic-
tion.1I37 The court may have also found that Beacon had waived its 
right to jury trial on the legal counterclaim by joining the counter-
claim to Fox's equitable claim.1I38 The Beacon Court held that there 
, was a jury right as to the antitrust issues, whether they were raised 
in Fox's claim for declaratory relief, or in Beacon's counterclaim for 
treble damages. 1I39 
The second way the jury right may be violated is by a trial 
court holding, as it did in Beacon, that Fox's essentially equitable 
claim should be tried by the court before jury trial of Beacon's 
counterclaim. lI40 In Beacon, Fox's equitable claim and Beacon's legal 
counterclaim contained a: common issue of fact, the reasonableness 
of the exclusive contracts. 1I41 Thus, the effect of trying the equitable 
claim first was that the court's determination of the factual issues 
would preclude, by way of res judicata or collateral estoppel, a later 
determination of those issues by the jury.1142 The Beacon Court held 
1133. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500,502 (1959). 
1134. See id. 
1135. See id. at 502-03. 
1136. See id. at 503. 
1137. See id. at 505. 
1138. See id. at 519 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart noted the anomaly of a 
waiver theory where, as in Beacon, the counterclaim was compulsory under 
FED. R CIV. P. 13(a). 
1139. See id. at 504, 508. 
1140. See id. at 503. 
1141. See id. at 503-04. 
1142. See id. Bourne and Lynch seek a solution to the obvious lack of finality, a re-
quirement for res judicata or collateral estoppel. See Bourne & Lynch, supra 
note 5, at 21 n.120; cf. LARRy L. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHITTEN, CML PROCEDURE 
94445 (1994) (stating that the doctrine of law of the case precludes relitiga-
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that the jury right required that the factual issue common to the le-
gal and equitable claims be tried first by the jury. 1143 
Beacon also suggested that a third, and less obvious way1144 that 
the jury right may be violated is by delay. The trial of legal issues 
was postponed until the trial of equitable issues, presumably even 
when there was no factual overlap between the twO. 1145 This post-
ponement had the effect of an equitable injunction of the legal 
claims. l146 The Beacon Court suggested that the jury right required 
that trial of the legal issues not be delayed, but that they be tried 
ahead of the equitable issues. 1147 
Let us begin with the problem situations in Lynch and 
Bourne's article that was published in 1984, the year when Law and 
Equity merged in Maryland. 1148 
A. The Article 
Lynch and Bourne's article examines eleven problem situations. 
First, the authors consider three problems of characterizing issues 
as legal or equitable--declaratory judgments, land titles, and fraud. 
Then, they treat actions in which separate legal and equitable 
claims are joined. In three of those situations the plaintiff joins 
claims or remedies- injunction with damages in tort, specific per-
formance with damages in contract, and divorce with tort damages. 
In three other situations, the plaintiff, by claim, and the defendant, 
by counterclaim, join separate legal and equitable claims in one ac-
tion of issues of law at successive stages of the same case). Although the is-
sues in Beacon were factual issues originally, the court's determination of 
those issues would include not only a historical or pure fact question (were 
Fox's and Beacon's theaters in competition with each other?) and a mixed 
law and fact question (were the exclusive contracts between Beacon and the 
film distributors reasonable?), but a question which looks very much like a 
question of law (does Fox have a legal right to make exclusive contracts with 
film distributors?). 
1143. See Beacon, 359 U.S. at 508, 510-1l. 
1144. Query, does the Beacon Court's statement that trial of one claim to two fact-
finders (part to a judge and part to a jury) is undesirable, see id. at 508 & 
n.lO, support a fourth way that the jury right may be violated (by the ineffi-
ciency of separate trials)? 
1145. See id. at 508. 
1146. See id. at 507. 
1147. See id. at 507, 508. 
1148. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. At that time, there was no recent, 
post-merger Maryland precedent. Nonetheless, there were good reasons to 
accept the line of federal cases beginning with Beacon as persuasive authority. 
See supra notes 192-97 and accompanying text. 
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tion-enforcement of lien with breach of contract, quiet title with 
ejectment or trespass, and contract with accounting. Finally, Lynch 
and Bourne address two situations in which traditionally equitable 
issues must be resolved before legal issues may be tried-historically 
equitable joinder devices such as class actions, intervention, and in-
terpleader, in which plaintiff seeks damages,. and actions in which 
plaintiff seeks an equitable remedy, such as reformation or rescis-
sion as a prerequisite to damages. 1149 
1. Declaratory Judgments 
Lynch and Bourne take an approximation of pre-mergerl150 ap-
proach, characterizing the declaratory judgment, a modern statu-
tory remedy,1151 as legal or equitable. Before the merger of Law and 
Equity, the declaratory judgment was available at Law as well as in 
Equity.1152 Mter merger, the declaratory judgment is difficult to 
characterize as being either legal or equitable. 1153 Lynch and Bourne 
view the declaratory judgment as a substitute either for legal relief 
or for equitable relief. If alternative legal relief would have tradi-
tionally been available, the declaratory judgment action would be 
triable of right by a jury. Otherwise, the declaratory judgment ac-
tion must be tried by a judge. 1154 
Lynch and Bourne are reluctant to accept persuasive federal 
authority, such as the Beacon line of cases, which addresses the right 
to jury trial in declaratory judgment actions. They are reluctant to 
accept Beacon because it rejects a traditional approximation of pre-
merger approach 1155 in favor of an approach that takes account of 
modern procedural developments1156 and protects the jury right. 1157 
1149. Bourne and Lynch treat these last two problems under one heading, «Ac-
tions in Which Adjudication of Equitable Issues is a Prerequisite to Adjudica-
tion of Claims Triable by a Jury." Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 72-77. 
1150. Here, the pre-merger date seems to be prior to the adoption of the declara-
tory judgment act. See id. at 50. 
115l. The Maryland Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act was adopted in 1939. 
1939 Md. Laws ch. 294. But cf., e.g., McCoy v. Johnson, 70 Md. 490, 17 A. 387 
(1889) (describing an earlier act providing for a declaratory judgment in 
certain matters). 
1152. See Himes v. Day, 254 Md. 197,206,254 A.2d 181, 186 (1969), cited in Bourne 
& Lynch, supra note 5, at 50. 
1153. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 4546 & n.293, 47. 
1154. See id. at 47, 50. 
1155. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 505-07, 509 (1959). 
1156. See id. at 506, 507-09. 
1157. See id. at 504,506,508, 510-1l. 
o 
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This reluctance is apparent in three ways. First, Lynch and Bourne 
rely not on Beacon, which was in part a suit for declaratory relief, llSB 
but on a number of lower federal court decisions after Beacon. 1159 
Some of these decisions are protective of the jury right while others 
are not. Beacon and other Supreme Court cases have been very pro-
tective of the jury right in declaratory judgment actions. llOO Second, 
Lynch and Bourne note only a limited exception to their approxi-
mation of pre-merger approach, where they would instead use a 
"basic nature of the issue" approach. ll61 In a few cases,ll62 the deter-
mination of the jury right would depend upon whether the claims 
or other issuesll63 underlying the declaratory remedy are of an in-
herently legal nature, triable by a jury, or are of an inherently equi-
table nature, triable by a judge. However, the basic nature of the is-
sue approach may be more widely used in the federal courts than 
the authors suggest. In Beacon itself, the Supreme Court held that 
the antitrust issues on which plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment 
1158. But cJ. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 46 n.293 (citing Beacon " [f1or discus-
sion of the declaratory judgment remedy"). Bourne and Lynch also do not 
mention another Supreme Court declaratory judgment case, Simler v. Conner, 
372 U.S. 221 (1963). However, the authors do mention Simler in their discus-
sion of the declaratory judgment in LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 338 
n.231. 
1159. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 4748. 
1160. See, e.g., infra notes 1484-1514. 
1161. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 19. This basic nature of the issue approach 
should be distinguished from a basic nature of the action approach, which 
would characterize an entire action containing both legal and equitable is-
sues as legal or equitable, depending on which predominated. See, e.g., id. at 
20 (stating that the trial court in Beacon viewed the complaint, which con-
tained claims for both declaratory and injunctive relief, as "essentially equita-
ble"); id. at 24 (stating that the trial court in Dairy Queen viewed the com-
plaint, which contained claims for both injunctive relief and an accounting, 
as either "purely equitable" with possibly "incidental" legal issues); id. at 26 
(stating that the court of appeals in Ross viewed a shareholder's derivative ac-
tion as "entirely equitable"); cJ. id. at 50 (stating that the Illinois approach, 
when relief in addition to a declaratory judgment is sought, is to determine 
the right to jury trial by the nature of that additional relief). 
1162. Bourne and Lynch cite two federal district court cases where a jury trial was 
granted because the issues were "inherently legal." See id. at 48 & nn.306-07 
(slander of title in a patent infringement suit and mental capacity of a party 
in an insurance contract rescission action, respectively); see also id. at 52 
(characterizing as legal a claim for a judgment to declare void a deed). 
1163. See generally id. at 35-37 (substantive equitable and legal classification of rights 
of action). 
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were "essentially" jury questions. lI64 In Simler v. Conner,1I65 the Su-
preme Court held that a contract for legal services, upon which 
plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that the fee was unreasona-
ble, was "essentially" a legal matter for the jury.lI66 Indeed, later in 
their book, Lynch and Bourne characterize the "basic nature of the 
issue" as the federal approach that should be adopted in Mary-
land.1167 Third, the authors go out of their way to criticize Beacon as 
"radical" for suggesting that declaratory judgment provides a legal 
remedy.1168 Yet, Lynch and Bourne elsewhere concluded that declar-
atory judgments are not inherently equitable. 1I69 In fact, Lynch and 
Bourne suggest that they might be basically legal,1170 particularly 
where the underlying issues were inherently legal. 1171 Lynch and 
Bourne also criticize Beacon for requiring that judicial discretion be 
exercised to preserve the constitutional jury right. lin Yet, they rec-
ognize that the jurisdiction of Equity is limited by the constitutional 
right to jury tria1. 1173 
In some cases, by characterizing the declaratory judgment as a 
substitute for equitable relief,1174 Lynch and Bourne allow the consti-
tutional jury right to be violated by the trial judge holding that 
there is no right to jury trial at all.1175 In doing so, they overlook a 
number of ways, in light of modern procedural developments, to 
preserve the .jury right in declaratory judgment actions. First, the 
1164. The Supreme Court rejected the lower courts' holdings that the declaratory 
remedy was essentially equitable either because it was joined with a plea for 
injunctive relief, or because the complaint could traditionally have been 
heard only in Equity. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 
504-08 (1959). 
1165. 372 U.S. 221 (1963) (per curiam). 
1166. The Supreme Court rejected the lower court's holding that the declaratory 
remedy was purely equitable because it was basically for cancellation of a 
contingent fee contract. 
1167. LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 337-38. 
1168. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 49 (citing Beacon, 359 U.S. at 509). 
1169. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 19 & n.109. 
1170. See id. at 19. 
1171. See id. at 48. 
1172. See id. at 49. 
1173. See id. at 50-51 (citing McCoy v. Johnson, 70 Md. 490, 17 A. 387 (1889». The 
Maryland Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act expressly provides that "[t]he 
fact that a proceeding .is brought under this [Act] does not affect a right to 
jury trial which otherwise may exist." MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-
404 (1995). 
1174. See supra note 1154 and accompanying text. 
1175. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 4748. 
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declaratory judgment may be considered as an adequate remedy at 
Law that in many cases limits the jurisdiction of Equity.1176 Second, 
like the Federal Rules, the revised Maryland Rules permit a determi-
nation of the jury right on an "issue-by-issue" basis, rather than on 
an "action" basis.1177 Thus, even if the "court" (a judge) grants the 
declaratory judgment,1178 a jury may determine the underlying fac-
tual issues. 1179 Third, where new statutory rights are created, they 
may be tried by a jury if they are analogous to common-law 
rights. 1180 Similarly, new statutory remedies should be triable by a 
jury if they are analogous to common-law remedies. The declaratory 
judgment may be similar to a judgment at Law for the defendant1181 
or for the plaintiff on the issue of liability alone. 1182 Therefore, the 
declaratory judgment may be triable by a jury. Fourth, the need for 
immediate relief should not preclude the jury right in a declaratory 
1176. See id. at 47 & n.298 (noting that the declaratory judgment was traditionaUy availa-
bit! in Maryland in both Law and Equity); see also LYNCH & BOURNE. supra note 
3, at 330 (discussing Beacon); Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 21-22, if. Ma-
ryland Theatrical Corp. v. Brennan, 180 Md. 377, 388-89, 24 A.2d 911, 917 
(1942) (holding that Equity may grant a declaratory judgment, rather than 
an injunction, against a public official in order to stop enforcement of an in-
valid law), cited with approval in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 
500, 507 n.9 (1959). See generally Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 38, (sug-
gesting that the inadequate remedy at Law requirement for equitable juris-
diction in Maryland is as dynamic as the requirement in federal courts 
under Beacon). 
1177. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 6, 45, 72. 
1178. See MD. CODE ANN .. Crs. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-403(a), -409(a) (1995). 
1179. See, e.g., Beacon, 359 U.S. at 508 (providing jury verdict, then judge's injunc-
tion); see also Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987) (providing jury trial 
of violation of statute, but judge trial of amount of penalty). This develop-
ment occurred after the Bourne and Lynch article. Cf LYNCH & BOURNE. 
supra note 3, at 333-34; Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 25-26 (discussing 
Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970) (upholding judge's determination of 
the stockholder's right to sue on behalf of the corporation, then jury verdict 
on tort and con tract damages». 
1180. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 27-28; see also LYNCH & BOURNE, supra 
note 3, at 313-14 (discussing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974». For a 
development after the Bourne and Lynch article, see LYNCH & BOURNE, supra 
note 3, at 314-15 (discussing Tull). 
1181. Cf FED. R CIV. P. Form 31 (providing judgment on a jury verdict that the 
plaintiff take nothing). 
1182. See MD. RULE 501(a) (1977) (repealed 1984) (applicable in Law and Equity, 
permitting separate trial of claims or issues); if. MD. CODE ANN., Crs. & JUD. 
PROC. § 3-412 (1995) (stating that further relief based on a declaratory judg-
ment may be granted in a later action). 
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judgment action. The Maryland Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act 
expressly provides for expedited treatment. 1I83 If necessary, provi-
sional injunctive relief may be granted pending trial of the declara-
tory judgment action.lI84 
Thus, Lynch and Bourne's approximation of pre-merger ap-
proach, their reluctance to accept persuasive federal authority, and 
their overlooking of ways to preserve the jury right, all exemplify 
their generally restrictive approach to the right to jury trial in de-
claratory judgment actions. 
2. Land Titles 
Nominally, Lynch and Bourne reject an approximation of pre-
merger approach 1185 in favor of a protective approach to the jury 
right in cases involving land titles. They conclude, with only a few 
exceptions, that claims of title are legal and, therefore, triable by a 
jury.1I86 Lynch and Bourne's approach to' such claims, however, is 
more an approximation of pre-merger approach. That is, after the 
merger of Law and Equity, actions of or defenses to ejectment and 
trespass, traditionally available at Law, will be triable by a jury.1I87 
Actions to quiet title 1I88 or remove a cloud from title,1I89 traditionally 
available in Equity, will be tried by a judge. 
While Lynch and Bourne note several situations in which legal 
and equitable claims were joined, and in which the jury right after 
merger might be more protected than before merger, the marginal 
difference seems small. In the first situation, Lynch and Bourne crit-
icize Equity for taking jurisdiction of the whole case on the ground 
that immediate equitable relief was indicated.1I90 However, even 
1183. See MD. CODE ANN., Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-409(e) (1995). 
1184. See Beacon, 359 U.S. at 508; L\NCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 330-31; Bourne 
& Lynch, supra note 5, at 61. 
1185. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 52 (stating that the jury right should 
not turn on "in what court the relief would have been sought in a bifurcated 
system of courts"). 
1186. See id. at 51-53; see also id. at 36-37. But if. id. at 19 (stating that it is only 
"possible" that Maryland considers cases involving land titles as basically le-
gal and, therefore, triable to a jury). In their book, Bourne and Lynch say 
only that "Maryland has shown a distinct preference for adjudicating title to 
land at law." L\NCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 312. 
1187. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 51. 
1188. See id. at 69. 
1189. See id. at 51. 
1190. See id. at 51-52 (discussing Smith v. Shiebeck, 180 Md. 412, 24 A.2d 795 
(1942» . 
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before merger, provisional equitable relief was available under Ma-
ryland Rules BF40 to 43 1191 as ancillary relief in an action at Law. 1192 
In the second situation, Lynch and Bourne criticized Equity for tak-
ing jurisdiction on the ground that equitable relief was "primary"· 
and legal relief was only "subsidiary."1193 They concede, however, 
that any jury right in the case was only hypothetical under the cir-
cumstances,1194 and they later note that it was unclear whether or 
not injunctive relief under Maryland Rules BF40 to 43 was limited 
to "ancillary" (or subsidiary) injunctive claims in relation to more 
substantial (or primary) legal daims. 1195 In the third situation, 
Lynch and Bourne suggest that the jury right may be a limit on Eq-
uity's clean-up of damages claims. 1196 However, they concede that 
any jury right in the case was only hypothetical under the circum-
stances,1197 and they are later ambivalent on whether or not the 
merger of Law and Equity changed Equity'S clean-up jurisdiction. 1198 
Lynch and Bourne mention no federal authority regarding the 
right to jury trial in cases involving land title, although some ap-
pears persuasive. By characterizing an action as an equitable one to 
quiet title, rather than as a legal one involving title , 1199 Lynch and 
Bourne allow the constitutional jury right to be violated by the trial 
judge holding that there is no right to jury trial at all. 12OO In doing 
so, and in light of modern procedural developments, they overlook 
a number of ways to preserve the jury right in cases involving land 
title. First, a judge may "see through" a plaintiff's equitable suit, 
styled as one to quiet title, and conclude that it was really a legal ac-
tion of ejectment or trespass. 1201 Problems of mis-characterization 
1191. See supra note 174. 
1192. See Corkran v. Zoning Comm'r, 41 Md. App. 437, 397 A.2d 262 (1979); cf. 
Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 61 (noting that an interlocutory injunction 
is available under MD. RULE BB70(c) in a jury uial). 
1193. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 52 (discussing Waring v. National Sav. & 
Trust Co., 138 Md. 367, 114 A. 57 (1921». 
1194. See id. at 52. 
1195. See id. at 56. 
1196. See id. (discussing Cibula v. Sause, 173 Md. 87, 194 A. 826 (1937». 
1197. See id. at 53. 
1198. See id. at 53-55 (clean-up in reformation or rescission cases is undermined); 
id. at 60-61 (clean-up in injunction cases is undermined); cf. id. at 61-62 
(clean-up in specific performance cases is not undermined). See generally in-
fra notes 1274-75 and accompanying text. 
1199. See supra notes 1187-89 and accompanying text. 
1200. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 51. 
1201. Cf. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 u.S. 469 (1962) (holding a complaint for 
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seem almost encouraged by the breadth of the quiet title statute, 
which makes the proceeding available "when [the plaintiff's] title to 
the property is denied or disputed, or when any other person 
claims of record or otherwise, to own the property, or any part of 
it, or hold any lien encumbrance on it."1202 Moreover, the statutory 
term "title" and the related term "possession" are legal conclusions 
often based on the application of elaborate legal requirements1203 or 
complex factual situations. 1204 Second, Lynch and Bourne note that 
the right to jury trial would exist if, as might be expected1205 in a 
suit to quiet title, the defendant counterdaimed1206 for ejectment or 
trespass. 1207 For the reasons stated above,1208 title may often be at is-
sue and, thus, the legal counterclaim would be available. Third, the 
declaratory judgment may be considered as an adequate remedy at 
Law for trying title that in many cases limits the jurisdiction of Eq-
Uity.1209 Fourth, the revised Maryland Rules permit a determination 
an' equitable accounting to be a legal claim for damages), discussed in 
Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 23-25. But cf. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 
5, at 70 n.445 (providing a counterclaim for ejectment was determined to be 
an equitable claim for cancellation of lease). 
1202. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 14-108(a) (1996). 
1203. See East Wash. Ry. v. Brooke, 244 Md. 287, 294, 223 A.2d 599, 603-04 (1966) 
(actual, hostile, open, notorious, exclusive, under claim of title or ownership, 
and continuous and uninterrupted for 20 years). 
1204. See id. 
1205. See, e.g., Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 65 n.414, 69-70 (discussing cases). 
1206. See generally Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 503-04, 508 
(1959). 
1207. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 70. The revised MARYLAND RULES permit 
the joinder of a legal counterclaim to an equitable claim (and an equitable 
counterclaim to a legal claim). See MD. RULE 2-301, -303(c) (merger of Law 
and Equity); MD. RULE 2-302, -331 (a) (joinder of counterclaims). 
1208. See supra notes 1202-04 and accompanying text. 
1209. See generally Beacon, 359 U.S. at 504, 506-09. Bourne and Lynch note the use 
of the declaratory judgment in title cases. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, 
at 37 n.236, 51-52, 70 n.445; see also EDWIN BORCHARD, DEClARATORY JUDG-
MENTS 741-58 (2d ed. 1941); cf. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-406 
(1995) (deeds and land patents). But see id. § 3-409(b) (providing special 
statutory remedy, perhaps such as a statutory action to quiet title, is to be 
followed rather than a declaratory judgment proceeding); cf.McCoy v. John-
son, 70 Md. 490, 17 A. 387 (1889), discussed in Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, 
at 51 (stating that statutory equitable remedy in title cases violates the consti-
tutional right to jury trial). 
The declaratory judgment is an adequate remedy at Law. First, the de-
claratory judgment is adequate. It is available on an expedited basis. See MD. 
CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-409(e) (1995). It may be supplemented by 
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of the jury right on an "issue-by-issue" basis, rather than on an "ac-
tion" basis. 1210 Thus, even if the judge grants an injunction, a jury 
may determine the factual issues underlying title. 1211 Fifth, Lynch 
and Bourne suggest that the need for immediate relief may pre-
clude the jury right in a case involving title to land.1212 However, as 
developed above, provisional injunctive relief is available in a case 
tried by jury. 1213 
Thus, Lynch and Bourne's approximation of pre-merger ap-
proach, their reluctance to even mention (much less accept) per-
suasive federal authority, and their overlooking of ways to preserve 
the jury right, all exemplifY their generally restrictive approach to 
the right to jury trial in cases involving title to land. 
3. Rescission and Restitution Based upon Fraud 
Lynch and Bourne take a mixed approach to the jury right in 
cases involving rescission and restitution based o~ fraud. Before the 
merger of Law and Equity, Equity would rescind or reform a con-
tract for fraud or mistake and then award restitution (damages) 
under its clean-up powers. 1214 Lynch and Bourne conclude that after 
merger, restitution should be triable by a jury1215 and tried by the 
jury first if an earlier grant of equitable relief might otherwise fore-
close the award of damages. 1216 Thus, in part they take a protective 
approach to the jury right. However, Lynch and Bourne also take 
preliminary injunctive relief. See supra note 1184 and accompanying text. It 
may also be supplemented by additional relief, such as a final injunction. See 
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &: JUD. PROC. § 3-412 (1995). Second, the declaratory 
judgment may be considered a remedy at Law because declaratory relief is it-
self legal. 'See supra notes 1164-Q8 and accompanying text. It may be consid-
ered a legal reme~y also because the underlying issues of title are legal. See 
supra note 1163 and accompanying text. The equitable suit to quiet title is 
available only where no adequate remedy at Law exists. See Bourne & Lynch, 
supra note 5, at 51, 53. 
1210. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 6, 45, 72. 
1211. Adjudication of land titles may be "inherently legal.» See supra note 1163 and 
accompanying text; if. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 48 & n.307 (provid-
ing slander of title in a patent infringement case and mental incapacity of a 
party in a contract rescission action are inherently legal). Legal issues may 
be tried by a jury before equitable issues are tried by a judge. See supra note 
1179. 
1212. See supra note 1190 and accompanying text. 
1213. See supra note 1184 and accompanying text. 
1214. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 53-54. 
12i5. See id. at 55. 
1216. See id. 
1997] The Right to Trial by Jury 459 
an approximation of pre-merger approach in such cases. They pre-
dict that Maryland courts will characterize the claims of fraud and 
mistake in such cases as "essentially equitable."1217 They also con-
clude that the remedies of rescission (and reformation) in such 
cases are "purely equitable."1218 
Lynch and Bourne do not mention federal authority about the 
jury right in cases involving rescission and restitution based on 
fraud. Some persuasive federal authority supports the part of their 
approach that is protective of the jury right. Their assumption that 
equitable restitution is essentially legall219 is analogous to the hold-
ing of Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood,1220 that damages were an adequate 
remedy at Law for an equitable accounting. The idea that restitu-
tion should be tried by the jury first if an earlier grant of equitable 
relief might otherwise foreclose the award of damages is consistent 
with Beacon. 1221 As developed below, persuasive federal authority sup-
ports an even more protective approach. I222 
In a number of ways, Lynch and Bourne may allow the consti-
tutional jury right to be violated in cases involving rescission or ref-
ormation and restitution based on fraud or mistake. In doing so, 
they downplay or overlook ways to preserve the jury right in light of 
modem procedural developments. , 
First, Lynch and Bourne suggest that fraud, at least where dam-
ages are sought, is a common-law action triable by a jury.1223 Simi-
larly, reformation can be viewed as an interpretation of a contract, a 
common-law action triable by a jury.1224 Second, Lynch and Bourne 
1217. See id. at 54. They reach this conclusion after making a suggestion to the 
contrary. See id. at 55. 
1218. See id. at 55. Again, they reach this conclusion after making a suggestion to 
the contrary. See id. at 54. 
1219. See id. at 54-55. 
1220. 369 U.S. 469,477-79 (1962), discussed grneraUy in Bourne & Lynch, supra note 
5, at 23-25. 
1221. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 51~11 (1959), discussed 
grneraUy in Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 2~23. 
1222. See infra notes 1223-30 and accompanying text. 
1223. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 53, 54. But see Parklane Hosiery Co. v. 
Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (assuming that fraud was triable by jury, even 
where fraud was joined with a claim for rescission). 
1224. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 53; cf Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 477 
(holding a claim for an accounting was considered to be really one for dam-
ages on a debt). Dobbs says that this so-called "reformation at law" may not 
suffice where third persons are involved. See 1 DAN B. DOBBS. LAw OF REME-
DIES § 4.3(7) (1993). But see MD. RULE 2-212 to 231 (permitting joinder of 
parties) . 
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suggest that rescission, and presumably reformation, may be seen as 
essentially declaratory judgments defining the contract and its en-
forceability,1225 which are inverted actions at Law1226 triable by a jury. 
Third, in another context they suggest that there may be an ade-
quate remedy at Law for rescission and restitution-the action for 
money had and received. 1227 Fourth, in two other contexts, Lynch 
and Bourne suggest that an equitable claim might be met with a le-
gal counterclaim1228 and that the legal counterclaim may provide 
the plaintiff with an adequate remedy at Law, a defense to the 
counterclaim, triable by jury.1229 Thus, in a case where the plaintiff 
asks for rescission and restitution based on fraud, the defendant 
may counterclaim for damages for breach of contract, and the 
plaintiff's defense to that counterclaim may establish that the con-
tract is unenforceable. 1230 However, Lynch and Bourne forsake these 
four suggestions in favor of their prediction that Maryland courts 
will characterize claims of fraud and mistake as "essentially equita-
ble"1231 and will characterize remedies of rescission and reformation 
as "purely equitable."1232 One suspects they do so because of their 
approximation of pre-merger approach. Fifth, as Lynch and Bourne 
recognize in other contexts, the revised Maryland Rules permit a de-
termination of the jury right on an "issue-by-issue" basis, rather 
than on an "action" basis. 1233 Thus, even if the judge determines 
whether rescission or reformation is appropriate, a jury may deter-
mine the factual issues underlying the fraud or contract claims, as 
well as the damages remedies. 1234 
1225. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 53-54; see also BORCHARD, supra note 
1209, at 514, 525; Beacon, 359 U.S. at 507, 508-09. Third persons to the con-
tract may be joined as parties to the declaratory judgment action. See MD. 
CODE ANN., Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-405(a)(I) (1995). But if. Bourne & Lynch, 
supra note 5, at 15 n.71, 28, 39,41, 76 (stating the equitable remedies of can-
cellation and rescission of a contract are unavailable at Law). 
1226. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 54. 
1227. See id. at 53. Dobbs says that this so-called "rescission at law" is available only 
where plaintiff offers to make defendant whole and that "rescission at law" 
may not suffice where third persons are involved or where plaintiff wants re-
covery of unique property. 1 DOBBS, supra note 1224, § 4.3(6). ' 
1228. See Bourne. & Lynch, supra note 5, at 68-70. 
1229. See id. at 70. 
1230. See Beacon, 359 U.S. at 508 (a legal counterclaim was given priority over an 
equitable claim). 
1231. See supra note 1217 and accompanying text. 
1232. See supra note 1218 and accompanying text. 
1233. See supra note 1210 and accompanying text. 
1234. See supra notes 1178-79 and accompanying text. 
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In these five· ways, Lynch and Bourne may allow the constitu-
tional jury right to be violated by the trial judge holding that there 
is no right to jury trial at all on certain issues. In another way, they 
may allow the right to be violated by delay.1235 The trial of fraud and 
mistake by the judge before the trial of damages by the jury, even 
where the earlier judicial determination does not foreclose the later 
jury determination, may violate the jury right because of the post-
ponement of the trial of the legal issues. 
Thus, Lynch and Bourne's approximation of pre-merger ap-
proach, their reluctance to accept persuasive federal authority, and 
their overlooking of ways to preserve the jury right, all exemplify 
their generally restrictive approach to the right to jury trial in cases 
involving rescission and restitution based on fraud. 
4. Suits to Enjoin Interference with a Business Relationship and 
for Damages 
Lynch and Bourne take an approximation of the pre-merger 
approach,1236 which happens to be a protective one similar to Bea-
con,1237 in suits to enjoin interference with a business relationship, 
such as for nuisance, continuing trespass,1238 wrongful discharge, or 
disparagement of business and property rights,1239 and for damages. 
That is, the damages claim would be heard first by a jury. The judge 
would then issue injunctive relief based on the jury verdict. l240 That 
approach is consistent with the practice before the merger of Law 
and Equity. Under former Maryland Rule BF40, 1241 ancillary injunc-
tive relief was permitted at Law.1242 Any delay that trial by jury might 
cause could be alleviated by the judge ordering interlocutory in-
junctive relief. 1243 
1235. See supra notes 1144-46 and accompanying text. 
1236. Bourne and Lynch say their result is "obtained under established Maryland 
principles." Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 61. 
1237. See id. 
1238. See id. at 6().61. 
1239. See id. at 56. 
1240. See id. at 61. 
1241. See supra note 174. 
1242. See Bourne & Lynch, supra n·ote 5, at 55-56, 61. Here, Bourne and Lynch may 
be slightly more protective of the jury than was pre-merger practice. They 
would have the damages claim heard first by the jury, before injunctive relief 
was issued by the judge, even if the equitable claim was more substantial 
than the legal claim. It was not clear that the equitable claim in that context 
was "ancillary" within the meaning of MD. RULE BF40. See id. at 56. 
1243. See id. at 61. But cf. infra note 1255 and accompanying text (prior restraint 
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Lynch and Bourne are reluctant to accept persuasive federal 
authority, such as the Beacon line of cases, in suits to enjoin interfer-
ence with a business relationship and for damages. As developed 
above, Lynch and Bourne's approach is based on "established Mary-
land principles" which provide "a result similar to that in 
Beacon." 1244 
Lynch and Bourne's reluctance1245 is apparent in three ways. 
First, Lynch and Bourne fully develop Maryland pre-merger practice 
under former Maryland Rule BF40 as a basis for their approach. 1246 
Second, Lynch and Bourne are generally unwilling to extend the 
policy of Maryland Rule BF40 to forms of equitable relief other 
than injunction, such as rescission or specific performance. 1247 
Third, they survey the practice of other states and note that while 
"some states have taken a position similar to Beacon,"1248 "many state 
courts" have rejected Beacon. 1249 
Lynch and Bourne's approximation of pre-merger approach in 
suits to enjoin interference with a business relationship and for 
damages is generally protective of the constitutional jury right. How-
ever, by characterizing relief as injunctive and, therefore, equitable, 
Lynch and Bourne may allow the constitutional jury right to be vio-
lated by the trial judge holding that there is no right to jury trial at 
all as to that remedy. In doing so, they overlook several ways, in 
light of modern procedural developments, to preserve the jury 
right. 
First, there may be a number of adequate remedies at Law, 1250 
triable by jury, which should be issued instead of an injunction. The 
declaratory judgmentl251 may be adequate1252 in a suit to enjoin in-
doctrine). 
1244. [d. at 56, 61. 
1245. Much of this reluctance is set forth in an introductory section. See id. at 55-
60. 
1246. See id. at 55-56, 61. 
1247. See id. at 55-56 n.360, 56; see also id. at 61-62. 
1248. [d. at 56. 
1249. [d. at 57. Bourne & Lynch, however, do criticize the waiver and discretionary 
approaches taken by the state courts which have rejected Beacon. 
1250. As developed above, the inadequate remedy at Law requirement for equita-
ble jurisdiction in Maryland may be as dynamic as that in the federal courts 
under Beacon. See supra note 1176. 
1251. The declaratory judgment may be a legal remedy triable by a jury. See supra 
notes 1168-82 and accompanying text. 
1252. In addition to the tort of interference with a business relationship, Bourne 
and Lynch mention claims of nuisance, continuing trespass, wrongful dis-
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terference with a business relationship, particularly where the 
defendant is a public official or other responsible corporate en-
tity.1253 Indeed, an injunction against interference with a business re-
lationship by false and malicious statements about plaintiff's busi-
ness, as Lynch and Bourne assume,1254 may w:ell be prohibited by 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments' prior restraint doctrine. 1255 
Second, even if the declaratory judgment or other remedy at 
Law is not adequate, it may be that the jury may determine p~t or 
all of the claim to injunctive relief. 1256 Professor Owen Fiss has ex-
plored this idea. 1257 Because of the interdependence between rights 
charge, and disparagement of business and property rights. The declaratory 
judgment or other legal remedies may also be adequate for those claims. 
The other legal remedies which offer specific relief, similar to an injunction, 
include replevin and ejectment. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 37-38, 
51, 69-70. It also includes mandamus. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. 
§§ 3-8A-OI, -02 (1995); MD. RULE 15-701. See generally Robert Allen Sedler, Eq-
uitable Relief, But Not Equity, 15 J. LEGAL EDUC. 293, 295 n.12 (1963). 
1253. See Maryland Theatrical Corp. v. Brennan, 180 Md. 377, 388-89, 24 A.2d 911, 
917 (1942), cited in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 507 n.9 
(1959). See generally BORCHARD, supra note 1209, at 428-30, 435-38. Further re-
lief based on a declaratory judgment may be granted if necessary. See MD. 
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-412 (1995). 
1254. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 60. . 
1255. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). But" cf. Virginia State 
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
772 n.24 (1976) (dictum) (stating prior restraint doctrine may be inapplica-
ble against commercial speech). 
1256. Bourne and Lynch assume that final injunctive relief would be issued by a 
judge, not a jury. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 61; see also id. at 28 
(stating that an injunction, rescission, restitution, cancellation, and foreclo-
sure are purely equitable remedies in federal courts). But cf. id. at 38-44, 75-
76 (arguing that equitable discovery, accounting, and multiplicity may be 
supplanted by adequate remedies at Law). See generally id. at 39 (stating that 
injunction, constructive trust, cancellation, rescission, and accounting are 
remedies unavailable at Law); id. at 55 & n.357 (arguing that an injunction, 
setting aside judgments procured by fraud, constructive trust, and rescission 
are purely equitable relief); id. at 76 (arguing that rescission, cancellation, 
and specific performance are within the particular remedial competence of 
Equity). 
1257. See FIss, supra note 719, at 5()"58. Interestingly, Fiss explored the idea in the 
context of extending the right to an injunction, not the right to a jury trial. 
He concluded that the injunction should be made more readily available as 
a remedy. If the right to a jury trial was a hindrance to that goal because of 
the traditional distinction between Law and Equity, Fiss believed that the 
right to jury trial should be extended to injunctions. See id. Mter all, it was a 
historical accident that Law and Equity developed independently. See id. at 
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and remedies, a determination by a jury that a right has been vio-
lated is also a determination, to some extent, about what the rem-
edy should be. 1258 Indeed, even the terms of an injunction might be 
determined by a jury if there was a full evidentiary presentation on 
the remedy, including expert testimony and explanatory judicial in-
structions. 1259 However, both federal1260 and Maryland1261 courts have 
assumed without analysis that the issuance of an injunction would 
be for the judge, not the jury. 
Thus, Lynch and Bom:ne's approximation of pre-merger ap-
proach, their reluctance to accept persuasive federal authority, and 
their overlooking of ways to preserve the jury right, all exemplify to 
some extent their generally restrictive approach to the right to jury 
trial in suits to enjoin interference with a business relationship and 
for damages. 
5. Suits Joining Claims for Specific Performance and Damages 
Generally, Lynch and Bourne take an approximation of pre-
merger approach to suits joining claims for specific performance 
and damages. 1262 Before the merger of Law and Equity, specific per-
formance was a basis for equitable jurisdiction, and Equity would 
50-51. The Law courts did issue remedies like injunctions--quia timet, es-
trepement, and prohibition writs-and, but for historical accident, could 
have issued injunctions. See id. at 45, 51. But cf. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 
5, at 55-56, 61 (stating that ancillary injunctive relief at Law developed in 
Maryland). 
While sympathizing with Fiss's analysis, I disagree with his goal: ex-
tending the right to an injunction, rather than extending the right to a jury 
trial. Cf. supra notes 77-92, 96 and accompanying text (arguing that there is a 
constitutional right to trial by a jury, not to courts of Equity or to trial by a 
judge). 
1258. See Fiss, supra note 719, at 55-56. 
1259. See id. at 56. However, Fiss did not believe that the jury would ever deter-
mine part or all of the injunction because of the weakness of the constitu-
tional preference for the civil jury. See id. at 51, 56. I do not share this per-
ception of the weakness of the preference for the civil jury right, either in 
the U.S. CONST. or in the MD. CONST. See supra notes 46-67 and accompany-
ing text (text); supra notes 103-35 and accompanying text (history); supra 
notes 164-299 and accompanying text (doctrine). 
1260. See, e.g., Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 508 (1959). 
1261. Cf. Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 552, 530 A.2d 724, 734 (1987) (specific 
performance and recoupment). 
1262. The damages are those sought either for specific performance or for inci-
dental losses for wrongful detention. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 
61. 
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award damages even if specific performance was denied. 1263 Lynch 
and Bourne conclude that after merger this equitable clean-up of 
damages should not change. 1264 However, they would make excep-
tions, permitting jury trial either where there was no strong likeli-
hood that the specific performance remedy would issue, or where 
the damages were not likely to be merely incidental. 1265 These ex-
ceptions, being discretionary with the judge,1266 are not very protec-
tive of the jury right. 1267 
Lynch and Bourne expressly reject persuasive federal authority, 
the Beacon line of cases, which would generally require a jury in 
suits joining claims for specific performance and damages. 1268 They 
reject Beacon for three reasons. First, the only substantial damages 
available would be as an alternative if the claim for specific per-
formance failed. 1269 Second, damages for wrongful detention would 
be only incidental and would be dwarfed by the value of perform-
ance. 1270 Third, specific performance involves "factors uniquely 
within the province of the chancellor," matters which are not for a 
jury. 1271 
In a number of ways, Lynch and Bourne may allow the consti-
tutional jury right to be violated in suits joining claims for specific 
performance and damages. By allowing Equity clean-up damages, by 
characterizing legal issues as "incidental" to equitable issues, and by 
characterizing relief as specific performance and, therefore, equita-
ble, Lynch and Bourne would allow the constitutional jury right to 
be violated by the trial judge holding that there is no right to jury 
trial at all of some or all issues in a case. In doing so, they overlook 
some ways, in light of modern procedural developments, to pre-
serve the jury right. First, as Lynch and Bourne recognize in other 
1263. See id. at 62. 
1264. See id. But see infra note 1275. 
1265. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 62. 
1266. See id. 
1267. See also infra notes 1272-81 and accompanying text. 
1268. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 61-62. Indeed, they call the require-
ment of jury trial in such cases "ridiculous." See id. at 62. 
1269. See .id. at 62. But if. infra notes 1272-75 and accompanying text. 
1270. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 62. But if. infra note 1276 and accompa-
nying text. 
1271. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 62. But if. supra notes 959-1103 and accom-
panying text (criticizing Bourne and Lynch's suggestion that Equity is supe-
rior to Law as a mode of trial because a judge has expertise that a jury does 
not have, because the decision-making process of the judge is better than 
the decision-making process of the jury, or because of other reasons). 
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contexts, the revised Maryland Rules permit a determination of the 
jury right on an "issue-by-issue" basis, rather than on an "action" 
basis. 1272 Thus, even if a judge determines whether specific perform-
ance is appropriate, a jury may determine the factual issues in the 
contract claim (underlying both the alternative or incidental rem-
edy of damages at Law and specific performance in Equity) and the 
damages remedy.1273 Lynch and Bourne concede in several other 
contexts, although not in this one,1274 that the justification for Eq-
uity's clean-up jurisdiction is eliminated by the merger of Law and 
Equity.1275 Second, non-frivolous legal issues should be triable by the 
jury, even if they are characterized as "incidental" equitable is-
sues. 1276 Third, as developed above, the inadequate remedy at Law 
requirement for equitable jurisdiction in Maryland may be as dy-
namic as that in the federal courts under Beacon. l277 There might be 
a number of adequate remedies at Law, triable by jury, which 
should issue instead of specific performance. Replevin may be an 
adequate remedy at Law where a plaintiff claims specific perform-
1272. See Bourne and Lynch, supra note 6, at 6, 45, 72. 
1273. See supra notes 1164-68 and accompanying text. 
1274. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 62 (discussing clean-up of damages af-
ter specific performance); see also id. at 75-77 (discussing judge's discretion 
clean-up damages after specific performance). 
1275. See id. at 52 (declaratory judgment voiding a deed after enforcement of a 
lien); id. at 54-55 (damages after rescission of a contract); see also id. at 72-75 
(damages in class actions, intervention, interpleader, subrogation, and re-
ceivership); cf. id. at 75-77 (judge'S discretion to clean-up damages after re-
scission, cancellation, accounting, and multiplicity). But see id. at 63-64 
(clean-up of tort damages after divorce-related claims). 
In another context, Bourne and Lynch suggest that former MD. RULE 
BF40 may serve as a "model" for jury trial in cases joining legal and equita-
ble claims. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 55. They also suggest that 
the "policy" of that rule might extend to non-injunctive equitable relief, 
such as specific peformance. See id. at 55-56 & n.360. A case decided after 
Bourne and Lynch's article approves of this approach, at least where a 
defendant raises breach of contract as a defense or counterclaim. See Higgins 
v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 535 & n.l, 551, 530 A.2d 724, 724 & n. 1, 725, 733-34 
(1987); cf. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970) (discussing shareholder's 
derivative action bifurcated with equitable issues tried by the judge and legal 
issues tried by the jury). 
1276. See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 470-73 (1962), discussed in 
Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 23-25. This conclusion was approved, after 
Bourne and Lynch's article, by Higgins, 310 Md. at 545, 530 A.2d at 730; see 
also id. at 548-49, 530 A.2d at 732. 
1277. See supra note 1176 and accompanying text. 
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ance of a contract for personal property.1278 Ejectment may be an 
adequate remedy at Law where a plaintiff claims specific perform-
ance of a contract for real property.1279 Generally, the declaratory 
judgment1280 may be an adequate reqJedy at Law. 1281 
Thus, Lynch and Bourne's ap~ioximation of pre-merger ap-
proach, their reluctance to accept persuasive federal authority, and 
their overlooking of ways to preserve the jury right, all exemplify a 
generally restrictive approach to the right to jury trial in suits join-
ing claims for specific performance and damages. 
6. Suits Joining Divorce-Related Claims with Actions at Law1282 
Lynch and Bourne attempt an approximation of pre-merger ap-
proach to suits joining divorce-related claims (limited divorce 1283 or 
absolute divorce 1284 and property disposition 1285) with legal claims 
(assault and battery1286 or conversion 1287) for damages. As developed 
below, however, their approach is less protective than an actual ap-
proximation of pre-merger approach. Before the merger of Law 
and Equity, the equitable divorce-related claims and the legal claims 
would have been heard in separate proceedings-the equitable 
claims by a judge and the legal claims by a jury. 1288 After merger, as-
1278. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 37-38. See generally MCCUNTOCK, supra 
note 741, at 107. 
1279. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 51, 69-70. See generally MCCLINTOCK, 
supra note 741, at 106. 
1280. The declaratory judgment may be a legal remedy triable by a jury. See supra 
notes 1161-68 and accompanying text. 
1281. See generally BORCHARD, supra note 1209, at 551-54. Specific performance may 
not even be available to enforce a contract to provide personal services. See 
MCCUNTOCK, supra note 741, at 164-65. 
1282. The relationship among status (e.g., divorce), declarations of rights or obli-
gations arising from status (e.g., alimony, child support, and division of 
property), enforcement of declarations of status, rights, or obligations (e.g., 
injunction and contempt), and catch-all or peripheral tort claims (e.g., sex-
ual abuse, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress) are con-
sidered in another context-the judicially-created domestic relations excep-
tion to the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts in Ankenbrandt v. 
Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 716 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
1283. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 62-63. 
1284. See id. at 64. 
1285. See id. 
1286. See id. at 63-64. 
1287. See id. at 64. 
1288. See id. at 63. See generally id. at 11, 29, 34, 4445. There was a good deal of 
doubt about whether "divorce courts" had any more than the limited powers 
of ecclesiastical courts in England. See Kapneck v. Kapneck, 31 Md. App. 410, 
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suming the equitable divorce-related claims and the legal claims are 
heard together,1289 Lynch and Bourne would give less protection to 
the jury right. They conclude that the judge should hear the di-
vorce-related claims first an~ imply that the judge should then 
clean-up the legal claims for ordinary damages. Lynch and Bourne 
would have the legal claims tried separately by a jury only if puni-
tive damages were demanded. 1290 
Lynch and Bourne generally reject the Beacon line of cases,1291 
which would require the legal claims to be tried by the jury before 
the divorce-related claims are tried by the judge.1292 They reject Bea-
con because they believe the decision is an affront to the legislative 
grant of divorce jurisdiction to Equity and the need for expeditious 
trial. 1293 
Lynch and Bourne would allow the constitutional jury right to 
be violated in suits joining divorce-related claims with actions at 
Law. If Equity cleaned-up the legal claims, there would be no jury 
trial at all as to those issues. Lynch and Bourne overlook some ways, 
in light of modern procedural developments, to preserve the jury 
356 A.2d 572 (1976). However, the legislature rejected Kapneck and expressly 
gave "divorce courts" all the powers of courts of Equity. See 1977 Md. Laws 
ch. 221 (preamble) (codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 1-
203 (a) (1991». But if. Winston v. Winston, 290 Md. 641, 431 A.2d 1330 
(1981) (holding that "divorce courts" had power to enforce divorce-related 
orders by injunction for more than a century pursuant to generally applica-
ble MARYLAND RULEs). The powers of courts of Equity, expressly recognized 
by the legislature in 1977, presumably would include equitable clean-up of 
legal damages. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 13-15, 29, 45 & n.292, 
4647, 52-54, 56-57, 60, 75-78. To date, however, there are no reported cases 
so holding. See id. at 63. 
1289. But if. 1993 Md. Laws ch. 198, § 2 (Family Division, authorized by the legisla-
ture to be established in each circuit court where feasible, is not assigned 
tort matters). 
1290. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 63-64. Punitive damages were not within 
the traditional scope of Equity jurisdiction. See id. at 33-34, 56 n.365, 61, 63-
64. 
1291. But if. id. at 64 nA08 (citing Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966) (author-
izing equitable clean-up of legal claims in bankruptcy to effectuate the con-
gressional scheme for expedition». 
1292. See id. at 63-64. 
1293. See id. However, there is no statutory command for expeditious treatment of 
divorce-related claims. Cf id. at 64 & nA08 (Lynch and Bourne's citation to 
a statute, after a sentence containing the expeditious trial proposition, is ap-
parently a citation for the other proposition-"the legislative determination 
that equity should determine ownership of marital personal property"). 
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right. 1294 First, any need for expeditious trial should not preclude 
the jury right in light of the availability of provisional injunctive re-
lief.1295 Second, as Lynch and Bourne recognize in other contexts, 
the revised Maryland Rules permit a determination of the jury right 
on an "issue-by-issue" basis, rather than on an "action" basis. 1296 
Thus, even if a judge determines the divorce-related claims, a jury 
may determine the legal claims. 1297 If the divorce-related claims and 
the legal claims are heard side-by-side, the jury determination 
should precede the judge's determination in order to avoid any 
preclusive effect of earlier judge-tried issues on later jury-tried 
issues. 1298 
Thus, Lynch and Bourne's attempted approximation of pre-
merger approach, their reluctance to accept persuasive federal au-
thority, and their overlooking of ways to preserve the jury right, all 
exemplify their generally restrictive approach to the right to jury 
trial in suits joining divorce-related claims with actions at Law. 
7. Suit to Foreclose a Mechanic's Lien and a Counterclaim for 
Breach of Contract 
Lynch and Bourne also take an approximation of pre-merger 
approach 1299 to the jury right in suits joining a clai~ to foreclose a 
mechanic's lien and a counterclaim for breach of contract. Before 
1294. The use of the declaratory judgment in divorce cases is specifically precluded 
by statute. See MD. CODE ANN., CIs. & JUD. PROC. § 3409(d) (1995). But cf. 
BORCHARD, supra note 1209, at 478-81 (declarations of validity and continuity 
of marriage and of illegality of divorce and remarriage). 
1295. See supra note 1184 and accompanying text. 
1296. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 6, at 6, 45, 72. 
1297. Cf. supra note 1290 and accompanying text (punitive damages tried sepa-
rately by a jury). Lynch and Bourne concede in several other contexts that 
the justification for Equity's clean-up jurisdiction is eliminated by the merger 
. of Law and Equity. See supra note 1275 and accompanying text. Jury trial of 
legal claims before judge trial of divorce-related claims would hardly be an 
affront to the legislature because the legislature likely neither considered 
that divorce-related claims would be combined with claims triable by a jury, 
nor intended that the jury right would be precluded in such cases. See 
Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 63. If the equitable divorce-related claims 
and the legal claims are not heard together, the divorce court should stay its 
trial until the legal claims are tried in the other court. See MD. CODE ANN., 
CIs. & JUD. PROC. § 6-104(a) (1995). 
1298. See supra note 1275 and accompanying text. 
1299. Bourne & Lynch, saying they are "attentive[] to established Maryland princi-
pIes," resort to the traditional scope of equity. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 
5, at 69. . 
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merger of Law and Equity, the claim to enforce a mechanic's lien 
would have been brought in Equity which likely would have cle-
aned-up the legal counterclaim for damages for breach of con-
tract. l3OO Lynch and Bourne conclude that the same approach 
should generally be taken after merger. 1301 
Lynch and Bourne reject Beacon, which would require issues 
common to both the mechanic's lien and contract damages to be 
heard first by a jury. 1302 They reject Beacon as "rigid," less "sensible" 
than their own approach, and inconsistent with or frustrating the 
policy of the legislature for prompt adjudication of the lien. 1303 
Lynch and Bourne would allow the constitutional jury right to 
be violated in a suit to foreclose a mechanic's lien and a counter-
claim for breach of contract. If Equity cleaned-up the legal counter-
claim, there would be no jury trial at all as to that counterclaim. 
Lynch and Bourne may overlook some ways, in light of modern pro-
cedural developments, to preserve the jury right. 
First, the statutory provision for expeditious trial should not 
preclude the jury right in view of the availability of provisional in-
junctive relief.1304 Second, as Lynch and Bourne recognize in other 
1300. See id. But see id. at 64 n.412 (citing Brown, supra note 85, at 472, for doubt-
ing that Equity would entertain a legal counterclaim). See generally id. at 64-
65. 
1301. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 69. Bourne and Lynch would give the 
judge discretion to order a separate jury trial of contract damages if the 
counterclaim exceeded the amount of the lien claim. See id. This discretion 
existed in some situations before merger. See id. at 34-35 (Equity'S reference 
of issues of fact to Law); id. at 72-73 (Equity's transfer of issues of fact to 
Law). 
1302. See id. at 68. 
1303. See id. at 69. In a footnote, Bourne and Lynch analogize the clean-up juris-
diction of the court, presumably to assure prompt adjudication, to "the sum-
mary equitable jurisdiction which federal bankruptcy courts may exercise 
over claims asserted in bankruptcy proceedings in furtherance of the con-
gressional purpose of expeditious adjudication." Id. at 69 n.473; cf. id. at 35 
n.226 (citing Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 329-30 (1966), for the proposi-
tion that bankruptcy proceedings have been historically characterized as eq-
uitable). However, in a case decided after the Bourne and Lynch article. the 
Supreme Court made it clear that the bankruptcy courts are courts of Eq-
uity, not because they proceed in summary fashion, but because they have 
"'actual or constructive possession' of the bankruptcy estate." 
Granfinanciera, SA. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 57 (1989) (citing Katchen, 382 
U.S. at 327). Delay and expense considerations are not enough to overcome 
the right to jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. See id. at 63, 64 n.18. 
1304. See supra note 1184 and accompanying text. 
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contexts, the revised Maryland Rules permit a determination of the 
jury right on an "issue-by-issue" basis, rather than on an "action" 
basis.1305 Thus, even if a judge determines whether the mechanic's 
lien should be enforced, a jury may determine the factual issues in 
the contract claim (underlying both the supplier's right to payment 
and the owner's right to performance) and the counterclaim for 
damages. 1306 The jury determination of the contract claims should 
be heard before the judge determines the establishment of the lien 
in order to avoid any preclusive effect of earlier judge-tried issues 
on later jury-tried issues. 1307 Third, equitable jurisdiction over the 
lien enforcement claim may be denied because there is an adequate 
remedy at Law. 
In developing the historical right to jury trial in Maryland, 
Lynch and Bourne discuss the case of Richardson v. Stillinger.130s 
There, the plaintiff was denied equitable jurisdiction to enforce a 
statutory vendor's lien because he had an adequate remedy at Law, 
an action on the note. 1309 The conclusion of Richardson may have 
even more force today because of state and federal constitutional 
developments. Lynch and Bourne note that Richardson, preserving 
the jury right, was reached under the original Maryland Constitu-
tion's jury trial provision, which was regarded as subject to restric-
tion by the legislature,1310 not under the current provision, which is 
designed to protect the jury right from encroachment by the legisla-
ture. l311 Doctrinally, the adequate remedy at Law principle is proba-
bly more protective of the jury right after Beacon and Higgins than it 
ever has been. 1312 
A federal constitutional development, that of procedural due 
process, has eroded the utility of the mechanic's lien. l313 While a 
1305. See supra note 1210 and accompanying text. 
1306. Cf Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 69 (jury trial at the chancellor's discre-
tion). Lynch and Bourne concede, in several other contexts, that the justifi-
cation for Equity's clean-up jurisdiction is eliminated by the merger of Law 
and Equity. See supra note 1275 and accompanying text. 
1307. See supra notes 1140-42 and accompanying text. 
1308. 12 G. & J. 477 (1842), discussed in Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 29-30. 
1309. The action would be one for damages. See Richardson, 12 G. & J. at 481-84. 
1310. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 30 & n.192. 
1311. See id. at 32 & n.21O. But see id. at 33 n.210 (discussing Capron v. Devries, 83 
Md. 220, 34 A. 251 (1896). 
1312. See supra notes 704-71 and accompanying text. 
1313. See Barry Properties, Inc. v. Fick Bros. Roofing Co., 277 Md. 15, 353 A.2d 222 
(1976), superseded fly statute as stated in York Roofing, Inc. v. Adcock, 333 Md. 
158,634 A.2d 39 (1993). 
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supplier of construction materials or laborl314 is still permitted a 
remedy against the improved property itself, the lien no longer at-
taches automatically without the filing and proof of a claim, and the 
lien no longer relates back for priority purposes to the commence-
ment of construction. l315 Thus, an action by a supplier on a contract 
with the property owner for money damages, triable of right by a 
jury, may well provide an adequate remedy at Law. 1316 A judgment 
1314. Bourne and Lynch assume that it is the contractor that is the supplier of 
construction materials or labor. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 68-69. 
The contractor has not only a remedy against the improved property itself, 
but a cause of action on the contract against the owner. Even if the supplier 
is a subcontractor, it may have a cause of action against the owner on one or 
more of several theories. 
First, the owner may be liable in negligence for having paid the contrac-
tor without taking precautions to see that suppliers are paid. See Diener v. 
Cubbage, 259 Md. 555, 563-64, 270 A.2d 471, 476 (1970). That negligence 
,would be underscored by the statute that requires the supplier to give notice 
to the owner, see MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-104(a) (1996), and by the 
owner's right under the statute to withhold the amount claimed by a sup-
plier from payments due the contractor, see id. § 9-104(f). 
Second, the owner may be liable to the subcontractor on a contract im-
plied in law. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 (1981). 
Under the mechanic's lien statute, the owner may be liable to pay the debt 
of the contractor to the subcontractor. See generally MD. CODE ANN., REAL 
PROP. §§ 9-101 to 113 (1996). But cf. Kees v. Kerney, 5 Md. 419, 421-22 (1854) 
(providing the law creates no contract between owner and subcontractor). 
Third, the subcontractor may be a third-party creditor or intended ben-
eficiary implied in law by the contract between the owner and the contrac-
tor. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302(1) cmt. (d), il-
lus.12 (1984). But see id. § 302, illus.19. The mechanic's lien statute provides 
for payment to suppliers by the owner, either directly or indirectly through 
the contractor, for supplies and labor provided for the construction project 
by the contractor's suppliers. See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-104(f) 
(1996). 
Fourth, the statute may be seen as extending the contractor's liability on 
the contract with the subcontractor to a new person, the owner. Compare 
Aviles v. Eshelman Elec. Corp., 281 Md. 529, 379 A.2d 1227 (1977) (statute 
provides a remedy only), with MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-111 (1996) 
(statute does not preclude other action against the owner or contractor). But 
cf. Barry Properties, Inc. v. Fick Bros. Roofing Co., 277 Md. 15, 36 n.ll, 353 
A.2d 222, 235 n.ll (1976) (providing subcontractor is remediless against the 
owner). 
1315. See Kenneth B. Frank & George W. McManus, Jr., Balancing Almost Two Hun-
dred Years of Economic Policy Against Contemporary Due Process Standards-
Mechanics'Liens in Maryland after Barry Properties, 36 MD. L. REv. 733, 736-38, 
782-84 (1977). 
1316. See Mervin L. Blades & Son, Inc. v. Lighthouse Sound Marina & Country 
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creditor's remedies after an action at Law are generally as adequate 
as the remedies of a supplier who established a mechanic's lien. 
The Law judgment also may constitute a lien 1317 and may be en-
forced by sale of property.1318 In certain respects, the Law judgment 
may be superior to the mechanic's lien,13I9 while in other respects, 
the mechanic's lien may be superior. 1320 To the extent the supplier's 
remedy at Law is adequate, the supplier's claim should be triable by 
a jury. 1321 
Club, 37 Md. App. 265, 269, 377 A.2d 523, 526 (1977). 
1317. See MD. RULE 2-621. 
1318. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-301 (1995); MD. RULE 2-641, 2-644. 
1319. The Law action must be filed within three years of accrual of a cause of ac-
tion. See MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 5-101 (1995). The mechanic's 
lien proceeding, however, must be filed within 180 days after the supplies or 
labor were furnished. See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-105(a) (1996). The 
Law judgment expires 12 years from its date of entry or any renewal thereof. 
See MD. RuLf. 2-625; see also MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 5-102(a) (3) 
(1995). The mechanic's lien expires one year after the petition was filed. See 
MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-109 (1996). The Law judgment is augmented 
by interest. See MD. RULE 2-604. Yet, the mechanic's lien does not bear inter-
est. Law judgments have priority over later-filed mechanic's liens, but 
mechanic's liens may not always have priority over other mechanic's liens. See 
MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-108 (1996). The Law judgment may be satis-
fied from any real or personal property of the judgment debtor, even that in 
the hands of a third person. See MD. RULE 2-641 to -646. The mechanic's lien, 
however, can only be enforced against the real property subject to the lien. 
See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-102 (Supp. 1996). 
1320. For example, the filing of a mechanic's lien proceeding may immediately af-
fect title to the owner's property under the doctrine of lis pendens. See gener-
ally Janice Gregg Levy, Comment, Lis Pendens and Procedural Due Process: A 
Closer Look After Connecticut v. Doehr, 51 MD. L. REv. 1054 (1992). The Law 
action has no affect on the property until recording of the judgment. See 
MD. RULE 2-621. The elements for establishing a mechanic's lien are rela-
tively simple and the defenses few. See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-105(a) 
(1996). The elements and defenses related to the Law action may be more 
complicated. The mechanic's lien statute, unlike the ordinary Law action, 
provides for expedited proceedings. See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-
106 (a) (1), (a)(3), (b)(3)(vi) (1996). The mechanic's lien statute, unlike a 
Law action, provides for interim payments to a supplier by the owner. See id. 
§ 9-104(f). The mechanic's lien once established, automatically attaches to 
the real property. See id. § 9-106(b) (1996); cf. id. § 9-107 (regarding the fil-
ing requirement for part of land located in another county). The Law judg-
ment constitutes a lien on real property only if recorded and indexed. See 
MD. RULE 2-621. 
1321. Cf. Dairy Queen Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 477 (1962) (provid.ing that a 
claim for an accounting that was recast as a claim for a debt on a contract 
or for trademark infringement would still have adequate remedies at Law). 
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Fourth, because of the advantages of a Law action, a supplier 
may join a claim for contract damages with a claim to establish a 
mechanic's lien.1322 Since equitable relief became available as ancil-
lary relief in an action at Law,1323 a suit joining the two claims might 
be considered a dual action-a determination of the parties' respec-
tive rights and responsibilities on the contract1324 or, in tort,l325 with 
liability and damages triable first by a jury, and then the establish-
ment of the lien triable by the judge. 1326 This approach was taken in 
a case decided after publication of Lynch and Bourne's article, 
Kahle v. McDonough Builders, Inc. 1327 
But if. Richard v. Stillinger, 12 G. &J. 326,484 (1842) (dismissing a claim on 
a vendor's lien where there was an adequate remedy at Law). 
1322. Cf MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-111 (1996) (providing mechanic's lien pro-
cedure does not preclude another action). 
1323. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
1324. The claim and counterclaim may raise many of the same issues. CJ. Bourne 
& Lynch, supra note 5, at 70 (providing claim to quiet title and counter-
claim for ejectment or trespass to raise the common issue of title). 
1325. See supra note 1314 (discussing Diener v. Cubbage, 259 Md. 555, 270 A.2d 471 
(1970) ). 
1326. A mechanic's lien, a form of non-injunctive equitable relief, was probably not 
available as ancillary relief in an action at Law. See Bourne & Lynch, supra 
note 5, at 55-56 n.360. However, a mechanic's lien might, nonetheless, be 
considered within the policy of former MD. RULE BF40. See Bourne & Lynch, 
supra note 5, at 56. 
1327. 85 Md. App. 141, 582 A.2d 557 (1990). Knhle was anticipated by the court of 
appeals in Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 550, 530 A.2d 724, 733 (1987) (dis-
cussing Singer v. Steven Kokes, Inc., 39 Md. App. 180,384 A.2d 463 (1978». 
See also PAUL V. NIEMEYER & LINDA M. RICHARDS, MARYLAND RULES COMMENTARY 
42 (Supp. 1988). 
In their book, Bourne and Lynch state that Kahle held that the claim 
foreclosing a mechanic's lien could be tried ahead of a breach of contract 
counterclaim. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 331 n.197. In Knhle, there 
were no common factual issues in. the mechanic's lien claim and the con-
tract counterclaim. See Kahle, 85 Md. App. at 151, 582 A.2d at 562. Thus, an . 
earlier judicial determination of the mechanic's lien would have no preclu-
sive effect on the jury-tried contract counterclaim. However, the earlier judi-
cial determination might delay trial of the legal issues and might, therefore, 
be a violation of the jury right, as suggested by Beacon. See supra notes 1145-
47 and accompanying text. 
Unlike Bourne and Lynch, I do not believe that Kahle held that the 
mechanic's lien claim could be tried ahead of a breach of contract counter-
claim. Kahie was a joint jury and bench trial. See Kahle, 85 Md. App. at 143, 
582 A.2d at 558 (noting that the judge heard the mechanic's lien claim at 
the same time the jury heard the contract counterclaim); if. id. at 154, 582 
A.2d at 563 ("first" of two reasons for the judge hearing another claim for 
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Fifth, the declaratory judgment action may be an adequate 
remedy at Law, triable by a jury,1328 in place of an equitable suit to 
establish a mechanic's lien.1329 
Thus, Lynch and Bourne's approximation of pre-merger ap-
proach, their rejection of persuasive federal authority, and their 
overlooking of ways to preserve the jury right, all exemplify their 
generally restrictive approach to the right to jury trial in a suit to 
foreclose a mechanic's lien and a counterclaim for breach of 
contract. 
8. Actions Involving Claims to Quiet Title and Legal 
Coun terclaims 
Nominally, Lynch and Bourne take a protective approach to 
the jury right in actions involving a claim to quiet title and a legal 
counterclaim for ejectment or trespass. Lynch and Bourne say that 
Maryland courts have expressed a strong preference for adjudicat-
ing land titles at Law, based in part on a desire to preserve the jury 
right. 1330 Because the counterclaim raises the issue of title, a legal 
matter triable by a jury, the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at 
Law, the defense to the counterclaim. This legal issue should be 
tried first by the jury. Any additional equitable relief can later be or-
dered by the judge. 1331 
However, Lynch and Bourne's approach to such actions is re-
ally more of an approximation of pre-merger approach. That is, af-
ter the merger of Law and Equity, claims of ejectment and trespass, 
traditionally available at Law, will be triable by a jury; actions to 
quiet title or remove a cloud from title, traditionally available in Eq-
uity where there was no adequate remedy at Law, will be tried by a 
breach of fiduciary duty with the mechanic's lien claim). 
1328. The declaratory judgment may be a legal remedy triable by a jury. See supra 
notes 1161-68 and accompanying text. 
1329. Cf. Barry Properties, Inc. v. Fick Bros. Roofing Co., 277 Md. 15, 37, 353 A.2d 
222, 235 (1976) (dictum) (declaratory judgment remedy); MD. CODE ANN., 
CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3409(b) (1995) (providing that a special statutory pro-
ceeding should be followed rather than a declaratory judgment proceeding). 
But cf. id. § 3409(c) (providing that concurrent statutory equitable proceed-
ing is no bar to declaratory relief); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-111 
(1996) (providing that mechanic's lien procedure does not preclude other 
action). 
1330. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 70; see also supra notes 1185-1213 and 
accompanying text. 
1331. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 70. 
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judge. 1332 Lynch and Bourne fail to address existing federal author-
ity involving the right to jury trial in an action involving a claim to 
quiet title and a legal counterclaim. Federal authority is, however, 
quite persuasive in this area. 
Lynch and Bourne may overlook some ways, in light of modern 
procedural developments, to preserve the jury right in an action in-
volving a claim to quiet title and a legal counterclaim. First, Lynch 
and Bourne conclude that a claim for immediate injunctive relief in 
such an action may be enough, based on pre-merger precedents, to 
preclude the jury right. 1333 Thus, Lynch and Bourne might eliminate 
the jury entirely. However, as they also suggest, the need for imme-
diate relief should not preclude a jury in an action involving a legal 
counterclaim. 1334 Provisional injunctive relief may be granted pend-
. ing trial of the land title by a jury. 1335 
Second, Lynch and Bourne conclude that after trial of the 
ejectment or trespass counterclaim by the jury, the trial judge may 
order additional equitable relief quieting title or removing a cloud 
from title.1336 Lynch and Bourne, therefore, might eliminate the jury 
right as to that additional relief. The declaratory judgment, how-
ever, may be an adequate remedy at Law, triable by a jury in place 
of that additional equitable relief. 1337 
Third, Lynch and Bourne conclude that if the legal counter-
claim to the equitable claim to quiet title was not for ejectment or 
trespass and did not raise the issue of title, the order of trial would 
not be significant. There would be no common issues, and an ear-
lier judge trial of the claim to quiet title1338 would have no preclu-
sive effect on a later jury trial of the legal counterclaim.1339 Thus, 
Lynch and Bourne would allow the jury right to be violated by de-
1332. See id. at 51, 70; see also id. at 70 n.441; id. at 70 n.442 (citing McCoy v. John-
son, 70 Md. 490, 17 A. 387 (1889». But if. id. at 52 (after merger, "Maryland 
precedents" may be limited by the right to jury trial, regardless of whether 
suit would have been brought in Law or in Equity before merger). 
1333. See id. at 37, 52. 
1334. See supra note 1190 and accompanying text . 
. 1335. See supra note 1184 and accompanying text. 
1336. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 70. 
1337. See supra note 1209 and accompanying text; see also Waring v. National Say. 
Trust Co., 138 Md. 367, 114 A. 57 (1921), discussed in Bourne & Lynch, supra 
note 5, at 52. 
1338. Again, the declaratory judgment may be an adequate remedy at Law, triable 
. by a jury, in place of the claim to quiet title. See supra note 1209 and accom-
panying text. 
1339. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 70. 
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lay. As we have seen, persuasive federal authority may prohibit the 
postponement, not just the preclusion, of a jury trial by earlier trial 
by the judge.1340 If the legal counterclaim and equitable claim are 
not tried together, the legal counterclaim should be tried before the 
equitable claim. 
Thus, Lynch and Bourne's apparent approximation of pre-
merger approach, their reluctance to even mention (much less ac-
cept) persuasive federal authority, as well as their overlooking of 
ways to preserve the jury right, exemplify their generally restrictive 
approach to the right to jury trial in actions involving a claim to 
quiet title and a legal counterclaim. 
9. Suits Involving a Claim for Accounting and a Claim for a Legal 
Remedy 
Nominally, Lynch and Bourne also take a protective approach 
to the jury right in suits involving a claim for an accounting and a 
claim for a legal remedy. 1341 Using a hypothetical based on the facts 
of Johnson & Higgins v. Simpson, Inc.,1342 they conclude that an em-, 
ployee's claim for contractual benefits, met by the employer's coun-
terclaim for an accounting, should be tried by a jury. Thus, they 
reach the same result as the federal case, Dairy Queen, Inc. v. 
WOOd. I343 However, I believe this approach to such suits is more an 
approximation of pre-merger approach. 1344 Even before merger of 
Law and Equity, discovery was an adequate remedy at Law for an ac-
counting in many situations,1345 with a jury trial on the legal 
claim. 1346 However, Lynch and Bourne suggest that in some situa-
1340. See supra notes 1142-44 and accompanying text. 
1341. Bourne and Lynch discuss this situation in tenos of a legal claim for contract 
damages and a counterclaim for an accounting. See Bourne & Lynch, supra 
note 5, at 71. However,. their logic would also cover the converse situation: a 
claim for an accounting and a counterclaim for legal relief. See id. at 71, 75-
76. 
1342. 165 Md. 83, 166 A. 617 (1933), discussed in Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 
7(}71. 
1343. 369 U.S. 469 (1962). 
1344. There is doubt about whether a Law court would entertain a counterclaim 
for an accounting before the merger of Law and Equity. See generaUy Bourne 
& Lynch, supra note 5, at 64. However, the jury trial issue would arise if an 
accounting was sought in a separate suit and then Equity sought to enjoin 
the action at Law. See id. at 71. ' 
1345. See id. at 71 & n.450 (citing Johnson v. Bugle Coat Apron & Linen Serv., 191 
Md. 268, 60 A.2d 686 (1948». 
1346. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 7(}71 (discussing Johnson & Higgins). 
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tions the remedy at Law may be inadequate; therefore, an equitable 
accounting may be needed.1347 Lynch and Bourne identifY three fac-
tors that may justifY equitable jurisdiction-a fiduciary or confiden-
tial relationship between the parties,1348 an ongoing relationship that 
raises the possibility of a multiplicity of actions,1349 and where an ac-
counting is sought against the party in possession of the ac-
counts. 1350 Thus, Lynch and Bourne used the Beacon and Dairy Queen 
Bourne and Lynch are ambivalent about whether the right to jury trial 
was the basis for the holding in Johnson & Higgins. Compare Bourne & Lynch, 
supra note 5, at 31 (stating the court of appeals "did not decide whether as-
sumption of equitable jurisdiction over what was essentially a defense to a le-
gal action would unconstitutionally infringe the equity defendant's right to 
trial by jury"), with id. at 71 (stating the court of appeals "held that account-
ing was not appropriate, partly because the party seeking the accounting 
controlled the records and partly because adjudication of the issues common 
to both actions ... would preclude the company's [sic] right to trial by jury 
in the action at law"). 
1347. See id. at 31, 71. 
1348. See id. at 3842. But if. id. at 3940 (providing discovery may be an adequate 
remedy at Law where no other grounds of equitable jurisdiction is asserted). 
1349. See id. at 4244. But see id. at 31, 38, 44 (stating that multiplicity, as a basis for 
equitable jurisdiction, has been rendered obsolete by modem joinder rules). 
1350. See id. at 4243. But if. id. at 43 (providing that discovery may be an adequate 
remedy at Law). 
Interestingly, Bourne and Lynch take a comparatively narrow view of eq-
uitable accounting before merger, but a comparatively broad view of equita-
ble accounting after merger. Historically, according to commentary, Equity 
had jurisdiction of an accounting, regardless of whether there was an ade-
quate remedy at Law, where there was a trust or fiduciary relationship. See, 
e.g., MCCLINTOCK, supra note 741, §§ 200-01. There was support for this view 
in Maryland law. See, e.g., Legum v. Campbell, 149 Md. 148, 131 A. 147 
(1925). However, Bourne and Lynch state that the relationship was not 
enough. There must also have been a need for discovery of the accounts 
kept by the trustee or fiduciary. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 3940, 
4243. According to commentary, Equity also had jurisdiction of an account-
.ing, even absent such a relationship, where the accounts were complicated, 
making the remedy at Law inadequate. See, e.g., McCLINTOCK, supra note 741, 
at §§ 200, 202; see also Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 24, 42 n.266 (dis-
cussing Dairy Queen). However, Bourne and Lynch state that resorting to an 
accounting would rarely have been appropriate where the accounts were 
complex. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 42 & n.267; if. id. at 31 n.195 
(discussing whether accounts were sufficiently complex to give Equity juris-
diction). After merger, however, Bourne and Lynch suggest that equitable 
accounting may be broader in Maryland than equitable accounting is in the 
federal courts. See id. at 75-76; see also id. at 25 n.148. But if. id. at 71 (stating 
that Maryland courts would reach the same result as the Dairy Queen Court 
did in a hypothetical based on Johnson & Higgins). 
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decisions as points of comparison, not as persuasive authority. 1351 
Lynch and Bourne may overlook some ways, in light of modern 
procedural developments, to preserve the jury right in suits involv-
ing a claim for an accounting and a claim for a legal remedy. Their 
approximation of pre-merger approach is protective of the jury 
right in their hypothetical based on the facts of Johnson & Hig-
gins. 1352 If the facts were different, however, their approach would 
likely not be protective of the jury right. It is in those different hy-
potheticals that Lynch and Bourne may overlook ways to preserve 
the jury right. 
In those situations where Lynch and Bourne find no adequate 
remedy at Law for an accounting, they would try those claims by 
the judge.1353 Thus, Lynch and Bourne might eliminate the jury as 
to the accounting claim. If the accounting claim were tried by the 
judge before trying the contract claim by the jury, the jury might be 
precluded from determining common facts underlying the contract 
claim.1354 If the accounting claim were tried by the judge, who used 
Equity's clean-up to try the legal claims as well,1355 the jury might be 
. eliminated entirely. Yet, as the persuasive Dairy Queen case held, 
those situations should be tried by the jury because there is an ade-
quate remedy at Law. 1356 
In some cases the claim for accounting may be, as in Dairy 
Queen, just a "choice of words used in the pleadings" to cover for a 
claim of damages and thereby avoid trial by jury.1357 In those cases, 
1351. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 71. Bourne and Lynch also refer to Ma-
ryland cases and state that the judge has a choice between Law or Equity. In 
addition, they state that the choice is governed by the adequate remedy at 
Law standard. Bourne and Lynch conclude that their analysis of the hypo-
thetical based on the facts of Johnson & Higgins reaches "the same result as 
in Dairy QJJeen." [d. 
1352. See supra notes 1342-43 and accompanying text. 
1353. See supra notes 1348-50 and accompanying text. 
1354. Cj Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 69 (actions involving a suit to foreclose 
a mechanic's lien and a counterclaim for breach of contract). But if. id. at 
70 (discussing actions involving a claim to quiet title and legal counter-
claims). 
1355. See id. at 71 ("Maryland has permitted equity to preclude the right to trial by 
jury when there is an adequate remedy at law .... "); see also id. at 34, 75-76 
(opining that Equity, once it exercised jurisdiction on a claim for an ac-
counting, could clean-up legal claims). But see id. at 54-55 (stating that the 
justification for Equity'S clean-up jurisdiction was eliminated by the merger 
of Law and Equity). 
1356. See Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 469-79 (1962). 
1357. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 24-25. 
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the jury should try the so-called claim for accounting, as well as the 
claim for a legal remedy. In other cases, Lynch and Bourne are less 
likely than are the federal courts to find an adequate remedy at 
Law for an accounting. Generally, they are more likely to use the 
adequate remedy at Law doctrine to expand, rather than contract, 
Equity jurisdiction. 1358 Specifically, while Lynch and Bourne do men-
tion that discovery may be an adequate remedy at Law for an equi-
table accounting,1359 they do not mention other possible adequate 
remedies at Law for an accounting. 1360 In addition, Lynch and 
Bourne suggest that after merger, equitable accounting may be 
broader in Maryland than in the federal courts. 1361 Second, in 
Lynch and Bourne's hypothetical, the employer counterclaimed for 
an accounting. In the Johnson & Higgins case itself, the employer al-
leged that the employee had embezzled money and that the con-
tract should be rescinded. Elsewhere, Lynch and Bourne have char-
acterized rescission as "purely equitable" and fraud, as a basis for 
such relief, as "essentially equitable."1362 They would try those claims 
by the judge, thereby eliminating the jury.1363 However, the charac-
terization of those claims as rescission based on fraud, no less than 
as an accounting, would violate the jury right. 1364 In both of these 
situations, Maryland practice should conform with federal practice 
and preserve the jury right. 1365 
Thus, Lynch and Bourne's approach exemplifies their generally 
restrictive approach to the right to jury trial in suits involving a 
claim for an accounting and a claim for a legal remedy. 
10. Actions in Which Adjudication of Equitable Issues is a Prereq-
uisite to Adjudication of Claims Triable by Jury 
In considering actions in which adjudication of equitable issues 
is a prerequisite to adjudication of claims triable by jury, Lynch and 
Bourne distinguish between actions in which the equitable issue is a 
1358. See supra notes 704-87 and accompanying text. 
1359. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 39-40, 43, 71. 
1360. See 1 POE'S PLEADING & PRACTICE §§ 106-31 (1970). But if. Bourne & Lynch, 
supra note 5, at 53 (stating Equity may grant rescission, regardless of an ade-
quate remedy at Law for money had and received). 
1361. See supra note 1350. 
1362. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 54-55. 
1363. Cf. supra notes 1355-56 and accompanying text (possible preclusion or clean-
up). 
1364. See supra notes 1223-34 and accompanying text. 
1365. See infra notes 1469-83 and accompanying text. 
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narrow procedural determination and actions in which the equita-
ble relief is more substantial. 1366 The following analysis follows that 
distinction. 
a .. Narrow Equitable Procedural Determinations 
Lynch and Bourne classify the narrow equitable procedural de-
terminations as "historically equitable actions which are essentially 
joinder devices."1367 They include in this category class action, inter-
pleader, shareholders' derivative suit, intervention, subrogation, re-
ceivership, and assignment. 1368 Lynch and Bourne take an approxi-
mation of pre-merger approach to actions involving legal claims in 
anyone of these historically equitable actions. In other words, they 
are guided by "traditional practices"1369 which provided for Equity's 
reference of factual issues to Law for trial by jury,1370 to transfer 
from Equity to Law of factual questions,1371 and which, by court de-
cision 1372 or by court rule,1373 permitted jury trial of legal claims 
brought by persons holding power under certain equitable doc-
trines. In these situations, Lynch and Bourne would generally con-
tinue to have the trial judge resolve the equitable issues first and 
then have the jury hear the legal claims. 1374 
Lynch and Bourne refer favorably to the federal precedent of 
Ross v. Bernhard,1375 a case in the Beacon line. The Ross Court held 
that the legal claims in a shareholders' derivative suit, traditionally 
an equitable proceeding, were triable of right by a jury. However, 
Lynch and Bourne rely on the earlier Maryland case of Allender v. 
Gh~ngherm6 as much as on RoSS.1377 
1366. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 72-77. 
1367. [d. at 73. 
1368. See id. at 72-73, 76. 
1369. See id. at 73; see also id. at 75 ("Maryland's courts"); id. at 76 ("Maryland 
cases" and "Maryland practice"); id. at 77 ("established Maryland proce-
dure"). 
1370. See id. at 34-35, 72. 
1371. See id. at 72-73. 
1372. See Allender v. Ghingher, 170 Md. 156, 183 A. 610 (1936) (holding that a liq-
uidating bank is not entitled to maintain a suit in equity to enforce stock-
holder liability). 
1373. See MD. RULE 240 (1977) (repealed 1984) (assignees); MD. RULE 243 (1977) 
(repealed 1984) (subrogees). 
1374. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 73, 74-75. But if. id. at 74 (limited jury 
right of legal claims in interpleader). 
1375. 396 U.S. 531 (1970). 
1376. 170 Md. 156, 183 A. 610 (1936). 
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Lynch and Bourne may overlook ways, in light of modem pro-
cedural developments, to preserve the jury right in actions involving 
legal claims in these historically equitable procedural actions. First, 
Lynch and Bourne would have some equitable procedural issues in 
these actions heard first by the judge, eliminating jury trial of those 
issues. Yet, as Lynch and Bourne recognize, some of these histori-
cally equitable procedural actions, such as class action and interven-
tion, were brought into Law from Equity1378 even before merger. 1379 
Thus, issues of fact as to these equitable procedures in an action at 
Law might be triable by a jury. 1380 
Second, Lynch and Bourne do not consider whether there 
might be an adequate remedy at Law, triable by a jury, for these 
historically equitable procedural actions. For example, the declara-
tory judgment might be an alternative to interpleader1381 or actions 
relating to subrogation1382 or assignment. 1383 As noted above, the de-
claratory judgment may be triable by a jury.1384 
Third, in any event, if there is an issue common to the equita-
ble procedure and the legal claim, that issue should be heard first 
by the jury. This would avoid a loss of the jury right through an ear-
lier determination of the issue, as an equitable one, by the judge.1385 
1377. Compare Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 74-75 (both cases cited), with id. at 
75 (only Allender cited), and id. at 76 (only Rnss cited). 
1378. Cf. Ross, 396 U.S. at 539 (stating that historically equitable procedural actions 
might have been borrowed from Equity by Law). 
1379. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 73; see also id. at 36 (discovery); id. at 45 
n.291 (liberal joinder); cf. id. at 55-60 (injunction as ancillary remedy at Law, 
but triable under equitable principles to the judge). 
1380. Cf. id. at 47-50 (discussing jury right in a declaratory judgment, a remedy un-
known at common law but now within the concurrent jurisdiction of Law 
and· Equity). 
1381. See BORCHARD, supra note 1209, at 363-65. 
1382. See id. at 544-45. 
1383. See id. at 580-81. 
1384. See supra notes 1176-82 and accompanying text. 
1385. See Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 540-41, 545, 551, 530 A.2d 724, 728, 730, 
733 (1987). Higgins was decided after the Bourne and Lynch article and they 
discussed it at length in LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 327-37. See gener-
ally, e.g., Hashem v. Taheri, 82 Md. App. 269, 571 A.2d 837 (1990). Hashem 
was also decided after Bourne and Lynch's article, and they noted it in 
LYNCH & BOURNE, SUPRA note 3, at 336 n.222. In Hashem, the issue of whether 
the plaintiff was a shareholder of the corporation in a shareholders' deriva-
tive suit was held to be triable of right by a jury because it was essential to 
plaintiff's legal claims, as well as to the preliminary equitable issue of 
whether he had standing to sue for the corporation. See Hashem, 82 Md. 
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Fourth, Lynch and Bourne lump interpleader with the other histori-
cally equitable procedural actions in which legal claims are subject 
to jury trial under Ross and Allender. 1386 Yet, Lynch and Bourne make 
an exception, limiting the jury right in interpleader, because the 
"policy" of the former rule,1387 which provided for trial by jury only 
when demanded by the defendant, could be construed as continued 
in the revised rule. 1388 However, commentaries on the revised rule 
take an approach much more protective of the jury right, one con-
sistent with Ross and Allender.1389 
Thus, Lynch and Bourne's approximation of pre-merger ap-
proach, their somewhat reluctant acceptance of persuasive federal 
authority, and their overlooking of ways to preserve the jury right, 
all exemplify their generally restrictive approach to the right to jury 
trial in actions involving legal claims in historically equitable proce-
dural actions. 
b. More Substantial Equitable Relief 
Lynch and Bourne include reformation, cancellation, resCIS-
sion, specific performance of contracts,1390 and accounting1391 in the 
category of more substantial equitable relief. Lynch and Bourne 
take an approximation of pre-merger approach to actions involving 
legal claims in one of these historically equitable actions. In other 
words, "Maryland cases"1392 provided for Equity's clean-up of legal 
App. at 269-74, 571 A.2d at 837-40. 
1386. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 72-73, 76. 
1387. See MD. RULE BU73 (1977) (repealed 1984). 
1388. See MD. RULE 2-221(c); see also, Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 74. Thus, 
Bourne and Lynch appear to permit court rules to limit the constitutional 
jury right. But if. infra notes 1585-95 and accompanying text (providing that 
interpleader rules extend the constitutional jury right). 
1389. See Commentary on the New Maryland Rules of Civil Procedure, 43 MD. L. REv. 669, 
735 (1984) ("[I]nterpleader does not abridge any preexisting right to ajury 
trial on an underlying action."). NIEMEYER & SCHUETT, supra note 1, at 136, 
states generally that practice under the rule will be similar to practice under 
the federal rule. Specifically, while there would not be a right to jury trial of 
a historically equitable order of interpleader, see id. at 137, 140, there would 
be a jury right by all the parties of legal claims and defenses (e.g., contract 
and fraud) in either a "pure" interpleader action or in an action in the na-
ture of interpleader. See id. at 138-40; see also infra notes 1576-95 and accom-
panying text. 
1390. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 72, 75-76. 
1391. See id. at 75-76. 
1392. Id. at 76; if. id. at 75 ("many cases"); id. at 76 ("lines of authority" and "Ma-
ryland practice"); id. at 77 ("established long ago" and "established Mary-
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claims in these historically equitable actions. 1393 Lynch and Bourne 
would have a jury trial of the legal claims, after determination of 
the equitable remedy, only at the trial judge's discretion. 1394 
Lynch and Bourne distinguish federal authority, at least Ross v. 
Bernhard,1395 as limited to cases where narrow equitable procedural 
determinations must be made. 1396 They do not consider other fed-
eral authorities that may bear on the jury right in cases where more 
substantial equitable relief is sought,1397 although they suggest they 
are departing from "federal post-merger practice."1398 
Lynch and Bourne may overlook ways, in light of modern pro-
cedural developments, to preserve the jury right in actions involving 
legal claims in cases where more substantial equitable relief is 
sought. First, before the merger of Law and Equity, Equity'S clean-
up jurisdiction was justified by avoiding the cost, delay, and inconve-
nience of duplicate proceedings in Law and Equity.1399 Mter merger, 
those justifications no longer exist to preclude the jury right. l400 Sec-
ond, developed above, there may be adequate remedies at Law, tria-
ble by a jury, for these more substantial equitable remedies. 1401 
land procedure"). 
1393. See id. at 75-77. 
1394. See id. at 77. Bourne and Lynch's discussion of this point appears to contain 
an inadvertent error. Before the sentence in question, Bourne and Lynch 
note the broad sweep of Equity powers and conclude that those powers 
would not likely be reevaluated. After the sentence in question, Bourne and 
Lynch note that, traditionally, once equitable jurisdiction has attached, it 
would clean-up any legal claims, regardless of the availability of a remedy at 
Law. The sentence with the addition of the bracketed word, which I believe 
corrects the error, follows: "It seems that such a re-evaluation would [not] 
preclude the chancellor from deciding the entire case once equitable juris-
diction has attached." [d. at 77. 
1395. 396 U.S. 531 (1970). 
1396. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 76-77. See generally supra notes 1368-89 
and accompanying text. 
1397. See, e.g., Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959); Dairy Queen 
Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962). 
1398. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 77. 
1399. See id. at 54-55, 76. 
1400. See id. at 54-55. 
1401. See supra note 1224 and accompanying text ("reformation at Law" may be ad-
equate for reformation); supra notes 1225-26 and accompanying text (declar-
atory judgment may be adequate for rescission and, presumably, reforma-
tion); supra note 1281 and accompanying text (specific performance); supra 
note 1227 and accompanying text (an action for money had and received 
may be adequate for rescission and restitution); supra note 1278 and accom-
panying text (replevin may be adequate for specific performance of a con-
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Third, even if there are no adequate remedies at Law, Lynch and 
Bourne might require specific findings by the trial judge that there 
are strong grounds for believing that the equitable remedies will is-
sue and that the adjudication of equitable claims is a prerequisite 
for adjudication of the legal claims. 1402 Those findings may be neces-
sary to protect the jury right in cases where the equitable claims are 
not prerequisites, but are supplementary to,1403 alternatives to,1404 or 
characterizations of1405 the legal claims. Fourth, even if the equitable 
claims are prerequisites to the legal claims, preserving the jury right 
may first require trial of any factual issues common to the equitable 
and legal claims by the jury. 1406 Lynch and Bourne recognize this in 
one context. 1407 If necessary, perhaps provisional injunctive relief 
could be granted pending trial. I408 
tract for personal property); supra note 1279 and accompanying text (eject-
ment may be adequate for specific performance of a contract for real 
property); supra note 1360 and accompanying text (the common-law com-
mon counts of money lent, money paid, money had and received, or ac-
count stated may be adequate for accounting). In addition, the adequate le-
gal remedies may become available with a defendant's counterclaims. Cf. 
supra note 1331 and accompanying text (action to quiet title with a counter-
claim for ejectment or trespass); supra notes 1341-42 and accompanying text 
(claim for accounting and counterclaim for damages). See generally Beacon, 
359 U.S. at 506-07, 509. 
1402. Cf. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 62 (suits joining claims for specific per-
formance and damages). Bourne and Lynch's hypothetical, based on Damazo 
v. Wahby, 269 Md. 252, 305 A.2d 138 (1973), illustrates the need for these 
findings. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 76-77. The authors hypothe-
size that a plaintiff seeks both the equitable remedy of setting aside a fraudu-
lent conveyance and the legal remedy of money damages. See id. Bourne and 
Lynch assume that the trial judge, after determining that the fraudulent con-
veyance could not be set aside, would likely clean-up the damages claim. 
Thus, the jury right would be side-stepped in a case where the equitable 
remedy was neither actually issued nor a prerequisite to the legal claim. 
1403. Cf. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 60-61 (discussing suits to enjoin inter-
ference with a business relationship and for damages). 
1404. Cf. id. at 62 (discussing specific performance, if chattels are unique, and 
damages, if they are not). 
1405. Cf. supra note 1357 and accompanying text (discussing damages character-
ized as an accounting and Dairy Queen Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 476-78 
(1962». 
1406. See supra notes 1136-39 and accompanying text. 
1407. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 55 (rescission and damages). 
1408. See supra note 1184 and accompanying text. But cf. Bourne & Lynch, supra 
note 5, at 55-56 (ancillary injunction at Law may not include non-injunctive 
equitable relief). 
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Thus, Lynch and Bourne's approximation of pre-merger ap-
proach, their reluctance to accept persuasive federal authority, and 
their overlooking of ways to preserve the jury right, all exemplify 
their generally restrictive approach to the right to jury trial in ac-
tions involving legal claims in cases where more substantial equita-
ble relief is sought. 
B. The Book 
This Article now turns to Lynch and Bourne's book,l409 written 
in 1993, almost a decade after the merger of Law and Equity in Ma-
ryland. Significantly, the book came after the decision of the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland in Higgins v. Barnes,1410 which adopted the 
Beacon protective approach to the constitutional right to jury 
trial. 1411 However, even after Higgins, Lynch and Bourne fall back on 
their approximation of pre-merger approach. They are like the pro-
fessor who vows to end future classes promptly when students re-
mark upon the lateness of the hour, but who then continues to 
hold classes overtime. 
Again, this Article considers in detail three characteristics ()f 
Lynch and Bourne's approach to problem situations. 1412 First, they 
usually try to approximate the way the jury right was applied before 
the merger of Law and Equity.l413 Second, if they accept recent, 
post-merger Maryland precedent and persuasive federal authority, it 
is only reluctantly. Third, they often overlook ways to preserve the 
jury right in light of modern procedural developments. Thus, their 
approximation of pre-merger approach is generally restrictive of the 
jury right. 
Professors Lynch and Bourne's book examines in some depth 
the right to jury trial in nine problem situations. Four of those situ-
ations, which are not considered in depth here, deal with the jury 
right independently of the distinction between Law and Equity. 
Those situations are the right to jury trial after default; 1414 in ap-
1409. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3. 
1410. See id. (discussing Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 530 A.2d 724 (1987». 
1411. See id. at 541-51, 530 A.2d at 729-33. 
1412. See supra note 1132 and accompanying text. 
1413. While approximating pre-merger, Bourne and Lynch, as detailed above, 
largely ignore the constitutional aspect of the jury right, see supra note 1130 
and accompanying text, and also abandon their own principled discretionary 
theory, see supra note 1131 and accompanying text. 
1414. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 309-10. Bourne and Lynch call this situ-
ation "Jury Trial Right Mter Default Judgment." Id. at 309 (emphasis added). 
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peals of administrative agency orders in the circuit courts,1415 in suits 
against the government,1416 and in contempt cases. 1417 The other five 
situations, which are considered in some depth here, do relate to 
However, as they note elsewhere in their book, MD. RULE 2-613 contemplates 
a two-step process-an order of default, entered after the defendant's failure 
to plead, and a default judgment, entered after a determination of liability 
and relief. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 60W9. As Bourne and 
Lynch recognize, this problem situation, in view of earlier precedents, raises 
a substantial constitutional jury right question. See id. at 309. 
1415. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 320-24. As Bourne and Lynch recog-
nize, this situation may raise a substantial constitutional jury right question 
in view of an earlier Maryland precedent, State v. Rutherford, 145 Md. 363, 
125 A. 725 (1924), (discussed in LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 321-22). See 
also LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 323 (discussing Granfinanciera, S.A. v. 
Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989) (analogous federal case); if. supra notes 340-45 
and accompanying text (stating that, by analogy, the Sixth Amendment right 
to jury trial in criminal cases may apply in administrative proceedings, such as 
those adjudicating "public" rights, LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 323, 
which are substitutes for criminal proceedings). 
The legislature's power to preclude trial by jury is not supported by the 
authors' authority. See Capron v. Devries, 83 Md. 220, 34 A. 251 (1896); see 
also supra notes 792-837 and accompanying text. 
1416. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 324. While Bourne and Lynch do not 
mention it, there is a substantial debate over the constitutional right to jury 
trial in suits against the federal government. Compare Lehman v. Nakshian, 
453 U.S. 156, 162 n.9 (1981) (holding that there is no constitutional jury 
right in an action against the United States), with Doe v. American Nat'l Red 
Cross, 847 F. Supp. 643, 646 (W.D. Wis. 1994) (holding there is a jury right. 
in an action against a federal agency having authority to "sue and be sued"), 
and Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22 (1980) (dictum) (stating that there is a 
jury right in action against federal official). See generally, Jason Weedon, 
Note, Historically Immune Defendants and the Seventh Amendment, 74 TEx. L. REv. 
655 (1996). The debate will eventually be joined in suits against the state. 
1417. As Lynch and Bourne recognize, if the contempt sanction is really a criminal 
one, this situation may raise a substantial constitutional jury right question. 
See id. at 325 & n.163 (imprisonment for more than six months); United 
Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (1994) (holding serious fines for con-
tempt require a criminal jury trial); see also supra notes 34245 and accompa-
nying text. Bagwell suggests that another constitutional defect with the con-
tempt power is that it fuses legislative, executive, and judicial powers in the 
judge. See United Mine Workers, 512 U.S. at 831. In contempt cases, it seems 
that a jury is most needed. See supra notes 384, 386, 390 and accompanying 
text. See generally RONALD L. GoLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 293 (1963) (co-
ercive civil contempt abused by a party seeking indefinite imprisonment of 
an opponent). For an example of a long period of confinement in a coer-
cive civil contempt case, see Kate Shatzkin, Bouknight Case Tests Limits· of Con-
tempt: Missing Child's Jailed Mother Refuses To Talk for 7 Years, THE SUN (BALT.), 
Feb. 12, 1995, at F1. 
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the distinction between Law and Equity. Those situations are as fol-
lows: (1) the right to jury trial in newly created causes of action; (2) 
the right to jury trial in three situations in which legal and equita-
ble claims or issues are combined-actions in which a historically le-
gal claim is joined with a historically equitable claim for which 
there is no adequate remedy at Law, actions in which a historically 
legal claim is joined with some preliminary equitable procedural 
matter, and equitable actions of accounting; and (3) the right to 
jury trial in declaratory judgment actions. 
1. Newly-Created Causes of Action 
Lynch and Bourne nominally take a strict historical approach 
to whether new causes of action, created by the legislature or the 
courts, are legal or equitable. In other words, if the new causes of 
action are analogous141S to rights and remedies at common law ex-
isting in 1776, the date of the first constitutional jury right in Mary-
land, those new causes are triable by a jury; if the new causes of ac-
tion are analogous to equitable rights and remedies existing in 
1776, the new causes are not triable by a jury. 1419 However, Lynch 
and Bourne actually take a different approach to whether new 
causes of action are legal or equitable. First, Lynch and Bourne 
state that in most cases "the question of whether an action is triable 
by jury may be resolved by looking to see whether before merger such 
action was adjudicated in courts of law or in courts of equity."1420 
Second, Lynch and Bourne's nominal, strict historical approach re-
lies on one case, Pennsylvania ex rel. Warren v. Warren,1421 a case 
which cited no Maryland precedent for that point and whose ap-
proach has not been followed in any subsequent, reported Mary-
land case. Third, Lynch and Bourne make it clear that the legisla-
ture and the courts are free to assign causes of action to Law or 
Equity.1422 Thus, Lynch and Bourne essentially take an approxima-
tion of pre-merger approach to whether new causes of action are le-
gal or equitable. 
Lynch and Bourne refer favorably to the federal precedents of 
1418. Here, Bourne & Lynch, by using analogies, depart from their avowed strict 
historical approach. See supra notes 506-632 and accompanying text. 
1419. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 312-15. 
1420. Id. at 312 (emphasis added); see also id. at 318. 
1421. 204 Md. 476, 105 A.2d 488 (1954); see supra notes 536, 546 and accompanying 
text. 
1422. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 316-18. 
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Curtis v. Loether,1423 Tull v. United States,1424 and Chauffeurs, Teamsters 
& Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry,1425 all cases in the Beacon line. 1426 
Those cases held that the jury right in new causes of action de-
pended on historical analogies to legal rights and remedies existing 
in 1791, the time the Seventh Amendment was adopted. However, 
Lynch and Bourne rely as much on the earlier Maryland case, War-
ren, as on the federal precedents. 1427 Lynch and Bourne do note 
that Higgins cited Tull with approval. 1428 
Lynch and Bourne overlook several ways to preserve the jury 
right in the trial of new causes of action. First, Lynch and Bourne's 
cut-and-dried use of the categories of Law and Equity does not rec-
ognize a pitfall for the jury right. A party may characterize a new 
cause of action in equitable rather than legal terms to avoid trial by 
jury.1429 This pitfall is most apparent where a party claims rights 
analogous to equitable rights1430 or remedies analogous to equitable 
remedies1431 that Law has "borrowed" from Equity. In order to pre-
serve the jury right, the courts should "see-through" the characteri-
zation of legal rights and remedies in equitable terms. Second, an-
other pitfall in the use of the categories of Law and Equity is that a 
party may claim new rights and remedies that are analogous to 
those existing in both Law and Equity.1432 Because the constitutional 
right is a jury trial, not a judge trial,1433 the courts should prefer the 
1423. 415 U.S. 189 (1974). 
1424. 481 U.S. 412 (1987). 
1425. 494 U.S. 558 (1990). 
1426. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 313-15. 
1427. See id. at 315. Bourne and Lynch also cite two other Maryland cases for sup-
port. See id. at n.75 (citing Impala Platinum, Ltd. v. Impala Sales (U.S.A.) 
Inc., 283 Md. 296, 389 A.2d 889 (1978), and Fink v. Pohlman, 85 Md. App. 
106,582 A.2d 539 (1990». 
1428. See Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 546, 530 A.2d 724, 731 (1987), discussed in 
LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 315. 
1429. Bourne and Lynch discuss this problem in another situation. See LYNCH & 
BOURNE, supra note 3, at 332-33 (discussing Dairy Queen (claim for money 
judgment cast in terms of an accounting». 
1430. Fraud is one example. In a footnote, Bourne and Lynch, do recognize the 
possibility of an adequate remedy at Law. See id. at 316 n.82. See generaUy Me-
CUNTOCK, supra note 741, at 5. 
1431. In a footnote, Bourne and Lynch recognize the possibility of discovery in an 
action at Law. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 319 n.124. 
1432. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 
(1990) (contract and trust); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987) (debt 
and nuisance). 
1433. See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text. 
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legal, rather than equitable, rights and remedies. 1434 Third, as de-
'tailed above, Lynch and Bourne say that the legislature and the 
courts are free to assign new causes of action to Law or Equity. 1435 
However, as developed above, the legislature and the courts are lim-
ited in doing so by the constitutional jury right. 1436 
Thus, Lynch and Bourne's essential approximation of pre-
merger approach, their reluctant acceptance of persuasive federal 
authority, and their overlooking of ways to preserve the jury right, 
all exemplify their generally restrictive approach to the right to jury 
trial in newly-created causes of action. 
2. Actions in Which Legal and Equitable Claims or Issues are 
Combined 
Lynch and Bourne, in considering actions in which legal and 
equitable claims or issues are combined, distinguish among three 
situations as follows: (1) actions in which a historically legal claim is 
joined with a historically equitable claim for which there is no ade-
'quate remedy at Law, (2) actions in which a historically legal claim 
is joined with some preliminary equitable procedural matter, (3) 
and equitable actions of accounting. 1437 Those distinctions are used 
here. 
a. Actions in Which a Historically Legal Claim is Joined with a Histori-
cally Equitable Claim 
In their book, Lynch and Bourne consider actions in which a 
legal claim is joined with an equitable claim as one situation. 1438 
However, in their earlier article, they treated these actions as seven 
situations: three where a plaintiff claims legal and equitable relief si-
multaneously, three where legal claims are met by equitable coun-
terclaims (or vice versa), and one where adjudication of a substan-
tial equitable issue is a prerequisite to adjudication of a legal 
issue. 1439 
1434. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391, 494 U.S. at 580 (Brennan, j., 
concurring) ("tie-breaker" in favor of jury trial). 
1435. See supra note 1422 and accompanying text. 
1436. See supra notes 788-866 and accompanying text. 
1437. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 326-37. 
1438. See id. at 326-35, 337. 
1439. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 2, 55-77. However, in this last situation 
tJ;ley distinguish between actions in which the equitable issue is a narrow 
procedural determination and actions in which equitable relief is more sub-
stantive. See supra note 1366 and accompanying text. 
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Because of Higgins, Lynch and Bourne generally follow the fed-
eral Beacon line of cases in taking a protective approach to the jury 
right. l440 In other words, where legal and equitable claims are joined 
and involve common facts, those facts are triable of right first by a 
jury. 1441 In generally following the federal, protective approach and 
in treating all actions joining legal claims with equitable claims 
under one heading, Lynch and Bourne depart from the discussion 
in their article. In their article, as developed above, Lynch and 
Bourne took an approximation of pre-merger approach,I442 which 
was applied in the seven specific situations. Interestingly, in their 
book, Lynch and Bourne depart from that approach without 
comment. 1443 
While Lynch and Bourne generally accept the recent, post-
merger Maryland precedent of Higgins and the persuasive federal 
authority of Beacon, they seem to do so reluctantly. This reluctance 
is apparent in three ways. First, in their general discussion, Lynch 
and Bourne take a narrow view of the endorsement by Higgins of 
the Beacon line of cases. l444 Second, the authors predict that Beacon 
and its progeny will be accepted in Maryland,I445 rather than recog-
nize that they already have been accepted in Maryland. l446 Third, 
they quote two portions of the Beacon dissent with approval. I447 
Although Lynch and Bourne generally take a protective ap-
proach to the jury right in actions in which a legal claim is joined 
with an equitable claim, they overlook several ways to preserve the 
Bourne and Lynch give only brief treatment to the situation where pre-
liminary equitable relief is granted in an action for final legal relief. See id. at 
61; see also LYNCH & BOURNE, SUPRA note 3, at 330-31. The preliminary injunc-
tive relief, being tentative and temporary, would have no res judicata effect 
on the later determination of the legal relief. See REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
JUDGMENTS § 13 (1982) (requirement of finality). See generally supra note 1142. 
Also, the proceedings on the preliminary injunctive relief, being summary in 
nature, should not significantly delay the jury trial. 
1440. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 327-28, 331, 335, 337. 
1441. See id. ·at 328, 331. 
1442. See supra notes 1236, 1262, 1283-87, 1299, 1332, 1344, 1367-74, 1390-93 and ac-
companying text. 
1443. In their book, Bourne and Lynch seem to accept not just a narrow reading 
of Beacon (jury trial of legal issues in a case including the plaintiff's equitable 
claim and the defendant's legal counterclaim), but Beacon, its progeny, and 
their implications. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 328, 335, 337. 
1444. See id. at 331, 334-35. But see id. at 328, 335, 337. 
1445. See id. at 335, 337. 
1446. See supra notes 192-205 and accompanying text. 
1447. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 329 n.188, 330 n.191. 
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jury right in such actions. First, as already noted above in discussing 
Lynch and Bourne's article, there may be adequate remedies at 
Law, triable by a jury, for these equitable claims.I448 Second, the au-
thors may have overlooked the significance of one aspect of Higgins. 
They note that Higgins pointed out that the legal issue of breach of 
contract was raised as well by the defendant's answer to the plain-
tiff's claim to specific performance of a contract, as it was by the 
defendant's counterclaim for damages on the contract. I449 However, 
Lynch and Bourne miss the significance of that point in Higgins. If 
a plaintiff claims an equitable remedy for violation of a tort or con-
tract duty, the defendant's answer denying the duty may raise a le-
gal issue triable by a jury, even without a counterclaim. 1450 Thus, 
there may be a right to jury trial where only an equitable remedy is 
requested if the underlying claim is a legal one in which facts are 
contested. Third, Lynch and Bourne conclude that the jury right is 
in danger only where there is a factual overlap in the legal and eq-
uitable claims so that a determination of equitable issues by the 
judge would preclude the right to later jury trial of common legal 
issues. 1451 However, Beacon suggests that there may be a violation of 
the jury right if there is a delay of trial of a legal claim by the jury 
by the earlier trial of an equitable claim by the judge, even where 
there is no preclusion.1452 
Thus, while Lynch and Bourne generally accept the protective 
federal approach, their reluctance in doing so and their overlook-
ing of ways to preserve the jury right both exemplifY their generally 
restrictive approach to the right to jury trial in actions in which a 
historically legal claim is joined with a historically equitable claim. 
1448. Where the equitable claim is made as a pretext to avoid the jury right, the 
adequate remedy at Law may be apparent. See, e.g. Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 
U.S. 469 (1962). See generaUy supra note 1358 and accompanying text. 
1449. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 332 (citing Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 
532, 535 n.l, 530 A.2d 724, 725 n.l (1987»; see also id. at 551-53, 530 A.2d at 
734. 
1450. Cf Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 504, 506-09 (1959) (right 
to jury trial on the plaintiff's claim for declaratory judgment that it was not 
in violation of antitrust laws). 
1451. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 331. 
1452. See supra notes 114446 and accompanying text. It may be that dividing a trial 
between the judge and jury is inefficient, as well as a delay. 
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b. Actions in Which a Historically Legal Claim is Joined with Some Pre-
liminary Equitable Procedural Matter 
Professors Lynch and Bourne consider historically legal claims 
joined with some preliminary equitable procedural matter, which 
they treated as a problem situation in their earlier article,1453 again 
in their book.1454 While Lynch and Bourne mention only the prelim-
inary equitable procedural matters of preliminary injunction, class 
action certification, and the shareholders' right to sue on behalf of 
the corporation in a shareholders' derivative action,1455 this category 
is probably much broader.1456 
Because of Higgins, Lynch and Bourne follow the federal Beacon 
line of cases, particularly Ross v. Bernhard,1457 in taking a protective 
approach to the jury right. In other words, after the judge has re-
solved the preliminary equitable procedural matter, the jury may 
decide legal claims. 1458 
While Lynch and Bourne generally accept the recent, post-
merger Maryland precedent of Higgins and the persuasive federal 
authority of Ross, they do so reluctantly. This reluctance is apparent 
in three ways. First, it has already been noted that in their general 
discussion Lynch and Bourne take a narrow view of the degree to 
which Higgins accepted Beacon and its progeny.1459 Second, the au-
thors quote the Ross dissent with approval. l460 Third, they implicitly 
criticize the recent Maryland case of Hashem v. Taheri. 1461 
As already developed above in discussing their article, Lynch 
and Bourne overlook a number of ways to preserve the jury right in 
actions where historically legal claims are joined with some prelimi-
nary equitable procedural matter. I462 
Thus, while Lynch and Bourne generally follow the protective 
federal approach, their reluctance in doing so and their overlook-
1453. See supra notes 1367-1408 and accompanying text. 
1454. See LYNCH & BOURNE. supra note 3, at 335-36; see also id. at 333-34 (discussing 
Ross v. Bernhard, 396 V.S., 531 (1970». 
1455. See id. at 333-36. 
1456. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 72-76. See generally supra notes 1368-89 
and accompanying text. 
1457. 396 V.S. 531 (1970). 
1458. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 336. 
1459. See supra note 1446 and accompanying text. 
1460. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 333 n.209, 334 & n.212. 
1461. 82 Md. App. 269, 571 A.2d 837 (1990), discussed in LYNCH & BOURNE, supra 
note 3, at 336 n.222. 
1462. See supra notes 1378-89. 
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ing of ways to preserve the jury right both exemplifY their generally 
restrictive approach to the right to jury trial in actions where histor-
ically legal claims are joined with some preliminary equitable proce-
dural matter. 
c. Equitable Accounting Actions 
Lynch and Bourne consider equitable accountings, which they 
treated as a problem situation in their earlier article,1463 again in 
their book. l464 Lynch and Bourne expressly take an approximation 
of pre-merger approach to equitable accountings. That is, if an eq-
uitable accounting alone is sought in a suit after merger of Law and 
Equity, there is no right to jury trial because there was no such 
right before merger. I465 Lynch and Bourne suggest an exception to 
this approach where a party, in order to avoid jury trial, character-
izes an essentially legal action, such as contract damages, as an equi-
table accounting. l466 
In general, Lynch and Bourne reject federal authority, the 
Dairy Queen case, even though they state that it was cited sympatheti-
cally in Higgins. 1467 The Dairy Queen Court held that the availability 
of masters under Federal Rule 53 to assist juries with complicated 
accounts enhanced the adequacy of legal remedies and eroded the 
equitable nature of accountings. I468 Lynch and Bourne say that the 
counterpart of Federal Rule 53, Maryland Rule 2-543 (Auditors), 
"does not contemplate the use of auditors to assist juries. "1469 Thus, 
they say that Maryland and federal practice diverge with respect to 
the jury right in equitable accountings. 1470 However, in one respect 
Lynch and Bourne accept federal authority. As noted above, they ac-
cept the admonition of Dairy Queen that the jury right should not 
be sidestepped by allowing a party to characterize an essentially le-
gal action, such as contract damages, as an equitable accounting. 1471 
1463. See supra notes 1341-65 and accompanying text (suits involving a claim for an 
accounting and a counterclaim for a legal remedy, or vice versa). 
1464. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 318-19, 336-37; see also id. at 332-33 (dis-
cussing Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 u.s. 469 (1962». 
1465. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 318-19; see also id. at 337. 
1466. See id. at 319 (referring to Dairy Queen). 
1467. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 335. 
1468. See id. at 332-33, 337. 
1469. Id. at 337; see also id. at 335 n.216. 
1470. See id. at 335 n.216, 336; see also id. at 337. 
1471. See supra note 1466 and accompanying text. 
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As detailed above, in discussing their article, Lynch and Bourne 
overlook a number of ways to preserve the jury right in equitable 
accounting actions. 1472 Further, they restrict the jury right another 
way in their book. Lynch and Bourne conclude that equitable ac-
counting has greater viability in Maryland than in federal courts be-
cause Maryland Rule 2-543 (Auditors), unlike Federal Rule 53 (Mas-
ters), does not permit assistance to the jury in complicated 
accountings. 1473 Respectfully, Lynch and Bourne may be wrong 
about that. Maryland Rule 2-543 may permit auditors to assist juries 
in complicated accountings, and Maryland practice should be as 
protective of the jury right as federal practice. Maryland Rule 2-543 
(Auditors), unlike Maryland Rule 2-541(b)(2) (Masters) and Mary-
land Rule 2-542(b) (Examiners),1474 does not expressly provide that 
auditors shall only be used for matters "not triable of right before a 
jury."1475 By negative implication, Maryland Rule 2-543 would permit 
use of an auditor in a jury trial. While the notes to Rule 2-543 list 
former Rule 595 (Auditor),1476 applicable only in Equity, as a source,. 
the former rules also included Rule 525 (Auditor-Action Involving 
Account),1477 applicable at Law as well as in Equity.1478 
The principal commentary on the Maryland Rules provides that 
"any type of matter, whether legal or equitable in nature," relating 
to an account, may be referred to an auditor.1479 Traditionally, audi-
tors have been able to present matters as evidence to juries. 1480 
More broadly, even Maryland Rule 2-541 (Masters) may contemplate 
masters being used in jury trials. Maryland Rule 2-541 (b)(2), permit-
1472. See supra notes 1357-65 and accompanying text. In their book, Bourne and 
Lynch discuss one way to preserve the jury right in equitable accounting ac-
tions-by re-characterizing, as the Dairy Queen Court did, an equitable ac-
counting as a legal action for contract damages. See supra note 1466 and ac-
companying text. 
1473. See supra note 1469 and accompanying text. 
1474. See FED. R Crv. P. 53 (defining "master" as including referee, auditor, exam-
iner, and assessor). An auditor is analogous to a master. See Robinson v. 
Brodsky, 268 Md. 12, 24, 298 A.2d 884, 890 (1973). 
1475. MD. RULE 2-541 (b)(2) , -542(b). 
1476. See MD. RULE 595 (1983) (repealed 1984). 
1477. See MD. RULE 525 (1983) (repealed 1984). 
1478. However, the "Appendix: Tables of Comparable Rules" to the MARYLAND 
RULES does not list MD. RULE 2-543 or any other revised rule as having been 
derived from former MD. RULE 525 (1983) (repealed 1984). 
1479. NIEMEYER & SCHUETI, supra note 1, at 432. 
1480. See Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 275, 385 A.2d 57, 69 (1978) (dic-
tum); if. MD. RULE 5-702 (expert testimony), MD. RULE 5-704 (opinion on ul-
timate issue). 
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ting reference to a master of any "matter or issue not triable of 
right before a jury," may simply be a truism, protecting the constitu-
tional jury right. In other words, the master may hear issues not 
jury triable or may make non-binding recommendations to the jury 
on issues. 1481 Permitting auditors to assist juries in complicated ac-
countings also may be suggested by the Higgins case, which gener-
ally cited Dairy Queen with approval,1482 and which notes Maryland 
courts' traditional reliance on federal courts' interpretations of anal-
ogous rules as persuasive authority. 1483 
Thus, Lynch and Bourne's approximation of pre-merger ap-
proach, their reluctance to accept recent, post-merger Maryland 
precedent and persuasive federal authority, and their overlooking of 
ways to preserve the jury right all exemplify their generally restric-
tive approach to the right to jury trial in equitable accountings. 
3. Declaratory Judgments 
Lynch and Bourne consider the declaratory judgment action, 
which they treated as a problem situation in their earlier article, 1484 
again in their book.1485 While Lynch and Bourne nominally endorse 
what they call the federal "basic nature of the issue" approach,1486 
their approach is more akin to an approximation of pre-merger ap-
proach. 1487 Lynch and Bourne state the basic nature of the issue ap-
proach as the general rule in federal courts. 1488 That is, the claims 
or other issues underlying the declaratory ·remedy are examined, 
and a jury trial is provided for claims or other issues of a legal na-
ture, not for those of an equitable nature. 
However, Lynch and Bourne make two exceptions to the gen-
eral rule. The first is for the "inverted" suit in which the declaratory 
judgment plaintiff may be suing on what would otherwise be a de-
fense to a claim that the declaratory judgment defendant might 
1481. Cf NIEMEYER & SCHUETI, supra note 1, at 424-25 (stating that MD. RULE 2-541 
does not limit masters to Equity, but "the court may not refer any matters to 
a master that are within the province of a jury to decide"; the master acts 
"subject to constitutional limitations"). 
1482. See generally Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 541, 545, 551, 530 A.2d 724, 728, 
730, 733 (1987). 
1483. See id. at 54243, 530 A.2d at 729. 
1484. See supra notes 115~84 and accompanying text. 
1485. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 337-38. 
1486. Id. at 338. 
1487. See id. 
1488. See supra notes 1161-62 and accompanying text. 
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raise. 1489 Lynch and Bourne suggest that because the declaratory 
judgment plaintiff's remedy often resembles the equitable remedy 
of cancellation of a contract, there may be no right to jury trial. 1490 
This exception may swallow the rule, particularly if the jury right 
would also be denied because the declaratory judgment plaintiff's 
remedy might resemble other equitable remedies, such as injunc-
tion, specific performance, reformation, or constructive trust. 1491 
Thus, in this first exception, Lynch and Bourne suggest that the 
"basic nature of the issue" may be the available remedy, often equi-
table, if there were no declaratory judgment, rather than the "basic 
nature of the issue" being the underlying claim, often legal. 1492 This 
first exception is an approximation of pre-merger approach,1493 
which seems contrary to both the Beacon line of cases and the Hig-
gins decision. In Simler v. Conner,1494 a Beacon line case, a lower court 
held that a declaratory judgfi?ent action was basically an equitable 
claim for cancellation of a contract and, thus, was not triable by a 
jury.1495 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the underlying 
contract action was a traditionally legal matter triable by a jury.1496 
In Higgins, a defense of breach of contract, raised in an answer 
(and counterclaim) in a suit for specific performance of a contract, 
was held to raise a legal issue triable by a jury. 1497 
The second exception to the general rule that the right to jury 
trial depends upon the "basic nature of the issue" is for cases where 
"legal-type relief would not be possible at the time a declaratory 
judgment action is filed .... "1498 In Lynch and Bourne's hands, this 
1489. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 337; see also Bourne & Lynch, supra 
note 5, at 48 ("reverse" bill or claim, "defensive" use of the declaratory judg-
ment, "inverted" suit); Beacon Theatres, Inc., v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 515 
(1959) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("juxtaposition of parties"); id. at 515 n.7 
("[t]ransposition of parties"). 
1490. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 337-38; see also id. at 319 & n.129. 
1491. See id. at 319. 
1492. See id. at 319, 337-38. 
1493. See generally supra notes 1150-54 and accompanying text. 
1494. 372 U.S. 221 (1963). 
1495. See Simler v. Conner, 295 F.2d 534 (10th Cir. 1961). 
1496. See Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221 (1963) (per curiam), discussed in LYNCH & 
BOURNE, supra note 3, at 338 n.231 (relying on Simler as primary authority for 
the general rule that the right to jury trial depends upon the "basic nature 
of the issue"). 
1497. See Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 535 n.l, 530 A.2d 724, 725 n.l (1987); see 
also id. at 551-53, 530 A.2d at 733-34. 
1498. LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 338. 
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exception may also swallow the rule. For example, legal relief might 
not be possible because a claim for damages is not yet ripe l499 or be-
cause the case is one of inverted parties,1500 and "there was no suit 
pending" on the declaratory judgment defendant's claim. 1501 
The breadth of this second exception is underscored by several 
things. First, Lynch and Bourne cite as authority for the exception 
their earlier article,1502 which more clearly took an approximation of 
pre-merger approach. 1503 Second, the authors use of the phrase "in 
keeping with the traditional distinctions between law and equity"1504 
betrays their sympathies, generally, for an approximation of pre-
merger approach. Third, one of the federal cases Lynch and 
Bourne cite for their general rule, the basic nature of the issue ap-
proach, may illustrate this exception to the rule as well. In Simler v. 
Conner,1505 a declaratory judgment action by a client to determine 
the amount of a reasonable fee owed to his attorney under a writ-
ten contract was held to be a traditional common-law issue triable 
by a jury. 1506 Yet, absent that holding, the case might have been seen 
as one where legal relief would not be possible at the time the de-
claratory judgment action was filed, either because the case was one 
of inverted parties and the defendant lawyer's claim was not yet 
pending or because the lawyer's claim for damages was not yet ripe 
in view of the ethical constraints on lawyers suing their clients for 
fees. 1507 
1499. See id. at 338 (discussing Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Candimat Co., 83 
F. Supp. 1 (D. Md. 1949»; see also Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 4748. 
But if. LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 330 & n.193 (stating the federal de-
claratory judgment act, comparable to the Maryland declaratory judgment 
act, provides a legal remedy in circumstances where only an equitable rem-
edy would have been available earlier). 
1500. That is, the declaratory judgment plaintiff's claim for declaratory relief is 
what otherwise would be a defense to a claim that the declaratory judgment 
defendant might raise. 
1501. LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 338 (discussing Candimat); if. supra note 
1490 and accompanying text (inverted suit considered as suit for equitable 
cancellation) . 
1502. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 338 & n.232. 
1503. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 47, 50. See generally supra notes 1150-54 
and accompanying text. 
1504. LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 338. 
1505. 372 U.S. 221 (1963). 
1506. See id. at 221-23. 
1507. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIUlY EC 2-23 (1969); CANONS OF 
PROFESSIONAL Enucs Canon 14 (1908). 
I.' 
I 
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Lynch and Bourne only reluctantly accept post-merger Mary-
land precedent and persuasive federal authority about the right to 
jury trial in declaratory judgment actions. That reluctance is appar-
ent in several ways. First, Lynch and Bourne do not even mention 
Beacon in connection with the declaratory judgment action as a 
problem situation. 1508 Second, in their general discussion, Lynch 
and Bourne continue their criticism of Beacon, although that criti-
cism is not as pointed as the criticism in their earlier article. 1509 Spe-
cifically, they criticize Beacon for holding that the declaratory judg-
ment act may provide an adequate remedy at Law, triable by a 
jury.1510 Yet, as noted above, that holding seems consistent with Ma-
ryland law. 1511 Moreover, Lynch and Bourne concede that the pro-
tective Beacon approach to the jury right will likely be fully accepted 
in Maryland.1512 Third, Lynch and Bourne do not mention that Hig-
gins cites part of the Beacon discussion of the declaratory judgment 
with approval. l513 As already detailed above, Lynch and Bourne over-
look a number of ways, in light of modern procedural develop-
ments, to preserve the jury right in declaratory judgment actions. 1514 
Thus, Lynch and Bourne's approximation of pre-merger ap-
proach, their reluctant acceptance of recent, post-merger Maryland 
precedent and persuasive federal authority, and their overlooking of 
ways to preserve the jury right all exemplify their generally restric-
tive approach to the right to jury trial in declaratory judgment 
actions. 
v. PRESERVING MARYLAND'S PROTECTIVE APPROACH TO 
THE JURY TRIAL RIGHT 
To return to the analogy of the college instructor, the founda-
tion for a course should be its description in the school catalog, not 
the course instructor's bold new ideas or past practice. Lynch and 
Bourne propose a principled discretionary theory to the right to 
1508. Cf LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 329-31, 334-35 (discussing Beacon in 
connection with the problem situation of actions in which legal and equita-
ble claims or issues are combined). 
1509. See supra notes 1155-73 and accompanying text. 
1510. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 330, 331. 
1511. See supra note 1176. 
1512. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 334-35; cf supra notes 192-203 and ac-
companying text (noting Beacon and its progeny already have been accepted 
in Maryland). 
1513. See Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 551 n.12, 530 A.2d 724,733 n.12 (1987). 
1514. See supra notes 1174-84 and accompanying text. 
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jury trial in civil cases. 1515 However, in analyzing whether the jury 
right applies in various situations, they ordinarily use an approxiina-
tion of pre-merger approach. 1516 To the contrary, the Maryland Con-
stitution should· be the basis for determining the right to jury trial, 
and the constitution requires a protective approach to the jury 
right. 1517 This protective approach is better than other approaches 
to the jury right. 15ls Maryland's protective approach generally fol-
lows the federal approach in theoryl519 and in practice,1520 but Mary-
land's approach may be even more protective. 1521 
How then may Maryland's jury right be "inviolably preserved" 
and not just "pickled"?1522 How may Maryland's jury right be part of 
a constitution that is "living," applicable to new circumstances,1523 as 
well as "written," limiting the branches of govemment?1524 
Maryland's protective approach may be preserved in a number 
of ways: by Maryland'sl525 legislature and people through constitu-
tional amendment, by the legislature through statute, and by the 
courts through cases and court rules. 1526 
1515. See supra notes 10-13, 453-1124 and accompanying text. 
1516. See supra notes 14, 1125-1514 and accompanying text. 
1517. See supra notes 16452 and accompanying text. 
1518. See supra notes 231-299 and accompanying text. 
1519. See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
1520. See supra notes 199-205 and accompanying text. 
1521. See supra notes 223-30 and accompanying text. 
1522. See supra notes 6, 57-63 and accompanying text. 
1523. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. 
1524. See supra notes 16-25 and accompanying text. 
1525. The jury right in Maryland could be affected by developments on the na-
tional level. Amendments to the United States Constitution, pursuant to Arti-
cle V, might extend the federal jury right to state courts. Compare U.S. 
CONST. amend. VII Uury right, which was held not applicable to the states, 
in e.g., Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151 
(1931», with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (guarantee of other rights, applicable to 
the states, against bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing 
the obligation of contracts). Congressional legislation might extend the fed-
eral jury right to state courts. See Dice v. Akron, C. & Y R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 
359 (1952) (Commerce Clause legislation, the Federal Employers' Liability 
Act); Daniel J. Leffel!, Note, Congressional Power to Enforce Due Process Rights, 
80 COLUM. L. REv. 1265, 1281-82, nn.101, 102 (1980) (hypothetical legislation 
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). The Supreme Court might de-
cide that the Seventh Amendment should be applied to the states. See supra 
notes 353-54 and accompanying text. 
1526. Maryland's executive would appear to have only a limited role in these 
processes. See MD. CONST. art. XN, § 1 (discussing governor's publication of 
proposed amendment and governor's proclamation that an amendment was 
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Maryland's protective approach to the jury right may be pre-
served by the legislature and people through constitutional amend-
ment, pursuant to Article XIV of the Maryland Constitution. In the 
past, the jury right has been received as part of the English com-
mon law in the first Maryland Constitution,1527 put beyond reach of 
the legislature in the 1851 Constitution,I528 and extended in that 
constitution to eminent domain cases1529 and appeals to the circuit 
courts from the judgments of justices of the peace.1530 
Maryland's protective approach to the jury right may be pre-
served by the legislature through statute. 1531 Indeed, the legislature 
may extend the jury right beyond that guaranteed by the Maryland 
Constitution. The legislature has plenary powers, except where lim-
ited by the Maryland Constitution.1532 The legislature's powers under 
the Maryland Constitution expressly include the power to pass laws 
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers vested 
by the constitution in any department of government. 1533 One of 
those departments is the judiciary.1534 The legislature's power to 
make laws for the judiciary, such as extending the right to trial by 
adopted by voters); id. § 2 (discussing legislation taking the sense of the peo-
ple regarding the call of a constitutional convention and legislation calling 
such a convention, which is presumably subject to the governor's approval or 
veto under MD. CaNST. art. II, § 17); id. (governor's approval or veto of ordi-
nary legislation); see also id. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 8 (separation of legislative, 
executive, and judicial powers). But cf. id. art. II, §§ 1, 9 (governor's execu-
tion of laws); id. §§ 10-14 (governor's appointment of officers); id. § 16 (gov-
ernor's convening of legislature on extraordinary occasions). 
1527. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
1528. See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text. 
1529. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
1530. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
1531. See LYNCH & BOURNE, SUPRA note 3, at 317 n.106; see also Bourne & Lynch, 
supra note 5, at 36 n.229 (citing Union Passenger Ry. v .. Mayor of Baltimore, 
71 Md. 238, 241, 17 A. 933, 934 (1889), for the proposition that the legisla-
ture may give Law courts jurisdiction of matters traditionally heard in Equity 
(semble». 
This legislative power is gerierally recognized. See MD. RULE 2-511 (a) 
(preserving the right of trial by jury as guaranteed by the MD. CaNST. "or as 
provided by law"); cf. FED. R CIY. P. 38(a) (federal "right of trial by jury as 
declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a 
statute of the United States"). 
1532. See Board of Supervisors of Elections v. Attorney Gen., 246 Md. 417, 428-29, 
229 A.2d 388, 394 (1967). See generally Note, The Theory of State Constitutions, 
1966 UTAH L. REv. 542, 553-54. 
1533. See MD. CONST. art. III, § 56. 
1534. See id. art. IV. 
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jury, apparently is not generally limited by any provision of the Ma-
ryland Constitution. As already noted, there is no constitutional 
right to trial by judge.1535 The separation of powers1536 is no limita-
tion because the power to make procedural law for the judiciary is a 
power that is expressly shared by the legislature and the judiciary. 1537 
This legislative power to extend the jury right has been exercised 
on a number of occasions. 1538 
Maryland's protective approach to the jury right may be pre-
served by the courts through decisions in cases. 1539 Indeed, the 
scope of the constitutional jury right is a question to be determined 
by the courts. 1540 
Maryland's protective approach to the jury right may also be 
preserved by the courts through rule-making. 1541 The courts by rule 
1535. See supra note 86-95 and accompanying text. 
1536. See MD. CONST .. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 8. 
1537. See id. art. IV, § 18(a); Funger v. Mayor of Somerset, 244 Md. 141, 149-51,223 
A.2d 168, 172-73 (1966); INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION. SURVEY OF 
THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF MARYLAND 53-56 (1967); cf THE FEDERAUST No. 83 
(Alexander Hamilton) ("A power to constitute courts is a power to prescribe 
the mode of trial: and consequently, if nothing was said in the Constitution 
on the subject of juries, the legislature would be at liberty either to adopt 
that institution or let it alone."). 
1538. See MD. CODE ANN .. REAL PROP. § 8-332(b) (1996) (distress appeals); MD. CODE 
ANN .. CTS. & JUDo PROC. § 3-2A-06(b) (2) (1995) (medical malpractice arbitra-
tion appeals), noted in LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 322 n.148; MD. 
CODE ANN .. FAM. LAw §§ 5-1026(a), 5-1027(b) (1991) (paternity proceedings); 
MD. CODE ANN .. HEALTH-GEN. § 10-805(e) (1994) (release from a facility of 
persons with mental disorders), noted in LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 
317 n.106; MD. CODE ANN .. HEALTH-GEN. § 7-507(e) (1994) (release from a fa-
cility of persons with mental retardation); MD. CODE ANN .. LAB. & EMPL. § 9-
745 (d) (1991) (worker's compensation appeals), noted in LYNCH & BOURNE, 
supra note 3, at 322; if. Patterson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 127 Md. 233, 96 A. 
458 (1915) (stating that the right to jury trial in eminent domain was first 
given by the legislature); Baltimore Belt R.R. v. Baltzell, 75 Md. 94, 23 A. 74 
(Md. 1891) (the legislature may summon a special jury, rather than use a 
common-law jury). 
1539. See supra notes 164{)5, 170-78, 184-205 and accompanying text. But if. supra 
notes 179-83 and accompanying text (some unfavorable interpretations befrn-e 
the merger of Law and Equity). 
1540. See Knee v. Baltimore City Passenger Ry., 87 Md. 623, 624, 40 A. 890, 891 
(1898) . 
1541. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 73-74 & n.465 (citing MD. RULE BU73 
(1977) (repealed 1996), and revised MD. RULE 2-221 (c) (the limited right to 
jury trial in interpleader». But cf id. at 35 n.221 (citing MD. RULE 517 
(1977) (repealed 1984) (abolition of Equity'S reference to Law for a jury 
trial» . 
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may extend the jury right beyond that guaranteed by the Maryland 
Constitution. The courts' powers under the Maryland Constitution 
expressly include that of making rules of "practice and proce-
dure."1542 The legislature, which has the power to pass laws neces-
sary and proper for carrying into execution the powers vested by 
the constitution in any department,1543 has declared that the courts' 
power to make rules governing "practice and procedure" shall be 
"liberally construed"1544 and that practice and procedure include 
(without limitation) "trials" and "unification of practice and proce-
dure in actions at law and suits in equity, so as to secure one form 
of civil action and procedure for both." 1545 Indeed, court rules have 
been characterized as "legislative" in nature. 1546 Presumably, if the 
legislature can extend the right to jury trial beyond its constitu-
tional scope,1547 so may the courts, acting pursuant to their constitu-
1542. See MD. CONST. art. IV, § 18(a); if. U.S. CONST. art. III (providing no express 
power of federal courts to make rules of practice and procedure); McCulloch 
v. Maryland, 7 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406-11 (1819) (stating that branches of 
government have incidental or implied powers related to expressly enumer-
ated powers); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1,42-43 (1825); Sib-
bach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941) (providing that the federal 
courts' rule-making authority is delegated by Congress). 
1543. See MD. CONST. art. III, § 56. 
1544. MD. CODE ANN .. CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 1-201 (a) (1995) provides: 
[d. 
1545. [d. 
The power of the Court of Appeals to make rules and regulations 
to govern the practice and procedure and judicial administration in 
that court and in the other courts of the State shall be liberally 
construed. Without intending to limit the comprehensive applica-
tion of the term "practice and procedure,» the term includes the 
forms of process; writs; pleadings; motions; parties; depositions; dis-
covery; trials; judgments; new trials; provisional and final remedies; 
appeals; unification of practice and procedure in actions at law and 
suits in equity, so as to secure one form of civil action and proce-
dure for both; and regulation of the form and method of taking 
and the admissibility of evidence in all cases, including criminal 
cases. 
1546. See Ginnavan v. Silverstone, 246 Md. 500, 504-05, 229 A.2d 124, 126 (1967). 
The rules are to be interpreted in the same manner as statutes. See Pappas v. 
Pappas, 287 Md. 455, 465, 413 A.2d 549, 553 (1980); see also MD. RULE 1-
201 (c); if. County Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Equitable Say. & Loan Ass'n, 261 
Md. 246, 252-53,274 A.2d 363, 367 (1971) (stating a rule prevails over a con-
flicting prior statute). 
1547. See supra notes 1531-38 and accompanying text. 
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tional and delegated powers. 1548 
Two questions have been raised about the courts' power to ex-
tend the right to trial by jury beyond its constitutional scope. One 
question is whether the courts, whose power relates to "practice and 
procedure," have power to modify the right to jury trial, which may 
be a substantive matter. Thus, one case has stated that "the rules of 
procedure may not abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive rights 
of a litigant."1549 
There are a number of possible affirmative answers to this first 
question. Unlike the federal rule-makers, who are expressly prohib-
ited from making rules which "abridge, enlarge or modify any sub-
stantive right,"1550 the state rule-makers are not prohibited by consti-
1548. The courts' power in this respect apparently is not generally limited by any 
provision of the MD. CaNsT. Cf supra note 1535-37 (noting that the legisla-
ture's power to expand the jury right is not generally limited by any provi-
sion of the MD. CaNST.). The constitution may require extension of the right 
to jury trial beyond its original scope. See infra note 1574 and accompanying 
text. 
1549. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Slater, 227 Md. 459, 467, 177 A.2d 520, 
524 (1962) (dictum); see also MD. RULE B11 Committee Note (1977) (re-
pealed 1993) ("The question of the right to trial by jury is substantive rather 
than procedural. However, the Committee believes it desirable that Rule B11 
be included in order to make it clear to the reader that the question of the 
right to trial by jury has not been overlooked."); see also Explanatory Notes of 
the Reporter (Second Report) on the General Rules of Practice and Procedure, MD. 
ANN. CODE, app. B, at 2107 (Cum. Supp. 1947) ("The proposed [joinder] 
rules do not create a substantive right. Such rules relate only to matters of 
procedure and not substantive rights."); Kenneth C. Proctor, Maryland Rules 
of Practice and Procedure: Brief History-Pending and Projected Changes, 9 MD. BJ. 
24, 26 (Dec. 1976) ("[In reviewing the Maryland Code, the Rules] Commit-
tee had to determine what was substance and what was practice and proce-
dure. The test applied was-'Provisions answering the question "What is the 
right and its extent?" are substantive; provisions answering the question 
"How is the right enforced?" are procedural.' "); cf. MD. RULE 2-301 commit-
tee note (providing that "this Rule [one form of action] ... does not affect 
the right to jury trial"); NIEMEYER & SCHUETT, supra note 1, at 155; Commen-
tary, supra note 1389, at 742-43 (providing that the rules neither abridge nor 
enlarge the right to trial by jury). 
1550. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994). The Rules Enabling Act 
provides: 
(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general 
rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in 
the United States district courts (including proceedings before mag-
istrates thereof) and courts of appeals. 
(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive 
right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further 
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tution 1551 or statute 1552 from enlarging substantive rights. Thus, 
although there is some authority to the contrary,1553 court rules may 
extend the allegedly substantive right to jury trial. 
Even if the courts' rule-making power over procedural matters 
implicitly bars their power over substantive matters, the distinction 
is not always clear. The rule-making power may include "matters 
which, though falling within the uncertain area between substance 
and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either."1554 
The right to jury trial may be rationally classified as proceduraP555 
or substantive. 1556 Thus, court rules may extend the right to jury 
trial, which may lie in the uncertain area between substance and 
procedure. 
Of course, the right to jury trial may be classified as clearly pro-
cedural. As noted above, the legislature has granted the courts 
power to make rules regarding "trials" (jury trial is one mode of 
trial) and unify "practice and procedure in actions at law and suits 
in equity, so as to secure one form of civil action and procedure for 
both."1557 Moreover, the legislature has provided that the rule-
making power be "liberally construed. "1558 Of course, the rules 
force or effect after such rules have taken effect. 
[d. 
1551. See MD. CaNST., art. IV, § 18(a). Article IV provides: 
[d. 
The Court of Appeals from time to time shall adopt rules and regu-
lations concerning the practice and procedure in and the adminis-
tration of the appellate courts and in the other courts of this State, 
which shall have the force of law until rescinded, changed or modi-
fied by the Court of Appeals or otherwise by law. The power of 
courts other than the Court of Appeals to make rules of practice 
and procedure, or administrative rules, shall be subject to the rules 
and regulations adopted by the Court of Appeals or otherwise by 
law. 
1552. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUO. PROC. § 1-201 (a) (1995). 
1553. See supra note 1549 and accompanying text. 
1554. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965). The Supreme Court held that 
the manner of service of process in a federal diversity case was governed by 
the FEDERAL RULES. See id. The federal rule-makers are expressly prohibited 
from enlarging substantive rights. See id. at 471-73. A fortiori, the state rule-
makers, who are not expressly prohibited from enlarging substantive rights, 
see supra notes 1551-1552 and accompanying text, may have power over mat-
ters in the uncertain area between substance and procedure. 
1555. See supra note 1545 and accompanying text. 
1556. See supra note 1549 and accompanying text. 
1557. Supra note 1544. 
1558. See supra note 1544 and accompanying text. 
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themselves provide for election, withdrawal of election, and waiver 
of the right to jury trial,1559 for preservation of the right, a jury of 
six persons, and no advisory verdict by a jury; 1560 moreover, the rules 
provide for jury challenges. 1561 Federal practice also supports the 
conclusion that the right to jury trial in this context is procedural 
and, thus, may be extended by court rules. 1562 
Even if the right to jury trial is classified as substantive, court 
procedural rules may extend the right. As noted above, state rule-
makers have not been expressly prohibited from extending the jury 
right. 1563 State procedural rules govern a number of areas which 
might be characterized as substantive. One commentator notes that 
the rules, based on express or implied constitutional authority, in-
clude topics such as admission to the bar, attorney discipline, code 
of professional responsibility, judicial discipline, judicial code of eth-
ics, client security fund, attorney's fees, and evidence.1564 Other pro-
visions of the rules relate to res judicata 1565 and privileges from dis-
covery.1566 Thus, court rules may extend the right to jury trial even if 
it is substantive. 
1559. See MD. RULE 2-325. 
1560. See MD. RULE 2-511. 
1561. See MD. RULE 2-512. 
1562. The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1984), formerly provided that. 
"[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right and 
shall preserve the right of trial by jury as at common law and as declared by 
the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution." Cf supra note 1550 (current 
version of the Act). The Act formerly mentioned "substantive right" and 
"the right of trial by jury" in separate phrases, as though they were distinct. 
The Act also formerly provided that the "rules shall not abridge, enlarge or 
modify" any substantive right, but provided that the rules shall "preserve" 
the right to trial by jury. In the vertical choice of law context under the re-
gime of Erie RR v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the Supreme Court has 
suggested that the right to jury trial is procedural, not substantive. See Byrd v. 
Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop. Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958); cf. Simler v. Conner, 
372 U.S. 221 (1963) (holding the application of federal law was compelled 
by the Seventh Amendment). The FEDERAL RULES deal with a number of as-
pects of the right to jury trial. See FED. R Crv. P. 38-39, 48. 
1563. See supra notes 1551-52 and accompanying text. But cf. supra note 1549 and 
accompanying text (stating the rules may not enlarge substantive rights). 
1564. See DONNA]' PUGH ET AL .. jUDICIAL RULEMAKING 107-08 (1984). 
1565. See MD. RULE 2-231 (i) (class action); MD. RULE 2-332(c) (plaintiff's failure to 
claim against impleaded third person); MD. RULE 2-506(c) (voluntary dismis-
sal); MD. RULE 2-507 (f) (certain involuntary dismissals). 
1566. See MD. RULE 2402(c), (e) (trial preparation materials and experts). 
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The second question is whether the courts should extend the 
right to trial by jury beyond its constitutional scope. Lynch and 
Bourne are ambivalent on this point, apparently torn between 
rights, 15~7 democracy,1568 and resultsl569 arguments favoring jury trial 
and suitability,1570 efficiency, 1571 and delay1572 arguments opposing 
jury trial. Thus, at one point they state: "It does not appear that the 
Maryland courts would extend the right to trial by jury to actions 
which did not exist at the time of the adoption of the Constitu-
tion. "1573 However, their article recognizes that the right to jury trial 
must be extended to preserve it in the face of various procedural 
developments. 1574 
In addition, in a later discussion of the right to jury trial of le-
gal issues in historically equitable joinder devices, Lynch and 
Bourne conclude that the Maryland Rules have extended the right 
to jury trial. The extension was implicit in the case of the former 
rules which provided that intervention and class actions might be 
used at Law, as well as in Equity.1575 The extension was explicit in 
the case of the former interpleader rule, which permitted the jury 
right to be demanded by other claimants where the stakeholder it-
self asserted a claim to the property. 1576 
Lynch and Bourne's ambivalence is most pointed in their dis-
cussion of the revised interpleader rule. On the one hand, they 
1567. See, e.g., Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 59-60. 
1568. See id. at 49 n.311. 
1569. See id. at 3. 
1570. See id. at 27 n.162, 60. 
1571. See, e.g., id. at 60. 
1572. See, e.g., id. at 63. 
1573. Id. at 36. However, the article cites for that proposition a case which de-
scribed the constitutional right to trial by jury. See id. (citing Impala Platinum 
Ltd. v, Impala Sales (U.S.A.), Inc., 283 Md. 296, 320, 389 A.2d 887, 901 
(1978) ("The constitutional guarantee of a trial by jury extends only to the 
type of cases in which the right of a trial by jury existed at the time of the 
adoption of the Constitution." (quoting Pennsylvania ex rel. Warren, 204 Md. 
467,474, 105 A.2d 488, 491 (1954»). 
1574. See id. at 16, 23, 47 (federal courts); id. at 29-30, 34, 38, 44, 50, 55, 73 (state 
courts); see also NIEMEYER & SCHUE1T, supra note 1, at 204. 
1575. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 73 (citing MD. RULE 208, 209 (1977) 
(repealed 1984». The article also referred to assignment and subrogation in 
that connection. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 73 (citing MD. RULE 
240,243 (1977) (repealed 1984». However, the rules relating to those mat-
ters were based on earlier statutes, 1924 Md. Laws ch. 551 (repealed 1957), 
and 1830 Md. Laws ch. 165 (repealed 1957). 
1576. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 73-74 & nn.457, 465. 
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conclude that there was traditionally no right to jury trial in inter-
pleader,l577 that the former rule provided no general, but only a 
limited, right to jury trial,1578 and that the revised rules could be 
construed as continuing only that limited right. 1579 On the other 
hand, Lynch and Bourne conclude that the revised rules and Mary-
land practice may permit or even require trial of legal issues by a 
jury in traditional equitable proceedings,1580 including 
interpleader. 1581 
With regard to this second question, whether the courts should 
extend the jury right beyond its constitutional scope, the Maryland 
Rules themselves supply a number of answers. Apparently, only two 
rules by themselves extend the· jury right beyond its constitutional 
scope-Maryland Rule 2-221(c) and Maryland Rule 1O-205(b).1582 
Those two rules are good case studies, illustrating the purposes for 
extending the right to jury trial by court rule. 
Although the interpleader jury trial provision, Maryland Rule 2-
221(c), is rather opaque, several purposes may be seen in its allow-
ance of a right to jury trial. Traditionally, equitable interpleader 
("pure" interpleader) was available only at the request of a party 
having no claim to the property, that is, a mere stakeholder. 1583 The 
former Maryland Rules also made interpleader (an action "in the na-
ture of" interpleader) available at the request of a stakeholder who 
had a claim to the property.1584 Those rules gave the other claimants 
a right to demand a jury trial as to the issues raised by the stake-
holder's claim to the property.1585 Presumably, the stakeholder 
1577. See id. at 73-74 & n.465. 
1578. See id. at 74 n.465. 
1579. See id. at 74. 
1580. See id. at 72-73, 74-75. 
1581. See id. at 73, 76. 
1582. Other rules, by making certain equitable devices available at law, implicitly 
extended the right to trial by jury. See supra note 1575 and accompanying 
text. Many of those rules did not themselves extend the right, but they were 
based on earlier statutes. See id; see also MD. RULE BF4043 (1977) (repealed 
1984) . 
1583. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 74 n.465; see also MD. RULE BU71 (c) edi-
tor's note, MD. RULE BU72(b) editor's note (1977) (repealed 1996). 
1584. MD. RULE BU70(a) (1977) (repealed 1996). 
1585. MD. RULE BU73 (1977) (repealed 1996) provided: 
If the original plaintiff asserts a claim to the property deposited 
in court.or a claim adverse to a defendant, the court shall upon re-
quest by a defendant for trial by jury filed not later than fifteen 
days after the passage of the decree of interpleader, either 
(a) transfer the action to a law court pursuant to Rule 515 
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waived any right to jury trial by initiating the equitable interpleader 
action. 1586 Although the former interpleader jury rule contains no 
explanatory note,1587 the rule-makers apparently extended the jury 
right to actions "in the nature of"1588 interpleader in order to pre-
serve the right in the face of expanding Equity jurisdiction over 
those actions. 1589 
The present interpleader jury provision, Maryland Rule 2-
221 (c), provides: "A demand for jury trial as to those issues that are 
triable of right by a jury shall be filed not later than 15 days after 
the entry of the order of interpleader or such other time as the 
court may specify in the order of interpleader." 1590 The rule does 
not appear to provide for a right to jury trial; the rule only appears 
to provide for the timing of the demand for jury trial. 
However, commentators have concluded that the rule does ex-
tend the right to jury trial. Lynch and Bourne believe that the rule, 
like the former rule,1591 should be construed to extend the jury 
right only to the other claimants as to the issues raised by the stake-
holder's claim to the property in an action "in the nature of" inter-
pleader. 1592 Other commentators believe that the rule also extends 
the right to jury trial to claimants as to common-law issues among 
the claimants themselves in "pure" interpleader cases, stakeholders 
as to common-law issues raised by their claims to property in actions 
"in the nature of" interpleader, and claimants as to common-law is-
sues among the claimants themselves in actions "in the nature of" 
interpleader.1593 There is some support for this broader view of the 
Id. 
(Transfer of Action From Law to Equity and Vice Versa); or 
(b) order that the claim asserted by the plaintiff be tried sepa-
rately in a law court pursuant to Rule 501 (Separate Issue or Claim) 
and Rule 515 (Transfer of Action From Law to Equity and Vice 
Versa), and the court may make such further order relating to the 
sequence of the trial of the interpleader action and the issue to be 
tried before a jury as justice may require. 
1586. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 73-74 n.465. 
1587. CJ. MD. RULE BU71(c) explanatory note (1977) (repealed 1996) (providing 
verification that there is no collusion between the plaintiff and any defend-
ant is a safeguard against efforts to avoid trial by jury). 
1588. See infra note 1593 and accompanying text. 
1589. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 74 n.465; if. id. at 31, 73-74 (discussing 
Allender v. Ghingher, 170 Md. 156, 183 A. 610 (1936». 
1590. MD. RULE 2-221 (c). 
1591. See supra note 1585 and accompanying text. 
1592. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 5, at 74. 
1593. See NIEMEYER & SCHUETT, supra note 1, at 138-40. 
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right to jury trial in the rule's source reference to federal prac-
tice,1594 which takes a broader view. 1595 
Another commentary suggests that the interpleader jury provi-
sion was added in part to call attention to the right to jury trial, 
which otherwise might be overlooked. 1596 Thus, the apparent pur-
pose of this first rule, the interpleader jury trial provision, was to ex-
tend, or at least to preserve, the jury right in the face of expanding 
Equity jurisdiction over actions "in the nature of' interpleader. 
The second case study illustrating the purposes for extending 
the right to jury trial by court rule is the guardianship jury trial pro-
vision. While the current provision, Maryland Rule 1O-205(b), has 
only a modest right to jury trial, the former provision, Maryland 
Rule R77 (b) (1),1597 significantly extended the right to jury trial. The 
purposes of the former rule were stated by the rule's draftsmen. 1598 
The current guardianship provisions of the Maryland Rules pro-
vide for the adjudication of a person's disability,1599 the appointment 
of a guardian of the person,l600 and the termination of the guardi-
anship on the ground that the disability has ceased. 1601 The rules 
provide for trial by jury of the existence of the disability1602 when 
the person is incapacitated because of "mental disability, disease, 
1594. See MD. RULE 2-221. Source reference states that MD. RULE 2-221(a), describ-
ing the right to interpleader, is derived from FED. R CIV. P. 22(1) as well as 
from the former MARYLAND RULES. Although only the source reference to 
MD. RULE 2-221 (a) refers to the FEDERAL RULES, two commentators conclude 
that "the remainder of the rule adopts a practice that is sufficiently similar 
to the federal practice that the federal cases will be useful for interpretative 
guidelines." NIEMEYER & SCHUElT, supra note 1, at 136. Of course, a source 
reference is not part of the rules. See MD. RULE 1-201(e). However, the 
source reference was adopted by the court of appeals. See 11:9 Md. Reg. 5-21 
(April 27, 1984). 
1595. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 3, at 307, 313-15, 329-38; Bourne & Lynch, 
supra note 5, at 20-29, 74-76. 
1596. See Commentary, supra note 1389, at 735; see also Minutes of Rules cOmmittee, 15 
(Md. May 11-12, 1979) (comments of Mr. Sykes); Minutes of Style Subcommittee 
of Rules Committee, 3 (Md. Jan. 23, 1980); cf.MD. RULE B11 committee note 
(1977) (repealed 1993) (providing that the right to jury trial was included in 
rules regarding appeals from administrative agencies in order to make clear 
that the right had not been overlooked), quoted in supra note 1549. 
1597. See MD. RULE R77 (b) (1) (1995) (repealed 1996). 
1598. See infra note 1616 and accompanying text. 
1599. See MD. RULE 10-205(b). 
1600. See id. 10-108(a). 
1601. See id. 10-209(c). 
1602. See id. 10-205 (b). 
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habitual drunkenness, or addiction to drugs .... "1603 The other mat-
ters-the appointment of a guardian and the cessation of the disa-
bility-are to be determined by a judge. 1604 
The former guardianship provisions of the Maryland Rules had 
a significantly broader right to jury trial. Those rules provided for 
jury trial of the incapacities mentioned in the current rules plus in-
capacities from physical disability, senility, or other mental weak-
ness. 1605 The former rules also provided for a right to jury trial on 
the cessation of the disability.1606 
The former guardianship provisions of the Maryland Rules sig-
nificantly extended the right to jury trial. Before those rules, a right 
to jury trial existed in the case of adjudications of some disabilities, 
but not others. A statutory right to jury trial existed in adjudications 
of both mental disability1607 and its cessation. 1608 A statutory right to 
jury trial existed in adjudications of habitual drunkenness or addic-
tion to drugs. l609 Apparently, there was neither a statutory provision 
for adjudication of cessation of disability from habitual drunkenness 
or addiction to drugs nor a statutory right to jury trial in such 
proceedings. 
While statutes provide for adjudications of physical disability, 
senility or other mental weakness, and disease,1610 such adjudications 
are to be made by a court of Equity,1611 not by a jury. As noted 
above, the former guardianship rules provided for a right to jury 
trial in adjudications of all such disabilities and their cessation. 1612 
The right was not provided for by statute; statutory rights have ei-
ther been repealed 1613 or they never existed. There is also some au-
thority that such adjudications, being special proceedings, not com-
1603. Id. 10-103 (b). 
1604. See id. 10-108(a), -209(c). 
1605. See id. R70(b) (1995) (repealed 1996). 
1606. See id. R80(a)(3) (incorporating MD. RULE R77 (1995) (repealed 1996». 
1607. See 1947 Md. Laws ch. 751, § 124A (repealed 1969). The term, "mental disa-
bility" in the rules is equivalent to the terms "lunatic" and "non compos men-
tis" in the statutes. See MD. RULE R70 explanatory note (1963) (repealed 
1996), quoted in infra text accompanying note 1616; see also MD. CODE ANN., 
EST. & TRUSTS tit. 13, introductory note (1974). 
1608. See 1947 Md. Laws ch. 751, § 134 (repealed 1969). 
1609. See 1953 Md. Laws ch. 528 (repealed 1969). 
1610. See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §§ 13-201 (c), -704 (1991 & Supp. 1996). 
1611. See id. § 13-704. 
1612. See supra notes 1605-06 and accompanying text. 
1613. See supra notes 1608-10; if. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-704 (1991) 
("court" direction). 
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mon-Iaw actions, are not within the constitutional guarantee of a 
jury trial. 1614 Apparently, the draftsmen of an earlier version of Title 
10 justified extending the right to jury trial by court rule as a part 
of a general codification of disability procedures. The draftsmen 
stated: 
In the interest of simplification and standardization of pro-
cedure these rules purport to pull together all statutory pro-
visions relating to incompetency, whether arising from ac-
tual mental disability (the traditional non compos mentis) or 
from other causes rendering a person incompetent to care 
for himself or his affairs, such as infancy, habitual drunken-
ness or narcotic addiction. The jurisdiction of the equity 
courts over such persons and their affairs is basically the 
same, and the problem is fundamentally alike in every case. 
The result, however, marks a substantial change in proce-
dure in many instances, in the interest of standardization 
and also in the interest of due process. The result is in-
tended to fit into the pattern approved by the Court of Ap-
peals in Matter of Easton, 214 Md. 176, 133 A. (2d) 441. 1615 
1614. See In re Easton, 214 Md. 176, 189-91, 133 A.2d 441, 449-50 (1957). For the 
following reasons, Easton may not be good authority for the broad proposi-
tion stated in the text. First, that case dealt with a lunacy adjudication involv-
ing a guardian of property, where there was no statutory right to jury trial, 
not a guardian of the person, where there was a statutory right to jury trial. 
The distinction continued in R77(b)(l) (1995) (repealed 1996). The distinc-
tion is continued in the current guardianship rules. See MD. RULE 1O-205(b); 
see also id. 10-103(b). Second, Easton appeared to recognize that there was a 
traditional right to jury trial of adjudications of lunacy involving a guardian 
of the person. See Easton, 214 Md. 176, 180, 133 A.2d 441,444. But see Beck v. 
Beck, 236 Md. 261, 265, 203 A.2d 900, 902 (1964). That traditional right 
should be received or preserved under MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS arts. 5, 
23. There appeared to be no such traditional right to jury trial in disability 
cases not involving lunacy. Third, even if lunacy guardianship proceedings 
were in Equity, where there was no constitutional right to a jury trial, con-
current jurisdiction may have existed as to certain lunacy proceedings in 
common-law courts, where there was such a right. See Tomlinson v. Devore, 1 
Gill 345, 34849 (1843). 
1615. MD. RULE R70(b) explanatory note (1963) (repealed 1996). The justification 
for extending the right to jury trial was apparent, not express, because the 
note spoke of procedure in general terms only. It did not expressly mention 
the right to jury trial. At the time of the note, the former rules extended the 
jury right beyond its statutory scope, only to adjudications of cessation of ha-
bitual drunkenness or addiction to drugs. See id. R70(b), R77 (b) (1) (1963) 
(revised 1970). Later, the former guardianship rules extended the jury right 
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The extension of the right to jury trial by court rule served the pur-
poses of standardization and due process. Standardization was 
served because the jury trial is the uniform method for determining 
the existence and cessation of a disability where guardianship of the 
person was sought. 1616 
Due process1617 was served in two ways by the rule's extension 
of the right to jury trial. First, the jury trial is an aspect of procedu-
ral fairness that has been recognized since the Magna Carta. 1618 Sec-
ond, due process limits discrimination against those similarly situ-
ated. 1619 In other words, if some persons were accorded jury trials in 
to adjudications of physical disability, senility or other mental weakness, and 
disease, and to their cessation. See id. R70(b), R77 (b) (1) (1970) (repealed 
1996). Presumably, the justification for the further extension of the jury 
right is the same as the justification for the extension of the right by the 
draftsmen of the note. While notes to the rules are not part of the rules, see 
id. 1-201 (e), the notes were adopted by the court of appeals as a part of a re-
port and are an aid to interpretation of the rules. See generally Alexander v. 
Tingle, 181 Md. 464,468, 30 A.2d 737, 739 (1943). 
1616. But cJ. MD. RULE 10-205(a) (providing no jury right exists in guardianship 
proceedings relating to minors); id. 10-304 (providing no jury right exists in 
adjudications of disability where the appointment of a guardian for property 
only is sought). In some disability cases, where the right to jury trial exists, it 
may be waived, either by the disabled person, or by that person's attorney. 
See id. 10-205(b). Also, even in cases tried by a jury, the court will itself deter-
mine some issues. See supra note 1604 and accompanying text. 
1617. Of course, the current guardianship rules promote due process in a number 
of ways unrelated to the right to jury trial. See, e.g., MD. RULE 10-105, -203 
(specifying requirements of notice); id. 10-205 (establishing hearing proce-
dures). 
1618. See Magna Carta ch. 39 (pairing "judgment of his peers," which came to 
mean jury trial, with "law of the land," which came to mean due process, as 
limitations on sovereign power); SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 6-7; MD. CONST., 
DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 24. Compare McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543-
50 (1971) (holding that there is no right to jury trial, as an element of due 
process, in juvenile delinquency proceedings), with Developments in the Law-
Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1190, 1294-95 (1974) 
·(stating that whether the right to jury trial, as an element of due process, ex-
ists in commitment proceedings has not yet been determined). But cJ. Br-
inge v. Collins, 274 Md. 338, 344-45, 335 A.2d 670, 674-75 (1975) (holding 
that the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial is not made applicable 
against the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
1619. The concept of equal protection is implicit in the Due Process Clause of the 
MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 24. See Attorney Gen. v. Waldron, 289 Md. 
704-05,426 A.2d 929,940-41 (1981); see also Celanese Corp. v. Davis, 186 Md. 
463, 471-73, 47 A.2d 379, 383-84 (1946) (assuming equal protection is im-
plied in the Maryland Due Process Clause). 
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disability proceedings, so should others. 1620 The fonner guardianship 
jury trial provision, therefore, extended the jury right in order to 
serve the purposes of standardization and due process. 
Accordingly, Maryland's protective approach to the right to jury 
trial may be preserved in a number of ways: by the legislature and 
people through constitutional amendment, by the legislature 
through statute, and by the courts through cases and court rules. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The merger of Law and Equity in Maryland in 1984 called for a 
re-evaluation of the constitutional right to trial by jury under the 
new procedures. Lynch and Bourne, in a 1984 law review article 
and in a 1993 book chapter, re-evaluate the right. I believe that 
Lynch and Bourne try to "pickle," not preserve, the jury right. Both 
their principled discretionary theory1621 and their applied approxi-
mation of pre-merger approach1622 restrict the jury right. Both their 
theory and their application largely ignore the crucial constitutional 
aspect of the jury right. 1623 Instead, both their theory, by leaving the 
jury right generally to the discretion of judges, and their applica-
tion, by deferring largely to pre-merger judicial precedents, overem-
phasize the judicial role in determining whether there is to be a 
jury trial. Lynch and Bourne apparently restrict the jury right be-
cause they believe it is inefficient1624 and inferior as a mode of 
trial. 1625 I have criticized those reasons for restricting the jury right, 
both on their own tenns1626 and for being contrary to the Maryland 
Constitution. 1627 
Rhetorically, I believe Lynch and Bourne have picked expedi-
ence (the "efficiency" of trial to judge) over law (the constitutional 
right to trial by jury). I believe they have approved rule by elites 
Uudges exercising their discretion and applying pre-merger judicial 
1620. See supra note 1615 and accompanying text. But if. Dorsey v. Solomon, 435 F. 
Supp. 725, 734-35 (D. Md. 1977) (finding that equal protection was notvio-
lated, even though jury trial was granted in guardianship proceedings, but 
was not granted in proceedings to confine persons acquitted of crimes be-
cause of insanity), modified, 604 F.2d 271 (4th Cir. 1979). 
1621. See supra notes 10-13, 475-1124 and accompanying text. 
1622. See supra notes 1125-1514 and accompanying text. 
1623. See supra notes 15-452 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 7-9 and ac-
companying text. 
1624. See supra notes 867-954 and accompanying text. 
1625. See supra notes 956-1124 and accompanying text. 
1626. See supra notes 971-1139 and accompanying text. 
1627. See supra notes 920-955, and accompanying text. 
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precedents) rather than democratic government (one limited by the 
constitutional check of a jury drawn from the people). 
To "preserve" the jury right, Maryland should follow the fed-
eral protective approach under the Beacon line of cases,1628 as it has 
in the Higgins line of cases. 1629 Of course, through constitutional 
amendment,1630 constitutional interpretation,1631 legislative act,1632 
and court rule,1633 Maryland's approach to the jury right has been 
even more protective than the federal approach. 
1628. See supra notes 189-205 and accompanying text. 
1629. See supra notes 194, 197 and accompanying text. 
1630. See supra notes 1527-1530 and accompanying text. 
1631. See supra notes 223-27, 1539-1540 and accompanying text. 
1632. See supra notes 1531-1538 and accompanying text. 
1633. See supra notes 154148 and accompanying text. 
